

'The True Father of Confederation'?: Archbishop E.P. Roche, Term 17, and Newfoundland's Confederation with Canada'

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IN THE SECOND REFERENDUM on July 22, 1948, a small majority of Newfoundlanders voted to join Canada as its tenth province. Among the factors traditionally cited as influencing voting patterns has been religion. The extent to which denominationalism played a role in the two 1948 referenda has been the subject of much comment, but only a limited amount of analysis, principally demographic.² Quantitative approaches can be instructive, but they do not explain how and why the referenda campaigns became as sectarian as they did, and the social and political results. In the historiography of the confederation period — a literature principally created by the winners and sustained by their political and literary apostles³ — Edward Patrick Roche, the Roman Catholic archbishop of St. John's from 1915 to 1950, is often portrayed as the chief villain for allegedly using his position to influence the outcome of the referenda campaigns against confederation. Joseph R. Smallwood, the victor and chief beneficiary of the confederate movement, wrote in his autobiography that he was "painfully aware" of Roche's opposition to confederation, noting that the archbishop feared it would jeopardize the denominational system of schooling which had existed since the early nineteenth century.⁴

Richard Gwyn, Smallwood's first biographer, pronounced that "one of the enigmas of the Confederation battle was the motive for the unyielding opposition to union with Canada" of Archbishop Roche, "an aloof, ascetic prelate nicknamed by some Catholics, after the place of his birth, 'The Placentia Machiavelli,' the 'Borgia from Branch'."⁵ Out of whole cloth, Gwyn manufactured and then projected pride, xenophobia, and profound aloofness onto Roche, suggesting that

loosened divorce regulations, a loss of personal prestige for the Newfoundland episcopal hierarchy, Roche's dislike of "Mainland ways" and his ultraconservative leadership led him to suddenly champion a concerted effort by Newfoundland Catholics to defeat confederation.⁶ It fell to Smallwood's lieutenant and other biographer, Harold Horwood, to simply admit that the confederates found in Roche the perfect Irish-Catholic anti-confederate enemy, just the right sort of bogeyman needed in deepest outport Orange Newfoundland to create a Protestant backlash, and guarantee victory for confederation.⁷ But the most vivid, and ironic, encapsulation of Roche came from Gregory J. Power, Smallwood's other lieutenant and the poet-laureate of *The Confederate* in 1948, who in his last years lost no opportunity to saucily characterize the archbishop, his *cousin*, as the "True Father of Confederation."⁸ Without exploiting Roche's position, or his perceived position, Power maintained, the confederates could never have won.

Given the debate in the 1990s over education reform in Newfoundland, what Archbishop Roche did, and did not do, in stating the case for denominational education is significant. Certainly, the history of denominational education is much more than the history of Roman Catholic involvement in that system. But no other denominational leader was vilified as Roche was, or held up to so much post-confederation denunciation and ridicule. How true were these confederate characterizations of Roche's and Catholic attitudes towards confederation? When, why and how did Roche oppose confederation with Canada? Was there a monolithic Church? And what was the relationship between the Church's attitude towards confederation, the denominations' customary, legal, and political rights in education, and the creation of the education clause, Term 17, which, for the first time, recognized those rights as constitutional rights? This essay argues that Roche was a long-standing, principled opponent of confederation. The confederates knew this, and the existence of sectarianism in the referenda campaigns was much more their creation than Roche's. The confederates knew that they had to guarantee denominational rights in education in the Terms of Union in order to put sectarianism back in the bottle, and heal bitter divisions.

Roche was born in Placentia in 1874, and after completing school at St. John's, attended the seminary at All Hallows' College, Dublin, where he was ordained in 1897.⁹ In 1905, as the parish priest at Manuels, Conception Bay, he was appointed secretary of an archdiocesan education committee, charged by Archbishop Michael Francis Howley to gather information on Catholic education with which to answer unnamed proposals submitted to the government which might possibly challenge the "denominational principle" of education.¹⁰ A quiet, shy man, and a scholar with an eye for nuance and detail, he became pastor of the cathedral parish and vicar general of the Archdiocese of St. John's shortly after. When Howley died in October 1914, Roche became the administrator of the archdiocese, and was consecrated archbishop the next year, the youngest Roman Catholic archbishop in the British Empire.

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The leader of over 100,000 lay Catholics, and 200 priests, nuns, and brothers, he was considered in Catholic Newfoundland a “loyal Newfoundlander.”¹¹ Like his predecessor, Roche was a native-born priest, and he shared Howley’s ultramontanism and his cultural orientation towards Ireland, the ancestral homeland of the vast majority of Newfoundland Catholics. But Roche was not xenophobic, and increasingly looked towards the United States, a society to which many Newfoundlanders had a great affinity.¹² Diagnosed with tuberculosis, Roche made occasional winter-time retreats to Lake Saranac, New York,¹³ and he was well known to members of the American hierarchy. Though Roche spent time at his residence at Beaconsfield on Topsail Road, conveniently near the Sanatorium, he was not aloof. He maintained a wide circle of friends, and made frequent pastoral visits to parishes and schools throughout his archdiocese. Neither was he ascetic. He drove — or was driven — in a Pierce-Arrow, among other vehicles, and had a distinct penchant for pomp and ceremony.

Roche was keenly aware of the roles played by his Church and his episcopal predecessors in the creation and preservation of the denominational system of education. He also presided over, guarded and exercised the close relationship that existed between Church and state, animated by cultural sensibilities which amounted to the belief that the Church was, for Irish Catholic Newfoundland, the guardian of the state and of their spiritual, cultural, and social identity. Catholics materially supported the creation of a large institutional Church and its associated fraternal and benefit societies, a cultural and religious organism which provided a cradle-to-grave social, cultural, and economic framework in which to live out one’s life, a framework for identity, a cultural pattern for survival. Thus Catholics, by and large, supported the Church in 1869 when it opposed confederation with Canada. From the 1830s to the 1930s, in the outports, the parish priest was the pope of the village; in working-class Catholic St. John’s, Catholics sought employment at Water Street firms owned by Catholics first, and went armed with letters of reference from priests, bishops, brothers, and sisters. Protestants did much the same. It was well known which jobs and sectors of the workforce were filled with employees of which denomination, and even these were stratified by social class. For jobs on Water Street, at the railway, in government, and even Rhodes Scholarships, there was no use applying if it was not your denomination’s turn.

While tradition, arts and culture were close to Roche’s heart, education and spiritual development were his keenest interests. In October 1915, Roche called a meeting of fourteen senior clergy and laity. It was occasioned by the rising interest among other denominations in having the Council of Higher Education offer “extension courses”, which Roche feared would be the thin edge of the wedge against denominational education.¹⁴ The Catholic Education Council was founded. In his remarks, Roche observed that

... it is for the advantage of the Catholics that the Protestant community should be well-educated as it is for the Protestants that the Catholics should be equally so. The interest of the two great sections of the population is identical and the intelligence and morality of each is a guarantee of peace and union to the other it is impossible that any improvements in the education or circumstances of one party should not excite an honourable rivalry in the other equally advantageous to both.¹⁵

In 1916, Roche again made a strong statement on education in his first address to the priests of his archdiocese. Described by MacLeod as “a giant step towards cooperation”, the speech was a milestone because it accepted the principle of co-operation with other denominations in providing the proposed “extension lectures” — a concession made because non-cooperation might have called denominational education into much greater question.¹⁶ The speech was also a milestone because it connected the possibility of confederation with a threat to denominational education, and set policy for the Newfoundland Catholic Church for the next thirty-five years:

If we are to put forth our greatest endeavors, ... it can only be by working together in harmony, unity and co-operation. Hitherto we have, it must be admitted, suffered and suffered severely through lack of concentrated action. The ancient policy of ‘divide et impera’ [divide and conquer] is as powerful and effective in this age of the world as it was in the days of old.... The preservation of our denominational system of education rests entirely with ourselves.

