The Debating Talents of the First Governor of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, François-Gabriel d’Angeac, 1764-1769

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Nations have affections for themselves, though they have none for one another; the body politic has no heart... political humanity... is not likely to be found in a country of commerce.

In 1969, explaining Governor Hugh Palliser’s campaign to reorganize and police the Newfoundland fishery between 1764 and 1768, William H. Whiteley mentioned in passing that François-Gabriel d’Angeac (1708-1782), the first governor of St. Pierre and Miquelon, “smoothly” defended the French against Palliser’s accusations of treaty violations. The article, based on British sources, did not mention certain earlier works that had touched on the subject, and a number of others have appeared since. Re-examining the exchanges between the British and French governors, this essay reflects upon d’Angeac as an advocate of French imperial interests. As the title implies, the focus is less on the veracity, legality or probity of his argument than on his ability to articulate it.

THE CONTEXT

In the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris (1763), the Newfoundland fishery was crucial. France obtained the renewal of the right, originally granted by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, to fish on the so-called French Shore between Cape Bonavista and Pointe Riche, as well as the conditional cession of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. But, in their anxiety to achieve peace, the British and French governments postponed discussion of several controversial issues until after the
signing of the document. The French interpreted the treaty as flexibly as possible. British ministers, under fire from opponents in Parliament for having conceded any Newfoundland fishing rights at all, sought to limit French ambitions by a narrow interpretation of the treaty.

Thus the French contended that the renewal of their coastal fishing rights implied exclusivity, and indeed, this had been largely undisputed de facto from 1713 to 1756. Since the intention of the treaty was the continuation of the French fishery, they maintained, the occupation of harbours on the French Shore by British subjects was designed to hinder its revival and France had no reason suddenly to abandon a portion of the rights it had hitherto enjoyed. The British government maintained the right of British subjects to use that coast, contending that absence between 1713 and 1756 did not mean they had given up a right to which they were entitled under the Treaty of Utrecht. The two sides remained adamant. In practice, however, the French Shore fishery after 1763 was concurrent. The French insisted this was a temporary situation, subject to adequate harvests of cod by their fishers. The British asserted that concurrence was permanent, and in order to settle the priority of claims to harbours, a compromise system of two “admirals,” French and British, was devised, but only after a great deal of argument. The British also hoped to make other Newfoundland coasts, along with the newly-acquired Labrador, monopolies of the English ship fishery.

“Exclusivity” was not the only issue left pending by the Treaty of Paris. The southern limit of the French Shore on the west coast had been “fixed” at Pointe Riche, without clear knowledge of where that geographical feature actually was. The two parties offered “cartographical evidence” for and against placing it at Cape Ray. Putting it there would have given the French access to the whole west coast. The British located it some 80 leagues further north. The question remained unresolved until 1783.

Two issues arose directly from a concurrent fishery on the French Shore. One was how late in the season the French could remain on the coast. The French wanted their fishers to be allowed to finish drying their catch before returning to France. The British suspected the bartering of French goods with Newfoundlanders, and naval officers on the scene recommended fixing a compulsory departure date. After considerable debate, French fishers were allowed to stay as late as the end of October, and French ministers undertook not to countenance smuggling. The second issue was whether French fishers had the right to leave boats, fishing equipment and salt on the French Shore over the winter. Suspecting the French of selling excess salt to Newfoundlanders, the British contended that the treaties gave the French the right to build huts for use during the fishing season only, and not for storing boats, equipment or salt during the winter. They could take those materials to St. Pierre for safekeeping if they did not wish to take them back to France: that had been one of the reasons for granting the islands to France. The French countered that anything curtailing an already short season, including transport time, threat-
ened to nullify the fishery. In 1763, as the owners left one of the harbours for France, a British naval officer ordered the burning of boats and equipment and confiscated the salt. The French protested, and the British eventually paid damages. There was, in due course, an understanding that the salt could be buried over the winter, and covered with sod.\textsuperscript{17}

St. Pierre and Miquelon, ceded as an unfortified shelter and base for the fishery, presented another set of issues. The islands had a dual function: to be a safe haven for the metropolitan fishing fleets — the “dry” fishery of the French Shore (where Frenchmen were allowed to land their catches) and the “green” fishery of the Grand Banks — and also to be the successor to Île Royale and Plaisance as France’s North American resident fishery. It was hoped that eventually the residents would produce enough fish for sale to satisfy demand in the Antilles and Europe.\textsuperscript{18} But given the fragile economy of the islands, the French government sought to limit the number of settlers in order to maintain a balance between population and available resources. A number of fishers, from Île Royale for example, could be absorbed,\textsuperscript{19} but there was far too little arable land on Miquelon for the many experienced Acadian farmers who wished to settle there and who, skilled though they might also be at hunting and woodcraft, had no experience as full-time fishers. In 1763 the Crown authorized and transported, in addition to military and administrative personnel, only fishers and their dependents as the initial settlers. This did not prevent over 250 Acadians from arriving in 1763 and 1764, uninvited and on their own initiative, from Boston and Halifax. As a result, the economic viability of the islands was somewhat precarious. In any event, their dual function, and their proximity to Newfoundland, raised the problems which are the main focus of this paper, since it was with them that d’Angeac was mainly concerned.

As the re-establishment of the French fishery required the co-operation of government and the private sector, the advice of the armateurs (outfitters) was enlisted. The most able among them, Louis Bretel, a Granville lawyer, was retained as a permanent advisor. The government would provide naval protection, in the hope that the armateurs could be persuaded, by the prospect of recovering markets\textsuperscript{20} and pre-war profit levels, to re-invest in the necessities of the industry: the manufacturing, provisioning and the expensive fitting-out of terreneuviers. The livelihood of many families on the Channel and Atlantic coasts of France — particularly in St. Malo and Granville\textsuperscript{21} — was dependent upon the restoration of the Newfoundland fishery following wartime deprivation. The primary and secondary industries would again provide employment, and the government would benefit from the naval manpower pool (the “nursery for seamen”) which the fishery, of all the merchant marine’s components, was best suited to furnish.\textsuperscript{22} The policy developed by the Duc de Choiseul, France’s principal minister (who was preparing “with determination” for an “inevitable war” with Great Britain in the distant future),\textsuperscript{23} was to assert France’s maritime claims, but with caution: for even a combined Franco-Spanish force was still far from ready to challenge the British navy. Ap-
plied to the fishery, the policy was to meet, with prudent confrontation, British determination to prevent its recovery: it was to be protected and fostered without provoking British armed hostility, which might well discourage investment by armateurs, even if it stopped short of war.  

