

# INTRODUCTION

By December 1942, when these Bulletins begin, the tide of World War II was beginning to turn against the Axis powers. The United States had been a combatant for a year, and the USSR for a year and a half. In Europe, the British and the Americans were beginning to assert mastery of the skies over the Nazi-occupied continent. In North Africa, General Montgomery had just defeated Field Marshall Rommell in the great desert battle of El Alamein; within a few months the Allies would be landing in Sicily to begin a thrust at Hitler's 'soft underbelly' in Italy. In the Soviet Union, the Nazi advance had been halted, and the catastrophic German defeat at Stalingrad was about to unfold. In the Pacific, the ultimately decisive naval battle of Midway had halted the Japanese advance westward in the spring, and the Americans were driving the Japanese from Guadalcanal through December and January. For Canadians, the dark days of early 1940 when Canada stood at Britain's side against a triumphant Hitler straining at the English Channel were history, replaced by a confidence that in the now globalized struggle the Allies held the ultimately winning hand.

Confidence in final victory abroad did not of course obscure the terrible costs, material and human, which were still to be exacted. World War II was a total war, in a way in which no earlier conflict could match. The 1914-1918 war took a worse toll of Canada's soldiers, but what was most chilling about the 1939-45 struggle was to the degree to which civilian non-combatants were targeted by the awesomely lethal technology of death. Canadians were of course immune from direct Axis attack from the skies, but this did not diminish the definition of the war as one not of army against army but of people against people, which finally culminated in the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, but was already prefigured in the Nazi extermination camps and the Allied firebombings of German cities like Hamburg and Dresden. In a war of people against people, all resources — economic, social, political, human — were to be mobilized. Such a war could only be justified in terms of ideology, a 'battle for the minds of men' as the phrase went. 1914-1918 had been seen as a

struggle between nationalities, a clash of competing patriotisms. 1939-45 was this as well, but it was also patriotism marching under the ideological banners of Fascism, Communism, and Democracy.

In this kind of war, there were always two fronts: one where armies clashed, and a second at home. The home front was where the battle for war production had to be won, where civilian morale and enthusiasm was to be maintained and defeatism crushed, where enemy espionage, sabotage and subversion were to be countered. The spectre of the 'Fifth Column' — the enemy's agents within our gates — had been vividly impressed on Canadian minds in 1940, but it never entirely disappeared, even as optimism grew of eventual Allied victory. Posters in public places warned Canadians of the dangers of 'loose lips' sinking ships, of the spies and saboteurs in their midst ready to pounce upon any weakness or misplaced confidence. Government employment was greatly swelled by wartime activity, and tens of thousands of employees were subjected to fingerprinting and security screening. The press was censored, as were the mails. Organizations were banned as subversive, and some Canadians were seized by the state and interned as potential enemies of the war effort based on their ethnicity, or their ideological associations. The ultimate culmination was the involuntary removal of the Japanese-Canadian population of the west coast to camps in the interior, along with the confiscation and disposal of much of their property.

Complaints voiced by minorities about the conduct of the state in invading and curtailing the rights of private citizens and associations were generally met with indifference or active hostility on the part of the agencies of the state and by the press and those powerful majority groups who identified wholeheartedly with a 'total' war effort. Civil libertarians, as few and far between as they were in wartime Canada, worried about the totalitarianizing effect of a total war against totalitarianism. While it would be ludicrous to compare the home front with the war front in terms of the costs in human liberty (or indeed to compare the Canadian home front with those in Germany, Japan or Soviet Russia), the war did have brutalizing effects on the fabric of liberty and civility in Canadian society. The RCMP did not initiate these policies, but they were charged with carrying out surveillance for the state in pursuit of security and mobilization of loyalty. They acted in many cases as the cutting edge of state repression and their activities in this role must be assessed in the wider context of a total war.

One new wartime role for the RCMP about which the *Bulletins* remain entirely silent — or at least remain silent after the CSIS censors have applied their scissors — was counter-intelligence. Intelligence and counter-intelligence were primary elements of the military struggle. There was for instance the celebrated 'Double Cross' system whereby *Abwehr* [German

military intelligence] spies were detected and 'turned', to the extent that British counter-intelligence, in the words of one British participant, 'actively ran and controlled the German espionage system in [Britain]'.<sup>1</sup> The Double Cross system had its attractions for the Mounties, who tried their hand at it — with disappointing results.