Of recent years there have been rumours, persistent rumours ... of Confederation with Canada. Of the truth or otherwise of these rumours I know no more than the man in the street. I have no inside information, and I know as much and as little about the possibilities in that direction as anyone listening to me. It is a large question involving vital interests of our country, involving very grave financial and economic issues upon which I do not wish to pronounce any opinion. I have no doubt, however, that if ever such a question should arise the people will get an opportunity of passing upon it. It will then be our duty as citizens, as Newfoundlanders, as lovers of our country, to examine every phase of the question minutely it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that it may be incumbent upon us to tender our advice to the Catholic people ... should the issue ever become a real and vital one unless our educational terms are acceded to, no matter how attractive the other aspects of the question may be, we will be forced to give it our most pronounced and uncompromising opposition.¹⁷

For Roche, the issues of confederation and the Church’s ability to maintain the status quo in education were inextricably linked. This meant a mixture of political, legal, proprietary, and moral rights which included the right to state funding for Catholic schools on a per-student basis equivalent to that given to other denominational or secular schools; the right to employ (and dismiss) Catholic teachers in those schools; the right to ensure that the curriculum did not contain matter contrary

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to Roman Catholic beliefs; and the right to determine and teach religion.¹⁸ Confederation would be acceptable only if Catholic educational terms were accepted and funded by a state in which Catholic claims to rights in education were accepted. Throughout his episcopacy Roche consistently opposed confederation because he thought it threatened Church-sponsored education. These were positions from which he never retreated, and the Church's position was rarely challenged by successive governments.

Indeed, any potential intrusion by the state into the realm of education involved lengthy negotiations with Roche who, it must be said, was supported by his Protestant counterparts. Thus a non-denominational university college and a Department of Education appeared, but firmly within the matrix of a denominational system policed by the churches. The Commission of Government, installed in 1934, was initially more belligerent than its predecessors. Only two days after the Commission was sworn in, British Commissioner Sir John Hope Simpson (who with his wife was given to fits of anti-Catholicism¹⁹) wrote privately to his son that "we hope to succeed in undenominationalizing education here."²⁰ In October 1934, Thomas Lodge, another British Commissioner, proposed to abolish the denominational superintendents of education, centralize financial administration, appoint a superintendent with authority over the curriculum, and a chief inspector of schools. The Commission was opposed by Roche and the Anglican Bishop William C. White. An acrimonious battle ensued, and the churches eventually had their way. Occasional minor changes were made in the administration and wider provision of education, but these were not undertaken without consulting the churches, particularly Roche and Dr. Vincent P. Burke, the Chairman of the Catholic Education Committee.²¹

The result of the Commission's challenge was that at the height of the Depression, Roche redoubled his efforts to provide Catholics with more modern educational facilities. Over 38 Catholic schools were built or renovated, many without government assistance, which further entrenched the status quo. Roche also redoubled his efforts to ensure that Irish-Newfoundland Catholic cultural and historical sensibilities were ingrained into the clergy and laity. In 1937, he reminded the priests' retreat of "the gradual process by which our freedom was won from what might be described as serfdom to Representative Government and then to Responsible Government, and that full freedom ... is the birthright of every nation, no matter how great or small." He took care to put the Commission in its proper place and summed up the political situation: "We have placed ourselves and our Country and our future destiny unreservedly in the hands of outsiders ... we have given up everything for which peoples and nations, great and small, have been struggling from the beginning and will struggle to the end of time."²²

By 1942, the British coalition government was becoming increasingly concerned with the Newfoundland question. In September, Clement Attlee, then Dominions Secretary, visited Newfoundland. He and Peter Alexander Clutterbuck

of the Dominions Office met for three hours with Roche and came away with the definite impression "that the Hierarchy was strongly opposed to any move towards closer union with Canada."²³ The members of the so-called "goodwill mission" of 1943 also met Roche, who reportedly said that responsible government should be restored, or as an alternative, Newfoundland "should have a form of government like Northern Ireland with representatives in the House of Commons in London."²⁴ But reflecting an idea which had some currency in St. John's that summer, Independent MP Alan Herbert suggested that one possible solution to the constitutional question be a citizens' council, a "national convention", to make recommendations as to Newfoundland's constitutional future. This suggestion was favoured and adopted by Attlee, who announced the convention in December 1945.

Canadian officials also knew that the Roman Catholic Church in Newfoundland had traditionally opposed confederation, and were concerned that this antipathy might harm confederate chances. J.S. Macdonald, the High Commissioner in St. John's, began to take soundings. In March 1946, he reported to Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, a conversation with Mr. Justice Cyril Fox of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland about the forthcoming National Convention. Fox was "well disposed towards Canada," and because he was a Catholic and had "many friends and acquaintances, particularly in Roman Catholic circles ... his opinion is worth recording."²⁵ But that summer, the archbishop made a statement on confederation and education to the priests of the archdiocese. He remarked that the Commission of Government at present showed an "intelligent appreciation of the education situation in Newfoundland," and that

If ... the people of this country should decide to become a province of Canada — I hope that contingency will never arise, because it would become an ill-advised and unfortunate decision — immediately the education issue would become a live issue. It is true that in theory in Canada each Province decides its own educational policy, but it had to provide the funds. Newfoundland's economy being what it is, we could never from direct taxation provide the necessary grants, and education would at once become a Federal question with results and consequences that anyone would foresee.²⁶

Dependence on an unknown quantity of transfer payments from Ottawa was unacceptable, because it would make Newfoundland and the Church beholden to Ottawa for educational funding. Then, emphasizing the need for "informed public opinion among our Catholic people," and the responsibility of the Church to promote Catholic literature, Roche noted the need to keep the archdiocesan newspaper, *The Monitor*, in press as a vehicle for the Church's concerns.²⁷

By the late 1940s Roche may have been prominent in St. John's, but he did not directly represent the political views of the whole Roman Catholic Church. Catholic clergy and people were divided over confederation, giving the lie to the myth of a monolithic anti-confederate Church. In 1948 Roman Catholics consti-

tuted about one-third of the population (106,006 out of 321,819), and were the dominant denomination in seven electoral districts. In St. John's, they were principally of Irish descent and constituted a substantial portion of the urban working class, with some representation in the mercantile and professional classes. The predominantly rural people of the Diocese of St. George's, stretching along the west coast of the island, included settlers of Acadian, French, Scots, and Canadian heritage, and they were led by the Irish-born Bishop Michael O'Reilly, who shared little of east-coast Newfoundland nationalism. The bishop of the more Irish Diocese of Harbour Grace on the northeast coast was John M. O'Neill, a native Newfoundlander. As suffragan bishops, both deferred to Roche as protocol required, and they tried to present a unified appearance. But O'Reilly was a pro-confederate,²⁸ and supported the election to the National Convention of the eloquent pro-confederate William J. Keough, an organizer of the co-operative movement. O'Neill silently opposed confederation, despite attempts by Smallwood to "convert him".²⁹ While letting Roche handle the issue from St. John's, O'Neill quietly spoke of his views to his priests.³⁰ Because of Roche's tuberculosis, in the spring of 1945 Monsignor Thomas J. Flynn, the pastor of St. Patrick's parish (and founder of *The Monitor* in 1934) was appointed as co-adjutor archbishop.³¹ J.S. Macdonald reported that soon after the arrival of the new British governor, Gordon Macdonald, Flynn visited Government House and "spoke favourably of Confederation with Canada."³²

