


## Wealth and Nations:

“ Every time I  
return to Catalonia I am  
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situation there  
and in Québec. ”



**T**

HE FIRST TIME I arrived in Barcelona was almost a decade ago on May Day 1978. On that day, the first legal international workers' holiday since the defeat of the Republic nearly forty years earlier brought almost a million people into the streets. Political posters covered almost every visible

surface, sometimes brazenly occupying billboards; in the spaces between the various calls to mobilization you could glimpse remnants of automobile or toothpaste ads. Barcelona's broad boulevards were invisible beneath the miles of demonstrators; trade unions, political parties, women's rights groups, neighborhood associations, and even a new gay group carried banners bearing the narrow red and gold Catalan stripes. Slogans were in Catalan. Catalonia's national language had been banned by Franco at the end of the Civil War and even in the years preceding his death in 1975 it was tolerated in only the most limited of circumstances. Demands for national self-determination and social progress were thus poignantly intertwined that day in a manner that underscored all that had been suppressed by the fascists. But for me, they could not help but resonate with another situation that was

far more familiar: the national movement in Québec. Of course, this May Day demonstration was larger than anything I had ever seen in Montreal where demonstrations were already gargantuan compared to the rest of Canada. But looking at its composition and enthusiasm, listening to the participants articulate concerns around self-determination, language rights, and almost palpably feeling their sense of national community, it would have been difficult not to have been reminded of the outstanding issues of the day back home. It would be outrageous to compare the historical relations between Canada and Québec to the impact on Spain and Catalonia of the Franco regime, not to mention the horrific war that led to his victory. But there can be no denying that the respective conjunctures initiated by Franco's death on the one hand and the electoral victory of the Parti Québécois on the other forced the central states in question to confront anew and with unmistakable urgency the character of the relationships they wished to maintain with their most formidable national minorities. (In Spain, it should be immediately stated, Catalonia shares this status with Euzkadi, the Basque country). Each conjuncture was born with immense possibilities.

In the intervening years, I have returned to Catalonia only to be struck again by the same feelings of kinship between the situation there and in Québec. But now, the comparisons suggested by visits in the late 70s and early 80s have been reinforced by recent scholarly interest in the dynamics that characterize national communities within developed states. The very possibility for such interest has depended on the emergence of unstable situations in several western countries previously regarded as fully formed "nation-states." While Québec now appears to be a prime example of this phenomenon, modern nationalism emerged there in the 1960s before many comparable situations were volatile. At that time, the discourse appropriated by many Québécois intellectuals to explain the character of national oppression and formulate their own role in ending it was drawn largely from the decolonization struggles in Africa and the anti-imperialist campaigns of Cuba and Vietnam. But with the gradual abandonment of this paradigm generated in the Third World, comparative models that see Québec sharing a problematic with other minority nations of the developed world are receiving more attention. What is so intriguing about looking comparatively at Québec and Catalonia -- and so suggestive for understanding the motor forces of national consciousness -- is that today's national concerns are similar despite radically divergent economic and political histories.

# Modern Nationalism in Quebec and Catalonia

Robert Schwartzwald



*By the time* Samuel de Champlain established his *Habitation* at Québec in 1608, Catalonia had already known several centuries of highly sophisticated constitutional government, one which many historians consider to have been the most advanced in medieval Europe. The strong bonds that joined the Kingdom of Catalonia's four provinces did not disappear when it entered a confederation with the Kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia. Nor did the subsequent unification of the crowns of Aragon and Castille in 1478-79 produce such a result. On the contrary, feelings of distinctiveness tended to strengthen as Catalans found themselves forced to bail out what they perceived as an impossibly mismanaged central state in the period following the colonial conquests in the Americas. An indigenous capitalist class had long made Catalonia among the wealthiest regions of the Iberian peninsula, most often the wealthiest, and in periods of deep crisis the region emerged as the "saviour of Spain." The high level of industrialization, especially in textiles, and the thriving principal port, Barcelona, consistently attracted immigrant work forces from the rest of Spain as well as from underdeveloped southern France. The various urban, rural, commercial, and industrial interests found expression in a representative assembly, the Generalitat. This continuing measure of self-government was the price Catalonia had successfully exacted from the Spanish crown in recognition of its