In November 1942 an *Abwehr* agent was landed by U-boat in Quebec. Detected almost immediately and arrested by the RCMP, the agent confessed and agreed to become a double agent. In an operation codenamed *Watchdog*, the Mounties set themselves up in business with a transmitter beamed to Hamburg. The officer in charge, Clifford Harvison (later a Commissioner of the force after the war), was so pleased that he sent off the transcripts of his interrogation of the German agent to London. Unfortunately for the Mounties' self-esteem, the MI5 team quickly concluded that the information disclosed about German operations was worthless. Although the recently published official history of British security and counter-intelligence during the war is somewhat cryptic on this point, noting only that *Watchdog* proved 'truculent' and 'difficult to handle' and had eventually to be interned in Britain,<sup>2</sup> two Canadian historians quote one of the MI5 men as recalling that *Watchdog* had clearly 'made a monkey out of Harvison'. The RCMP had to call upon the British to help them out, and soon Cyril Mills, an MI5 officer experienced in the Double Cross system, flew to Canada to take over the case. Mills apparently discovered later that *Watchdog* had secretly informed his German masters of his capture, but that the RCMP had not detected this.<sup>3</sup> Harvison himself had to take his putative double agent to Britain for detention, after which he remained for a number of months undergoing basic training in counter-intelligence from MI5. Harvison's own memoirs gloss over this less than exemplary story.<sup>4</sup> Nor were two other German agents landed in Canada successfully converted to Allied use. The 'only successful double-cross operation in Canada' was entirely fictitious — an invention of MI5 (appropriately codenamed *Moonbeam*!) was 'notionally' transferred to Canada to the evident enthusiasm of the gullible *Abwehr*.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>J.C. Masterman, *The Double Cross System* (London 1973), xii.

<sup>2</sup>F.H. Hinsley and C.A.G. Simkins, *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, v.4: *Security and Counter-Intelligence* (London 1990), 228.

<sup>3</sup>J.L. Granatstein and David Stafford, *Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost* (Toronto 1990), 26-8.

<sup>4</sup>C.W. Harvison, *The Horsemen* (Toronto 1967), esp. 105-21.

<sup>5</sup>Hinsley & Simkins, *Security*, 228. The RCMP's own correspondence re *Moonbeam* seems to have convinced the RCMP historians that he actually existed: Carl Betke and S.W. Horrall, 'Canada's Security Service: an historical outline, 1864-1966' (RCMP Historical Section 1978), obtained under Access to Information from CSIS Files, 117-90-107, 568, n. 28.

There was another instance of foreign espionage in which Canadians showed greater finesse. A Spanish press officer had been detected in pro-German espionage activity by MI6. The same official later turned up in North America where he attempted to organize another spy network among Spanish journalists and diplomats on behalf of Japan. Presumably he would have been flagged by MI6 for observation. According to one source, 'this network was abandoned when a Canadian counter-intelligence officer caught them encoding information for transmission'.<sup>6</sup> This is apparently a reference to an incident in 1943. The Spanish Consul General in Vancouver, Senor Fernando de Kobbe, was deported for spying on behalf of the Japanese. The RCMP and FBI had intercepted cash payments and detailed instruction for the Consul and had acquired evidence that he was using the Spanish diplomatic pouch to send his replies.

The Consul was quietly returned to Spain. Evidence of the spying was then passed to the British to be used against Spain. As Norman Robertson of External Affairs noted in a memorandum to the Prime Minister, the information would allow the Allies 'to put the screws to Franco. In the present phase of the European political situation, the threat of exposure of Spanish collusion with the Axis may be a very useful lever in securing further concession from Spain, or if this course seems more desirable, (it) could be used to discredit the present dictatorial regime entirely.'<sup>7</sup> External Affairs officer Tommy Stone (who specialized in intelligence matters) added a note that 'the implied threat of a most disagreeable public scandal might result in a general clean-up of the anti-United Nations activities in the Spanish foreign service.'<sup>8</sup>

In the case of the Spanish Consul, it was External Affairs which guided the RCMP to an appropriate way of handling counter-espionage. *Watchdog* suggested that on their own the Mounties were not especially competent. If the Mounties flunked their entry test into the spying big leagues, this was hardly surprising. Nothing in their background as a prairie police force chasing down horse thieves and controlling Saturday night drunks had prepared them for the delicate and complex world of international espionage. Just after the end of World War II, one of the biggest international espionage cases in the world erupted in Ottawa with the defection of Igor Gouzenko. Gouzenko's evidence indicated that throughout the latter

<sup>6</sup>Phillip Knightley, *Philby, KGB Masterspy* (London 1988), 104, citing 'Spanish diplomat admits spying in US and London', *The Times*, 21 Sept 1978. See also Hinsley & Simkins, *Security*, 107-9, 161; and Philby, *My Silent War* (London 1968), 35-6.

<sup>7</sup>National Archives of Canada (NAC), William Lyon Mackenzie King Papers, Correspondence, v.272, p.187002, N.A. Robertson to Mackenzie King, 3 Nov 1943.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p.187010, T.A. Stone, 22 January 1944.

war years there had been extensive espionage organized from the Soviet Embassy involving a number of Canadians in positions of trust within the government itself. None of this had been detected by the Mounties until Gouzenko fell so astonishingly into their laps.<sup>9</sup> Of course, the discovery of *Soviet* spying, linked to Canadian Communism, was much more to the Mounties' ideological taste than finding agents of the Third Reich. They might not have caught any Communist spies on their own, but they could certainly attest to the fact that they had never wavered in their determination to warn Canadians against the dangers of Communism.

