

Aping the “American Type”: The Politics of Development in Newfoundland, 1900-1908

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THE ISSUE OF EMIGRATION EXERTED a strong political impact in Newfoundland from the mid-1800s onward. During the 1889 election, the *Evening Telegram*, a supporter of the Liberal opposition, set the tone when it printed day after day a drawing of a tombstone with the inscription: “Sacred to the Memory of 15,000 Newfoundlanders.”¹ Every government thereafter faced criticism over the “exodus” of colonists from their native land. And every government denied responsibility for its occurrence—or even that it had occurred at all—but mostly without success. All the while, political leaders felt enormous pressure to induce economic development to keep people at home. For Robert Bond in particular, the solution lay in reciprocity or free trade with the United States.

En route home from Washington in 1902, where he had negotiated the Bond-Hay Treaty, a reciprocity arrangement, Premier Bond spoke of American economic prowess to the *Montreal Daily Witness*. He also expressed his admiration for the “American type.”

And chiefly he noted (Sir Robert talks charmingly), the tremendous energy of the Americans. When they eat at the public restaurant, they are reading a paper or a magazine; when they enter a street car, they at once begin to read something. They work so hard that you would think they have no time to read. But talk to the average American, and you will find him surprisingly well informed upon all vital questions. He knows the modern world; he is full of resource; he is intellectual, agile, and he works till he drops.²

For the recently knighted Bond, the English-educated son of a wealthy fish merchant, reciprocity with America meant a fuller participation by Newfoundland in the “modern world.” But first the United States Senate would have to ratify his treaty.

Bond knew that commercial interests in the United States, especially in Boston, favoured closer trade links with Newfoundland. The man who eventually championed these interests, Henry Whitney, had already demonstrated how American enterprise could affect colonial development. Now in a complex interplay of international relations and domestic politics, Bond and Whitney became caught up in a protracted struggle to get the Bond-Hay Treaty ratified. When Bond eventually faltered, in the election of 1908, he did so against a political opposition that had capitalized on his preoccupation with reciprocity. It was also an opposition shaped in large part by the considerable development, much of it American-related, that had occurred during his two terms in office.

Bond's identification with reciprocity dated from 1890. As Colonial Secretary in the Whiteway government, he negotiated a free-trade treaty with American Secretary of State James Blaine; but much to his chagrin—and that of many Newfoundlanders—the Imperial government disallowed the Bond-Blaine Convention following a protest from Canada about the colony's unilateral action. Yet Bond refused to abandon his dream. If anything, the troubled 1890s underscored the need to diversify the Newfoundland economy and to lessen its reliance on the sale of salt cod to Brazil, the West Indies, and southern Europe. In the fiscal year 1898-1899, for instance, the colony sent less than 10 percent of its total exports by value to the United States—including just \$100,681 worth of salt cod—while it took from that country about 30 percent of its imports.³ An increase in sales to the American market would provide greater balance; it would also offset a rapidly growing trade with Canada, no small concern for the nationalistic Bond.

For Bond, somewhat paradoxically, nationalism and reciprocity went hand in hand. Presumably, an improved market for Newfoundland products, together with American investment in the colony, would stimulate development. In turn, prosperity would ensure political independence vis-à-vis Canada. A strong anti-Confederation sentiment had stymied late-nineteenth-century attempts to bring the colony into the Dominion—the most notable in 1869.⁴ Bond shared this determination to go it alone under the British umbrella, and by 1900, after several years in opposition, he was once again in a position to pursue his vision.

Early in 1900 Bond became premier during a political crisis precipitated by the Railway Contract. At a critical moment, Edward Morris and several supporters, who had earlier broken with the Liberals to back the Contract, deserted the Winter government and returned to the fold. Their price was that Bond revise the Reid deal, not repeal it. In a late 1900 election fought overwhelmingly on the Contract issue, the Liberals swept back into power with a twenty-eight-seat majority in a House of thirty-six seats.⁵ Bond took the ambitious Morris into his cabinet, but from the start the two had an uneasy alliance. In time, the Premier's drive to get reciprocity implemented would set the stage for Morris' own bid for power.

Initially the Premier moved with caution to fulfill an election promise to seek a renewal of the Bond-Blaine Convention. Only after winning the reluctant consent of Imperial authorities in 1902—London needed colonial cooperation on the French Shore Question—did Bond make his way to Washington to negotiate with Secretary of State John Hay. Encouraged by calls in the United States for general tariff reduction, Hay was accommodating; in short order, the two men signed the Bond-Hay Treaty.⁶ This proved the easy part.

In Newfoundland, the Bond camp had already oversold the treaty. The *Evening Herald*, for example, trumpeted that reciprocity, by opening access to a market of eighty million people, would

bring in its train, cold storage, shipments of fish fresh, new methods of curing fish, the introduction of American capital, and American ideas, and an industrial boom among our fishing population which will exceed anything in our history.⁷

Opposition leader A.B. Morine, the editor of the *Daily News*, was more sceptical. An arch-Confederationist, he depreciated the talk of eighty million customers as “twaddle,” attributable in part to Edward Morris, who was pushing a scheme for cold storage, and in part to government attempts to win two by-elections then underway.⁸ In short, Morine argued, “the introduction of American capital, American ideas and industrial booms” were “all stereotyped phrases connected with Liberal politics.”⁹

Morine need not have worried. From the start, the new treaty proved a weak reed on which to base the colony’s hopes for an economic breakthrough. Made public in November of 1902, it allowed Americans to purchase bait on the same basis as Newfoundlanders and to “touch and trade” in colonial ports; it also removed or reduced colonial duties on a wide range of imports from the United States.¹⁰ In return, Newfoundland obtained free access to the American market for its fish products and metal ores. Specifically excluded from the free list, though, was fresh or unsalted cod. Anxious to mollify Gloucester fishing interests, Secretary Hay had rejected Bond’s “earnest solicitation” to have it included.¹¹

The exclusion deflated much of the hoopla about a new cold-storage trade to America. Nevertheless, the St. John’s Fish Exporters’ Association unanimously endorsed the treaty. For them, customers for salt cod, unlike cold storage, were an immediate need. With European markets congested in late 1902, the removal of a three-quarter-cent-per-pound duty would help sales to the United States and provide some relief. There were also medium-term prospects: America’s new dependency of Puerto Rico reportedly needed 300,000 quintals of salt cod annually; and Cuba, “under good government” as an American protectorate, would require even more.¹² Thus, the treaty’s provision for salt cod—and for metal ores—meant that it still had much to recommend it.

For Bond and other treaty supporters, however, much greater distress awaited. Unmollified by Hay’s exclusion of fresh or unsalted cod, the

Gloucestermen adamantly opposed the free admission of the salt product into the American market. They turned for help to their congressman, Augustus Gardiner, and his father-in-law and fellow Republican, Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a close friend of President Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge was well placed to influence events. Acknowledging nation-wide pressures for tariff reform, Lodge had initially seen some merit in a deal, enough to encourage Hay to proceed; the problem, though, was to make it "reasonably satisfactory" to the Gloucester people.¹³ Once the latter's position became clear, Lodge's lukewarm support turned to outright hostility.

With Lodge's help, the Gloucestermen pressed their case to the Foreign Relations Committee when it considered the treaty during the winter of 1902-1903. The supporters of reciprocity, especially those in the press and in commercial organizations in New York and Boston, lacked a comparable champion. Their most prominent advocate, Osborne Howes, a journalist who worked with the Boston Chamber of Commerce, was no match for Lodge. The Foreign Relations Committee sat on the treaty, refusing to report it out before the session ended.¹⁴

After the treaty became mired in the Senate, a frustrated Bond weighed his options. He could pressure the Gloucestermen by restricting their access to colonial waters; but to do so without effective support in the United States was to increase the risk of failure. Anyway, by late 1903, Bond had other preoccupations, among them a renewal of hostilities with the Reids over their \$3.5 million claim for compensation for loss of the colonial telegraph system.¹⁵ Also, recovering fish prices made a breakthrough into the American market less urgent; and increased activity in the mining and forest sectors, particularly the budding Harmsworth deal, offered hope of real economic change. Sensing that the time was inopportune for action, retaliatory or otherwise, the Premier waited.

In early 1904, circumstances changed. A new champion for the Newfoundland cause emerged in Massachusetts when the Boston Chamber of Commerce elected Henry Whitney as its president. Contending that "the future prosperity of Boston was dependent largely upon the extension of her markets to the north and east," Whitney called for concerted lobbying to secure ratification of the Bond-Hay Treaty and closer trade with Canada.¹⁶ At a mass meeting in Faneuil Hall in May, he orchestrated the formation of the Chamber of Commerce Committee of 100 on Reciprocal Trade. Sparring with Lodge, the Boston entrepreneur then oversaw a state-wide bipartisan campaign to muster support, one that soon attracted national attention. Facing an election in November, President Roosevelt and the Republican hierarchy became acutely aware of this new pressure for tariff reform.¹⁷

Bond, too, was aware of Whitney's campaign. As he prepared for his own fall election, he warned that "unless the present movement in the United States

looking to the ratification of our Convention is successful, I shall look to the next session of the Legislature to adopt another course of procedure."¹⁸ At this point, the Premier presided over a colony buoyant with unaccustomed confidence. The settlement of the French Shore Question in April had helped. So, too, had successful fisheries and rising cod prices that had more than offset the failure of James Wright's cold-storage venture, and the expansion in the mining and forest sectors that had overshadowed the government's inability to attract a steel industry. During Old Home Week festivities, Newfoundlanders had proudly paraded their progress and had spoken glowingly of the future.¹⁹ As the 1904 campaign accelerated, no one's future appeared more certain than Bond's.