economic importance. It was suppressed, however, after the Catalans were abandoned by their British commercial allies in the Spanish War of Succession. When Britain signed the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713-14, it also spelled the end to formal constitutional identity for Catalonia. This would not be recovered until the 1930s, when the Spanish Republic accepted an autonomy statute presented to it by a revived Generalitat and massively approved by the Catalan people. General Franco, of course, suppressed the statute along with all Catalan institutions following his final victory in the Civil War. Since his death in 1975, however, the Generalitat has been legalized, an Autonomy Statute negotiated, and the Catalan language been granted "co-officiality" in Catalonia along with Castilian. But while this sounds like a happy ending, the current status of these gains is highly problematic. To see how it is that long-cherished aspirations may turn sour just as they seem to be within reach, a telling example may be invoked from the unlikely sphere of urban planning.

One way the new sense of possibility after Franco's death manifested itself in Catalonia was through an energetic program for renewing many of the urban spaces of this highly industrialized region. The level of municipal services has traditionally been higher in Catalonia than in most other parts of Spain due to indigenous wealth and a sense of communal solidarity. Yet, industry has been allowed to develop under the Franco regime in a way that flaunted these standards. Horrible air and water pollution and a lack of urban green space were some of the more obvious results. But since the restoration of democracy, the Catalan Architects' Association, whose building sports a Picasso mural, has led a discussion about urban space through publications, colloquia, and exhibitions. This has already led to some great urban projects, including the extension of Barcelona's famed Ramblas into an esplanade that will rehabilitate the city's old port. Many of the houses and buildings in the turn-of-the-century *modernismo* style identified by most non-Catalans with the architect Antonio Gaudi have undergone cleaning and restoration, while other new urban projects celebrate Catalan artists that have won international recognition. There is a breathtaking new monument to Picasso designed by the modernist artist Antoni Tapies. A giant glass cube, continuously obscured by flowing water, sits provocatively on a broad boulevard adjacent to the *beaux-arts* pavilions of the 1888 Universal

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Exposition. Inside the cube, various mementos of the prosperous but smug era when the youthful Picasso lived in Barcelona are thrown together; turn-of-the-century furniture, a piano and other sundry objects are shrouded by banners bearing iconoclastic slogans taken from the artist's cubist and surrealist writings. The monument brilliantly amplifies Picasso's own challenge to the incipient provincialism of the city. At the same time, it is clearly an expression of Catalan pride. The project deftly proclaims its participation in current aesthetic debates without sacrificing its specific cultural referentiality. Not only must the universal be brought to bear critically on the particular, it seems to say, but this is possible in Barcelona because the city and its culture have always been intimately involved with these universal issues. Across town near a bull-ring, an equally exuberant if somewhat provocative monument may be found: a sprawling new park of palm trees, concrete, and covered walkways surrounds a ceramic phallic tower by Joan Miró that is topped off with a characteristic crescent moon.

And yet it was only three years ago, as I stood with a friend in the refurbished beaux-arts splendour of the Plaza Real, that he sighed as he said in Castilian, "*Barcelona no es lo que era,*" or, "Barcelona isn't what it used to be." For years, Barcelona's seedy port life, with its transvestites, prostitutes and sailors on the make, had most graphically set itself against the cautious ambiance of Madrid. Located deep in the interior of the Iberian peninsula and under the vigilant eye of the reactionary central government, Madrid was "protected" from such unsavoury influences. But with the changes that have taken place in Spanish political life, Barcelona and Catalonia as whole have lost the self-assurance of being the one part of Spain in touch with outside developments. In truth, Madrid has stolen not a little of Barcelona's thunder. It has come into its own as a cultural and intellectual metropolis; and from outside it has been lionized as the capital city of a country that has successfully made the peaceful transition to democracy. Word had it at the time that Madrid had come so far that its left-wing mayor had even declared "*una semana del erotismo*"! All the differences between the seedy old times and the technocratic new ones could be grasped at once in this proclamation.