In contrast to Roman Catholics, Newfoundland Methodists were more receptive to Canada, as were some Anglicans and members of the Salvation Army. On 10 June 1925 Newfoundland Methodists had become part of the United Church of Canada.³³ Religious books and materials were standardized, and the United Church hymnal and religious materials came from Canada, not England.³⁴ Many residents of predominantly Methodist communities on the south and the northeast coasts had family connections and friends in Canada, who occasionally returned to Newfoundland with evidence of Canadian prosperity,³⁵ and those who could afford an education were often trained at Canadian universities like Mount Allison, in New Brunswick.³⁶ Furthermore, in St. John's, the Methodist College Literary Institute, one of Newfoundland's most respected debating societies, arranged debates on confederation, which were widely attended, widely reported, and avidly followed.³⁷ Smallwood and Bradley were nominal Methodists, and their advocacy of confederation may have found some resonances with their co-religionists.

From 1945 the Church of England in Newfoundland under Bishop Philip Abraham had been discussing union with the Anglican Church of Canada.³⁸ His Newfoundland clergy were interested in participating in the Canadian Church's retirement fund, which provided better pensions than their own pension fund.³⁹ In 1948 the Newfoundland Synod approved the merger, and the two churches were united on 7 September 1949.⁴⁰ Brigadier Clarence D. Wiseman, Territorial Commander of the Salvation Army, was a friend of Smallwood's, and the Army later provided assistance to the confederates.⁴¹ Denominational persuasions did not

universally equate with political persuasions. But if the Roman Catholic Church in St. John's opposed confederation in part because of its historic involvements in the Newfoundland state and in part because it had fewer ties with the Church in Canada, the Church of England, the United Church, and the Salvation Army favoured confederation in part because of their ties with sister churches in Canada.

In September 1946 the National Convention met, and began its deliberations by dividing into committees with mandates to inquire into various aspects of Newfoundland society and economy. The Education Committee consisted of Malcolm Hollett (convener), Joseph Fowler, Colin G. Jones, Frank D. Fogwill, John T. Spencer, Leonard Miller, Michael Harrington, J.R. Smallwood, Dennis Ryan and Isaac Newell.⁴² The committee confined itself to an examination of the economics of education, and delivered its report on 28 October 1946, relatively early in the life of the Convention. Underpinning the report was the assumption and common understanding that there would be no change to the Newfoundland denominational education system, for it received no specific attention in the committee's report. The committee observed that the Department of Education had made excellent use of the money and means at its disposal, and felt "very strongly that none of the existing services should be abolished or reduced," but where possible, increased.⁴³ During the discussion of the report, only three members of the Convention expressed some dissatisfaction with the denominational system.⁴⁴ The remainder expressed support, or no opinion. The Convention passed no resolutions on education, save to accept the Committee's recommendation that more funds be allocated. In May 1947 the Convention returned to the subject when Gordon Higgins rose to read a copy of an address delivered by Archbishop Roche in 1945, which recommended the expansion of Memorial University College into a fully-fledged university.⁴⁵ Higgins observed that

There are many who hold that this country has suffered grievously by being tied down to the system of education of other countries. They do not believe that any system, no matter how excellent in its own country is really suited to our life and problems. It is their belief that we must evolve our own system of education completely independent of other countries, so that Newfoundlanders may develop their own way of life with the enlightenment and enrichment that only a sound educational system can provide, and in my belief this system can only be developed from the establishing of a cultural focus, such as the university.⁴⁶

Higgins had affirmed the Newfoundland education system. On other occasions, members spoke about making pro-industry adjustments to the school curriculum, but not to the denominational system.⁴⁷

Education became an issue again when the Convention sent a delegation to Ottawa in the summer of 1947, consisting of Smallwood, Rev. Lester Burry, Charles Ballam, Chairman F. Gordon Bradley, Gordon Higgins, P.W. Crummey, and T.W.G. Ashbourne. They were warmly received in Ottawa on the portentous

date of 24 June 1947 — the 450th anniversary of the Cabot landfall — and Canadian civil servants were prepared for their arrival.

Though relatively little had been said in the Convention about denominational education, Canadian civil servants were arriving at the conclusion that for Smallwood's confederation campaign to be successful, the churches, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, had to be guaranteed that their educational rights would be protected. In early May 1947, R.A. MacKay wrote Paul Bridle of the Department of External Affairs to offer his "offhand opinion" that "since the Newfoundland system of multi-denominationalism rests largely on law rather than custom, Sec. 93 [of the British North America Act] would rivet the system indefinitely on Newfoundland in the event of union, unless precautions were taken in the act of union to avoid this."⁴⁸ MacKay, an advisor to the Department of External Affairs on constitutional law and on Newfoundland, was clearly uncomfortable with denominational education because he believed that any guarantees given on education in section 93, or its possible successor in any terms of union between Canada and Newfoundland would be permanent, and that this, in the future, could upset Protestant denominations which might wish to amalgamate their schools. But Bridle replied that this would be politically necessary in order to secure adequate support for confederation:

... the education question is of very considerable importance. If possible ... it would be best to have the matter left open in such a way that the Newfoundland Provincial Government (or a provisional Government should such a government be established) could decide how the matter is to be dealt with in the Act of Union. As you have pointed out, it would be best to avoid appearing to discriminate against any one denomination; certainly it would be very dangerous to plump either for fastening the present system on Newfoundland or for a section on education which would not specifically safeguard the rights of the Roman Catholic minority.

Notably, the Canadians agreed that Newfoundland Roman Catholics were a minority and had rights. Bridle added: "It seems that the Roman Catholic section of the community may already be subject to anti-confederation pressure and, if the opponents of confederation were able to add fuel to the fire by raising real bogies on the divorce and education questions, the result might be rather unfortunate."⁴⁹

The Canadian civil servants knew that they were caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, they preferred to leave education to the provinces, but on the other, they realized that the denominations in Newfoundland differed over what their educational rights should be. It was clearly recognized, though, that unless the rights in education of the Roman Catholic minority were guaranteed, it could rebound against the confederation movement and create substantial difficulties in the referendum. The solution would be to leave the initiative to the Newfoundland delegation (which honoured the federal "leaving education to the provinces"

principle) while going along with drafting a term on education which could satisfy both Roman Catholic and Protestant denominations.