The *Watchdog* fiasco did have one important implication for the RCMP's role in the world of intelligence. The arrival of Cyril Mills from MI5 proved to be a important step in the tightening linkage of the RCMP to the British and American counter-intelligence network. Mills stayed on in Ottawa for the duration of the war and was employed as MI5's point man in liaison with Washington, to which he made frequent trips.

There is a rather complicated background to the growing continental connection in wartime security and intelligence, involving two competing players in Washington (J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, and 'Wild Bill' Donovan who fashioned the OSS, America's first civilian intelligence agency to operate abroad), as well as William Stephenson, the Canadian whose BSC (British Security Coordination) was the initial point of contact between the British government and the Americans on North American intelligence matters. In 1941, Donovan wanted to become coordinator of information in the western hemisphere, working with the State Department, the BSC, and the Canadians. Agreement in principle was reached on stationing Donovan's representatives at 'certain key points' in Canada so as to facilitate access to vital information. Hoover was brought in to talk about liaison with RCMP. Donovan recommended a joint intelligence committee of representatives from the departments of State, War, Navy, Justice, his own Office for Coordination of Information, and Canada's department of External Affairs, to be located in Washington. Its 'primary concern' was the defence of the USA. Hoover was outraged and was able to obtain a presidential directive on 29 December 1941 that re-affirmed the responsibility of the FBI to operate its Special Intelligence Service in Canada, Mexico, and Latin America, but also directed all other intelligence agencies to clear 'any intelligence work' in these areas with the FBI. Hoover was authorized and instructed to convene meetings of the various

<sup>9</sup>There is no mention of Gouzenko in these *Bulletins*, since his defection and the subsequent publicity surrounding the case postdated the war. In a volume of *Bulletins* covering the latter half of the 1940s, to be published later in this series, readers will see that the security service took extensive note of the implications of Gouzenko.

hemispheric intelligence agencies to work in this area. Hoover could not tolerate Stephenson; with his bureaucratic triumph over Donovan on jurisdiction in the Western hemisphere, the BSC's days were numbered.<sup>10</sup> The BSC under the direction of Stephenson continued to carry out certain duties, especially vetting, on behalf of MI5 in the United States, but Mills was the major official contact with J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI on counter-espionage matters.<sup>11</sup>

The RCMP had been developing closer intelligence contacts of their own with the FBI since the late 1930s. Now that Canada was at war, international co-operation deepened. Hoover visited Ottawa in late 1940, more than a year before America was drawn into the conflict, and conferred with the RCMP director of criminal intelligence. The agenda was 'almost entirely devoted to security tasks' including espionage; Nazi fifth columnists operating out of the US with designs on Canada; the reliability of Japanese residents; subversive American organizations; and 'what to do about hundreds of Canadian and thousands of American passports known

<sup>10</sup>Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: a History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Frederick, Md. 1981), 111-19; the bitter relationship between Donovan and Hoover is detailed in Athan G. Theoharis & John Stuart Cox, *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition* (Philadelphia 1988), 188-91.

<sup>11</sup>Hinsley & Simkins, *Security*, 187. This official history, published in 1990, primarily avoids naming Mills, although his identity had already been disclosed in Nigel West, *A Matter of Trust: MI5, 1945-72* (London 1982), 26. He is also referred to by name in Granatstein & Stafford, *Spy Wars*.

BSC vetting did not always prove adequate. Physicist Bruno Pontecorvo was passed by the BSC for Canadian work on nuclear energy: see Margaret Gowing, *Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952*, v.2 (London 1974), 151. In fact the British director of the 'Tube Alloys' [i.e., atomic research] project reported to his assistant that the BSC had provided an 'unusually enthusiastic report' on Pontecorvo: Robert Bothwell, *Nucleus: the History of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.* (Toronto 1988), 30. Unfortunately for the RCMP and for MI5, who both took BSC clearance as adequate, Pontecorvo defected to the Soviet Union in 1950. After his disappearance, the FBI said they had passed information to the BSC in 1943 indicating that Communist literature had been found in his house in the United States, but it was impossible to check this because the wartime organisation had been disbanded. On the other hand, the highly security-conscious US General Leslie Groves (in charge of the Manhattan Project) complained in 1945 about 'foreigners' working on the Canadian project and insisted that they either take on citizenship or leave. Pontecorvo assumed citizenship and stayed; Groves pronounced himself 'pleased': Bothwell, 78. In any event, Pontecorvo did have Communist relatives and associations in his native Italy, a point that could have been readily verified had anyone followed up.

to be in the hands of Moscow'.<sup>12</sup> After Pearl Harbour, more official liaison was established, but squarely within the triangular Atlantic relationship.