Hugh Palliser (1723-1796), the senior British naval officer in Newfoundland and Labrador and governor of both between 1764 and 1768, was determined to enforce the treaties governing the fishery and the laws concerning colonial and foreign trade which, he was certain, Newfoundland residents, New Englanders and Frenchmen all tried to circumvent. He aimed to promote the English ship fisheries, discourage the Newfoundlanders’ boat fisheries and to exclude American colonials, his aim being to benefit the British economy and the wartime manning of the Royal Navy. By extension, he hoped to eliminate St. Pierre and Miquelon as an entrepôt for illicit trade with the French, and in 1764 he inaugurated year-round patrols in the narrow channel between the islands and Newfoundland’s south coast. During the fishing season Palliser was the senior agent of British policy in Newfoundland. During the rest of the year, when he was in England, he relied on naval subordinates and civil magistrates to ensure that official orders were carried out.

D’Angeac was appointed governor of St. Pierre and Miquelon in 1763 and remained in the colony year-round. His original instructions concentrated on the islands and said nothing about the French Shore. He was ordered to restrict the number of Acadians settling in the colony, to forbid outright the admission of mainland Amerindians, and as governor, to “look after everything concerning the fishery and the drying facilities of the French fishermen in the said islands.” But he was also the senior agent of French policy in Newfoundland waters, and had broader responsibilities. In 1764, for instance, he was told to provide, as soon as possible, a detailed report on the potential value of the fishery along the French Shore between the areas long frequented by the French and the British, the kind of “no man’s land” that existed between the Petit Nord at La Scie (near Cape St. John) and Bonavista, and to examine Trinity Bay as well. Since it was too late in the season to expect such information to be gathered by metropolitan fishers, he was to hire a trustworthy colonist who would send two shallows to each of those shores. Discretion was extremely important: only the colonist, definitely not the ministry, must appear to be involved, though the former was to receive a gratuity and to be compensated for damage in the event of “an accident.”

Palliser was a Yorkshireman, but D’Angeac was a native of Newfoundland (he had been born at Plaisance), and had some affinity with colonists, whether French or British who, if they obeyed mercantilist laws, had long been at the mercy of metropolitan merchants for the supply of necessities, not to mention luxuries. D’Angeac therefore sought to reconcile imperial responsibilities and colonial realities. He had grown to maturity in the colony of Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), where he had followed his father as an officer of the Troupes de la Marine, had par-
anticipated in the two sieges of Louisbourg, and had distinguished himself in the
defence of the Restigouche in 1760.32

THE DEBATE BETWEEN PALLISER AND D’ANGEAC

Over a five-year period, the two governors argued over closely related topics: rival
claims to the right to police the fishery and trade, the fishing boundary between St.
Pierre and Miquelon and southern Newfoundland, illicit trade, and the search for
wood. Each wrote in his own language; each had a translator interpret letters re-
ceived.

RIVAL CLAIMS TO POLICE THE FISHERY AND TRADE

Since the British had no wish to foster the French fishery, neither the French gov-
ernment nor the armateurs really expected British “protection” for their
terreneuviers. Every year from 1763 to 1768 (except 1766), France sent to New-
foundland waters one or more naval vessels to inspect, police and protect the
French fishery. The naval commander in 1763, 1764, 1767 and 1768 was L’Ollivier
de Tronjoly, and in 1765 the Chevalier d’Herlye.33 During the first two years,
Tronjoly was told to ensure that the English did not interfere with French fishers on
the French Shore, that differences among fishers were settled fairly, and that the
French were allowed to fish until the end of the season but no longer,34 leaving be-
hind their flakes and huts, with equipment, boats and leftover salt. He did so in
1763. In 1764 he did not go to the French Shore because damage to his frigate made
it impossible for him to go both there and to St. Pierre before returning to France.
Instead, he decided to cruise in the Gulf of St. Lawrence “chiefly to prove to M.
Palliser that His Majesty is perfectly within his rights to have warships there.”35
Palliser threatened to use force against the French squadron, claiming that Britain
had the exclusive right to inspect, police and protect the French fishery. Asserting
that the French were entitled to have only fishing vessels, not warships, in the Gulf,
he accused them of encouraging the inhabitants of unspecified Gulf ports —
French-speaking and Amerindian “new subjects” — to carry on illicit trade.36

Although the French ships were outnumbed and outgunned,37 and their visit
to St. Pierre relatively brief, Palliser also accused d’Angeac of circumventing the
treaty ban on the fortification of St. Pierre by rallying armed forces there. In 1765 he
demanded that French naval vessels stay away from St. Pierre.38 The French gov-
ernment had no intention of complying,39 and each year the ships were told to call at
St. Pierre and cruise off the Grand Banks (but no longer the French Shore — an un-
mentioned concession to the British), before returning to France with official des-
patches. Herlye, acting on d’Angeac’s advice,40 so informed Palliser when the
British governor challenged his right to be there. D'Angeac reiterated that no fortifications had been built on the islands — something Palliser should know, since his frigates were there often enough — nor did France intend to build any.41

In 1766, France emphasized caution. There was considerable agitation in Britain and the colonies as a result of the Stamp Act (1765) and its imminent repeal, demanded by British commercial interests threatened by American retaliation. It was not a time to provoke the British authorities and so, instead of a warship, a royal supply vessel came to St. Pierre,42 with a reminder to d'Angeac of his responsibility for the discipline of the French fishers. He was to prevent as far as possible the illegal landing in France of cod purchased from the English by issuing sharp warnings to fishers who called at St. Pierre; and he was to make detailed reports of related information.43 Also, fishers were to bury leftover salt, cover it with sod, and on no account sell any of it.44 Such mercantilist edicts45 affirmed the vice-regal authority of the government of St. Pierre over the whole French fishery.

In 1767 d'Angeac told Palliser that French warships were to enforce treaty articles.46 After visiting the Grand Banks, Tronjoly would confer with d'Angeac at St. Pierre, and then return to France with Acadian families.47 He was to reject any attempt by Palliser to make him curtail his stay, for nothing in the treaties forbade such a mission.48

By 1767 Palliser believed a winter naval patrol of the south coast was no longer necessary,49 but during the fishing season he wanted more and better naval vessels to police both the south and the north simultaneously. They were needed not only to frustrate the restoration of France's fishery, but also to pursue New Englanders and Newfoundlanders who traded with the French, competed with English ship fishers and harassed Labrador Natives.50 Even without reinforcements, however, his patrols felt free to enter St. Pierre harbour at will, stopping vessels of any nationality or home port and examining their cargoes. D'Angeac felt he was on strong legal ground in protesting this behaviour, arguing that there was nothing in the treaties to give the British the right to enter St. Pierre. However, he assured Palliser that he wanted to maintain Anglo-French harmony, and would abide by the rules — if only rules could be agreed upon.51 D'Angeac claimed to be "exceptionally pleased" that Palliser understood this. His priority had always been to follow the King's orders, the most important of which was "to pay scrupulous attention to overseeing the strict observance of the treaties." He would punish those who breached treaty provisions, and abide by the treaties without resorting to violence in peacetime.52 Nevertheless, in 1768 the British still presumed the right to pursue vessels into St. Pierre harbour. For example, on one occasion a British frigate fired three shots at a French shallop as it was entering, and when that failed to stop it, sent an armed barge.53