The fact is that the democratic governments in place since the death of Franco continue the centralist practices that privilege the "national" capital, but now in the name of modernity instead of tradition. The Cortes -- the Spanish parliament -- still has final control over the funds available to the Generalitat, a poignant reminder that the two capitals are hardly on equal footing. And recently, the central government has shown its determination to assume a



leading role among the Spanish, i.e. Castilian-speaking nations of the world. The combined impact of these policies is to encourage the feeling that Barcelona is somehow less international, more provincial than in the past, and that Catalonia as a whole is a recalcitrant society grasping at narrow ethnic interests. To those familiar with the thrust of "official" pan-Canadian nationalism as elaborated in the Trudeau years, this syndrome will not seem strange. The liberal government effectively prevented a meeting of the world's francophone nations for years because it was determined that Québec should have no independent international presence at such a meeting. At the same time, it adopted a relentlessly demeaning attitude toward all expressions of Québécois national aspirations. This attitude reflected a state-centric position that viewed Québec nationalism as a fundamental disruption to its own project. In this way, it had a logic of its own and was not merely reactive. Whether or not minority nations actively pursue their national goals, they are never "let alone;" the status of their relation to the central state is always vectorial, never stable. In this context, the question of winning or losing the initiative becomes all the more crucial.

What seemed to be happening in Catalonia in 1984 reminded me of the frustration many felt in Québec, particularly in Montreal, where the Parti Québécois government was accused of over-organizing the cultural sphere. Like in Québec, the Catalan government's increasing preoccupation with the symbolic seemed to be a defensive response to setbacks in the field of constitutional change. For although national independence was never the issue in Catalonia, the original formulation of the autonomy demand was much stronger than what was eventually secured. Like in Québec, popular mobilizations were

taken in hand by government agencies and transformed into an abundance of neighborhood, municipal, and regional "popular festivals." Expressions of "authenticity" that often spilled over into the sentimental and folkloric were common. New public art erected in village squares paid homage to various aspects of popular and traditional culture -- Catalan national dances, for example. Flanking these populist gestures were official government reports on the future of Catalan cultural and educational institutions such as museums, theatres, and universities. And in an uncanny way, even the economic importance of the Catalan *caixas*, or credit unions, and their immense intervention into cultural life brought to mind that of their Québec counterparts, the *caisses populaires*. Both institutions pride themselves on their expressed concern for the welfare of the popular layers of society and are regarded in turn with trust and familiarity.

Under other circumstances, especially if the autonomy process had proceeded well, this mixture of populist and high cultural concerns might have been lived unself-consciously and regarded as "normal." Unfortunately, ten years of unsatisfactory negotiations and compromises with Madrid had produced considerable demoralization. Although Catalans have historically seen themselves as embracing the new, one could sense for the first time a nagging doubt about the possibility of articulating modernity and nationhood now that the official nationalism of the central state claimed to be the legitimate barrier of that mantle.