Also helping was that Bond faced a badly divided opposition of ex-Liberals and Tories, including three ex-Premiers. Motivated by everything from "personal spite" to opportunism, five men led the optimistically named "United Opposition Party": ex-Premiers William Whiteway, A.F. Goodridge, and James Winter; ex-Supreme Court Justice Donald Morison; and Reid solicitor A.B. Morine, who had led the Opposition in the House, but whose presence was increasingly seen as a liability by anti-Bond elements.²⁰ Labelled as pro-Confederation and pro-Reid, the new "party" went nowhere, and led by Bond and Morris, the Liberals swept back into power with thirty seats; of the five opposition leaders, only Morine survived, retaining his seat in Bonavista. Armed with a fresh mandate, the Bond government now seemed virtually invincible.

Almost immediately a confident Bond sensed movement on the Bond-Hay Treaty. Within days, Henry Whitney arrived in the colony for negotiations to complete the Harmsworth deal. During his stay, he met with Bond and stressed to the press the need to obtain action once the Senate reconvened in December. Shortly after, Whitney headed a sub-committee of the Boston Chamber of Commerce Committee of 100 that travelled to Washington to meet the newly re-elected Roosevelt. Whitney came away believing that the President was "not only favourable" to the Bond-Hay Treaty but also "desirous of . . . the fullest possible freedom of trade with Canada."²¹ Sensitive to continuing calls for tariff reform, Roosevelt saw in the Newfoundland treaty an opportunity for at least a limited response. Accordingly, he asked Lodge to act on the treaty.²²

Thus, as 1905 opened, the signs were propitious. Yet when the Foreign Relations Committee finally reported the treaty to the full Senate, the headlines in the Newfoundland press—"THE SENATE BREATHES SLAUGHTER" and "AMENDED TO DEATH"—told the tale.²³ Evidently, Lodge had dropped his objection to the inclusion of fresh or unsalted cod on the free list, but had refused to yield on salt cod. In fact, Whitney informed Bond that the Committee had deleted both salt cod and metal ores, making the treaty nearly unrecognizable.²⁴ As committed as he was to the deal, the Premier had to respond.

Bond had one major lever. On April 5 he introduced into the legislature a bill to amend the Foreign Fishing Vessels Act (FFVA) of 1893, eliminating the

licensing system under which American vessels could hire crews and purchase bait and supplies on the Newfoundland coast. Apart from hitting at the American bank fishery, the new legislation, with its prohibition on hiring, struck most directly at the winter herring fishery in Bay of Islands. Bond did not stop there. According to the "American Shore" provision of the Convention of 1818, the Americans themselves had the liberty to fish

on that part of the Southern *coast* of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Ray to the Ramea Islands; on the Western and Northern *coasts* of Newfoundland from the said Cape Ray to the Quirpon Islands, on the shores of the Magdalen Islands, and also on the *coasts, bays, harbours, and creeks* from Mount Joly, on the Southern coast of Labrador, to and through the Straits of Belle Isle, and thence northward indefinitely along the coast²⁵

Because the Convention used the phrase "on the coasts, bays, harbours, and creeks" for Labrador and only the word "coast" for Newfoundland, the Premier argued that the Americans did not have a right to fish in the island's western bays. If upheld, this radical interpretation would exclude the Gloucestermen from the winter herring fishery in Bay of Islands altogether.

Since Bond's aim was to pressure the Gloucestermen to soften their opposition to reciprocity, presumably a positive response would see the measures eased. Such an outcome, however, would fall short of the wishes of the two major interests whose support the Bond camp claimed: the Water Street merchants and the bank fishing communities. Both favoured a permanent exclusion of the Americans in order to allow Newfoundlanders to reap greater benefit from their herring stocks. The bank fishermen also wanted an end to tough American competition for bait along the south and east coasts. On this count, at least, they would welcome any respite.²⁶

Others, though, saw only harm in Bond's policy. Noting that among Newfoundlanders there was "ten times" more sympathy for the Americans than for the French, Morine predicted that it would "recoil upon our heads."²⁷ In fact, Bond felt the recoil immediately. Prominent Ferryland M.H.A. Michael Cashin left the government to second an amendment proposed by Morine for a six-months' delay of the bill. Ferryland district, including Cashin's own business at Cape Broyle, did a thriving bait-and-supplies trade with American fishermen; also every year some of its residents travelled to the Bay of Islands herring fishery to hire out to American vessels. For Cashin, the new policy took "bread and butter" from his constituents; moreover, it violated the community between Newfoundlanders and American fishermen, many of whom were "the bone of our bone, the flesh of our flesh, our own people who were driven from our shores to earn a living in a foreign land."²⁸ Though Cashin's rhetoric proved insufficient to get the amendment passed, his defection had rocked the Bond government.

An emboldened Opposition sensed even more trouble within Liberal ranks. Cashin had a history of following Edward Morris' lead, notably on the Railway

Contract issue. When the *Telegram* charged that Cashin had “ratted” because “he and his friends” had failed to win him a Cabinet seat, the *News* suggested that the “friends” were Morris and his press ally P.T. McGrath.²⁹ Amid rumours of dissension at the top, Morris, by now Minister of Justice, remained conspicuously silent; in doing so, he added credence to Morine’s observation that “the bait policy must be fraught with far-reaching consequences.”³⁰

These consequences would take time to work out. The government began by implementing the amended FFVA against American Grand Banks fishermen. This branch of the Gloucester fishery was in decline, and in 1905 only fifty-four vessels would engage in it.³¹ Most apparently found bait on the American Shore, at Cape Breton and St. Pierre and even on the banks themselves; some also made purchases under cover of darkness in the prohibited area or took deliveries outside the three-mile limit. Such stratagems allowed the Gloucestermen to pooh-pooh the value of Newfoundland’s bait resources and its ability to damage their bank fishery. The anti-Gloucester *New York Fishing Gazette* conceded this point, but argued that the real test would come in the winter herring fishery where Newfoundland still held the “right bower.”³²

The Gloucestermen agreed. They had always found it convenient to purchase their herring or to hire Newfoundlanders to catch it for them, but if such practices were prohibited, then they would have to assert their right under the Convention of 1818 to fish for themselves. Even if legally sustainable, however, such action would alienate, perhaps to the point of violence, the hundreds of Newfoundlanders accustomed to earning American money. Understandably, as the 1905-1906 season approached, many in Gloucester grew concerned.

The Roosevelt Administration responded to that concern. In September, it sent the Fisheries Bureau schooner *Grampus*—Lodge had requested a warship—to Bay of Islands to monitor the fishery. That same month, Elihu Root, appointed Secretary of State after Hay’s death a short while earlier, came to St. John’s after a holiday in Labrador. Just missing Bond, who had left for London, he met with Governor William MacGregor, who shared Foreign Office misgivings about the Premier’s approach. He also met with Edward Morris—the acting premier—and enjoyed the hospitality of the Reids.³³ Given the company he kept, Root likely carried away a sense that Bond’s policy enjoyed less than universal support.

Meanwhile, as fishermen from around the colony gathered in Bay of Islands to await the Americans, “a fever of excitement” gripped the area.³⁴ A mass meeting of three to four hundred people organized a petition calling for the suspension of the FFVA; there were also references to the “famous Fortune Bay violence” of thirty years before.³⁵ Though the government had in place the revenue cutter ss *Fiona*, with Minister of Marine and Fisheries Captain Eli Dawe on board, it gave little indication of its intentions while Morris was acting premier. By the time Bond returned in mid-October to face a deepening crisis, Morris must have seen the makings of political opportunity for himself down the

road.

Another man saw a more immediate opportunity. In early October the Gloucester Board of Trade asserted that it was "common talk" in Newfoundland that Bond had proceeded "with the advice of certain Boston men interested in the development of that island."³⁶ The principal "Boston man" alluded to was Henry Whitney, who by then was seeking political office in Massachusetts. Though of "gubernatorial size," the prominent Democrat had decided against challenging Republican nominee Curtis Guild for the governorship because of the latter's pro-reciprocity sympathies; instead, he entered the race for the lieutenant-governorship against Eben S. Draper, an arch-protectionist supported by Lodge.³⁷ Whitney soon turned the election into a referendum on reciprocity, with the Newfoundland treaty portrayed as the first step toward freer trade with Canada. So vigorous was his campaign that the *New York Times* later concluded: "The national issue of the tariff was fought out on the lieutenant-governorship."³⁸

Crucial in dramatizing the tariff issue was the crisis in the Newfoundland herring fishery. With the Boston press playing up news from Bay of Islands, the Gloucester owners decided to hold most of their fleet in port while they sought political help. A delegation to Washington met with Secretary Root, who protested to the British that colonial legislation inconsistent with the Convention of 1818 did not apply to Americans; he also dismissed out of hand Bond's interpretation of "coast." If the Gloucestermen decided to fish for themselves, they would obviously have the support of the Administration; as it was, according to the State Department, they could ship Newfoundlanders outside the three-mile limit.³⁹ With this instruction, the Gloucester owners despatched the rest of their fleet to Bay of Islands.

The State Department's stand, anticipated by Imperial authorities, made it impossible for Bond to persist in his peculiar interpretation of the Convention of 1818. The Colonial Office now stressed that the Americans had the right to fish all along the American Shore; and though it supported the principle that Newfoundland could regulate American fishing activity, it warned against any attempt to use the FFVA to force the issue. To make their point, the British sent the *HMS Latona* to Bay of Islands to maintain order.⁴⁰ Just back from London, Bond quietly abandoned any hope of shutting the Americans out of the "bays, harbours and creeks" along the west coast.