Before his organization was marginalized at Hoover's insistence, Sir William Stephenson drew upon RCMP assistance, particularly the temporary loan of personnel, including the head of the Records Branch seconded as a 'filing expert'. Another expert who left the RCMP to take up a permanent post with the BSC in the spring of 1941 was Superintendent Ernest W. Bavin, an intelligence officer. Bavin's departure was smoothed by the fact that Bavin had been experiencing 'some friction' in his working relationship with Commissioner S.T. Wood. The Mountie historians point out that in his new position, Bavin 'discovered and communicated to the Force material of interest in BSC files'.<sup>13</sup>

Bavin also accompanied an MI5 mission to Canada in the summer of 1941 that reviewed security controls in effect for the Dominion. The mission was not impressed with what it saw, and made a number of recommendations to beef up standards. Sir Winston Churchill's personal intelligence adviser informed the British prime minister that security in Canada was 'terrible' (Halifax, he was assured, was a 'hotbed of German spies'). At his urging, Churchill sent a special exhortation on the subject to Mackenzie King. Although all of the measures recommended were not put into effect, enough were that the BSC eventually concluded that the Canadian internal security situation had been improved 'beyond measure'.<sup>14</sup>

These arrangements not only emphasised the relative importance of Canada within developing Anglo-American intelligence co-operation, but helped give the RCMP a window looking onto the wider world. For example, the Mounties sent representation to a Western Hemisphere Intelligence Conference in August, 1942. This international dimension was to become highly important in the handling of the Gouzenko affair in 1945-46; although Cyril Mills had by this time returned to London, his place in liaison was taken by Peter Dwyer, an MI6 officer stationed in Washington, who later came to Ottawa as the leading civilian official co-ordinating Canadian security intelligence and counter-espionage operations in the 1950s.

<sup>12</sup>Betke and Horrall, *History*, 521-2.

<sup>13</sup>Betke and Horrall, *History*, 529-31.

<sup>14</sup>David Stafford, 'The American-British-Canadian triangle: British Security Co-ordination 1940-1945', Paper presented to the International Studies Association Conference, London, March 1989, 33. Stafford points out that Stephenson had wanted a branch office of the BSC established in Ottawa to co-ordinate Canadian security, but that this, not surprisingly, was vetoed by Ottawa.

The RCMP's emerging role in counter-espionage was thus cast very much in a dependent, if not subordinate, relationship to its senior partners in Washington and London. The experience of the war years helped set a pattern which has remained more or less familiar ever since. In one area only, that of signals intelligence, did Canada develop an effective external intelligence capacity. The Examination Unit (an organization entirely separate from the RCMP) intercepted and decrypted enemy communications traffic.<sup>15</sup> But in this or in its subsequent guise as the postwar Communications Branch, National Research Council, and later yet as the Communications Security Establishment, Canadian signals intelligence has been effectively framed within the context of junior partner status to Britain and, especially, the USA.<sup>16</sup>

Despite its new role in counterintelligence, the police mentality was still very strong among the 'horsemen'. According to the official historians of the security service, the Mounties who were assigned field investigations in security intelligence at the outset of the war, 'still saw themselves as primarily policemen, not intelligence officers.' Indeed, most found the work 'boring', and lacking in 'glamour or glory' or clear prospects of career advancement in a paramilitary police force. Some tried to get transferred out, including Leonard Higgit, later a director of the security service, and even the celebrated John Leopold (the undercover star of the 1931 legal assault on the Communist party).<sup>17</sup> This was not perhaps promising material out of which to fashion an effective counter-intelligence force. Yet Leopold became in effect the nucleus of a branch which gradually expanded both its personnel and its responsibilities throughout the war.

In early 1940 the branch headquarters in Ottawa was comprised of three officers, five non-commissioned officers, eight constables and three special constables, along with civilian support staff. Regional divisions had their own intelligence sections, ranging from up to 20 in large centers down to much smaller numbers elsewhere. The number of agents run by these officers mainly within Communist and fascist groups is still considered classified information, although the RCMP historians note that they were 'operating reasonably evenly throughout Canada'. In early 1941, on the eve of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the size of the headquarters branch

<sup>15</sup>Wesley K. Wark, 'Cryptographic innocence: the origins of signals intelligence in Canada in the second world war', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 22 (1987), 639-65; Granatstein & Stafford, *Spy Wars*, 28-46.

<sup>16</sup>Jeffrey T. Richelson & Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries* (Boston 1985); James Littleton, *Target Nation: Canada and the Western Intelligence Network* (Toronto 1986).