Smallwood later wrote of the Ottawa talks that he "was implacably determined to see that the terms and conditions of Newfoundland's union with Canada would contain absolute protection of the existing rights of the churches to public funds for the operation of their schools. In short, I vowed that the status quo should be maintained in the most unalterable way that could be found and that this should be covered within the actual terms of union."⁵⁰ Smallwood was upset to discover that Gordon Higgins, as the "prominent and respected" Catholic member of the Convention delegation, had not called on Archbishop Roche to secure his views on education before leaving for Ottawa.⁵¹ In an attempt to do an end-run around Roche's opposition and circumvent Higgins' oversight, Smallwood devised a plan to obtain re-assurances from Canadian church officials that confederation would not be harmful to Newfoundland Catholics. In Ottawa, he arranged for Bradley to meet with the Apostolic Delegate to Canada and Newfoundland, Archbishop Ildebrando Antonutti, to ask for his opinions on the issues.⁵² Bradley, an Orangeman, was squeamish about meeting Antonutti. But the Delegate warmly welcomed Bradley and told him that while divorce would not be a problem (even though it was in Newfoundland, because the Church had always opposed divorce legislation), the Church would be more concerned with the financing of Catholic schools,⁵³ but that the Church "wouldn't want anything by way of rights, school rights, in Newfoundland more than the Protestant schools get in Quebec."⁵⁴ Bradley emerged from the meeting delighted and told Smallwood that Antonutti, "though a Roman Catholic and an Italian at that," had completely placed him at ease.⁵⁵ Smallwood's need to consult Roche had been obviated.

Education was discussed again in Ottawa on 2 July 1947. The Canadian notes of proceedings record that the Convention delegation "sought additional information concerning provincial jurisdiction over education, particularly in connection with the position of education carried on by religious denominations."⁵⁶ The Canadians assured the delegation that while provincial jurisdiction was complete over education, and while the BNA Act gave the federal government certain powers to safeguard separate school education, there would not be any difficulty in inserting into the terms "such provisions as they wished to adopt regarding their educational system and the federal government would not be disposed to intervene subsequently in contravention of the wishes of Newfoundland."⁵⁷ Five days later the Canadians reiterated the assurance that they would agree to whatever educational terms the Newfoundland delegation wished.⁵⁸ At a meeting on 11 August, the Canadians again assured the Newfoundland delegation that Section 93 of the BNA Act would "perpetuate the present denominational system of education in Newfoundland and prevent the provincial legislature from altering it," but "the Canadian Government would have no wish to dictate to Newfoundland regarding

the situation and it was left for the Newfoundland delegation to make specific proposals."⁵⁹

The decision to send a delegation to Canada, and the delegation's extended stay there, had caused great concern among the advocates of responsible government that "underhanded methods" were being used to further the cause of confederation. During the summer of 1947, the president of the Responsible Government League (the RGL), F.M. O'Leary, approached the Church, encouraging comment on confederation.⁶⁰ On 20 July, an address by Archbishop Roche was read by Archbishop Flynn to a reunion breakfast of the St. Bonaventure's College Old Boys' Alumni Club. Because the youth of the country had grown up in an "undemocratic atmosphere" since 1933, they now should awaken from their apathy in order to avert a "national disaster". They were "the trustees for posterity in a sense that no previous generation could claim to be," since "the fate of Newfoundland will be irrevocably determined for weal or woe in the very near future."⁶¹ The July-August issue of *The Monitor* reprinted the address, and reflected on the Convention and the delegations — which many felt should never have occurred — and on Bradley's and Smallwood's characterization of Newfoundland life in terms of class division: "It would surely be the supreme tragedy of our history, if by apathy, indifference, lack of enlightened leadership, or the influence of sinister propoganda we were to alienate irretrievably the inheritance which was won for us by our patriotic forbears, which is a sacred heritage from the past."⁶²

In what seemed like a response to this, on 7 August, the *Manchester Guardian* predicted that the Catholic vote would be "instructed" to vote for responsible government. Commissioner Albert Walsh, a Roman Catholic, also interpreted the address as anti-confederate, but Canadian civil servant J.C. Britton noted that Roche made no mention of how his listeners should vote, and observed that the archbishop was "... regarded as a diplomat of the highest order and, whatever his private views may be, [he was] unlikely to commit himself openly as favouring one form of Government. The letter has had quite wide circulation and as the Archbishop is held in such high regard by members of all denominations, his opinions carry considerable weight."⁶³ Britton's appraisal was accurate. Even when the referenda campaigns became sectarian, the archbishop carefully avoided telling anyone how to vote, even though all knew his views. Some Catholic clerics, however, had no such reservations.

Before the delegation left Ottawa, Bradley and Smallwood drafted a clause on education which was circulated to the Canadian cabinet. Mackenzie King noted the origin of the draft, and that the clause was evidently designed "(a) to protect existing denominational rights, and, (b) to permit of voluntary amalgamation of denominational schools which is a matter of concern to certain Protestant denominations."⁶⁴ Canadian officials were concerned not to give the impression that the clause simply was "what the federal government wished."⁶⁵ Therefore, on the return train trip through Eastern Canada, Smallwood, Higgins and MacKay discussed an alternative

draft which was "to make it clear that the federal government will fall in line with the suggestions of the provincial government," but this draft did not survive.⁶⁶ Later that fall, St. Laurent reiterated that education had been under the unrestricted control of Newfoundland and that the federal government had drafted the proposals to give effect to the Newfoundlanders' wishes.⁶⁷

It was one thing to obtain a term on education, but quite another for Smallwood and the Ottawa delegation to be assured of the approval of the heads of the religious denominations. Shortly after the delegation returned to St. John's, Smallwood informed J. Scott Macdonald that he had discussed the draft education clause with Bishop Abraham, with Dr. Burns, the President of the United Church Conference, and with Brigadier Wiseman of the Salvation Army; none objected to the wording of the clause.⁶⁸ According to Macdonald, Higgins also undertook to transmit the draft clause to the Roman Catholic bishops: "He called at the Palace and in the absence of the Archbishop, left copies of the two texts with Father O'Mara, the Archbishop's private secretary and the Administrator of the Archdiocese. Archbishop Roche has since returned to the city but Mr. Higgins has not yet had any further contact with him."⁶⁹ Macdonald also took care to report that "I learn from an unimpeachable source that, while he has taken no public stand, the Archbishop in private holds rather strong views on the political situation. A few days ago, discussing the matter with a friend of long standing, he regretted the reluctance of the right type of citizen to offer himself for public service but nevertheless expressed himself in favour of a return to Responsible Government."⁷⁰ The archbishop kept public silence, but the editorial of the 20 September 1947 *Monitor* explicitly articulated the Church's position on denominational education:

During the summer months the old question of public school vs. denominational school once more raised its head. Not only in private discussions but in public affairs as well, the usual propaganda against the denominational system is being revived and republicized. And its revivers will not realize that no argument based on mere economic grounds is worth even the trouble of mentioning when placed against the moral and spiritual value of a sound Christian and Catholic Education. Were denominational Education to cost the country ten times its present figure, it would still be more than worth the price.

It should by now be fairly well established even in the minds of her enemies that the Catholic Church, no matter what force of opinion or circumstances be brought against her, will not tolerate interference with her right to educate her children along her own lines and in her own faith. Any suggestion of a public school system, or of compromising in her duty can only meet with a steady and absolute refusal. Where a principle is at stake she will never compromise.⁷¹

This was the clearest pronouncement throughout the whole of the confederation campaign of the Church's teaching on its role in education, and one from which it never deviated.