That left in place the ban on hiring and on herring sales, which the Cabinet reconfirmed. As reports circulated that the Americans were coming equipped to fish for themselves, resentment mounted on the west coast. In this atmosphere, Morine and W.R. Howley, a former Liberal M.H.A. for St. George's who had broken with the Premier in 1903, arrived in Bay of Islands, ostensibly to tender legal advice to a fishermen's committee. At another mass meeting, with Americans in attendance, the two reportedly discussed ways to circumvent the FFVA and pointed out that the Americans could bring large purse seines to catch

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herring themselves.⁴¹ Newfoundland law prohibited these destructive devices, and any recourse to them would at once raise the issue of the relationship of colonial regulations to treaty rights. It would also further upset local fishermen, adding to Bond's political woes.

The political damage extended beyond Bay of Islands. At home, as the *News* pointed out, "almost every district in the island" sent men to the herring fishery, while abroad, an "insane" policy had imperilled Anglo-American relations.⁴² The *News* added, accurately, that with the American right to fish in western "bays and harbours" upheld, Bond had suffered a "humiliating rebuff"; at most, the remaining prohibitions only hampered the Gloucestermen.⁴³ In no way had the government pressured them enough to soften their opposition to reciprocity.

Bond's next best hope lay in Whitney's campaign in Massachusetts, which by late October was heating up. In a massive rally in Gloucester, Congressman Gardiner claimed that Whitney wanted reciprocity because "it would be highly to the advantage" of his Newfoundland Timber Estates Company, an allegation the *Gloucester Daily Times* repeated in general terms in subsequent days.⁴⁴ The most divisive part of the campaign, though, came when Osborne Howes charged that Lodge had misled John Hay by initially indicating that he favoured a Newfoundland treaty. Howes even asserted that "Secretary Hay was hurried to his untimely death by diplomatic disappointments and for these disappointments no man was more responsible than Henry Cabot Lodge."⁴⁵ The message was clear: a Whitney victory would frighten Lodge into cooperating on the trade issue.

Howes' claim created a furor. An incensed Lodge denounced it as "infamy" and asserted that Hay had been "one of his dearest friends."⁴⁶ As the controversy widened, Whitney related details of his meeting with Roosevelt the previous December at which the President supposedly had indicated his support for both the treaty and free trade with Canada; in response, Roosevelt, speaking through Lodge, disclaimed Whitney's version of the meeting. Whitney, meanwhile, continued to pummel Lodge for backing the Gloucester fishermen and to plead for free trade with Newfoundland.⁴⁷

A flare-up in Bay of Islands late in the campaign reinforced Whitney's claim about the importance of the Newfoundland treaty. By then the Gloucestermen were hiring large numbers of colonists beyond the three-mile limit. The Bond government, however, refused to accept this practice, and in early November the *Fiona* turned back the local steamer *Active* which was carrying crews out to American vessels. After protests from the Gloucestermen, the State Department again took up the issue. It was concerned about possible colonial attempts to search American vessels and, even more disturbing, about reports of an impending seizure of the schooner *Gossip* for shipping thirty Newfoundlanders outside the limit.⁴⁸ Though no major incident occurred, the

fishery dispute—and the related trade issue—refused to go away.

The Newfoundland issues apparently served Whitney well. On November 7, the “Whitney movement” came very close to electing Massachusetts’ first Democratic lieutenant-governor since the Civil War: the Boston entrepreneur fell just 1,996 votes short of Draper’s 182,197.⁴⁹ An obviously disappointed *Boston Herald* proclaimed a moral victory, one that showed the need for tariff revision; in a sentiment echoed by the *New York Times*, it also viewed the result as a lesson for Lodge.⁵⁰ That Whitney had come within an ace of pulling out victory was indisputable.

Indeed, at one point, someone in the Whitney camp wired Bond that he had won by a majority of 20,000 votes, news which the *Telegram* carried under the caption: “Good Outlook for the Bond-Hay Treaty.”⁵¹ Shortly after, Whitney himself wired the Premier:

Latest returns indicate my defeat by a small majority. I regret I am not elected mainly because of the moral effect it would have had elsewhere, but I am sure the campaign has resulted in a great accession of strength to the cause which I have been advocating and shall continue to advocate and that the majority of our Massachusetts people are desirous of having reciprocal trade relations with Newfoundland and Canada.⁵²

Despite Whitney’s effort to look to the future, 1905 represented his—and Bond’s—best chance for success in their common “cause.” The Bostonian’s very public differences with Roosevelt meant that he had little hope of ever winning Administration support, while in Massachusetts, internal divisions would hobble the Democratic Party for years to come. Whitney was to make a serious challenge for the governorship in 1907, but the Democrats were so badly split that he managed only a third-place finish.⁵³ By that time, any real hope Bond may have had for a political miracle in Massachusetts had dissipated.

Though taking a little longer, Bond’s own political fortunes unravelled after 1905, in large part because he became obsessed with bringing the Gloucestermen to heel. In the spring of 1906, his government further amended the FFVA to make it illegal for Newfoundlanders to ship aboard American vessels even outside the three-mile limit; the new legislation also stipulated that American vessels exercising their treaty rights would be “amenable to all the laws of the Colony not inconsistent with any such rights.”⁵⁴ The latter provision reasserted the colony’s long-standing contention that in instances of conflict, local laws would override treaty rights, a view always resisted by the Americans.

That same session, in a related move, the Bond government introduced legislation to expand the domestic herring fishery. Following the advice of Scot William Mair, the government sought to encourage a turn to a more capital-intensive fishery using Scottish driftnetting and curing techniques. If successful, such a fishery could replace the American trade.⁵⁵ On the other hand, it was a considerable gamble for Bond. Already hurt by the well-publicized fiasco with

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cold storage in its first term, his government could ill afford another such setback.

For Bond, though, the more immediate problem lay in American reactions to the tightened FFVA. If the prohibition on hiring held, the Gloucestermen would wish to use purse seines, creating the potential for more conflict. Amidst renewed apprehensions, President Roosevelt hinted at the need to send a warship to Bay of Islands to protect American interests.⁵⁶ By now the focus of the dispute had shifted from reciprocity to treaty rights, and though not readily apparent in Newfoundland, the initiative had begun to slip from Bond's hands.

Indicative of what was to come was the maneuvering by the Governor General of Canada, Lord Grey. Concerned at the threat to Anglo-American friendship, Grey concluded that the solution was to bring Newfoundland into Confederation. After a visit to the island in early summer, he informed Colonial Secretary Lord Elgin that Governor MacGregor and Archbishop Michael Howley were sympathetic to the idea; so, too, were the Bank of Montreal, the Canadian iron ore companies, and the Reid interests. In Grey's view, the best chance for success lay with Edward Morris, who, he believed, was "at heart" pro-Confederation.⁵⁷ As the Reids had just broken with Morine, causing him to leave the colony, the Opposition was leaderless; thus Morris only had to break with Bond and come on side. Morris, though, played his cards closely, never committing to Confederation and, all the while, waiting patiently as the American dispute enveloped Bond.

Bond, in fact, had painted himself into a corner. He could only watch as the American and British governments worked toward their own solution; and as they sent naval vessels—the USS *Potomac* and HMS *Brilliant*—to supervise the upcoming herring fishery. In early October, word came that the two governments had negotiated a *modus vivendi* for the 1906-1907 season, one that allowed the Americans to still ship Newfoundlanders outside the three-mile limit.⁵⁸ Also, though the Americans would have to respect colonial fishery regulations, they were permitted to use purse seines, evidently a safeguard against any inability to hire sufficient colonists.

At the level of fisherman to fisherman, the *modus* reduced tension. Allowed to hire Newfoundlanders, the Gloucestermen no longer needed purse seines. At the political level, however, the *modus* was the worst possible news for the Bond government, a sentiment expressed in the *Telegram* headline: "NEWFOUNDLAND SACRIFICED."⁵⁹ Key Bond supporters quickly reacted, among them Archbishop Howley and much of the St. John's merchant elite led by Edgar Bowring. Invoking memories of past resistance to Imperial concessions to the French, Howley urged: "Let us be up and doing!"⁶⁰ Yet despite such exhortations, Newfoundlanders failed to rally, evidently very few of them seeing in the issue the stuff of grand confrontation. In these circumstances, the government's response could only be judicial.

In October of 1906, in an effort to test the *modus*, the government arrested George Crane and Alexander Dubois of Wood's Island for shipping on the Gloucester vessel *Ralph B. Hall* outside the limit. The two, represented by W.R. Howley, were convicted by a local magistrate and fined \$500 or three months, whereupon Howley gave notice of an appeal to the Supreme Court. With the appeal underway and with hundreds of Newfoundlanders working for the Americans, the government pulled back from mass arrests. In search of a reciprocal move, it sounded out London about making a deal with the Americans to have them refrain from hiring more colonists. The British authorities artfully delayed their refusal; meanwhile, concerned that an eventual appeal to the Privy Council might uphold the Crane-Dubois verdict, they agreed to pay the fishermen's fines on condition the case be taken no further.⁶¹

As these maneuvers occurred, the 1906-1907 herring fishery turned out to be one of the largest ever. The Americans hired some 780 Newfoundlanders, 680 of them outside the limit, 23 at St. Pierre, and 77 at Sydney.⁶² For the second season in a row, Bond's hardheaded approach had antagonized many and accomplished little. By the spring of 1907, the Premier was desperate.

Events abroad afforded him little comfort. As the British and Americans groped toward a permanent solution, they knew that it would have to involve Canada since Bond's exclusion of American bank fishermen from colonial bait resources had compelled many of them to resort to Dominion waters where run-ins had also occurred. Given the complexity of this multi-sided controversy, the diplomats soon realized that a political settlement was impossible. That left arbitration, an option most unpalatable to Bond.⁶³ But by this time, the dispute had gone well beyond his ability to shape it.