The French government took the position in 1767 that until the dispute was settled at the diplomatic level, naval vessels should visit St. Pierre only.54 But in 1768, Tronjoly was instructed to protect French fishermen on the Grand Banks, referee their disputes, and report any who failed, after being cautioned, to observe treaty
limits. When d'Angeac asked for specific instructions on how to respond to incursions at St. Pierre, the minister of marine in February 1769 approved his past conduct. He was to continue avoiding armed clashes with the British while "firmly repeating" that France would stand up for its rights. Governor John Byron, who replaced Palliser in 1769, did not exchange letters with d'Angeac, although his vessels continued to enter the colony's port, and for several years no French warships were sent to Newfoundland. In the long run, however — after 1783, and particularly after 1815 — the British came to recognize France's right to police her own fishery and to exclude foreign warships from St. Pierre.

**ST. PIERRE ET MIQUELON AND SOUTHERN NEWFOUNDLAND**

In the face of criticism from the parliamentary opposition during a period of political instability, British ministers felt obliged to minimize the concessions which had been made to France. This entailed competing on the French Shore, and trying to undermine the viability of both the sedentary fishery at St. Pierre and Miquelon, and of the colony itself. If successful, this strategy could render the French fishery less and less profitable to the *armateurs* upon whose very large investments its survival depended, and damage French commercial and naval policy. There was, as a result, considerable wrangling over how the treaties governed the rights of French subjects to fish and trade in and around their colony. The French asserted a right to fish in the waters around St. Pierre and Miquelon, needed wood from Newfoundland for fuel and buildings, and wanted the colony to develop into a trading centre. Palliser and the British sought to prevent, or at least limit the local fishery and illicit trade, and to stop residents of the islands crossing to Newfoundland. The stakes were high, since the underlying issue was whether the French fishery was to survive and prosper.

(a) The fishing boundary

Although there was international agreement that vessels were not to pass closer than one league (approximately three miles) from the coastlines of foreign colonies, in the Caribbean ships sailing among their own islands often had to navigate quite close to foreign shorelines. Choiseul contended that any suspension of the "one-league" rule ought to include St. Pierre and Miquelon, whose proximity to Newfoundland's coast raised questions concerning where ships from either side could go. He was unable to win his point: the British were convinced that even the existing limit, whereby French ships were not to come within three leagues of the Newfoundland coast, was inadequate. The British did stop short, however, of claiming that the islands were within Newfoundland territorial waters.
In 1765 Palliser accused the crews of seven French shallops of fishing in Newfoundland waters, and three of them of wintering inland, cutting timber and building shallops, contrary to d’Angeac’s orders that fishers must stay within treaty limits. D’Angeac agreed that the complaints were justified. He had been unaware of those activities, and the offenders would be sent to France. He was “incapable of any infraction of the treaties,” he told Palliser, but he nevertheless made a sharp distinction between those arrested for fishing outside Newfoundland ports and bays, and those who landed on Newfoundland soil. The latter were clearly in breach of the treaty. In spite of precautions, “there were always refractory and disreputable people who contravened orders and were guided only by a spirit of piracy and brigandage.” Such individuals were “too despicable to be admitted into society as members.”

At the same time, d’Angeac intimated that there was collusion between his own “wayward” colonists and the inhabitants of southern Newfoundland (which hardly displeased him). Ironically, he asked Palliser, “But would there not be some slight acquaintance on the part of the English inhabitants who suffer their presence? Are they not free to chase them away whenever they go there? If they did so, they would assuredly oblige me.” That such collusion existed was confirmed when Palliser, in an order of 9 July 1765, exiled nine Newfoundland residents who had fished for and traded with Frenchmen, and confiscated their belongings. He also forbade “the practice of the inhabitants, particularly on the southwest coast of Newfoundland, to employ in the fishery numbers of Frenchmen contrary to law.” Those who did so in future would forfeit their shallops.

D’Angeac wanted an agreement between the two powers as to how close to the Newfoundland shore fishers from St. Pierre could come. He emphasized that in summer the fish were quite close to the land, and the French were now afraid to follow them. “If we are forced to keep three leagues away from that coast, we are scarcely able to leave this harbour,” and the fishery would have to be abandoned. He characterized Palliser as someone in a “wild and restless mood ... who cannot keep himself in check.” The visits of British warships led d’Angeac to lament that there was “no sadder or more critical position than mine: no armed force, no shelter....” The inhabitants of his colony were discouraged, and the ships that came to fish did not know where they stood in law.

In September 1765 the British released six men from a Miquelon schooner found in Placentia Bay, apparently forced there by bad weather. However, the schooner was confiscated since the crew was accused of having begun to cut down and load timber — “three pieces of wood,” according to d’Angeac. He appealed to Palliser to return the schooner, whose owner was entirely dependent on it to feed and clothe his large family. Since there had been no crime, could Palliser not be charitable? Were his superiors’ orders so restrictive that he could not grant the kind of hospitality offered even in wartime by people who were no longer barbarians? Surely even strict orders could be extenuated, for wrongdoing had not been proved.
D’Angeac was “persuaded” that Palliser could become “the advocate of that poor wretch.” “Plead the case; you will be performing a work of charity. I believe you are disposed to do so.” It would have been out of character for Palliser to be won over by such eloquence. He replied curtly that if the “non-barbarian” French respected the law, they too would be respected. D’Angeac should warn his people there would be a guard on the coast to prevent encroachments during the winter of 1765-66.

In August 1766, d’Angeac was still waiting for a letter of 19 June from Versailles, which would indicate officially that the British had consented to fishing off the “shores” of St. Pierre and Miquelon (without stipulating which shores), provided the French “did not go beyond those waters.” Although this directive was vague, until he received it he saw an opportunity to temporize. He informed Palliser that until he received clear instructions he had no intention of telling his colony’s fishers they could not fish to the east of the islands. Regardless of what Palliser had learned before leaving England he, d’Angeac, had yet to receive word; and so, as a military person, he would await orders before acting, “especially when it is a matter of the rights of nations.” To his minister, he added on 7 August that he preferred to see some of his people’s shallopstaken than to acknowledge any right of the British by acquiescing in their claims. The treaties did not mention distance restrictions on French fishing shallopst. The following year, when he could properly tell Palliser that “we have the right to fish in these waters,” he reiterated that he would continue to oblige French subjects to respect the treaties and the rights of man.