By mid-December, no reply had been received from Archbishop Roche on the education clause. Smallwood maintained that Higgins was not received by Roche, and that "we never did get any authoritative report of his feelings about the draft terms themselves."⁷² Roche, like many other Newfoundlanders, was highly offended at the notion that anything other than a responsible government should seek terms from Canada, and he refused to dignify such an ad-hoc process with a reply. Smallwood and the confederates were anxious about the education term. In mid-December, a copy of the *Proposed Arrangements for the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation*, including clause 19, was officially sent by W. Gordon Warren, the Secretary of the National Convention, to Father O'Mara,⁷³ but again Roche did not reply. The proposed arrangements for education under confederation appeared to have no effect on the Church's position that Catholic rights in education must be preserved. But the Church's position on education and by extension on confederation did have an effect on the lengths to which Smallwood went to try to satisfy the Roman Catholic Church and other denominations on the education question.

In November 1947, the Church made its first direct public statement on the confederation issue in *The Monitor*. In an article entitled "Newfoundland at [the] Parting of the Ways," it reflected the same arguments as the Responsible Government League. The tone was nationalistic, and it exhorted Catholics to "...consider what is best for the country ...," and to recognize that "... there has grown up with us during the past four and a half centuries a simple God-fearing way of life which our forebears have handed down to us and which we must pass on untarnished to posterity."⁷⁴ In its view, the only proper body to consider confederation was an elected Newfoundland parliament, and *The Monitor* noted that "... a referendum may very often bring about the results desired by the promoters of it and may not actually represent the real view of the voter. This notorious fact has been highlighted too often in recent years for us to accept a referendum as being a truly worthwhile test of public opinion."⁷⁵ The next month *The Monitor* warned readers that confederation was irrevocable, and that "a great deal of the information upon which the so-called 'terms' are based is at best well-informed guess-work, and the danger of a hasty decision becomes apparent."⁷⁶ While *The Monitor* was vetted for content by Roche's solicitor, R.S. Furlong,⁷⁷ and while it would have had Roche's informal *imprimatur*, it is not known who wrote its editorials.

Subsequent debate over education in the Convention centered on the implications of a budgetary reduction in education funding.⁷⁸ But when Michael Harrington charged that the proposed clause 19 would not protect the rights of denominations to their education systems any more than the guarantees given schools in 1890,⁷⁹ Smallwood replied that the Manitoba Schools question had taught the Government of Canada not to meddle in education, and that as a result, they wouldn't touch it.⁸⁰ Smallwood then expanded on the procedure by which a denomination might seek redress were its rights violated: There would be no valid way for any legislative or political body to remove the rights of the denominations so long as they wished to

exercise them, and if this were threatened, the denominations would be able to go to the courts and expect to win. Peter Cashin reminded the Convention that his colleague P.W. Crummey had stated that “if Canadians take charge of our country ... in every probability we will have imposed on us, even forced on us, the adoption of non-denominational schools.”⁸¹ Smallwood refuted Cashin’s claim and threatened to stop advocating confederation if it in any way threatened denominational education.⁸²

Years later, Smallwood noted that education was one of the big issues which “was almost enough to wreck it [confederation].”⁸³ Had protection not been given to the denominations — rights in education, “it would have torpedoed Confederation completely. There was no chance of it.”⁸⁴ In essence, then, the education clause, even more so than the financial clauses, was presented by Smallwood in the Convention and to the public as a solemn promise to Newfoundlanders and the religious denominations by Canada, to be ratified and confirmed by Newfoundlanders if they chose the constitutional option of confederation in the referenda. On a pragmatic political level, Smallwood wished to remove education as an issue of contention in the forthcoming referenda debates, for it had the potential among all the issues to de-rail the prospect of confederation if the religious denominations actively opposed it. In an attempt to secure their acquiescence, the education clause was created to give iron-clad guarantees to the rights of religious denominations to have the denominational education system continue unless they consented to its alteration.

The National Convention closed on 30 January, 1948, having recommended that only responsible government and Commission of Government appear on the referendum ballot. Smallwood and Bradley mounted a radio campaign, repeatedly telling Newfoundlanders to send telegrams “demanding” that the non-binding recommendations of the Convention be disregarded and that confederation be placed on the ballot by the Dominions Office. Within several weeks, the confederates had about 50,000 names.⁸⁵ Commenting on the Convention, the February 1948 edition of the *Monitor* authoritatively stated its views on confederation:

- 1) The MONITOR does not propose to become a journal of political opinion.
- 2) The MONITOR believes that the question of the ultimate form of government which the people of Newfoundland should enjoy is a question which can only be decided by the people themselves, and no coercive influence should be permitted or encouraged to influence the electorate.
- 3) The MONITOR believes, however, that the people should have all the information possible placed before them before they are asked to decide for themselves as to the future government of the country.
- 4) The MONITOR believes that to invite the people to declare themselves to be in favour or opposed to a political union with Canada, which can never be dissolved, on the basis of the incomplete information now available to them is not in the best interests of this country.

5) The MONITOR believes that constitutionally the people of this country should determine only one question at the present time, and that is whether they desire to return to Responsible Government or to retain Commission of Government.

6) If the people of this country desire to enter into an irrevocable political union with the Dominion of Canada, then this can be best carried out, and should only be carried out, after suitable negotiations between a full people's Government of Newfoundland and the Government of the Dominion of Canada.⁸⁶

Responsible government was presented as the logical, fair and just choice, the only proper position from which Newfoundland should conduct negotiations with Canada as a constitutional equal. To coincide with Catholic Press month and inform its readers about the function of the Catholic press, *The Monitor's* circulation was increased for the next four months to 20,000 copies per issue, to be distributed across the country to every Catholic home, free of charge.⁸⁷

Philip Noel-Baker, the Dominions Secretary, announced on 11 March that confederation would be on the ballot, along with Commission of Government for another five years, and Responsible Government as it existed in 1933. If there was no clear majority, the option which received the fewest number of votes would be dropped from the ballot and there would be a run-off referendum between the remaining two options. The confederates were jubilant, and responsible government advocates were astounded. Where now was British plain-dealing and justice? At the end of March *The Monitor* announced that

We cannot accept the reasons which have been advanced by the Secretary of State for including Confederation on the ballot paper ... to ask the people to go to the polls with such scanty information as they presently possess is indefensible. We have not sufficient information on the many financial and economic aspects of Confederation; and we have no information on any of the important social and spiritual aspects of it. This fact seems to have been lost sight of by the apologists for Confederation, and it must be borne in mind that there may be far more serious ills in prospect than purely economic ones.⁸⁸

The Monitor then compared confederation to a marriage between a couple, arranged by their parents without their consultation, and characterized the confederates as "opportunists who would have Confederation now at any price."⁸⁹ J.S. Macdonald advised Ottawa that "... the priests of St. Patrick's Deanery, who edit *The Monitor*, could not take so strong a stand on an important public question without the consent of the Archbishop. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that the views that they expound in the editorial under reference will have a considerable effect on the development of opinion among the Roman Catholic section of the electorate."⁹⁰ Macdonald also pointed out that *The Monitor* ignored the point that if Newfoundland returned to responsible government, there would be no negotiations with Canada, a point central to the confederate wish to have a referendum, and predicted that "both

parties would be controlled by Water Street and would see to it that Confederation proposals were not brought forward."⁹¹

The Monitor's complaint about the electorate's lack of information was well-founded. Smallwood's campaign was intensely personal and his appeal was based on an informed knowledge of what people in the outports wanted, not on what the finer points of constitutional law and procedure should be. The message was kept simple, emotional, anti-merchant, and a few themes were always present. These included statements about the personal financial benefits which everyone would reap from confederation, personal attacks on anti-confederates, the re-iteration of the "fact" that "everyone" was voting for confederation, reminders of the "lies" which were being spread about confederation by its opponents, and predictions about the role which religion would play in the vote. A close explanation of the financial implications for Newfoundland was never offered by the confederates.