Not that Bond admitted defeat. One hope lay in the Supreme Court, where a favourable ruling in the Crane-Dubois case would strengthen the colony's hand. Another rested with his trip to London for the Colonial Conference in May. Once in England, however, the Premier came under intense pressure from Imperial authorities and had to concede to arbitration before the Hague if the Americans agreed to take this route. Bond knew that when this concession became known at home, it would be proof that his policy had failed; moreover, the logic of any arbitration was that participation would be most effective if undertaken jointly with Canada, something that would leave him wide open to attacks from anti-Confederates.⁶⁴ Accordingly, he dragged his feet on agreeing to any such collaboration.

Back in Newfoundland, it was clear that Bond's trip would be unproductive. Not even a positive verdict from the Supreme Court in the Crane-Dubois case in early May could offset what had happened. As it was, acting premier Edward Morris communicated to the British government that Newfoundland would not carry out further prosecutions based on events of the past season. Whether Bond contemplated otherwise, as was later claimed,

remains questionable, but to have undertaken mass prosecutions would have been to invite direct Imperial intervention.⁶⁵ Morris, if not Bond, knew that; he also knew that the Premier was now at his most vulnerable.

That vulnerability became readily apparent within a month of Bond's less than triumphant return to Newfoundland in June. In an atmosphere "heavily surcharged," Morris resigned, ostensibly because of a dispute in Cabinet over pay rates for labourers on public works.⁶⁶ The *News*, however, reported speculation that the real reason was Morris' refusal "to accept a policy which involves the imprisonment of West Coast fishermen."⁶⁷ As the former Minister of Justice and acting premier, Morris could hardly have disavowed the policy of a government in which he was at the centre. Yet even in office, he had avoided anti-Gloucester rhetoric; instead, he had carefully argued: "This was no question of the Bond-Hay Treaty, or of a herring fishery, it was a grave constitutional issue."⁶⁸

Morris' ally P.T. McGrath had also walked a fine line. Since 1905 he had used the *Herald* and his articles in international periodicals—reprinted at home—to write admiringly of American fishermen. No opportunity was lost to play up the community between them and Newfoundlanders; in the spring of 1907, for instance, the *Herald* had called for a colonial entry into a schooner race in Gloucester, suggesting that it "would bring us in closer touch with our Yankee cousins, beside demonstrating what stuff our Newfoundland fishermen are made of."⁶⁹ With Morris' resignation, McGrath no longer needed to be subtle. Within hours, he left the *Herald*, and with the backing of the Reids, began preparations for a new anti-government newspaper.⁷⁰

McGrath's evocation of the affinities between American and Newfoundland fishermen only added to Bond's discomfiture. By late summer, the Premier's concession to the Foreign Office that he would participate in arbitration became public knowledge, prompting the *News* to trumpet that he had been "routed hip and thigh," that the colony with its affairs "in the hands of the Hague Tribunal" was worse off than ever.⁷¹ In this climate, Bond was reluctant to give his opponents more ammunition; for the remainder of 1907 he delayed moving on the matter of collaboration with Canada.

Meanwhile, further confirmation of Bond's weakened position had come in September when the Imperial government, to forestall conflict in the 1907-1908 herring fishery, issued an order-in-council which effectively renewed the *modus*. In response the Bond government tried to preserve at least the fiction of independence by formally permitting west coast fishermen to sell herring to the Americans—in effect, a return to the *status quo ante*. Once again, there was little public reaction to British intervention. Apparently many Newfoundlanders shared the *News*' view that "the well being of the fishermen" was "of vastly greater importance than . . . an academic question."⁷²

By now reciprocity, too, had become an "academic question." In a front-

page story in its initial number, McGrath's new paper, the *Evening Chronicle*, pointedly drew attention to "Whitney's Big Defeat" in the 1907 gubernatorial election in Massachusetts. It editorialized:

To what extent the policy of Reciprocity figured in the campaign it is not easy to estimate at this distance, but the circumstance cannot be regarded as a hopeful sign of the early triumph of the cause.⁷³

The source of so much turmoil, Bond's vision seemed farther from realization than ever before. To add to his woes, other external circumstances, apart from Whitney's political eclipse, also worked against him.

In late 1907 a severe recession hit the United States, affecting migration patterns. Graphic reports of distress throughout the Northeast, some involving expatriate Newfoundlanders, likely contributed to the smallest emigration from the colony in years—4,857, down from 7,460 in 1906 and 7,029 in 1907.⁷⁴ While the number of returning residents—5,498—was the smallest since 1903,⁷⁵ even at this low level the reverse migration only added to the pressure on the Bond government for economic development. Indeed, many of the thousands who had returned during Bond's tenure had done so with increased expectations; if these went unfulfilled, that pressure increased. Of all Bond's years in office, 1908, an election year, was a most inopportune one to have the safety-valve effect of emigration diminished.

Even more ominous were the first signs of trouble in the all-important cod fishery. An upward spiral in the value of fisheries exports by nearly 50 percent after 1900 had fuelled expansion and prosperity.⁷⁶ In late 1907, however, a record catch only accentuated a downturn in prices that brought the first real chill in years. Press reports told of resistance to reduced returns by fishermen, including mass meetings and talk of unionization around Conception Bay.⁷⁷ Evidently, though, most fishermen obtained at least a tolerable settlement and the momentum of expansion continued into 1908; for instance, fishermen along the northeast coast turned increasingly to motors for their inshore boats. As pressure built in the fishing industry, the political implications for Bond were explosive.

Well before the crisis in fish prices broke, Morris' challenge to Bond took shape. In a short session of the legislature in early 1908, he sat with Michael Cashin as an Independent Liberal and coordinated a reinvigorated Opposition. He mostly left the assault on government to others, notably Cashin and Tories Robert Moulton and Donald Morison—the latter elected in a 1906 by-election to succeed Morine. Cashin in particular focused on the American dispute, harassing Bond with questions about the Bond-Hay Treaty and about compensation for his constituents hurt by the FFVA. All three highlighted the increasingly evident failure to develop a colonial herring fishery to replace the American presence; efforts by the Scottish firm of Flett and Company to introduce new techniques, first in Notre Dame Bay, then in Bay of Islands, had fizzled.⁷⁸ With an election looming, the Opposition ensured that "Flett" and "Mair" would join "Wright" as

code words for incompetence.

The Opposition did more than attack. They used the session to mold policies for the new People's Party, announced to great fanfare by Morris shortly after the House prorogued. Notable among the thirty planks in its manifesto was a call for "NO CONFEDERATION," undoubtedly something of a disappointment to Morris' Canadian allies, but necessary to counter inevitable charges about his intentions.⁷⁹ The plank on the fisheries dispute also reflected Morris' caution; it committed the party to "a strict maintenance of every position taken by the Colony in defense of our constitutional rights under the Treaty of 1818." Similarly, the manifesto promised that the herring fishery would be conducted in "such manner as will best conserve the interests of the Colony and of the fishermen engaged in this industry."

The manifesto's major focus, though, was on development. It pledged everything from railway extensions to cold storage to old-age pensions. Many of its planks echoed initiatives promised or undertaken with little success by the Liberals, a continuity largely attributable to Morris and McGrath, the latter seen as the manifesto's principal author.⁸⁰ Just as McGrath had earlier used the *Herald* to laud American fishery practices, the People's Party now called for more diversified processing of cod, taking as a model the sixty-four varieties packed in Gloucester. If Liberal politics had earlier played up "the introduction of American capital, American ideas, and industrial booms," the People's Party now took its turn in promising a bright new modern world. The latter vision, however, did not hinge on reciprocity as its catalyst.

Indeed, the People's Party offered more a style than a vision, more a mindset than a master plan. For all the diversity and ability of the candidates it soon attracted—including three future premiers or prime ministers—it was, as political scientist S.J.R. Noel suggested, "preponderantly a party of 'new men.'"⁸¹ Many of them had emerged in the climate created by the advent of the railway and interior development, while others had risen in the fishery after the shakeout of the mid-1890s. They were relatively young, ambitious, and eager to establish themselves in a society dominated by the old merchant elite of St. John's. Their dynamism, though, was informed by more than opportunism alone. Influenced by what historian Kenneth Kerr called Morris' "new model of secular economic Nationalism," they exalted development for its own sake; under whatever auspices, it would mean employment and a stronger Newfoundland.⁸² Ironically, as an aspiring middle class, one that thrived in a more wide-open economic competition, many of them, consciously or otherwise, aped the "modern" American type which Bond had so admired back in 1902.

As leader, Morris epitomized the type. The son of a St. John's master cooper, the Ottawa-educated lawyer had close ties with both the city's fledgling labour movement and the Reids; he also did mining- and forest-related business in the United States. His political skills were such that Noel likened him to a New

York congressman, one who wooed his St. John's West constituents with an assiduous attendance at social functions and with an accumulation of personal favours; indeed, through an expatriate connection in Tammany Hall—"intimate friend" Sylvester Murphy from Barter's Hill—Morris even hobnobbed with New York politicoes on occasion.⁸³ Yet Morris had a broader range than the stereotypical congressman, making friends colony-wide: he acted as intermediary for northeast coast sealers and fishermen seeking improved prices; he helped stranded south coast herring catchers to return home from Bay of Islands; he organized relief efforts for fire-ravaged expatriates in Chelsea, Massachusetts; he arranged a day-long access to a government vessel for delegates to the Methodist General Conference at Grand Bank—the list seemed endless.⁸⁴ Not surprisingly, Morris made an ideal leader for other "new men" who sought political power.