When d’Angeac assured Palliser in 1766 that the “severe, precise orders” he had given to the inhabitants that they were not to approach Newfoundland “had been followed by them to the letter,” the British governor toned down his rhetoric. He appealed for co-operation in keeping “persistent interlopers” away from the Newfoundland coasts. That, he was convinced, would lead the offenders to realize the futility of attempting to obtain by stealth what they were excluded from by treaty.

In contrast to his view of Palliser who, he remarked to the minister, went repeatedly over old ground because he had no new grievances, d’Angeac portrayed himself as a victim. Despite his efforts to observe the peace treaties and human rights, he had to put up with repeated British violations of those very laws and principles. He cited several examples of “apparently innocent” shallopst having been taken by patrol vessels in 1766, some as early as January. Assuming, rhetorically, that such acts had been perpetrated without Palliser’s knowledge, he asked the British governor to correct them — unless, of course, Palliser was aware of some new regulations that made those acts legal: in which case he, d’Angeac, wished to be informed so that he could obey them; “since I wish for nothing more than to avoid all bother.”
(b) Illicit Trade, and the Search for Wood

Article 11 of Palliser’s instructions (1764) specified that he was to use his best endeavours to prevent any commerce between our subjects under your government and the [Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon], by means whereof the inhabitants of those islands may have the double advantage of getting easily and cheaply the materials for building vessels and erecting houses and works necessary for the fishery and of circulating French produce and manufactures amongst the British fishermen.  

D’Angeac advised the Duc de Choiseul in September 1763 that his colonists needed wood from Newfoundland, since there was an acute shortage on the islands. Letters from Tronjoly and a priest confirmed this. D’Angeac, expecting that Choiseul would ask British permission, added that both Newfoundland and St. Pierre residents would benefit from the trade. Contrary to the advice of his ambassador in London, Choiseul did not think British approval was necessary. In his opinion, French colonists had the right under the Treaty of Paris to cut Newfoundland wood for fuel, and for the construction of fishing vessels. In 1764 French colonists were reported to be cutting Newfoundland wood to build houses on Miquelon, and purchasing wood from New England merchantmen as well. In addition, Choiseul wanted wood for shipping to the Antilles, as he was concerned by the high cost of sending it out from France. In 1764 St. Pierre and Miquelon was asked to supply wood for the Antilles, and Choiseul must have known that it would have to come from Newfoundland. For his part, d’Angeac believed he was authorized to close his eyes to the acts of “those of our nation who might dare to obtain this help for us.” Thus, when Palliser complained that summer that men from St. Pierre had plundered southern Newfoundland harbours and stolen timber, d’Angeac replied that Palliser must have been misled by false reports. As Morandière has remarked, however, smugglers were able to exploit the area around Bay d’Espoir where there was no one to interfere with them except the occasional British frigate.

However, British patrols did help contain illicit trade at St. Pierre after 1765, once Parliament had passed an act expressly forbidding it. Such trade began in 1763 and 1764 with the exchange of “English” cod for French goods, during which time approximately 10,000 quintals were delivered to St. Pierre for purchase by French merchants. D’Angeac did not interfere, since most French ships calling at St. Pierre would otherwise have returned home empty, the colonists having too few shallop to guarantee full loads of “their own” fish. French merchants combined this illicit commerce with the resumption of the triangular trade between France, St. Pierre and the West Indies. From 1765 to 1769 an average of 37 ships a year came to St. Pierre from France, and they almost certainly carried fish to St. Domingue. And yet, metropolitan merchants could not be relied upon to guarantee regular delivery of essential supplies.
Palliser doubted that St. Pierre and Miquelon, a colony established as a haven for French fishers, possessed the right a sovereign state might have to protect illicit traders, and responded by sending several small cruisers "attended by shallops" to patrol around the islands from early spring until late fall to apprehend offenders. He did not tell his superiors that his ships would actually invade the harbours of the French colony.

As we have seen, Newfoundlanders on the south coast actively traded fish for French goods at least until 1765. In June of that year Palliser also complained to Herlye that, among other things, Frenchmen from St. Pierre and Miquelon had cut down and taken away an "immense quantity" of wood. In addition, St. Pierre merchants continued to purchase wood from New Englanders. By 1766 the trade was becoming problematic, given Choiseul's policy of restraint during the Stamp Act crisis. D'Angeac and his administrator, Beaudéduit, therefore decided they could no longer close their official eyes to illicit imports, including wood, because, as they wrote, one time period's necessity often became another's abuse. This illicit trade was forbidden and, if left unobstructed, could soon be carried too far. That summer they did not confiscate the cargoes of three New England ships whose captains claimed they had been forced by weather to call at St. Pierre, but took note in detail of their cargoes and warned them that in future under such circumstances they could no longer count on the colonial government's indulgence. They now asked for official direction on how to deal with such illicit trade.

The identity of persons described by d'Angeac in August 1766 as "vagabonds who without permission went to cut some wood on the island of Newfoundland" is not clear, but if the act occurred outside the fishing season they could not have been sailors from the Grand Banks green fishery, about whom d'Angeac did complain. He wanted to stop captains of the terreneuviers from visiting St. Pierre on the pretext of taking on water, but really to gather wood, and was annoyed that metropolitan captains questioned his authority on the grounds they did not belong to the colony.

At the end of 1767 Palliser informed Whitehall that an exodus of people from St. Pierre and Miquelon was a result of his campaign against illicit trade, but that could have been no more than a contributing factor. In fact, the French government had imposed a restriction on the number of Acadians in the colony, and tried to induce the rest to move to a government-assisted settlement in Guiana. Those assembled on Miquelon for that purpose had refused the offer, protesting that they could not tolerate the hot climate. In 1766 some were sent to France, while others hid. D'Angeac remarked that it was sad the islands were not larger and better supplied with wood, but keeping these "miserable refugees" would become "prejudicial." But since it would be unfair to send them back to the British colonies, they should go to France, where there was much uncultivated land. At minimal cost to the state, those "unfortunate people" could be settled on "those neglected tracts of
land" which, though unattractive, were certain to be more fertile than the soil of the islands. Only if coerced would they ever go to the tropics.\textsuperscript{101}

The shortage of wood in 1767 was demonstrated by an urgent request for twenty cords to be sent from France as fuel for the two guardhouses.\textsuperscript{102} There is no mention of wood in the official correspondence for 1768, but within six years it was one of the commodities regularly brought to St. Pierre by New England vessels. In 1776 the British tried to put an end to this trade, and Governor John Montagu was authorized to allow French colonists to take, in his territory, all the wood they needed for the construction and upkeep of houses, schools, flakes, boats and so forth.\textsuperscript{103} This, along with similar liberty gained after 1783 by the crews of \textit{terreneuviens} on the "new" west-coast French Shore, suggests that the French colony's desperate search for wood had never seriously threatened the British, but had been a pretext to intimidate offending colonists of both nationalities.