*Catalonia's historical disputes* with Madrid over an acceptable level of autonomy produced a situation diametrically opposed to that in Canada, where Québécois have always compensated for economic marginalisation through an exaggerated presence in functionary positions. A fateful example of this proclivity was Pierre Trudeau's own call for so-called "French Power" in Ottawa, a programme which independentist intellectuals viewed as a cynical and diversionary attempt to extend this tendency to the federal level. In Spain, the geographic concentration of the Catalan bourgeoisie and its historical failure to make alliances with other Iberian capitalists left it relatively isolated against the hostility of the centralist government in Madrid. And so, by early in this century, according to political economist Lluís Domenach i Montaner, "the region with the most distinct characteristics from the other Iberias; the one whose language is spoken in a quarter or fifth of Spain; which in the same proportion contributes to the costs of the state; the most advanced, richest, and best related to other civilized countries is scarcely represented in the government of the state." Even toward the end of the Franco regime, none of Spain's senior judges came from Barcelona and only 4% of the divisional chiefs within Spanish ministerial departments came from the city, as opposed to 21% from Madrid.

Indeed, the Catalan situation demonstrates that national aspirations cannot be explained away as a compensatory response to economic underdevelopment. In fact, modern nationalism in Catalonia emerged despite the clout of the Catalan bourgeoisie and in response to its continuing failure to secure the kinds of political arrangements with Madrid that would adequately meet demands for self-determination. Instead, it has been the intelligentsia,

especially the literary and artistic community, that has forged alliances with popular layers to prove the mainstay of Catalan national aspirations. Its commitment to this cause has historically differed from the tactical nationalism of the Catalan *haute-bourgeoisie* who have more than once relied upon the repressive apparatus of the state to quell labour unrest within their factories. Well into this century, the central state has excluded the intelligentsia from its institutions and regarded their linguistic and cultural heritage with enmity. This accounts for the particularly tenacious attention of the intellectuals to Catalan national demands. There is good reason for this, as Régis Debray points out in his book dedicated to the "scribe," particularly those involved in writing, teaching or publishing in the national language:

*The labour of universalization which is that of the intellectual is always tied to a concrete situation in which the stakes are the very possibilities to express and communicate. To conceptualize the intellectual, it is necessary to conceptualize the history of which he is a product. There is no intellectual in and of himself, just as there is neither a State in general or a universal subject.*

Following the abrogation of the liberal Cadiz constitution of 1812, the nationalism of Catalan intelligentsia cloaked itself in the romantic doctrines of the enduring relationships of land, people, and language. Students of traditional Québec nationalism will note that "faith" is not among these relationships. In nineteenth century Catalonia, the Church was not a key guardian of national institutions as in Québec, although elements of it were later to distinguish themselves by resisting the

Franco regime and supporting secular demands for autonomy. In fact, the outlawed Generalitat met under the shelter of the Benedictines of Montserrat, the famous abbey and pilgrimage centre overlooking Barcelona.

In Québec, hostile observers have always pointed to the preponderant role played by clerics in articulating nationalist sentiment. It is not uncommon for these same critics to contend that only the outward garb has changed between the messianism of yesterday's nationalists and the secular discourse heard in the modern independence movement. After the defeat of the May 1980 referendum, Pierre Trudeau gleefully boasted that these unrepentant demagogues had ultimately failed in their attempt to manipulate the population. It was as if the intervening twenty years of profound social and cultural changes, characterized in Québec by often intense alliances between teachers, writers, and the general public, had never taken place. In a multi-signature letter to the Montreal daily *Le Devoir* in December 1980, Québec's nationalist artists and intellectuals took issue with Trudeau's argument and gave Debray's general observation a more immediately compelling interpretation. They argued that "whether one calls Québec a national, a people, or a society, [*Québec français*] remains the site from which Québec's intellectuals and artists begin to create. *Québec français* is both the subject and interlocutor of their creation. The erosion of this territory directly compromises their existence and creativity."

Today, the first genuinely broad demonstration of political passion in Québec since the defeat of the referendum concerns protecting the integrity of the Charter of the French Language: "*Ne touchez pas à la Loi 101!*" proclaim the banners hanging from many of Montreal's ubiquitous balconies. Once again the question of language rights has come to the foreground in underscoring the continuing presence of the "national question." Likewise in Catalonia, where the Socialists swept to victory in the first Catalan elections based on a programme that convincingly combined socialist and nationalist demands, linguistic issues figured prominently among the latter. As Catalan sociolinguist Francesc Vallerdó explains in *The Linguistic Conflict in Catalonia*, "Language is the most visible sign of a national community: in addition to carrying through its socially integrating function as a medium of communication, it is the expression of a culture, not understood as a static and homogeneous product, but as a heterogeneous, multiform, and dynamic project. While taking tradition as its point of departure, it embraces the cultural concerns and aspirations of men and women of today."