Prominent among the People's Party candidates were several such men identified with the fishery or related trades, some of whom had run for the United Opposition in 1904. The only one elected, Robert Moulton in Burgeo-LaPoile, had built at Burgeo the most extensive business on the southwest coast and knew from his experience with voyages to the winter herring fishery just how alluring American money was to fishermen; he also did business in the United States and was reportedly a "heavy operator" on the New York Stock Exchange.⁸⁵ John Crosbie, too, did business in the United States, and as "a striking personality," the candidate for Bay de Verde was perhaps the most impressive of the "phalanx of successful young businessmen" supporting Morris.⁸⁶ The Crosbie family, including John's siblings, had long looked to America for opportunity; and in emerging as a leading fish exporter, the hustling Crosbie possibly owed something to the example of his uncle, Robert Crosbie, who had built a large shipbuilding firm in East Boston and become one of its "best known citizens."⁸⁷

Other candidates involved in the fisheries and with business or family ties in the United States came from different backgrounds. The ex-Liberal Michael Cashin had had close contact with American fishermen through his business at Cape Broyle. A more unusual experience, though, was that of novice Joseph Downey, who had been so convinced of the potential of a cold-storage trade in fish that he had gone to Boston to learn the latest in refrigeration techniques. He subsequently spent several years, in vain, trying to develop such a trade from southwestern Newfoundland.⁸⁸ He now returned as a candidate for St. George's, the district that included Bay of Islands.

Downey's career highlighted another subgroup in the People's Party: those involved directly or indirectly in the exploitation of land resources. After his cold-storage venture failed, Downey became the manager of the American-related New Land Lumber Company in central Newfoundland. In the forest sector, though, he took second place to J.J. Murphy, a candidate in Harbour Main, who in 1902 had sold his lumbering operations in the Gambo area to Timber Estates. A pioneer in the installation of electric power, "Gambo" Murphy

later dealt with Wisconsin parties in an effort to establish a pulp and paper project at Hawke's Bay. Less entrepreneurial were Morris and Michael Gibbs, a candidate in St. John's East, both of whom did legal work for Americans interested in land resources. For these two, as for Downey and Murphy—all talented and ambitious men of Irish Catholic extraction—such activity opened opportunities unavailable in the traditional economy; moreover, it gave them a common experience with prominent Orangeman Donald Morison, who also did legal work for Americans.⁸⁹ In an atmosphere of promotionism that softened sectarianism, collaboration was much easier.

Legal opportunities of a different kind added an overlapping subgroup: those identified with the growing labour movement in St. John's, principally Morris, Gibbs, and W.R. Howley. Of the three, Gibbs played the premier role in helping trade unions to organize; in 1907 he had ridden his popularity with labour into the mayor's chair. Howley, the nephew of the Archbishop and a candidate in Placentia-St. Mary's, had had an American twist to his career. While the Liberal M.H.A. for St. George's in the early 1900s, he had left the colony under mysterious circumstances for a year and a half. He spent much of his time away in the United States, particularly in Salt Lake City, where, he later wrote, he had learned "the dignity and importance of labour."⁹⁰ On his return in 1903 he took up labour causes, leaving the Liberals later that year. Following an unsuccessful bid for election as the "workingman's friend" in the United Opposition in 1904, Howley continued to mix politics and legal work, notably in representing Crane and Dubois.⁹¹

Other, less high-profile candidates in the People's Party also had American connections. J.B. Goodison, Michael Kennedy, Philip Moore, A.W. Piccott, Jesse Whiteway, and Sydney Woods all had work or educational experience or close family ties in the United States. The Liberal Party had such men too. The best known was Placentia-St. Mary's M.H.A. Edward (E.H.) Jackman, the Minister of Finance, who became Bond's chief Catholic lieutenant after Morris resigned. "Jackman the Tailor" owned a large clothing factory in St. John's and had spent a "few years" in Boston in part to learn his trade.⁹² Others such as Bond and his running mate in Twillingate, George Roberts, had been or were involved in the promotion of mineral and forest holdings; as owner of the *Twillingate Sun*, Roberts had written accolades to American capital.⁹³ The range of American ties in the Liberal Party, though, was limited. In contrast, in the People's Party, their prevalence gave an extra edge to its criticism of the "folly" of Bond's "anti-American" policy.⁹⁴ And in an age when party labels meant little, such ties imparted a distinctive tone to its strong pro-development stance.

That stance took on extra appeal as a November vote approached. The economic activity so evident in the early Bond years had noticeably slowed. In the forest sector, the transition to pulp and paper, though well underway, was incomplete; meanwhile, the large lumbering operations associated with Timber

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Estates and other pre-Harmsworth companies had scaled down or ceased. In mining a similar drop-off had occurred with the closure of Lark Harbour and Pilley's Island; only two major mines—Bell Island and Tilt Cove—still operated. Even more unsettling, the first signs of trouble in the fishery witnessed in late 1907 now blossomed into a major crisis. By election time, with another large catch recorded, the government faced a collapse in fish prices estimated at 35 to 40 percent.⁹⁵

The campaign of 1908 centred upon several issues, among them: the cut in fish prices, with its immediate impact on thousands of Newfoundlanders; Confederation, with each side trying to pin the pro-Confederation tag on the other; Morris' Catholicism, with each side accusing the other of sectarian appeals; and competence in government, with rival claims about the government's record in everything from development to meeting people's mundane needs. In a post-mortem on the election, Governor MacGregor was to observe that the American fisheries dispute, "the most characteristic feature of the last four years administration," did not "seem to have been made a very special issue in the electoral campaign."⁹⁶ Yet it was an issue, one that interacted with the others and exerted a substantial impact.

From the start, Bond and his allies claimed that the government's "firmness" in the dispute had paid off. The arrangement it had worked out with fishermen in the herring fishery in late 1907 had made the *modus* unnecessary; thus, the Premier now announced, the British had repealed their order-in-council.⁹⁷ The *Telegram* hailed this action as the "CROWNING VICTORY OF OUR GALLANT PREMIER," while on the stump, Liberal candidates praised Bond's "magnificent" fight against the ablest statesmen of both Great Britain and the United States.⁹⁸ No amount of posturing, however, could conceal what had happened or make the constitutional issue a live one. As the opposition saw it, Bond's eighteen years of "tinkering with reciprocity" had ended in failure, and the much-vaunted new arrangement only represented a return to the status quo.⁹⁹ For the Liberals, an attack on Morris' record during the dispute would prove more fruitful.

In his election manifesto, Bond charged that Morris had deserted the government in a crisis. Worse, he had done so under cover of a "PUERILE EXCUSE" to "BECOME THE LEADER OF A PARTY THAT DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE AIDED AND ABETTED THE AMERICANS IN THEIR ACTS OF AGGRESSION."¹⁰⁰ Even then, such treachery was but a prelude to the greater threat represented by Morris and the People's Party—namely, domination by the Reids and eventual Confederation.

Taking their cue from the Premier, the Liberal press played up the conspiracy angle. In one of its more intriguing variations, the *Telegram* charged that Morris, while still in government, had taken "extraordinary measures" to meet secretly in Boston with Henry Whitney and President Lucius Tuttle of the

Boston and Maine Railroad, all “in the interest of Canadian and American capitalists, who, to further their ends, wanted to make Newfoundland a Canadian province.”¹⁰¹ Presumably, as the Liberal press argued elsewhere, Confederation would give Canada control over the Newfoundland fishery which could then be used as a lever in a Canadian bid for reciprocity.¹⁰² Whatever their accuracy, such reports of Morris’ machinations meshed with a continuing attack on his trustworthiness.

In particular, E.M. Jackman related to a raucous, all-candidates meeting in Placentia how Morris had “treacherously” taken away Bond’s leverage in the fisheries dispute.¹⁰³ As acting premier in May of 1907, following the Supreme Court decision in the Crane-Dubois case, he had pledged to the British to forego further prosecutions of fishermen; however, in London, according to the *News’* account of Jackman’s speech, Bond had already informed the Imperial government that if it persisted in its actions, he would prosecute six hundred fishermen, not just two.¹⁰⁴ Though it used a different number, the *Telegram* supported Jackman’s version of events; it pointed out that the last thing the Colonial Office wanted was one hundred fishermen appealing convictions to the Privy Council only to have the colony’s position upheld. Printing relevant correspondence, it asked: “DARE YOU TRUST MORRIS?”¹⁰⁵

Obviously vulnerable to the Confederation “bugaboo,” and to criticism of Morris’ record, the People’s Party counterattacked. In fact, since late 1907, when the first reports of his likely collaboration with Canada at the Hague appeared, the Morris camp had tried to label Bond as pro-Confederation; then when the collaboration was confirmed and news came that Canadian Chief Justice Sir Charles Fitzpatrick would represent Newfoundland’s interests, their charges of a sell-out intensified.¹⁰⁶ Still, given the elements supporting the People’s Party, even if only dimly perceived, the Liberal cry of conspiracy was the more plausible one.

Though Morris reaffirmed his opposition to Confederation, his best defense lay in attacking the government and accentuating his own promises. He and his press allies were equal to the challenge: they revived earlier controversies about the government’s management of the Poor Asylum, H.M. Penitentiary, and the General Hospital; they berated it for its cosiness with local businessmen who supposedly operated monopolies or “trusts” in everything from beef to biscuits to coal; and they decried it for its support of such “fads” as a model farm and a private company’s plans to provide a fog-free rail link across northwestern Newfoundland for a so-called Short Ocean Line Service between Europe and North America.¹⁰⁷ Often the opposition press assumed a nativist tone, associating government schemes with “outsiders”: thus, “Drift Net” Flett, “Scotch Cure” Mair, “Cold Storage” Wright, “Fog Free Zone” Thompson, and “Model Farm” Zavitz.¹⁰⁸ Those issues relating to the fishery, however, got most play, and in the end, the crisis in fish prices gave the opposition its high card.