**ILLEGITIMATE TRADE WITH NEW ENGLAND**

As early as 1764, the French government developed a secret plan to turn St. Pierre into an entrepôt for illicit Anglo-French trade, as Plaisance (1663-1713) and Île Royale (1713-1758) had been. Vessels of various sizes would carry tropical products from the Antilles to New England and Canada, in exchange for timber and lumber. One adviser, recalling that illicit trade at Louisbourg had amounted to three million livres, predicted that, barring a new war, St. Pierre would flourish because it would be the only place where Great Britain could obtain produce from St. Domingue and Martinique.\textsuperscript{104} Although d'Angeac's initial instructions\textsuperscript{105} were silent on the revival of this trade, the Duc de Choiseul could see in it both economic and political advantages for France. It would help meet growing demands: of New England distillers for Caribbean molasses;\textsuperscript{106} of slaveowners in the Antilles for second-rate cod; of Europeans for first-rate cod; and of colonists throughout North America for French goods at reasonable prices.\textsuperscript{107} Choiseul astutely forecast an eventual uprising of Britain's North American colonies,\textsuperscript{108} and naturally supported anything, even on a small scale, that might further their independence while strengthening France. That was consistent with a gradual loosening of the reins of the \textit{exclusif}, the framework of French mercantilist law.\textsuperscript{109} For its part, Great Britain was going in the opposite direction: enforcing existing laws against such practices and introducing new ones. The trade of colonial merchants was more circumscribed than it had been for decades.\textsuperscript{110}

Palliser was expected to prevent illicit trade\textsuperscript{111} and d'Angeac was well aware that it was the main reason for the constant British patrols. Whereas in November 1765 he told Palliser he was unable to identify the nationality of a merchantman that had come to St. Pierre,\textsuperscript{112} in 1766 he reproached Palliser for charging that St. Pierre was carrying on a "large" amount of business with New Englanders. "They have
taken our money," he wrote, "it is true; in return for a few boards, cabbages, apples and onions." He could not have got along without that help, which the government had not forbidden. He had, however, told the New Englanders not to return, since he would be sorry to see them taken.\footnote{113}

Indeed, 1766 was a time for caution and not for apparent collusion with rebellious New England merchants. D'Angeac had been unable before to get along without the boards and other wood his islands lacked; now he could, since everyone was housed. Admittedly he was still in need of foodstuffs such as beef and salt meats, but the prices were too high. This applied even to commodities such as apples, flour and pears: a ship from Canada had just made a profit of about 1,243.09 percent from the sale of a cargo of those items.\footnote{114} He proposed an alternative: his colony could obtain steers, cows, sheep and poultry from the Azores at a very good price if two ships were sent there from St. Pierre with the approval of the minister and the cognizance of the Portuguese ambassador at Versailles. Within two years the islands would be sufficiently provided with livestock, since the pastureland was excellent and there was no lack of fodder.\footnote{115} Nothing appears to have come of that proposal.

Yet even as Palliser believed his attack on American trade had succeeded,\footnote{116} d'Angeac began to regret that New England ships were not coming to St. Pierre. Early in the season, one with a cargo of boards had been prevented by fog from entering the harbour and had not been seen since. One that had reached St. Pierre, a sloop bound for Quebec with a cargo of wine and brandy, was seized in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. After that, visits from other vessels were prevented by what d'Angeac called "privateers"\footnote{117} cruising just outside the colony's waters, boarding every vessel within reach, or questioning ships' officers on the number of men they had, their cargoes and their home port. The colony's loss of American trade until the mid-1770s was complicated by the activities of metropolitan captains at St. Pierre, such as their quest for wood noted above.\footnote{118}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

According to Jean-François Brière, the real rivalry for dominance was not between the metropolitan French and British fisheries, but between both of them and the North American resident fisheries.\footnote{119} Let us examine the Palliser-d'Angeac debate in light of that assertion.

Undoubtedly, British policy-makers were anxious about the size of the New England fishery and the growth of a resident fishery at Newfoundland. The more numerous colonial fishers became, the more they competed with the migratory ships, and the less they supported British interests. The Newfoundlanders' fishing season began earlier and finished later, and they were unavailable for wartime naval service. Whenever they could elude British patrols, they would sell fish that English ships might have taken to New Englanders and Frenchmen, in exchange for
goods that were unobtainable in Newfoundland. Admittedly, they also sold it to English fishers (though not necessarily for the best prices), but their main value was their "invasion" of the French Shore, challenging the "exclusivity" of the metropolitan French dry fishery and thereby, it was hoped, threatening its recovery. The New Englanders were even more serious competitors: although their season was shorter than that of Newfoundland residents, it was longer than that of the English. When they could evade British scrutiny, they traded Anglo-American and West Indian commodities with Newfoundlanders, and at St. Pierre and Miquelon, and challenged a British monopoly by supplying fishing equipment Newfoundlanders could not make themselves. Palliser’s interpretation of official policy entailed unstinting support for the English ship fishery, outright hostility toward the Newfoundland residents and New Englanders, and a determination to forestall, by various means, the restoration of the French fishery. He acted from a position of naval strength in order to impose English mercantilism through a narrow interpretation of international treaties.

As we have noted, in 1769 d’Angeac was informed that his superiors fully approved his interpretation of French policy regarding uninvited visits by British warships to St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the right to fish in the channel between the islands and Newfoundland. He stood up for French treaty rights while resisting a strong temptation to come to blows with the “neighbours.” During the period 1713-1755 the French metropolitan fishery had been partially dependent on the sedentary fisheries of Île Royale and Gaspé. Their disappearance, and the loss of de facto exclusivity on the French Shore, made France more dependent on the sedentary fishery at St. Pierre and Miquelon than the metropolitan armateurs might have liked. For that reason, the Court emphasized the local fishery as the mainstay of the colony, with implications for the size and nature of the colonial population; and until the colonial fishery was in operation, ministers turned a blind eye to the purchase of fish from Newfoundlanders and the search for wood on Newfoundland soil. Throughout the period the government supported the right of inhabitants to fish off the colony’s shores, including in the channel. It supplied the colony with some essentials, but did not direct the governor to refuse Anglo-American supplies, despite the illicit character of that trade, as long as it continued with immunity. France wished to play an imperial role, but had to bide its time. Turning the loss of New France to advantage during the growing restlessness in much of British North America, France sought hegemony in the Antilles, in the Levant and in southeast Asia; and in the cod fishery, equality. Pending the recovery of naval strength, these aims had to be pursued by diplomacy, exploiting Britain’s entanglement with its semi-independent colonies. Part of the process was to resist attempts by the British to restrict the growth of the French fishery.