**In both Québec and Catalonia, the current situation suggests little respite for those who feel that there are specific national communities worth defending.**



These same words could have, and in effect have been written many times over by proponents of linguistic reform in Québec over the past twenty-five years. Indeed, language and linguistic policy are today areas of common concern in Québec and in Catalonia -- a society where the economic goals of today's Québécois nationalists were long ago superseded. The process of linguistic normalization in Catalonia was initiated by the restored Generalitat and the election of the first post-Franco assembly of Catalonia in 1977. The exceptionally long duration of the dictatorship did much to accentuate the process of linguistic erosion and substitution there. In the years following the Civil War, the once burgeoning Catalan publishing industry was all but shut down, children were taught exclusively in Castilian, and the mass media developed solely in the language of the central state. The enormous waves of immigration to Catalonia from non-Catalan regions also contributed to the proportional reduction of the number of Catalan speakers. According to a study conducted just before the demise of the dictatorship in 1975, approximately 84% of the residents claimed to understand Catalan, only 68% said they could speak it, and a mere 11% claimed they could write it. Obviously, these figures are far more serious than any comparable ones for Québec in the same period. Yet the basic problems associated with protecting the status of the language are familiar: establishing its daily primacy in the public sphere, teaching the language to both native speakers and immigrants, reversing the trend toward seeing it as a socially inferior "dialect" through controls exercised over public institutions and the mass media, and resolving terminological problems that enable the respective languages to meet current needs.

One of the first acts of the Generalitat was to establish the *Direcció General de Política Lingüística* under the supervision of the Department of Culture. The parallels between the work carried out by the various agencies of the DGPL and those of the *Office de la langue française* in Québec are striking. In fact, the DGPL's White Paper makes prominent mention of the contacts between its representatives and those of the OLF. In September 1982, meetings were held which were described as having been "extremely valuable for the orientation of the activities of the Service." "The General Director," says the report, "maintains intense contact with the directors of all organisms in Québec which undertake tasks related to linguistic policy and scientific work on language: members of the autonomous [sic] government, deputies, directors of the *Office de la langue française*, of the *Conseil de la langue française*, the *Commission de surveillance* which oversees the current application of Bill 101... the Toponymic commission, the Centre for the Study of Bilingualism at Université Laval, and the Centre for Linguistic Studies at Radio-Canada."

In Canada, the excellent terminological work done by the OLF is generally unrecognized, and so notorious was its *Commission de surveillance* under the PQ government that most Canadians likely think that the OLF itself was created by the independentist party to police Bill 101. In reality, the OLF is a product of Jean Lesage's Liberal government of the early 1960s. By taking a longer view, it is clear that the real emphasis has been placed on improving the quality of the language used in public, from government through to advertisers. The difference, of course, is that in the early days the strategy of the OLF was to morally exhort the Québécois to speak "better" French. These highly normative campaigns have never really been abandoned, but under the PQ, the OLF became the state's major interventional arm in creating conditions that legally enforce and socially valorize the use of French. In the process, the French language has been made to appear more "necessary" to immigrant groups, although many still need to be convinced.

