Indigenous Rights and Claims for Freedom in Settler States

Resumen

Scholars such as Joyce Green and James Tully advance that Indigenous peoples, in settler states like Canada, are engaged in an ongoing, centuries-old struggle for freedom. Rights are an important instrument for securing and protecting freedom. However, a survey of the scholarship on freedom reveals a significant degree of contestation surrounding the nature and scope of this very basic human interest. In this paper, I examine three different conceptions of freedom with a view of assessing these conceptions’ suitability as a cornerstone of Indigenous rights. Specifically, I analyze a liberal conception of freedom (i.e. Isaiah Berlin’s work on negative liberty), a republican conception (i.e. Philip Pettit’s work on liberty as non-domination) and an Indigenous conception (i.e. John Borrows’ work on liberty as mobility). The purpose of this analysis is twofold. First, I aim to outline the types of rights and duties underpinned by each conception of freedom. Second, I aim to make the case that the liberal and republican conceptions are unsatisfactory, while Borrows’ conception shows some genuine promise, assuming the goal is to advance a set of rights and duties that would be useful in the Indigenous struggle for freedom.