<sup>17</sup>Betke & Horrall, *History*, 480-1. Leopold's request to be discharged with pension so that he could offer his services to the British was refused.

had mushroomed to 79 (although still only 3 officers, including the indefatigable Leopold). There were now no less than 12 functional divisions. Linguistic capabilities had expanded to encompass 24 languages. By early 1942, with the war now expanded to Asia as well as the USSR, the intelligence section at headquarters weighed in at just under 100 (including 29 stenographers and two clerks), double what it had been in early 1940. Thereafter, numbers declined as did the number of specialists although experts in 'Communism' and 'subversives' remained on the rolls. 'The chief internal organizational effect of the war was thus to increase Intelligence Section staff to the point at which it forced precise definition of Intelligence Section duties and personnel in the Divisions as well as at Headquarters.'<sup>18</sup>

The external bureaucratic environment within which the Mounties operated also changed during the war. On 10 November 1942, a Joint Intelligence Committee was formed, made up of the directors of intelligence from the three military services; the RCMP and the department of External Affairs were added as 'associate members'. Something along these lines had been strongly recommended by the British and by Sir William Stephenson. 'Occasional friction' had been present between the Mounties and Army intelligence, over what the Mounties saw as Army intrusion into domestic subversion and sabotage matters. The JIC provided a forum for smoothing out differences in interpretation of jurisdictions. It should be noted that after the war, a Security Panel was established with a secretariat housed in the Privy Council Office, which provided an expanded mechanism for coordination of security policy and administration in peacetime. The JIC was a forerunner of a new direction in the establishment of a permanent national security state.<sup>19</sup>

So far as the RCMP itself was concerned, the burden of its war effort lay where its own interest had always rested most comfortably: the protection of domestic security against the threat of subversion from alien ideological movements, especially from the left. Here the Mounties found themselves at somewhat of a disadvantage during the later war years. Despite the attraction of greatly increased resources, and the advantages of special emergency powers and the suspension of civil liberties protection which sometimes impeded their peacetime operations, they came up against the unnerving reality that after June 1941, the Soviet Union had become a fighting ally and the Communists vociferous proponents of a patriotic common front for winning the war. Throughout the period covered by these *Bulletins*, the familiar reference points which had guided the

<sup>18</sup>Betke & Horrall, *History*, 512-17.

<sup>19</sup>Betke & Horrall, *History*, 518-19.

security service from its founding through the years of the Great Depression seemed to have gone somewhat askew. In this context, the force found itself playing a role not only as a police and security agency carrying out orders from the government of the day, but as a lobby from within the state advocating a certain policy line which was not always intrinsically popular with its masters. To advance its own policy preferences, the RCMP sometimes had to strike alliances with certain forces outside the federal government. Part of the story of the RCMP's role during the latter war years is how it arrived at its own style of bureaucratic politics, and how well it performed in the bureaucratic in-fighting characteristic of Ottawa.

The main point of policy contention was the status of the Communist party. A legal party at the war's outset, the party had been declared an unlawful association under the Defence of Canada Regulations. The Nazi invasion of the USSR created a new political situation of which some people within the government, including Lester Pearson, believed Ottawa should take advantage. If the Communists had been suddenly converted from opponents into advocates of the war, Pearson suggested, Ottawa should not allow its natural contempt for such hypocrisy to cloud its judgement. Why not use the Communists as allies of convenience, especially where they could be of particular use — as in trade unions where they had begun demanding no-strike pledges under a win-the-war-first philosophy?<sup>20</sup> Although certain observers have claimed to have detected a strain of fellow-travelling naiveté in the officials who argued in this manner,<sup>21</sup> the Ottawa mandarins were under no illusions whatever regarding the nature of the Stalinist state but were pragmatic realists who wished to take advantage of whatever opportunities presented themselves to push the war effort through to a successful conclusion.

The RCMP, however, had quite a different perspective on the question. As was shown in the earlier volume of these *Bulletins*, the change in status of the Soviet Union did not convince the RCMP that any change was indicated in their longstanding attitude toward the Communists.<sup>22</sup> By December 1942, when this volume opens, the *Bulletin* is editorializing about the lies and hypocrisy of the Communists, and justifying the continuing ban on the party [15 December 1943]. By August 1944, they greeted the news of the dissolution of the Comintern with the assertion (no doubt

<sup>20</sup>King papers, Memoranda and Notes series, Pearson to Norman Robertson, 12 October 1941.

<sup>21</sup>The most extreme variant of this revisionism is James Barros' speculation that 'Lester Pearson was Moscow's ultimate mole' [*No Sense of Evil: Espionage, the Case of Herbert Norman* (Toronto 1986), 169]. About the political literacy of such a judgment, perhaps the less said the better.