D’Angeac, a 56-year-old soldier, acted from a position of naval weakness. Fully aware of his government’s objectives, he followed orders when they were clear and asked for clarity when they were ambiguous or were lacking. As a native
of the region and as a resident of the colony he had, unlike Palliser, a great deal of sympathy for the sedentary fishery and for his colonists, acting as their spokesman both with his superiors in France and with the British governor. D'Angeac proved to be an ideal choice for the governorship of France's tiny colony off Newfoundland's south coast. He fought an uphill battle against Palliser's bullying tactics, but was a very effective verbal advocate for his government. As a result, although the colony's population was reduced, it was viable; although the French fishery was confined within treaty limits, it included the colony's own waters; although there were repeated attempts to prevent French warships from coming to St. Pierre, they did so during all but one of the five difficult years; and although Palliser celebrated the end of Franco-American trade at St. Pierre, his successors would be hard put to make that "termination" permanent. Moreover, it is arguable that had d'Angeac and his naval colleagues not held their ground during the late 1760s, the next step, maintaining in the longer term unrestricted sovereignty over St. Pierre-Miquelon, might have been more difficult. Eventually the French also gained a de facto seasonal exclusivity on a geographically altered French Shore, with the right to take wood for the use of the fishery and the right of French naval vessels to patrol the area. Unlike St. Pierre and Miquelon, however, this achievement barely outlived the nineteenth century. Increasingly unpopular in Newfoundland, and used less and less by French fishers, the Shore was sacrificed in the Entente of 1904 to other French ambitions.

ARCHIVAL ABBREVIATIONS

AN: France, Archives nationales
Cols.: Fonds des Colonies
Marine: Fonds de la Marine
MAE: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères
PRO: Great Britain, Public Record Office
CO: Colonial Office
Adm.: Admiralty

Under Fonds des Colonies, series B contains letters from the Court; sub-series C¹² consists primarily of letters from St. Pierre to the Court; and sub-series C¹¹F comprises historical documents assembled in the nineteenth century on the fishery, particularly Anglo-French relations pertaining thereto. Under Fonds de la Marine, three sub-series have been used: B² letters from the Court; B¹ letters to the Court; and B⁴ miscellaneous documents relating to annual "campaigns" (operations).
Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented to the French Colonial Historical Society at East Lansing, Michigan, U.S.A. in June 2001. The translation of French texts (or their rendering into English indirect discourse) is entirely the responsibility of the author.


6 The Duc de Choiseul, France’s most powerful minister, hinted darkly in 1764 at re-opening the war if necessary — although that, he admitted privately, would have to be postponed until France was in a position to prevail (La Morandière, pêche française, II, 866, citing MAE, Angletterre, 455, f.89: Choiseul to Guerchy [1764]).


8 Two advocates of the armateurs wrote that it would be better to have twenty “exclusive” leagues of coast than 100 they had to share with the English (E. Daubigny, Choiseul et la France d’outre-mer, 310).

9 Brière, La pêche française, 230, citing a despatch by Choiseul, 11 March 1763. AN Cols. C116 1, ff.86-90v, unsigned memoir of 15 November 1763.

10 La Morandière, pêche française, II, 874-75, citing MAE, Angletterre, 456, f.418, Halifax to Guerchy, 30 April 1764.
11 La Morandière, pêche française, II, 862-75, citing, primarily, despatches of the French foreign ministry. Hiller, in “Utrecht Revisited,” points out that the dispute remained unresolved until the pertinent Utrecht article (#13) was finally abrogated by the Entente of 1904: “Had the question ever gone to arbitration — which neither side thought wise — it is likely that France would have had the better of the historical argument. Though the ‘reserved sovereignty’ theory was thin, it was no more so than Britain’s claim to sovereignty over an island which, until 1713, it had always shared with others, using a relatively small portion of the coastline. It cannot be disputed, either, that the intention of the treaty was to create separate fishing zones.” He adds that Britain [naturally] found it difficult to admit an exclusive foreign fishery within the British jurisdiction over Newfoundland and her coastal waters.

12 See, for example, La Morandière, pêche française, II, 872, citing MAE, Angleterre, 456, f.141: Guerchy to Praslin, 30 March 1764, where a British minister is quoted as saying that English law would recognize only a British “admiral.”

13 On the growth of settlement, see C. Grant Head, Newfoundland, 140. In his view, a ship-fishery monopoly would have been possible only where there were few or no European inhabitants, such as in Labrador.

14 La Morandière, pêche française, II, 885-90.

15 15 September, subsequently modified to 30 September.

16 La Morandière, pêche française, II, 881-85.

17 Brière, La pêche française, 231-32. In 1766 the British were reported to have agreed to burial of the salt under pieces of sod during the winter (AN Cols., C12, 2, ff.15-20v: Extract from a summary of 1766 correspondence from St. Pierre-Miquelon to the Minister of Marine dated at Versailles, 26 December 1766, specifically f.16v).

18 Pitt was reported to the effect that “There was an absolute unconditional surrender of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which, if France continued to be as attentive to her own interest, as we have hitherto found her, would enable her to recover her marine. He considered this to be a most dangerous article, to the maritime strength and future power of Great Britain” (Simmons and Thomas, Proceedings and Debates, I, 420). It was certain, wrote d’Angeac on 30 June 1765, that Louis XV had accepted the islands for one sole purpose: the cod fishery (PRO, CO 194/27, f.67: d’Angeac to Palliser).

19 Ribault (“La population des iles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon,” 5-66) found it difficult to distinguish, in the records, Acadians from others. Among the former Louisbourg residents adept at fishing some were, undoubtedly, Acadian. The term “Acadian,” however, referred almost exclusively to those expelled from farms in Nova Scotia who were not considered qualified for commercial fishing. Ribault did not find the number of persons from Louisbourg who settled at St. Pierre in 1763 but does mention “forty to fifty” ex-residents of Louisbourg who came uninvited in the spring of 1766. See also Poirier, Les Acadiens, 46-76.

20 Since the size of the fishing industry depended on the profitability of the sale of fish, the importance of markets cannot be overemphasized. Domestic demand was expected to return to pre-war levels; demand in the Antilles kept pace with the steady growth of the slave population, particularly in St. Domingue; nor was there evidence of a decline of demand in Portugal, Spain and Italy. If France had not tried to recapture her pre-war share of those markets, it would have fallen to Britain by default.