On 7 April, 60,000 copies of the first issue of *The Confederate* raised the campaign pitch even higher.⁹² The newspaper made its appeal largely to the outports, promising "baby bonuses" and "family allowance cheques," the cornerstone of the confederate campaign. A table was published listing the thirty-five electoral districts, with the number of names from each who had "demanded" to have confederation put on the ballot. Any outport Newfoundlander with even a remote sense of geography could tell that the seven least enthusiastic districts listed were predominantly Roman Catholic and situated close to St. John's.⁹³ As Smallwood later observed, "All people were conscious of their denomination, and they watched each other's activities narrowly. The sectarian spirit saturated all society in Newfoundland."⁹⁴ The RGL was condemned, and an article listed "great Newfoundlanders who were strong Confederates" including Roche's predecessor Archbishop Howley.⁹⁵

Ever aware of the need to dispel fears about the future of denominational education, the 7 April 1948 *Confederate* denounced claims that "our school system will be upset" as "another lie," for "our school system will not be upset. It will not be changed one bit under Confederation":

All school rights are guaranteed just as they stand today. Each religious denomination that has its own schools today will still have them under Confederation These will all remain. These will all go right on just the same as ever, just as long as they want to. They will go right on getting their money from the Government, just the same as now. There will be no change at all All these rights are written into the Terms of Confederation Confederation will not touch our schools. It will not put them in any danger whatever. Anyone who says otherwise is a liar.⁹⁶

Ten days later *The Monitor* accused the confederates of spreading "sinister propaganda."⁹⁷ Readers were told that it seemed that Newfoundlanders "alone are prepared to become a nation of shop-keepers, bartering autonomy and self-compe-

tence for a political and economic mirage."⁹⁸ Readers were told that "you have a vote For the first time in a decade and a half that conviction of yours counts for something. For the first time since 1933 you can express it where it will do most good, at the polling booth."⁹⁹ *The Monitor* then carefully noted that "... we would like to make it perfectly clear to all Catholics that when they vote, they are completely free to cast their ballot according to **their own personal** convictions. The only thing that we would add is that you must vote. You are free to vote how you will, but you are not free not to vote. YOU MUST VOTE."¹⁰⁰ The April edition of *The Monitor* condemned the Commission of Government and its methods: "For surely the common good of this state demands that after fifteen years in which the people were not the rulers of their own country, some stable and permanent form of government in which **the people themselves have a final or at least a limited say** should be established."¹⁰¹

The Monitor reflected widespread sentiments which even Governor Macdonald, despite his abiding sympathy for Commission of Government,¹⁰² was powerless to stem, and both he and J.S. Macdonald noted that the Commission option was losing support.¹⁰³ But the greater threat to confederation was noted by Paul Bridle, now posted to Newfoundland to replace J. Scott Macdonald. Bridle feared that "virtually all the Roman Catholic voters" would take *The Monitor's* advice, and vote against confederation.¹⁰⁴

The May edition of *The Monitor*, the last of its special series of four issues before the vote, published a large editorial entitled "God Guard Thee Newfoundland," in which it stated the belief that "the merits or demerits of Confederation with the Dominion of Canada are completely foreign to the problem to be decided at the present moment ... the question should not have been admitted to the ballot paper as a third choice."¹⁰⁵ Confederation had been placed on the ballot by "outside influences," and unfortunately this action was irrevocable. The British government was roundly condemned, and it noted that "to ask our people to decide the question of a union on the basis of the present meagre and indefinite information available, is to commit a political crime against this country."¹⁰⁶ In another article *The Monitor* reviewed each of the choices. The period of Commission of Government was a "wild era of limitless spending," and "could no longer be accepted as a possible form of government."¹⁰⁷ And since "no enquiry whatsoever has been put on foot to find out what the social and religious implications" of confederation were, the article concluded that there was "not sufficient information at present available to the people to enable them wisely to determine whether or not Newfoundland should become a province of Canada."¹⁰⁸ In contrast, the "positive advantage of Responsible Government" would ensure "the maximum efficiency in the business of government," based on "a complete and thorough knowledge of local affairs and local conditions; of the business of government being operated to the full by Newfoundlanders within Newfoundland."¹⁰⁹

While *The Monitor* in St. John's condemned confederation, other Roman Catholics elsewhere in Newfoundland favoured it. On 12 May Paul Bridle reported that Roman Catholics on the west coast had spearheaded the confederate movement. Bishop O'Reilly was "certainly not opposed to it," W.J. Keough had brought the co-operative movement on-side, and two of Smallwood's vice presidents, Kevin Barry and Loyola Whelan, were leading Roman Catholic lawyers in Corner Brook and spoke at confederate meetings.¹¹⁰ Barry was also responsible for the confederate pamphlet *Outport Opinion*, which for Corner Brook became the equivalent of *The Confederate*. Little documentary evidence exists to support a contention that Roman Catholic clergy were "instructed" by the hierarchy to support one option or another. Instead, they tended to go their own ways: some were known to favour confederation and to campaign for it,¹¹¹ while others supported a return to Responsible Government.

All residents of Newfoundland who were 21 years of age or over, registered on the voters' list, or who were sworn in at the last minute were eligible to vote in the referenda. In the 3 June referendum, responsible government won, although with only a plurality and not the required majority. Some 22,311 voters (14.32%) chose Commission of Government, 64,066 voters chose confederation with Canada (41.13%), and 69,400 chose responsible government (44.55%).¹¹² Sixty-seven per cent of voters on the Avalon Peninsula, composed of predominantly Roman Catholic districts, voted for responsible government, with 25% supporting confederation and 8% supporting Commission of Government. Considering that there had been no campaign for Commission, it did rather well. The considerable number of votes it received had resulted in an inconclusive verdict in the first referendum, and these votes were therefore crucial in a second run-off referendum which was to be held.

With these results in hand, the confederates lost not an instant. The first referendum campaign had been hard-fought, and bitter, with sectarian overtones. It had also left 22,311 Commission of Government supporters with their votes free to be won in a second referendum on 22 July. By Smallwood's own account, it was just after this that he latched onto the idea of appealing to outport Newfoundlanders' sense of being British, and the ties with Britain which Canada also shared, as a means of defeating the responsible government platform, which would require "us to strike the flag ... and swear a new oath of allegiance to a foreign land and flag."¹¹³ Smallwood had 50,000 posters made, bearing the words "British Union" and "Confederation," between which was a multicoloured Union Jack. "The sudden appearance of thousands of these in house windows and elsewhere," Smallwood claimed, "was a violent reminder of the fact that we were British, not American, and that Confederation would allow us to continue to be British subjects."¹¹⁴ The confederates' new platform was born.