<sup>22</sup>*RCMP Security Bulletins: the War Series, 1939-1941* (St. John's 1989), 371-424.

quite correct, it should be pointed out) that this meant absolutely nothing for the international reach of the Soviet Union through the agency of local Communist parties [1 August 1944]. Given these strongly held views, it is hardly surprising that the force opposed the public campaign in 1942 and after to legalize the Communist party as a friendly gesture toward our Soviet ally, a campaign which eventuated in a parliamentary committee recommendation to lift the ban. The ban was never lifted by the cabinet. An examination of the pressures swirling around the government on this issue indicates that the RCMP found very crucial political allies in the form of King's Quebec ministers and his Quebec caucus, backed by the passionately anti-Communist Catholic church, and the pro-business right-wing of the cabinet led by C.D. Howe.<sup>23</sup> The Mounties thus showed that they could successfully play bureaucratic politics on an issue that really mattered to them. The fact that the Communists continued to operate under the guise of the Labour Progressive party and indeed under that name elected their first (and last) MP in the person of Fred Rose (later convicted of Soviet espionage) might seem to indicate that the anti-Communist victory was a hollow one. But to the RCMP it was important that no overt legitimacy be granted the Communists, and the official ban on the party did give the Mounties a useful lever with which to control their public, if not their clandestine, activities.

Through 1944 and 1945, the Mounties continued a keen interest in the activities of Communist fronts, especially left-wing ethnic organizations, but also in civic associations within the mainstream of Canadian life which they believed to be unduly influenced by Communism. They were sometimes not very careful about painting people Red or Pink who were associated with such alleged fronts. For instance, their discussion of the National Council for Canadian-Soviet Friendship [1 February 1945, 223-31] contains the names of many persons who were probably never influenced by Communism at all. Similarly the description of the McGill University Labour Club (1 November 1945, 427-31) assumes that every member must have been a Communist or dupe of the Communists. Alert readers might spot the name of a future minister in the Quebec Liberal government of the early 1970s. He seems to have suffered no smears drawn on his youthful political activity. Noting these apparent suggestions of guilt by association in the *Bulletins*, one is grateful that McCarthyism never achieved the success in Canada it enjoyed in the United States, and relieved that the RCMP never threw up a J. Edgar Hoover who could carefully feed congressional witchhunters from his secret police files. The RCMP files

<sup>23</sup>Whitaker, 'Official repression of Communism during World War II', *Labour/le Travail*, 17 (1986), 149-52.

did remain secret. Despite posturing by certain opposition parliamentarians during the latter half of the 1940s about an alleged official coverup of left-wing security risks, the Mounties seem to have kept their hands, and their files, relatively clean.<sup>24</sup>

Nor were the Mounties unable to make distinctions between varieties of left-wing opinion. The social democratic left in Canadian politics, represented by the CCF in politics and by pro-CCF trade unionists in the labour field, is generally treated throughout these Bulletins as essentially a moderate bulwark against the Reds, although a constant target for infiltration by the Communists. For example, in the August 1945 (343-4) number an editorial from the social democratic *Canadian Forum* magazine is reprinted approvingly.

In October 1945, the Bulletin warns about labour militancy as a Communist tactic (397-8), but follows this editorial up with a cautionary item about how a Nova Scotia company had tried unsuccessfully (because it had failed to follow proper channels) to use the Mounties against strikers (407-8). Just because the Communists tried to use labour for their ends did not make the Mounties indiscriminately anti-labour, as such. It is interesting to note that when the Intelligence Branch reported formally to the Director of Criminal Investigations on an annual basis on the past year's activities, the largest amount of space was always devoted to an inventory of strikes and labour disturbances under the rubric of 'industrial unrest'. Yet specific reports on strikes most often concluded with an indication that the strikers had comported themselves in a peaceful and orderly fashion. Occasionally the activity of politically dangerous agitators was noted, but given the rigorous structure of wartime controls these usually concluded with indications of successful criminal action taken against the offending persons by local police or even by the RCMP itself.<sup>25</sup> Although labour unions, or at least strikes, were a preoccupation of the Intelligence Branch, they were not an obsession.

Occasionally, the preoccupation with the left was balanced with some equivalent concerns about fascism, especially if it was directly linked to the Nazi enemy. The Mounties kept a watchful eye on Otto Strasser, a former high Nazi official who was organizing an anti-Nazi 'Free German

<sup>24</sup>Passing secret information on Canadians to the Americans, either via State Department diplomats resident in Canada, or directly to the FBI in Washington was another matter. In the Cold War atmosphere of the late 1940s and early 1950s, occasional public notoriety was achieved when Canadians were barred from entry to the US based on information obviously passed by the RCMP to the US authorities.

<sup>25</sup>These internal reports, part of a process that eventually would result in a public Annual Report, have been obtained for the war years from CSIS under the Access to Information Act, with surprisingly few deletions, (CSIS, Access No. 117-91-11).