In the case of Catalonia, the two major preoccupations confronting the DGPL are "co-officiality" and integrating immigrants. These problems are roughly equivalent to those of bilingualism and immigrant integration faced in Québec, although the responses generated differ somewhat. Both the official and "unofficial" language campaigns in Catalonia look familiar enough to anyone who has lived through the last decade in Québec. Against the spontaneous background of street signs with the Castilian ("Spanish") painted out, there is the ubiquitousness of government advertising promoting the Catalan language. A little girl, Norma (as in "norm"), appears everywhere instructing citizens on the correct use of the language. Today, just about half the Catalan work force is composed of immigrants. Surveys show, however, that these workers have traditionally held positive attitudes toward learning Catalan and accepting it as the official language. Both economic and social factors have induced them to develop these attitudes. Catalan authorities are nevertheless conscious of the need to nurture this good faith, especially during the recent years of economic crisis. In this regard, Vallverdu's assessment of the situation is probably quite representative of the "realist" position: "While it is not possible to complete the process of Catalanisation with expedient measures, it is neither possible to simply allow things to take their "natural" course...It is not a matter of hoping for "bilingualisation" of Catalonia where the two languages would be interchangeable, but rather for the Catalanisation for our society following the only road that is viable today: the mutual respect of inhabitants...A more radical linguistic policy -- which would be possible -- would perhaps lead more quickly to the normalization of Catalan, but its social cost would be incalculable and put into danger the reconstruction of Catalonia in the process."

In the light of these general guidelines, the Catalan authorities concluded that a universal policy regarding Catalanisation would be both unrealistic and unproductive. Integration of immigrants takes place fairly easily in rural areas, while the industrial areas of Barcelona and other towns present a far greater challenge. Thus different policies, objectives, campaigns, and time frames were set for different parts of Catalonia.

As for the Spanish government's interpretation of linguistic "co-officiality," the stress is predictably not on the development or the presence of Catalan, but rather the rights of non-Catalan speakers to continue using Castilian in all public situations. The policy of the central government is seen by many as doing little more than upholding the linguistic status quo rather than cooperating in the process of reestablishing Catalan. The criticisms levelled against "co-officiality" recall those made in Québec about official Canadian bilingualism. The reversals that have accumulated with regard to Bill 101 -- largely through the provisions of the new Canadian constitution and its reinforcement by the Supreme Court -- show to what extent the language issue is a significant barometer for measuring the central state's willingness to redefine its relationship to minority national communities. Here, the attitudes of the former Liberal federal government -- which bequeathed us the Constitution -- and the social-democratic regime in post-Franco Spain are indeed similar.

In fact, Madrid consistently tends to give legislative proposals emanating from Catalonia the most restrictive interpretations possible under the Autonomy Statutes. Catalans first expressed their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs by blaming their own Socialist parliamentarians who had urged "trust" when dealing with Madrid. While the Statute was ratified by Catalan voters, the significant rate of abstention confirmed that these politicians were seen as compromised; they were held responsible for whittling away Catalonia's bargaining position. In the 1980 elections to the Catalan parliament, the Socialists did poorly and a moderate nationalist coalition was elected. And in the wake of the large number of nationalist deputies sent to the Cortes in the Spanish elections of 1982, negotiations with the newly elected Socialist government of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez became acrimonious on practically every point. Since then the Socialists in Madrid have been charged with banalizing the very notion of autonomy and accepting the policies elaborated by the young technocrats who assured the country's administration in the years following Franco's death. From 1977 until the Socialist victory in 1982, they had formed the governments of Spain through their political party, the Union of the Democratic Centre. In particular, their policy designated fourteen autonomous "communities,"

including Madrid itself! In this way, it evacuated the specificity of the demand for autonomy as it flows historically from distinct national communities such as the Catalans and the Basques. After the failed coup attempt in 1981, the central government bowed to the right wing by stating that the autonomy process had moved too quickly. In consultation with the Socialists, the central government then proposed a "Law for the Organic Harmonization of Autonomies" (LOAPA), which would prohibit one autonomous community from obtaining a right or privilege which is not shared by the others. This formal equality can have disastrous consequences for minority regions. As Louis Sola-Molins has explained in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, "It is not obvious that the Madrileñan autonomous community will want to legislate on the teaching and use of Castilian in its territory with a law comparable to that which the Catalans and the Basques would want in order to safeguard the use of their languages in their territories... In the name of the LOAPA, the central government would intervene to force Bilbao and Barcelona to adapt to Madrid." While recent decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal have curbed some of Madrid's worst excesses, they have also made it clear that attempts to assert the primacy of "regional" languages will not be tolerated.