In his election manifesto, Morris contended that the government had not “grappled with” the “great question” of making the fisheries more profitable.¹⁰⁹ He then repeated—from his party’s March manifesto—promises of development in everything from markets to cold storage to food-fish preparation *à la* Gloucester. Meanwhile, the government’s mishandling of the crisis gave more ammunition to Morris and his allies. When Bond advised fishermen to hold their fish as long as possible to await an anticipated price rise, he was undercut by colleague George Roberts, who sent his fish to St. John’s for sale at the current price. Redoubling its attack, the *Chronicle* argued that the price of fish was the “real issue,” not the Premier’s “silly manifesto about Confederation and the Reids’ domination.”¹¹⁰

Similarly, the opposition press regained the initiative on the issue of Morris’ loyalty during the American fisheries dispute, turning it around to herald his sympathy for ordinary fishermen. The *Chronicle*, for instance, argued that the “real betrayers” were Bond and his supporters who had been prepared to imprison six hundred fishermen for selling herring to the Americans; it was not Morris, who had refused to “be a party to such an outrageous miscarriage of justice.”¹¹¹ Repeatedly invoking the figure of six hundred fishermen, it coupled the government’s position in the fisheries dispute with that in the crisis related to fish prices as “two of the most desperate attempts ever made to squelch the fishermen.”¹¹² Alleging an anti-fishermen bias on the part of Bond—“in whose nostrils the very name of fishermen stinks”—it made the Premier’s own character an issue.¹¹³

The People’s Party press emphasized the contrast between the ever-accessible Morris and the aloof, aristocratic Bond. As if reluctant to pander to voters, the Premier spent most of his time in Twillingate district, providing little help to embattled colleagues elsewhere. Morris, on the other hand, travelled extensively before and during the campaign, including three visits to crucial Conception Bay districts and single ones to the west coast in August, to Bell Island and Grand Falls in September, and to Harbour Main, Bonavista, and Trinity districts in October. He also reached out to large groups of electors: in March, at the announcement of his new party, to sealers gathered in St. John’s for the trip to the ice; in May, in Conception Bay, to fishermen about to depart for Labrador; and in September, at Grand Falls, to construction workers from around the island. Crediting him with inaugurating “a campaign style unique in our political history,” the *Chronicle* enthused: “Morris is the Roosevelt of Newfoundland politics. His methods are of the strenuous type. . . . He is a man of the people, by the people and for the people.”¹¹⁴

The Liberals, too, spared no rhetorical excess. Working the Confederation issue in the final days of the campaign, the government press appealed to the “SPIRIT OF ’69” and even asked: “WHO SOLD IRELAND?”¹¹⁵ It also set off Bond’s ability to “WIN OUT” in the fisheries dispute against Morris’ attempt to

pose as “the friend of west coast fishermen.”¹¹⁶ In the end, though, the Liberals’ rhetoric only accentuated the largely abstract nature of their issues. In contrast, in its attack on the government’s record and in its promise of accelerated development, the People’s Party focused much more on what Morris termed “the vital issues of the moment.”¹¹⁷

Election Day, November 3, revealed how much the People’s Party had used these issues to breach what had once seemed an unassailable position held by Bond. In a cliff-hanger, it fought the Liberals to a tie, each side winning eighteen seats. The People’s Party took nine seats from the Liberals and reduced Liberal majorities in every other district save the Premier’s.¹¹⁸ As part of the myriad of influences shaping this outcome, Bond’s handling of the American fisheries dispute had contributed to concern about his priorities—and his competence to oversee colonial development. Furthermore, his policy of exclusion had violated the affinity many Newfoundlanders had for American fishermen and for America in general.

The area most affected by Bond’s policy extended from Bonne Bay on the west coast down to and along the south coast to the Avalon Peninsula and around to Conception Bay. It included the herring fishery centres of Bay of Islands, Fortune Bay, and Placentia Bay, only the first of which witnessed major American activity during Bond’s two terms. In St. George’s district, Joseph Downey tapped voter resentment to take the seat handily from the Liberals. In Fortune Bay district, Charles Emerson won the seat from the Liberals in part by playing upon a decades-long relationship with the Americans and the hope that they would return in numbers once stocks rebuilt. In Placentia-St. Mary’s, the three-member district in which the herring fishery had flourished in the 1890s, the People’s Party ticket headed by Frank Morris, the leader’s brother, gained from agitation over the exclusion of the Americans; however, though slicing the Liberal majority by about thirteen percent, it failed to wrest the district from the Liberal ticket headed by Jackman.¹¹⁹

The impact of Bond’s measures on the winter herring fishery extended beyond its three centres. As had the Fortune Bay and Placentia Bay fisheries earlier, only more so, the one in Bay of Islands had attracted men from elsewhere. The dependence of these migrants on American participation was underscored at the start of the 1908-1909 season when the late arrival of the Gloucester fleet left many of them destitute.¹²⁰ In some small way, at least, their dislike of Bond’s policy must have contributed to the virtually island-wide drop in Liberal support in 1908.

Bond’s policy also hit the more widely dispersed bait-and-supplies trade. Fishermen in St. George’s and in the south coast districts, especially Fortune Bay, had carried on this trade. In Burgeo-LaPoile, resentment over its loss likely helped in the return of Robert Moulton with an increased majority. Farther east, in two-seat Burin district, the outcome was different. Though some of Burin’s

residents travelled to the Bay of Islands herring fishery and others sold bait to the Americans, its economic mainstay was the bank fishery, whose leaders had since 1905 vigorously supported Bond's policy. As it was, Liberal incumbents Henry Gear and E.H. Davey saw their majority cut by over eight percent.¹²¹

Adjacent to Burin was Placentia-St. Mary's, mostly an Avalon Peninsula district, and also larger and more economically diversified. Despite some involvement in the bait-and-supplies trade, it too returned Liberal candidates. Of all the Avalon districts though, two-seat Ferryland was most identified with the trade. There Michael Cashin won reelection handily. Yet despite a nearly fifty percent drop in the Liberal Party's vote, its prime candidate, William Ellis, held onto the second seat.¹²²

Farther around the Avalon, in Conception Bay, two-seat Harbour Main possessed the island's principal squid-baiting centre, at Holyrood. Just before election day, the opposition press appealed to Holyrood voters, zeroing in on Liberal incumbent Captain John Lewis, the banking skipper, for being "especially subservient" to Bond on the American fisheries issue, an appeal which likely played a part in the election of People's Party candidates J.J. Murphy and William Woodford.¹²³ Other places on the northern Avalon had also traded with the Americans. One was Carbonear in Carbonear district; others were Bell Island, Portugal Cove, and Torbay in St. John's East. In these districts, both of which remained in the Liberal camp, though with reduced majorities, the policy of exclusion probably influenced some voters; however, especially in prosperous St. John's East, the issue would not have made an appreciable difference.

Just as connections in the fishery created an affinity for Americans, so too did migration to the United States. In the fishery, many of the American vessels had crew and captains from communities scattered throughout the region; some of the captains were folk heroes in their old homes. One was Captain Joseph Bonia, whose brother Thomas, a Liberal member for Placentia-St. Mary's, had appeared at best a half-hearted supporter of the FFVA. Thomas decided not to run with Jackman in 1908, ostensibly because of health reasons, but possibly, as the opposition suggested, out of concern over a backlash on the American issue.¹²⁴ His story illustrates at an individual level the influences at play in determining political behaviour—and the difficulty of explaining electoral outcomes.

Like fisheries connections, the ties created by emigration formed part of a complex of influences—including religion—that interacted to shape the backlash against the Liberals. Migration of all varieties was heaviest from eastern Newfoundland, where, in the census interval 1901-1911, rural Avalon had five of the six districts showing the highest percentages of population loss: Harbour Grace, Port de Grave, Harbour Main, Ferryland, and Placentia-St. Mary's.¹²⁵ The latter three of these were Catholic, the other two of mixed character. The Catholic ones, in addition to the colony's only other rural Catholic district—St.

George's—also had a history of connections with American fishermen. Obviously, despite Archbishop Howley's support for Bond, the prospect of the first Catholic Premier since 1861 had an appeal in these districts. Yet given the ties crated by the fisheries and emigration, a one-dimensional explanation of Morris' gains is insufficient.

Still, for Catholic voters in St. George's, Ferryland, Harbour Main, and St. John's West—where Morris won—and in Placentia-St. Mary's and St. John's East—where he made a good showing—the religious dimension itself was integral to a wider tradition of Irish-Catholic affinity for America. When the People's Party highlighted an endorsement by Captain John Dalton, formerly of Riverhead, Harbour Grace, who had gained fame as a steamship master sailing out of New York and Boston, it tapped into a sentiment that had been well articulated the year before by Reverend Edward Curran of Pouch Cove:

Among Newfoundlanders there is a genuine love for the United States, most especially among the Catholics, who can count friends and relatives from the Old Land as well as our own shores, friends who have found a home in the States after escaping the tyranny of English rule in Ireland, and friends who, failing to find a sufficiency in Newfoundland, have succeeded in building up careers and attaining to influence in the Republic.¹²⁶

Curran's argument was that this was "only sentiment" and had "no political value" in terms of possible annexation to the United States; however, for a Catholic leader opposing the colony's "mad anti-American policy," it did have such value.¹²⁷

Also echoing the experience of Ireland with emigration, the People's Party had pilloried the government over the "exodus" of people into "exile." The *Chronicle*, for example, charged that during Bond's two terms "more of our young men and women went out through the Narrows than ever before" and it urged "aged fathers and mothers" to exact revenge.¹²⁸ For his part, Morris proposed an "INDUSTRIAL POLICY" to promote manufacturing enterprises in order to stem "the tide of emigration which is drawing away the life blood of the Colony, its young men and women."¹²⁹ Used almost ritualistically by opposition parties since the 1880s, the emigration issue still had substance.