Movement' from a Canadian address. In May 1945, looking to Germany's imminent defeat, the Bulletin offers an interesting description of how SS personnel can be identified (278-80). After the war, the RCMP tended to take a hard line against the admission to Canada of former SS men, while Canadian bureaucrats and politicians and British and American intelligence agencies were busily circumventing their efforts.<sup>26</sup>

With regard to the 'enemy alien' populations in Canada itself, the registration of which had become an RCMP responsibility earlier in the war, their internal counsel tended to be rather low key. By early 1942, internments of Germans and Italians judged dangerous to the war effort had begun to subside and increasing numbers of these internees were being released. The West Coast was, however, another story. The RCMP had investigated the Japanese-Canadian communities of British Columbia and scooped up 57 individuals they believed potentially dangerous shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. A thoroughly war-spooked, not to say racist, population on the coast demanded the removal of the entire Japanese-Canadian community, which the federal government eventually effected. This massive operation, the forcible transfer of tens of thousands of persons to camps in the interior, and the disposal of their property, has of course become a *cause célèbre* in the history of civil liberties and race relations in Canada. More than four decades later, the government of Canada offered an official apology to Japanese-Canadians and compensation to the victims of this policy. The RCMP were inevitably involved in the evacuations and in the associated police work, as well as in interning those who actively resisted the policy. Yet it cannot be said that Mountie voices were added to the clamour of those demanding drastic action. On the contrary, the intelligence branch had been extremely cautious and moderate in its judgments about the potential threat of espionage and sabotage posed by the Japanese Canadians. This advice went unheeded by a government which rather lost its head, even though the prime minister later admitted that they never could attribute even a single concrete case of sabotage or espionage to Japanese-Canadians. From this episode, clearly the worst example of repression in the Canadian wartime record, the RCMP escapes with its reputation relatively unscathed.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup>Reg Whitaker, *Double Standard: the Secret History of Canadian Immigration* (Toronto 1987), 102-47. On the circumvention of Canadian controls through foreign intervention there is an excellent but unpublished study for the (Deschênes) Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals: Alti Rodal, 'Nazi War Criminals in Canada: the Historical and Policy Setting from the 1940s to the Present' (September 1986). A partial text has been released under the Access to Information Act.

<sup>27</sup>Recently the RCMP have been blamed for not being sufficiently alarmist, by four historians who have recently adopted a revisionist interpretation of the wartime

The Japanese were not an aberration: the Mounties showed no special hostility to any of the 'enemy alien' groups, as such. The Germans and Italians, as well as those who came from smaller central and eastern European nations allied to the Axis, were generally viewed by the Mounties as largely loyal and law abiding, despite the existence of some pro-Axis elements who could be fairly easily isolated and interned. The Mounties suspected — rightly as it turns out — that so long as the Axis powers seemed to be winning, disloyal sentiments might be harboured by some, but that once the tide of battle turned, the attraction of the enemy regimes in their homelands would wane.<sup>28</sup>

Readers of these Bulletins will note that much attention was paid by the Intelligence Branch to ethnic associations. The reporting on their activities is often quite detailed — reflecting the strength of their sources within these groups — and presents an argument for their republication, since much of the material found in these pages on Canadian ethnic associations has never seen the light of publication before. World War II was a period when the Canadian state attempted to mobilize immigrant groups for the war effort by strengthening the incorporation of 'ethnic' Canadians into fuller Canadian citizenship.<sup>29</sup> In a very limited sense, the earliest origins of the later policy of multiculturalism can be traced to this experience. The attempt was largely abortive, due to the prevalence of the values of traditional Anglo-Saxon superiority, but also because 'security' considerations won out among state officials over more imaginative and accommodative initiatives. The RCMP were charged with the task of maintaining detailed surveillance over political developments in the foreign-language

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encounter between the Canadian state and its Japanese citizens and residents: see Patricia Roy, J.L. Granatstein, Masako Iino and Hiroko Takamura, *Mutual Hostages: Canadians and Japanese During the Second World War* (Toronto 1990), especially 47ff.

That the Mounties lacked credible sources within the Japanese Canadian community was a fact, however, of which the Force itself was uncomfortably aware. In its internal annual report for 1941-2, the Intelligence Branch conceded that surveillance of the community was 'maintained only with difficulty, as due to racial and physical dissimilarities, our sources of contact are limited.' (Report dated 14 April 1942 obtained under Access to information).

<sup>28</sup>This comes out most clearly in the confidential annual reports of the Intelligence Branch. See n. 25, above.

<sup>29</sup>See Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., *On Guard For Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945* (Ottawa 1988), especially the articles by N.F. Dreisziger, 'The rise of a bureaucracy for multiculturalism: the origins of the Nationalities Branch, 1939-1941', 1-30 and Kordan and Luciuk, 'A prescription for nationbuilding: Ukrainian Canadians and the Canadian state, 1939-1945', 85-100.

communities. In the case of the Japanese, RCMP intelligence reports were either (depending on one's point of view) insufficiently knowledgeable or insufficiently alarmist. Their reports on European groups, on the evidence of these pages, were relatively knowledgeable and anything but alarmist. Their report on the Mennonites [1 March 1943, 64-66] is extremely sympathetic, despite the fact that this group's pacifism, along with their non-capitalist concept of property, might have made them offensive to conservative police minds.