It is true that the Canadian Constitution accords the provinces rights that far exceed those that presently exist for autonomous regions of Spain. Nevertheless, the extent to which other provinces and the central government itself will be willing to allow any practical consequences to flow from that admission that Québec constitutes a "distinct society" within Confederation -- the current wording of Québec's negotiating position for "signing on" to the new Constitution -- is a wide open question. Many provincial leaders have already declared, *à l'espagnole*, that they consider their own territories to be "distinct societies" too, so they don't see a problem in conceding the wording to Québec. But it is difficult to see how concrete respect for Québec's national rights fits into a scenario of a "commonality of differences." Will the other provinces, for example, be willing to amend a Constitution that defines the language rights of non-francophones in a way that once again could make bilingualism among francophones the *de facto* norm for public jobs in Québec?

**In both Québec and Catalonia**, the current situation suggests that little respite is in store for those who feel that there are specific national communities worth defending. Those Québécois who expected that economic progress would obviate the basis for national demands should look at the history of Catalonia, whose development demonstrates that such a pattern can never be taken for granted. In fact, despite unequal and even diverse patterns of development, the specific national concerns experienced in Québec and Catalonia today are fundamentally similar. To the extent that those concerns are born out of resistance to

operations of delimitation and marginalization on the part of larger central states, their respective responses will have much to learn from each other. At first Catalans may be tempted to look toward Canada for glimpses of a more generous federal system and Québécois toward Spain for a peek at the successes of a minority national bourgeoisie. But in the long run I would suspect they would do better looking at each other, learning from their respective interrelations with their central states. Thus they may plan the political and cultural forms of intervention that will make their collective futures viable.

#### Reading List

I am indebted to Oriol Pi-Sunyer and Susan M. DiGiacomo of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, whose recent articles have proven invaluable in understanding contemporary developments in Catalonia. I would be happy to provide a bibliography on request. The following monographs are recommended as further reading:

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#### Some important dates in modern Catalan History :

- 1931 - Draft proposal of Statute of Autonomy approved by referendum in Catalonia.
- 1932 - Statute of Autonomy proclaimed in Madrid by the Cortes of the Second Spanish Republic. Reestablishment of Generalitat for first time since 1714.
- 1938 - General Franco enters Catalonia. Abrogation of the Statute of Autonomy.
- 1939 - Defeat of the Republic.
- 1975 - Death of Franco. Juan Carlos becomes King of Spain.
- 1977 - Spanish parliamentary elections. Socialists win a clear majority in Catalonia. Among their demands, "*català, idioma oficial*" (Catalan, the official language). In Spain as a whole, the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) wins the most seats.
- 1978 - Adoption of new Spanish constitution.
- 1979 - Referendum on Statute of Autonomy. 88.1% of voting Catalans approve it, but abstention rate is 40.4%
- 1980 - Elections to Catalan parliament. Socialists lose to nationalist parties. 37.9% of voters abstain.
- 1981 - Attempted military coup. Members of Cortes held hostage.
- 1981-1982 - UCD government begins private consultations with Spanish Socialists over "LOAPA," an organic law to "harmonize" the autonomy process.
- 1982 - Spanish elections. Government formed by Socialist Party under Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez. First Minister of Territorial Administration a lawyer involved in drafting LOAPA project.
- 1984 - Nationalist Convergencia party wins majority of seats in new elections to Catalan parliament. A stronger performance than in 1980. As of today the Socialists continue to govern in Madrid.

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