22 Excise revenues were reduced or eliminated as a form of subsidy to the armateurs. Brière, *La pêche française*, 256-58.
25 Palliser’s view of those groups may be found in at least two of his letters: to the Board of Trade, 9 October 1764: PRO, CO 194/16, ff.34-7; and to Lord Halifax, 16 July 1765. In the latter he said he was “well satisfied that no examples, threats or orders will have any effect on such abandoned, savage wretches as the inhabitants of Newfoundland are and always will be whilst the fishery is carried on by inhabitant fishers.”
26 Part of an undated draft [1765] by Palliser, CO 194/16, ff.215v-16, and “Proposals for encouraging the fisheries on the coast of Labrador, and for improving them at Newfoundland,” 1765, CO 194/27, ff.217-24.
27 AN Cols. C^{12} 1, f.3-4: 23 February 1763.
29 These areas, however, were already being “invaded” by Newfoundland sedentary fishers. Head, *Newfoundland*, 176-77.
30 AN Cols. C^{12} 14, f.23: Minister to d’Angeac, 8 May 1764.
33 Instructions to Tronjoly:
1764: AN Marine B^{4} 106, ff.133-34: Tronjoly to minister, 30 November 1763; *ibid.*, 110, ff.208-209; 213-14: from internal evidence both documents pertain to 1764. AN Cols. C^{12} 14, f.22: to d’Angeac, 8 May 1764.
1767: AN Cols. C^{12} 2, ff.54-5v. Cf. draft: AN Marine B^{4} 110, ff.210-12, 26 April 1767.
1768: AN Marine B^{4} 112, ff.64-5, 1 May 1768.
Instructions to Herly, 1765: AN Marine B^{3} 378, f.563, 30 April 1765. See also an original in AN Marine B^{4} 112, ff.64-5, amended for use in 1768.
34 Any who refused to leave should be considered smugglers, particularly of salt: they were to be reported to the British governor or his next in command, because they forfeited the protection of the French Crown.
35 AN Marine B^{4} 197, ff.105-07v.
36 Palliser confided to his superiors in London that so much confusion reigned that his promise of “utmost exactness, probity and good faith” could be kept only when improper concessions of his predecessors were reversed and order among British fishers restored. Whiteley, “Palliser and the Newfoundland and Labrador Fishery,” 144-45. CO 194/16, ff.34-37: Palliser to Board of Trade, 9 October 1764. See also *ibid.*, ff.40-40v: Palliser to Tronjoly, 8 October 1764.
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37 D'Angeac to minister, 18 April 1765, Cols. C12 2, f.15. Herlye to Choiseul, 2 July 1765, Cols. C12 1, f.95. Both of these documents are cited by La Morandièere, pêche française, II, 760 and 757.

38 See, for example, La Morandièere, pêche française, II, 757-59, citing Palliser to Herlye, 19 June 1765, AN Cols. C11F 2, f.9.

39 As Brière has demonstrated (La pêche française, 233 and Tables 1-7), the French fishing fleet had, by 1765, regained its pre-war dimensions.

40 D'Angeac had been instructed to provide Herlye with all the information he might need.

41 AN Cols. C12 14, f.30: Choiseul to d'Angeac, 5 May 1765. PRO, CO 194/27, ff.66-68v and AN Cols. C11F 2, ff.32-7: d'Angeac to Palliser, 30 June 1765. La Morandièere, op. cit., II, 759-60, citing AN Cols. C11F 2, f.30: Herlye to Palliser, 25 June 1765 [to which was added a p.s. on f.30v, 30 June 1765].

42 AN Cols. B 123, f.636: minister to Barbel, 5 January 1766. The flûte called Le Salomon brought a new administrator (the commissaire-odontnateur Beaudéduit), the official mail, the annual funds and other supplies, and returned to France with Barbel, the administrator whom Beaudéduit had replaced. Palliser's officers were unable to confirm a report that two French warships, "one larger than the other," had been seen off the Grand Banks (PRO CO 194/27, ff.257-64v.: Palliser to Stephens, Secretary to the Admiralty, 25 August 1766).

43 AN Cols. B 123, f.638: to d'Angeac & Beaudéduit, 22 April 1766.

44 AN Cols. B 123, f.640: to d'Angeac: 19 June 1766. He was to reaffirm Tronjoly's instruction of 1764: fishers who ignored that rule forfeited the King's support and would be abandoned to the British; and d'Angeac was to report to the Court all relevant details.

45 Both the French and British governments wished, in its own interest, to suppress salt smuggling and the sale of "English" fish to the French.

46 D'Angeac to Palliser, 25 June 1767: AN Cols. C12 2, ff.54-5.

47 On the Acadians in the colony, see above, under the heading "Context" and below, under the heading "Illicit trade, and the Search for Wood."

48 La Morandièere, pêche française, II, 762-64. See also Palliser to Tronjoly, 10 July 1767: PRO, CO194/27, ff.322-23.

49 See above.

50 PRO, Adm. I/470, ff.13-4: Palliser to the Admiralty, 18 October 1767.

51 D'Angeac to Palliser, 6 August 1766: PRO, CO 194/27, ff.270-72; AN Cols. C11F 2, ff.88-91.

52 D'Angeac to Palliser, 25 June 1767: AN Cols. C12 2, ff.54-5.

53 AN Cols. C12 3, f.6: extract, dated 2 January 1769, of d'Angeac to minister, 23 August 1768; cited by La Morandièere, pêche française, II, 764.

54 La Morandièere, pêche française, II, 764, citing a memorandum by the Granvillais advisor Bretel in AN Cols. C11F 3, f.191v.


56 For a summary of the political scene, see J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III, 1760-1815 (Oxford, 1960), 575 et seq.
80 Thorpe


58 PRO, CO 194/27, ff.66-8v and ANCols. C11F 2, ff.32-7: d’Angeac to Palliser, 30 June 1765.


60 PRO, CO194/16, ff.183-84v, 9 July 1765; the same text, without the nine names, is in CO 194/27, ff.84-6. Of the nine offenders, two lived at Great St. Lawrence, two at Grand Bank, three at Fortune, and one each at Pass Island and Long Harbour. The order also condemned the damage and destruction of English ship fishers’ equipment and very pointedly emphasized the governor’s chief preoccupation: that any action harming the English ship fishery and hence the “nursery” for potential seamen of the Royal Navy contravened national policy and would not be tolerated.


63 When the French ambassador at Whitehall complained of rudeness in Palliser’s letters to d’Angeac, he was told that sailors were not used to polished language, but that Palliser would be advised to be more courteous to d’Angeac in future (*La Morandière, pêche française*, II, 762, citing MAE, Angl. 469, f.397 & seq. and 468, f.99).

64 D’Angeac to minister, 30 June 1765: ANCols. C11F 2, ff.5-6v.

65 D’Angeac to minister, 16 July 1765: ANCols. C11F 2, ff.47-8v. D’Angeac attributed the release to the departure for Europe of Herlye’s frigates, which Palliser no longer considered a “threat.” He remarked that for protection against a couple of French frigates, Palliser had not thought himself strong enough with a 54-gun ship, two 30- and 36-gun frigates and a snow, and had sent for another 50-gun ship and a frigate from Halifax!

66 D’Angeac to Palliser, 29 September 1765: PRO, CO 194/27, ff.140-40v, reiterated in another letter of 11 November 1765: *ibid.*, ff.265-67v (copies of neither were found in French colonial archives). Palliser to Conway, 30 October 1765: *ibid.*, f.133.