The second campaign was made into a sectarian dogfight by the confederates, who sought to create the impression that Roman Catholics had been instructed to

vote for responsible government by the Church. Roche in particular was targeted. On Sunday 6 June, the *Sunday Herald* reported that for the first time in their history, the Roman Catholic orders of Irish Christian Brothers, Sisters of Mercy, and Presentation Sisters had voted in the polls.¹¹⁵ Harold Horwood later claimed that the lay religious had been “released from their vows” by the archbishop,¹¹⁶ and thought it was “the most serious mistake of the campaign,”¹¹⁷ and that the division of the votes by religion in the first referendum was “a split we could use to great profit.”¹¹⁸ Horwood bought all the *Sunday Herald*s he could find.¹¹⁹ The confederates circled the article about the brothers and nuns, and with Smallwood worked up a list of Newfoundland Orange Lodges,¹²⁰ of which there were around 190.¹²¹ The article was clipped out of the paper and sent to every Lodge in the country.¹²² Copies of *The Monitor*’s editorials were also sent to the Lodges.¹²³ According to the confederate Greg Power, during the second campaign Smallwood called a number of his supporters into his office, notably the Keans and Barbours, the captains of vessels which called at ports around the island. He threw a copy of *The Monitor* on the desk in front of them, told them about the “Borgia from Branch” and “the Popish Plot.” Playing on the RGL’s “Home Rule” theme, he demanded of them, “What do you want? Rome Rule? Now go and tell your people.”¹²⁴

The reaction in Protestant Newfoundland was swift. On June 9, Captain Leonard T. Stick, a Confederate Association Vice President for Bay Roberts and Provincial Grand Master of the Loyal Orange Association, received a request by the members of the Star of Bethlehem Lodge L.O.B.A. and Benbow L.O.A. to discuss at the forthcoming meeting of the Grand Lodge whether “the Roman Catholic Church is endeavouring to dominate Newfoundland.”¹²⁵ Once the letter arrived in Stick’s hands, Bradley and Smallwood would probably have been given a copy.¹²⁶ The sense that things British and Protestant were being attacked by Roman Catholics was further fomented on 23 June when the pro-Confederate *Evening Telegram* told readers that an arsonist had levelled the Britannia Loyal Orange Lodge Hall at Petries on the west coast. Neatly juxtaposed with the article was a photograph of Roche, with a caption congratulating him on his fifty-first anniversary as a priest, pregnantly wishing “that His Grace may be spared many more years of fruitful service.”¹²⁷

During the second campaign, *The Confederate* took every opportunity to raise sectarian considerations. In an article entitled “Who Started This Sectarianism?”, the paper asserted that “the campaign leading up to June 3rd was a sectarian campaign,” and posed the following rhetorical questions:

Who whispered around in the Roman Catholic districts the foul lie that Confederation means Communism?

Not the Confederates.

Who whispered in those districts that Newfoundland would be flooded with divorce cases?

Not the Confederates.

Who whispered around that bingo, housie-housie and other games of chance would not be allowed under Confederation?

Not the Confederates.

Who went on the radio and in an anti-Confederate speech read out statements made by the Lord Bishop of Newfoundland and the Archbishop of St. John's?

Not the Confederates.

Who compared the recent June 3rd referendum to the recent election in Italy?

Not the Confederates.

Who plastered offensive anti-Confederate posters on Protestant Churches and the Orange Hall in St. John's two Sundays ago?

Not the Confederates.

Who went around St. John's around Polling Day in a loudspeaker truck flying the Pink, White, and Green flag, shouting "Don't vote against your flag?"

Not the Confederates.¹²⁸

Readers were asked how, if their Orange Lodges, unions, and churches were already united with Canadian lodges, unions, and churches, confederation could mean selling their country?¹²⁹ In an article entitled "Just Picture It," *The Confederate* warned outport readers that if responsible government won, Irish Catholics would be in power and the country would be in an uproar: "Cashin would want to be the boss in the Government. He would have Hr. Main, Ferryland, Placentia-St. Mary's at his back, and he would demand to boss the Government. He would be backed by O'Leary, Doyle and Hollett."¹³⁰ The campaign for responsible government was called "a disgusting game," "a filthy, diabolical game," but with 60,000 copies of *The Confederate* being delivered to every corner of the island, it was a game the confederates played better than their opponents.

During the week of 8-14 July, the women of the Loyal Orange Benevolent Association met for their annual convention at Grand Falls, which Gordon Bradley attended.¹³¹ After the convention, Bradley remained in Grand Falls for the convention of the Grand Lodge,¹³² which was presided over by Leonard Stick.¹³³ In Bradley's handwriting, there exists a resolution dated 12 July, Orangemen's Day, specifically citing that "... the campaign waged by *The Monitor* the official organ of the R.C. Church, the attitude of its clergyman, the nature of the arguments used by its adherents, and above all the records of the polls in the various settlements and districts indicate clearly an attempt to influence the results of the said referendum upon grounds having no relation to the various forms of government submitted to the people"¹³⁴ This letter indicated that the resolution was made "on behalf of Little Catalina Lodge."¹³⁵ At the Grand Falls convention there was considerable disagreement over the propriety of the resolution.¹³⁶ On 16 July, Chesley Fillier, a small merchant from Clarke's Beach, was elected to replace Stick,¹³⁷ and that same day, Fillier issued an "Orange Letter," which quoted Bradley's draft and addressed

all the Orangemen of Newfoundland.¹³⁸ Fillier later claimed that he never wrote the letter,¹³⁹ while Gregory Power later claimed that Smallwood wrote it.¹⁴⁰ The escalation of sectarianism in the referendum campaign reached its zenith when the letter became public: anti-Confederate Peter Cashin even obliged and ensured its wide distribution in Catholic districts “as evidence of Orange tactics.”¹⁴¹

Evidence exists to suggest that some individual Roman Catholic priests did engage in limited measures to sway votes against confederation, but of those who took an active part in the campaigns, more seem to have been ardent confederates, such as Power’s friend, Monsignor Finn of North River, Conception Bay, and Fr. Ronald Jones of Lourdes on the Port au Port Peninsula. There is no evidence in the Roche papers or elsewhere, however, to suggest that Roche masterminded a campaign to unite Catholic voters behind Responsible Government. If he gave sermons, there are no records of his texts, and extensive oral history interviews conducted with members of various Catholic parish congregations reveal no evidence of Roche ever mounting pulpits and preaching against confederation. Most significantly, while Roche did not write the *Monitor’s* editorials, he did vet the *Monitor* for content.¹⁴²

When the vote took place, the results were anti-climactic. Harold Horwood later summarized what happened to the RGL and the Catholic Church in the outports in the second referendum: “Every right thinking Protestant in the country went out and voted against them. In the last ten days we fired off tons of gunpowder and distributed thousands of dollars of Union Jacks. The baymen walked and crawled, and went in wheelchairs to the polling booths, and gave us a 7,000 majority (78,000 to 71,000). The Queen [sic] had been saved and the Pope sent back to his lair.”¹⁴³ When the final votes were counted, 84.89% of eligible voters had voted. Confederation received 78,323 votes, a small majority of 6,989 votes over the 71,334 votes cast for responsible government. The predominantly Roman Catholic districts of St. John’s East and West, Harbour Main-Bell Island, Ferryland, and Placentia-St. Mary’s voted for responsible government, along with the predominantly Church of England districts of Harbour Grace and Port de Grave, while the remaining districts, including the predominantly Roman Catholic districts of St. George’s-Port au Port and Placentia West, where the anti-Catholic card was not played by the Confederates, voted for confederation. Twillingate, which in the first referendum had voted 42% for Commission of Government and 43% for confederation, voted 75% for confederation in the second referendum, seemingly confirming the efficacy of the “British Union” campaign. The Avalon Peninsula had chosen responsible government, but the rest of Newfoundland had chosen confederation, and won.