A surprising degree of understanding toward European ethnic minorities was crosscut by intense ideological hostility toward pro-Communist ethnic organizations. Although the Mounties have been characterized from time to time (mainly in Quebec) as an instrument of Anglo-Saxon hegemony, it is clear that anti-Communism was far more dominant a strain in the police mind than ethnic prejudice. Indeed, while evidence for the latter is thin, evidence of the former is manifest on almost every page of these Bulletins. While the Mounties could make allowances for, say, nationalist Ukrainians' flirtations from time to time with pro-Hitler sentiments, they would never budge an inch with regard to the pro-Communist Ukrainians, even when the latter became vociferous proponents of the anti-Nazi war effort. Their visceral distaste for the Left Ukrainians is reflected occasionally in downright bizarre characterizations of their motivations. For instance, in the 1 March 1943 number, the complaint of the Ukrainian Labour Farmer Temple Association (banned under the Defence of Canada Regulations) that their property and halls had in some cases been sold by the Custodian of Alien Enemy Property to their 'bitter political enemies', the Ukrainian National Organization (a complaint echoed by a number of respectable civil libertarians in mainstream Canadian society) is dismissed in the following extraordinary fashion: 'The psychological effect upon the...membership through loss their halls to its [*sic*] opposition helps to keep alive the enthusiasm in their organization and produces a state of exuberance [!] so necessary to back their demands to the Government' (56).

Ironically, even if the RCMP was not deeply concerned with the security risks posed by nationalist and conservative ethnic associations, the persistent security risk they identified with left-wing pro-Communist organizations may have queered the pitch for a more participative and accommodative role for all ethnic organizations in the war effort. To the Ottawa bureaucrats preoccupied with winning the war, any evidence of potential disloyalty or subversion was sufficient for general suspicion, especially where fine distinctions between obscure factions speaking foreign languages were called for.

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It was explained in the introduction to the earlier volume covering the 1939-1941 Bulletins that at the end of 1941, the government indicated to the Mounties that they no longer wished to receive the Bulletins for general circulation among cabinet ministers and their staff.<sup>30</sup> How then were these Bulletins used? The May 1945 issue is headed by an editorial (269-70) that indicates precisely how the Intelligence Branch viewed these documents. They were essentially for the benefit of field officers, to keep them abreast of the wider national and international picture of intelligence and to counteract the tendency to become 'localized in viewpoint'. Readers, with historical hindsight of course, may form their own views of how broad a picture was actually being made available. But it is also evident from the complaining tone of the editorial that officers in the field may not always have taken the opportunity the Bulletins offered them. Six months later, another editorial advised Intelligence Branch consumers how to store the Bulletins in Accopress Binders thoughtfully provided for the purpose. An annual index would follow. 'The format is one lending itself to easy compilation as a ready and comprehensive reference fyle.' [1 November 1945, 411].

The war was over, but the Intelligence Branch was not winding down, but gearing up for a new era of more professional security and intelligence work. Although there had been no public notice of the fact yet, Igor Gouzenko had recently defected from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with a sheaf of documents implicating the USSR in espionage. Within a few months — just after this collection of Bulletins halts — the Gouzenko affair would burst upon the world as one of the first incidents in the emergent Cold War with Soviet Communism. The security service could forget the uncomfortable situation of a wartime alliance with Stalin and get down unimpeded to the business that was to consume their attention for almost the next half century: anti-Communism. What we see in these wartime Intelligence Bulletins is the emergence of a surveillance state that would be continued into peacetime, directed against another official enemy. For the Mounties, however, Communism had always been the primary enemy even during a successful war against fascism in which Communism had been an ally, of sorts.

<sup>30</sup>Kealey & Whitaker, *RCMP Security Bulletins: the War Series, 1939-1941* (St. John's 1989), 17-18.

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The preceding volume in this series ended with the 24 December 1941 Bulletin. This volume opens almost a year later with the 15 December 1942 number. Access to Information requests to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to cover the period from the beginning of 1942 through to the end of 1945 were unsuccessful with regard to the January-December 1942 period. While it is clear that Bulletins were produced during this period, CSIS has indicated that its Access section was unable to locate any copies of these missing documents. This appears to constitute an unfortunate gap in the documentary record of security surveillance. No explanation has been adduced for this hiatus. There are apparent gaps for January, April, June and July, 1943, but after this the record seems to be complete until the end of 1945.

The liberal application of exemptions under the Access Act by CSIS to the Bulletins that were recovered is of course another matter. Complaints to the Information Commissioner regarding the extent of the exemptions on documents — that are, after all, nearly a half century old — were unsuccessful. Readers may appreciate the extent of these deletions by the indications we have provided. It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the magnitude of the censorship precludes confident judgments as to the quality of the material gathered by the security service.

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R.W.