Yet Morris' appeal to those of Irish Catholic extraction had its limits. For one thing, he had to combat the Liberal identification of his party with Reid domination and eventual Confederation, the latter historically unpopular in Catholic districts. For another, he had to contend with a conservative church hierarchy that frowned on the "secular economic Nationalism" of his party. In Ferryland, for example, Cashin battled overt clerical influence to retain his seat, but he could not keep Ellis from winning the other one. In the denominationally mixed Conception Bay districts, meanwhile, intra-Catholic tensions likely took second place to a greater Catholic support for Morris; however, the correlation between percentages of Catholic voters and People's Party success was by no

means an exact one.¹³⁰

In most districts, if not all, local concerns played the largest part in the election. Such concerns no doubt contributed to the return of all the cabinet ministers with seats in the House; even Minister of Marine and Fisheries Captain Eli Dawe, who was most closely associated with Bond's policy of exclusion, managed to save his seat in Harbour Grace, though by just three votes. In many areas, including those with little history of an American fisheries presence and with low rates of emigration, local and regional concerns overlapped. In particular, the northeast coast north of Conception Bay shared with it an interest in the People's Party promises of railway extensions and of protection and enhancement of the Labrador fishery; it also liked Morris' championing of the sealers. In this mostly Protestant region, the districts north of Trinity—Bonavista, Fogo, Twillingate, and St. Barbe—had the island's lowest rates of emigration. Indeed, three-seat Twillingate, the site of Grand Falls, and St. Barbe, newly freed from the incubus of the French Shore, had had net in-migrations. St. Barbe, Twillingate, and Fogo remained in the Liberal camp while three-seat Bonavista returned the ticket headed by Morison for the People's Party. In the region overall, as elsewhere, the People's Party increased the opposition percentage of the popular vote—by 4.38%—attesting to the strength of its campaign.¹³¹

That campaign produced a tie vote, triggering a constitutional crisis that soon ended the Bond government and brought Edward Morris to power. It was an outcome shaped by the interplay of numerous elements, among them Bond's American policy. The Premier's preoccupation with trying to force reciprocity had left his government vitiated; by 1908 it seemed ill prepared to cope with the demands of office, particularly those created by the sudden and severe drop in fish prices that occurred on the eve of the election. For a population with expectations sharply curbed, Morris' vision of renewed development suggested an energy that was appealing. Ironically, it was the sort of energy that Bond had so admired in the "American type" that proved his undoing.

Notes

¹*St. John's Evening Chronicle* (hereafter EC), January 22, 1908.

²*Montreal Daily Witness*, extract in *St. John's Evening Herald* (hereafter EH), October 28, 1902.

³*Report on the Blue Book of Newfoundland for the Year ending 30th June, 1899*, 4, 71.

⁴James Hiller, "Confederation Defeated: The Newfoundland Election of 1869," *Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, eds. James Hiller and Peter Neary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980). Also see David Davis, "The Bond-Blaine Negotiations, 1890-1891" (M.A. thesis, Memorial University of Newfoundland [hereafter MUN], 1970), Ch. III.

⁵James K. Hiller, "A History of Newfoundland, 1874-1902" (Ph.D. diss.,

Cambridge University, 1971), 350-363.

⁶Charles Callan Tansill, *Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964; reprint of 1943), 94.

⁷EH, October 18, 1902.

⁸*St. John's Daily News* (hereafter DN), October 22. See also DN, October 18, 20, 23.

⁹DN, October 21, 1902.

¹⁰*St. John's Evening Telegram* (hereafter ET), December 15, 1902.

¹¹John Hay to Theodore Roosevelt, October 16, 1902, in Tyler Dennett, *John Hay: From Poetry to Politics* (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1963; reprint of 1933), 425.

¹²EH, December 26, 1902. For Fish Exporters' Association, see EH, December 17, 1902.

¹³Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, October 20, 1902, in *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, eds. Henry Cabot Lodge and Charles F. Redmond (New York: Da Capo Press, 1971; reprint, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), Vol. I, 543. For Lodge's initial approval, see Dennett, *Hay*, 426, 428; also draft of James Hiller, "The Political Career of Robert Bond," 5. The author is indebted to James Hiller for access to the draft of this paper and other completed articles. Subsequent references to the Bond paper, unless otherwise indicated, are to the published version in *Twentieth Century Newfoundland: Explorations*, eds. Hiller and Peter Neary (St. John's: Breakwater Books, 1994), 11-45.

¹⁴For Foreign Relations Committee, see Tansill, *Relations*, 94. For Howes, see *Boston Herald* (hereafter BH), March 26, 1899; EH, March 12, 19, 1903.

¹⁵Hiller, "Bond," 24.

¹⁶Boston Chamber of Commerce, *Association Records, 1900-1909*, Record of Annual Meeting, January 19, 1904.

¹⁷For Committee of 100 and campaign, see EH, May 17, August 16, 1904; and Richard M. Abrams, *Conservatism in the Progressive Era: Massachusetts Politics, 1900-1912* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), 116. For pressures for tariff reform and Roosevelt's response, see Abrams, *Conservatism*, 109-111.

¹⁸EH, September 28, 1904.

¹⁹For economy, see EH, December 31, 1904, and G.O. Cornelius to H.D. Peirce, November 30, 1905, in United States, Department of State, *Despatches from United States Consuls in St. John's, Newfoundland, 1897-1906* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957).

²⁰Hiller, "Bond," 18; S.J.R. Noel, *Politics in Newfoundland* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 34-35.

²¹*Gloucester Daily Times* (hereafter DT), November 16, 1905. See also Abrams, *Conservatism*, 122-123. For Whitney in Newfoundland, see EH, November 21, 1904.

²²Abrams, *Conservatism*, 111-112.

²³ET, February 11, 1905; EH, February 20, 1905.

²⁴Hiller, draft of "Bond," 15n.

²⁵"Proceedings" of the Newfoundland House of Assembly (hereafter "Proceedings" of NHA), April 7, 1905, in ET, April 10, 1905. For 1893 Act, see Newfoundland, General Assembly, *Acts of the General Assembly of Newfoundland, 1893* (St. John's: J.W. Withers, Queen's Printer, 1893), 24-27.

²⁶For Bond's aim, see "Proceedings" of NHA, April 7, 1905, in ET, April 10, 1905;

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EH, April 13, 1905. For Water Street support, see "Proceedings" of NHA, April 12, 1905, in ET, April 14, 1905; and summary of Legislative Council proceedings in ET, April 18, 1905. For bank fishery support, see editorial and correspondence, ET, March 25, 27, and EH, April 6, 1905.

²⁷"Proceedings" of NHA, April 7, 1905, in ET, April 11, 1905.

²⁸"Proceedings" of NHA, April 7, 1905, in ET, April 12, 1905.

²⁹ET, April 10, 1905; DN, April 11, 1905.

³⁰Morine in "Proceedings" of NHA, April 7, 1905, in ET, April 11, 1905.

³¹DT, December 12, 1905.

³²*New York Fishing Gazette* extract in DT, July 25, 1905. For American bait procurement, see Newfoundland, House of Assembly, *Journal* (hereafter JHA), 1906, Appendix, 182; EH, August 12, 18-19, 1905; and Major Peter Cashin, *My Life and Times, 1890-1919*, ed. R.E. Buehler (St. John's: Breakwater, 1976), 67.

³³For Lodge, see Tansill, *Relations*, 98. For *Grampus*, see ET, August 15, September 9, 25, 27, 1905. For Foreign Office misgivings, see Hiller, draft of "Bond," 15. For Root, see EH, September 1, 1905.

³⁴DN, October 3, 1905.

³⁵*Bay of Islands Western Star* (hereafter WS), October 11, 1905; DN, October 13, 1905.

³⁶*Boston Evening Transcript* (hereafter BET), October 13, 1905.

³⁷Michael E. Hennessey, *Twenty-five Years of Massachusetts Politics, 1890-1915* (Boston: Practical Politics, Inc., 1917), 148.

³⁸*New York Times* (hereafter NYT), November 9, 1905; DT, August 17, 1906; BET, October 12, 1905; and Abrams, *Conservatism*, 121-123.

³⁹For Boston press coverage, see BET, October 13-14, 1905; BH, October 14, 1905. For Gloucester delegation, see BET, October 16, 17, 1905; BH, October 17, 1905. For Root, see Tansill, *Relations*, 100-103. For State Department's response, see BET, October 18, 19, 1905, and Alvin C. Gluek, Jr., "Programmed Diplomacy: The Settlement of the North Atlantic Fisheries Question, 1907-1912," *Acadiensis* vi (Autumn 1976): 49.

⁴⁰For Colonial Office response, see Gluek, "Diplomacy," 49. For *Latona*, see ET, October 25, 1905.

⁴¹For Cabinet reconfirmation and circulating reports, see DN, October 20, 1905. For Howley and Morine, see DN, October 21-24, 1905.

⁴²DN, October 25, 27, 1905.

⁴³DN, October 28, 1905.

⁴⁴DT, October 24, November 2, 1905.

⁴⁵BH, October 28, 1905.

⁴⁶BET, October 28, 1905; BH, October 29, 1905.