67 Palliser to d’Angeac, 23 October 1765: PRO, CO 194/27, ff.141-43.


69 In a bilateral understanding, he could not depend on the word of a representative of the other party; he had to await that of his own principals.

70 C11F 2, ff.92-5.


73 D’Angeac to Palliser, 6 July 1766: PRO, CO 194/27, ff.268-69v. No copy has been found in French colonial archives.

74 Whiteley, “Palliser and the Newfoundland and Labrador Fishery,” 150, citing Palliser to d’Angeac, 26 July 1766: PRO, CO 194/27, f.275 (see also ANCols. C11F 2, ff.78-81v).

75 D’Angeac to the minister, 7 August 1766: ANCols. C11F 2, ff.92-5.
Summary of d’Angeac’s reports to the minister in 1766, Versailles 26 December 1766: AN Cols. C12 2, f.15.

D’Angeac to Palliser, 6 July 1766: PRO, CO 194/27, ff.268-69v.

PRO, CO 194/17, f.11v.


La Morandière, pêche française, II, 769-70.

La Morandière, pêche française, II, 770; Whiteley, “Palliser and the Newfoundland and Labrador Fishery,” 146, citing CO194/16, f.4: Palliser to the Board of Trade, 1 September 1764.

Also, from Louisiana in 1763 and Guiana in 1765. See Jean Tarrade, Le commerce colonial, I, 178, citing AN Cols. B 116, ff.139-40.

A recollection in AN C12 2, f. 33v.: d’Angeac and Beaudéduit to minister, 10 November 1766.

Whiteley, “Palliser and the Newfoundland and Labrador Fishery,” 145, citing Palliser to d’Angeac, 29 June 1764.

Whiteley, “Palliser and the Newfoundland and Labrador Fishery,” 145, citing d’Angeac to Palliser, 7 July 1764.

La Morandière, pêche française, II, 769.

It was accelerated significantly in the mid-1770s, as New Englanders paid little or no attention to British law.

Ribault, Histoire des iles, 57, citing d’Angeac to minister, 6 December 1766.

See, for example, PRO, CO 194/17, ff.45-45v. Enclosed with Palliser’s report in 1765 on events of 1764 were two intercepted letters from St. Pierre to inhabitants of Newfoundland whose names are missing: one, in French, from a merchant with ships from Bordeaux calling at St. Pierre en route to St. Domingue and back to Bordeaux; the other, in English, by a merchant from France called A. Chabot l’aînée, “by the enticement of Mr. Dick Welsh, now master of a shallop here.” Both writers wanted first-rate fish for France and second-rate for St. Domingue, and offered for sale a wide range of French goods.

In St. Domingue particularly there was a very large, and rapidly growing, market for second-rate cod.

Ribault, “La pêche et le commerce,” 277, 281, 284, and 288.


La Morandière, pêche française, II, 770, including citation of AN Cols. C11F 2, f.9.

“[C]e qui est nécessaire en un temps devient souvent abusif dans un autre et ... nous n’ignorons pas que le commerce d’interlope est défendu et pourrait bientôt se pousser trop loin si on ne s’y opposait pas ...” AN Cols. C12 2, ff.33-4: D’Angeac and Beaudéduit to minister, 10 November 1766. Other possible interpretations of “se pousser trop loin” are: “become counter-productive” and “be against our own interests.”

“[C]eux qui se trouveraient en pareilles circonstances à leur égard, ne devoient plus compter sur notre indulgence.” Ibid.

Ibid.


Presumably to buy from inhabitants wood that had been cut in Newfoundland.
99 D’Angeac to minister, 14 June 1766: AN Cols. C11 F 2, ff.73-74v.

100 Rothney, “History of Newfoundland and Labrador,” 120. Rothney, who cited nothing from French archives and may have been unaware of the French Court’s fear of overpopulation, seems to have accepted Palliser’s interpretation.

101 D’Angeac to minister, 30 May 1766: AN Cols. C11 F 2, ff.70-72v.


103 La Morandière, pêche française, 765-66.


105 AN Cols., C12 1, ff.3-4, loc. cit.

106 See Bernhard Knollenberg, The Origin of the American Revolution, 1759-1766 (New York, 1960), 145, for data presented in 1763 by Boston merchants. Most molasses imported into Massachusetts came from non-British islands, where prices were lower.

107 Ribault describes how such clandestine trade must have been carried out. On their way to Newfoundland, New England ships stopped at St. Pierre, where they traded their goods for wine from France and rum and molasses from the French Antilles. These goods, which “appeared” to come from New England ports, they sold in Newfoundland for fish. Jean-Yves Ribault, Histoire des îles Saint-Pierre et Miquelon, 59.

108 Chaussonand-Nogaret, Choiseul, 190.

109 Tarrade, Le commerce colonial, 1, 95-101 and 166-83.


111 Before returning to Britain for the winter of 1764-1765, Palliser left instructions that American ships that had been trading illegally with people on St. Pierre and Miquelon were to be seized and their case heard by the vice-admiralty court at St. John’s. Public Archives of Newfoundland (PANL), GN 2/1a, vol. 3, f.277. 4 November 1764.

112 D’Angeac to Palliser, 11 November 1765: PRO, CO 194/27, ff.265-67v.

113 D’Angeac to Palliser, 6 August 1766. PRO, CO 194/27, ff.270-72; AN Cols. C11 F 2, ff.88-91.

114 AN Cols. C11 F 2, ff.60-1: d’Angeac to minister, 30 December 1765. At f.60v, d’Angeac states: “Un bateau du Canada, qui avait pour toute cargaison du capillaire, quelques pommes, quinze quarts de farine et cinquante boisseaux de poires, le tout ne lui revenant pas à plus de 1,442 livres, en a fait ici dernièrement 19,380 livres, ce qui est facile à prouver.”

115 Ibid.

116 See Palliser’s despatches of 25 August 1766, PRO, CO 194/27, ff.261 and 264; and 21 October 1766: CO 194/16, f.303.

117 Though a misnomer in peacetime, the French word d’Angeac used was corsaires, which meant “privateers”; he did not call them pirates (forbans) or freebooters (flibustiers). They may have been armed merchantmen operating as naval auxiliaries under naval orders.

119 Brière, La pêche française, 8. "Le conflit franco-britannique à Terre-Neuve relève en partie d'une illusion dans la mesure où il a souvent recouvert des tensions et des heurts qui n'étaient nullement nationaux par nature mais internes au développement du système terre-neuvier lui-même. Le vrai conflit, le plus fondamental, n'était pas la rivalité franco-anglaise, mais celle qui opposait les pêcheurs d'Europe aux pêcheurs habitant les côtes de l'Amérique du Nord."
120 Minister to d'Angeac, 12 February 1769, AN Cols. B 132, ff.417-17v.