⁴⁷For Whitney's claim and Roosevelt's response, see Abrams, *Conservatism*, 122-123. For Whitney versus Lodge, see BH, BET, November 2, 1905.

⁴⁸For *Fiona* and *Active*, see DN, November 4, 1905; BET, November 3, 1905. For State Department concern, see BET, BH, November 4, 1905; DT, November 7, 1905.

⁴⁹For election outcome, see Abrams, *Conservatism*, 123; ET, November 8, 1905.

⁵⁰BH, November 9, 1905; NYT, November 9, 1905.

⁵¹ET, November 8, 1905.

⁵²ET, November 9, 1905.

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⁵³Abrams, *Conservatism*, 168-169; DN, November 6, 1907.

⁵⁴Newfoundland, General Assembly, *Acts of the General Assembly of Newfoundland*, 1906 (St. John's: J.W. Withers, King's Printer, 1906), 9. See also Gluek, "Diplomacy," 50.

⁵⁵George O. Cornelius to H.D. Peirce, April 25, 1906, in State Department, *Despatches, 1897-1906*.

⁵⁶Gluek, "Diplomacy," 50.

⁵⁷Cited in Peter F. Neary and Sidney J.R. Noel, "Newfoundland's Quest for Reciprocity, 1890-1910," in *Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967*, ed. Mason Wade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 218.

⁵⁸For movement to *modus*, see Tansill, *Relations*, 106-111; Gluek, "Diplomacy," 50-51; and Hiller, "Bond," 30. For warships, see ET, September 17, 19, 27-29, 1906.

⁵⁹ET, October 6, 9, 1906.

⁶⁰Howley to editor, ET, October 10, 1906.

⁶¹Hiller, "Bond," 30; Neary and Noel, "Quest," 219.

⁶²JHA, 1907, Appendix, 207; United States, Department of Commerce and Labour, *Report*, 1907 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1907), 51.

⁶³For run-ins in Canadian waters, see Gluek, "Diplomacy," 52-53. For Bond's view of arbitration, see Neary and Noel, "Quest," 220.

⁶⁴For Bond in England, see Hiller, "Bond," 31. For Bond's handling of arbitration, see Gluek, "Diplomacy," 53-54.

⁶⁵For Crane-Dubois verdict, see EH, May 8, 1907. For Morris' response, see Telegram, Governor William MacGregor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, May 8, 1907, in Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Colonial Office Records, Series 194* (hereafter C.O. 194), Volume 268, 294. See also ET, October 21, 1908.

⁶⁶DN, July 23, 1907.

⁶⁷DN, July 27, 1907.

⁶⁸Report of Assembly debate, February 13, 1907, in ET, February 14, 1907).

⁶⁹EH, May 17, 1907. See EH, May 12, 28, 1906, for *American Review of Reviews* article; EH, November 21-23 for *Book Lover's Magazine* article; and for other items, EH, February 15, May 2, 23, 25, July 4, 1906.

⁷⁰Noel, *Politics*, 49n.

⁷¹DN, August 27, September 26, 1907.

⁷²DN, October 10, 1907. For order-in-council, see Hiller, "Bond," 26; Neary and Noel, "Quest," 223; and ws, October 2, 1907.

⁷³EC, November 20, 1907.

⁷⁴Evidence of Mr. Henry W. LeMessurier, J.P., Deputy Minister of Customs, in Great Britain, Dominions Royal Commission, *Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions, Minutes of Evidence Taken in Newfoundland in 1914* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, King's Printer, 1915), 2.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 1.

⁷⁶EH, March 25, 1907.

⁷⁷DN, September 3, October 25-26, 29, November 5, 1907.

⁷⁸For Morison and Moulton, see JHA, 1908, 10, 21, 30, 35. For Cashin, see JHA, 1908, 18, 26, and EC, February 20, 1908. For herring fishery, see JHA, 1908, 14-15, 26, 45.

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⁷⁹EC, March 5, 1908.

⁸⁰Cashin, *Life*, 64.

⁸¹Noel, *Politics*, 103.

⁸²Kenneth Kerr, "A Social Analysis of the Members of the House of Assembly, Executive Council and Legislative Council in the Period 1855-1914" (M.A. thesis, MUN, 1971), 294n.

⁸³DN, August 1, 1904; Noel, *Politics*, 33. For labour movement, see EH, January 17, 1902; October 5, 1904; May 2, 1907.

⁸⁴For sealers, see DN, March 6, 1908; for fishermen, see DN, October 25, 1907; for herring catchers, see EH, December 26, 1902; for Chelsea expatriates, see DN, May 5, 1908; for Methodists, see EH, July 1, 1907.

⁸⁵ws, December 9, 1908. For business interests, see DN, February 15, 1908, and EC, January 18, 1908.

⁸⁶EC, September 28, November 4, 1908. For business in the United States, see EH, February 3, 1904.

⁸⁷*East Boston News* extract in EH, October 12, 1896. For Crosbie siblings, see Michael Harris, *Rare Ambition: The Crosbies of Newfoundland* (Toronto: Penguin, 1992), 39.

⁸⁸ws, June 21, 1901.

⁸⁹For Downey, EH, March 23, 1904. For Murphy and electric power, see Melvin Baker, Robert Pitt, Janet Miller Pitt, *The Illustrated History of Newfoundland Light & Power* (St. John's: Creative, 1990), 175, 182. For Morison, see EH, March 16, 1900; DN, September 5, 12, 1907, and July 28, 1908.

⁹⁰DN, March 31, 1904; also W.R. Howley to editor, DN, May 23, 1903. For Gibbs, see J.R. Smallwood, *Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador*, Vol. II (St. John's: Newfoundland Book Publishers, 1984), 520.

⁹¹For defection, see ws, April 22, 1903. For 1904 election, see ET, September 29, 1904.

⁹²The *Newfoundland Quarterly* (hereafter NQ), III (December 1903): 2. For Goodison, see BH extract in EH, October 22, 1900, and DN, May 5, 1908. For Kennedy, see EH, October 4, 1901; for Moore, see NQ IX (March 1910): 15, and DN, September 25, 1899; for Piccott, DN, April 14, May 20, 1908; for Whiteway, see EC, February 4, September 28, 1908; and for Woods, see DN, August 11, 1899; ET, April 6, 1894; and ET, July 23, 1906.

⁹³For Bond, see Wendy Martin, *Once Upon a Mine: Story of Pre-Confederation Mines on the Island of Newfoundland* (Montreal: The Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1983), 32. For Roberts, see *Twillingate Sun* extract in EH, October 6, 1906.

⁹⁴EC, October 6, 1908.

⁹⁵For collapse in fish prices, see Hiller, "Bond," 30.

⁹⁶Letter, MacGregor to Earl of Crewe, November 25, 1908, C.O., Vol. 273, 324. For overviews of the campaign, see Hiller, "Bond," 34-5; Noel, *Politics*, Chapter 5; and F. Vallis, "Sectarianism as a Factor in the 1908 Election," NQ 6 (January 1974): 17-28.

⁹⁷ET, September 29, 1908; Noel, *Politics*, 65.

⁹⁸ET, September 29, 30, October 24, 1908. For "magnificent" fight, see ET, October 13, 17, November 2, 1908; and EH, October 14, 1908.

⁹⁹EC, September 30, 1908.

¹⁰⁰ET, September 29, 1908.

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¹⁰¹ET, October 20, 1908.

¹⁰²See for examples, ET, September 24-26, 1908; EH, October 14, 1908.

¹⁰³ET, October 13, 1908.

¹⁰⁴DN, October 15, 1908.

¹⁰⁵ET, October 21, 1905.

¹⁰⁶For press items, see EC, October 6-8, 19, 23, 31, December 4-7, 18, 20, 1907; and May 15, August 14, 18-19, 1908.

¹⁰⁷EC, October 30, 1908; for "fads" see Hiller, "Bond," 28-29.

¹⁰⁸EC, October 22, 1908.

¹⁰⁹EC, October 5, 1908.

¹¹⁰EC, October 27, 1908; for Roberts, see EC, October 19, 1908.

¹¹¹EC, October 19-20, 1908.

¹¹²EC, October 30, 1908.

¹¹³*Ibid.*

¹¹⁴EC, October 13, 1908. For Bond, see Hiller, "Bond," 35. For Morris' travels, see Vallis, "Sectarianism," 21, and EC, September 16, 1908.

¹¹⁵ET, October 31, November 2, 1908.

¹¹⁶ET, November 2, 1908; EH, October 29, 1908.

¹¹⁷DN, October 14, 1908.

¹¹⁸For returns, see EH, November 11, 1908; Vallis, "Sectarianism," 27-28.

¹¹⁹Vallis, "Sectarianism," 27-28.

¹²⁰ws, October 21, 28, 1908; EC, October 23, 1908.

¹²¹Vallis, "Sectarianism," 28.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 27.

¹²³EC, November 4, 1908; October 30, 1908.

¹²⁴EC, April 30, May 16, 1908.

¹²⁵Newfoundland, *Census*, 1911, Vol. I, xiii.

¹²⁶Reverend E.B. Curran, "Newfoundland and Its Fisheries," *Donahoe's Magazine* LVII (March 1907): 236. For Dalton's endorsement, see EC, October 15, 1908.

¹²⁷EC, October 6, 1908.

¹²⁸EC, October 1, 1908.

¹²⁹EC, October 5, 1908.

¹³⁰For Confederation, see Noel, *Politics*, 25. For Church and "secular economic nationalism," see Kerr, "Analysis," 294n., 295. For clerical influence in Ferryland, see Cashin, *Life*, 76, and Kerr, "Analysis," 319-20. For correlation, see Vallis, "Sectarianism," 24.

¹³¹Vallis, "Sectarianism," 24.