The Government of Canada sent R.A. MacKay to St. John’s shortly after the referendum, where the public mood was still quite tense. MacKay sounded out confederates and anti-confederates alike, who essentially agreed that a large portion of the opposition to confederation was among east coast Roman Catholic voters,¹⁴⁴

and therefore the single institution with which MacKay concerned himself the most was the Roman Catholic Church. On the evening of 27 July 1948, MacKay was received by Coadjutor Archbishop Flynn, and Bishops O'Neill and O'Reilly. They voiced serious concerns, particularly that Newfoundland could negotiate better terms with Canada if it returned to self-government, and that to proceed with confederation would further split the country. MacKay later wrote that "they admitted that education would be safeguarded but queried the usefulness of this if there was not enough money to provide proper education."¹⁴⁵ In essence, the meeting amounted to a capitulation, allowing MacKay to put his own interpretation on the bishops' reaction and the general reaction in Newfoundland. On 31 July 1948, Mackenzie King and the British government announced that Canada would accept the referendum verdict as an adequate majority with which to proceed with confederation.¹⁴⁶ On 5 August, Governor Gordon Macdonald announced that Commissioner Albert Walsh would lead an appointed delegation to Ottawa to negotiate final terms of union, accompanied by Smallwood, Bradley, John McEvoy, Philip Gruchy, Gordon Winter, and Chesley Crosbie.

The second Ottawa delegation began its preparatory meetings in St. John's in late August, and submitted clause 19 to the Secretary for Education and his executive officers for their comments.¹⁴⁷ The clause was also considered by the Council of Education and by the denominational representatives on the Council.¹⁴⁸ The Roman Catholic executive officer, P.J. Hanley, wrote Archbishops Roche and Flynn and Bishops O'Neill and O'Reilly seeking their reaction.¹⁴⁹ No written reply from Roche has been found, but Hanley replied that the term was generally agreeable to the Roman Catholic authorities provided that a slight modification was made to include denominational colleges. Furthermore, the Church wanted to know how education funds would be allocated. The reply of the Church of England representative was essentially the same.¹⁵⁰

When the Newfoundland delegation arrived in Ottawa it met members of the Interdepartmental Committee and the senior civil service. In its initial memorandum, the delegation stressed its belief "that the edifice of union must be reared on the foundation of respect for private rights and privileges previously conferred by or under Newfoundland law; and the express preservation of the contractual and/or statutory obligations of the Government of Newfoundland from the exercise of Dominion legislative power as to such of these matters as may otherwise be within the jurisdiction of Parliament."¹⁵¹ Clause 19, which incorporated the Roman Catholic suggestions, went to the Interdepartmental Sub-Committee on Law and Procedure, which approved it in principle subject to minor drafting alterations.¹⁵² By 1 December 1948 the terms of union had gone through several drafts¹⁵³ and been rewritten so that the education clause was now Term 17.¹⁵⁴

Final terms were agreed upon in early December and were formally signed 11 December. The terms then had to be confirmed by legislation in the Canadian and United Kingdom parliaments. R.A. MacKay, commenting on Term 17 in briefing

notes for St. Laurent,¹⁵⁵ observed that the term had been “drafted largely by the Newfoundland delegation” in order “to assure the protection of minority rights while permitting amalgamation of schools when desired by the minorities concerned and assuring to both denominational and amalgamated (or common) schools and colleges their fair share of public funds.”¹⁵⁶ In reply to a question on 8 February during the second reading of the bill, St. Laurent told Parliament that the Newfoundland situation differed from that which had existed at the time of the creation of the two new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan, when the Parliament of Canada had control over education in those territories: “The delegates from Newfoundland were told we had no control over their educational system at the present time.... We also told them we had no right to insist upon any guarantee being written into the constitution because they have complete jurisdiction themselves; but if, for the satisfaction of their own people, they felt it was preferable to have a guarantee written into the constitution, we could not object.”¹⁵⁷ This supported Smallwood’s claim that it was politically necessary to have guarantees on education written into the terms. St. Laurent went on to say that “It was felt by the delegation from Newfoundland that it would be more effective to have the clause concerning guarantees drawn in this way so that the legislature would have complete control over education but would not have jurisdiction to do things that would impinge upon the rights of minorities. To do those things would be a denial of jurisdiction.”¹⁵⁸ In essence, St. Laurent told Parliament that Term 17 was written and intended to recognize the minorities’ — the denominations’ — educational rights.

St. Laurent also stated that if denominational minorities’ rights were trespassed upon, the ultimate appeal would be to the Supreme Court of Canada, following an appeal “to the ordinary provincial courts in the first instance, ... ultimately there could be an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.”¹⁵⁹ St. Laurent also assured the House that the status quo would not be fixed for all time by Term 17 when it came to permitting the schools of different denominations to amalgamate, and he reminded MPs that the Newfoundland legislature had the right to set up whatever other schools it wished. The bill passed. A similar piece of legislation made its way through the Westminster Parliament in March 1949.

It has recently been argued that the education clause reflected Smallwood’s own view of education and its role in Newfoundland society.¹⁶⁰ This interpretation ignores the historical climate in which the Newfoundland education system developed, as well as Smallwood’s political need both to create the myth of a monolithic Church, and to “put the lid” back on the Pandora’s box of sectarianism by formalizing the denominations’ rights and prerogatives in education. It has also become fashionable to portray Roche, the Church under his leadership, and the anti-confederate leaders, as ultra-conservative, xenophobic nationalists, who fought tooth-and-nail against confederation to preserve their own exclusive prerogatives and powers from corrosive external influences. One researcher has

recently compared Roche's position with that of antebellum America, where a "rhetoric of memory" was pitted against a "rhetoric of progress", where Smallwood's talk of "a more just distribution of wealth and greater social safety" won out.¹⁶¹ But Smallwood relied less on egalitarianism than he did on trying to buy off his opponents — which for politicians, is the essence of power.

In the wake of the bitter sectarian divisions caused by the referenda campaigns, Smallwood desperately wanted and needed Roman Catholics in his government to give it legitimacy. When in the winter of 1949 he invited F.M. O'Leary, his former Barreman employer and the leader of the RGL to join his cabinet, O'Leary asked Roche for his advice. Roche advised O'Leary not to join:

... the Catholic people of this country wish only to live and let live — to live in peace and ... harmony with their fellow countrymen. The monstrous slanders circulated recently [have put] a great part of the country against them, notwithstanding, they have not, and never had any desire to dominate the country and be a menace to their fellow countrymen. It would be far better for Catholics to have no representation in the Councils of their country than to do anything that might appear to condone bigotry and intolerance, and the creation of religious animosities against our people.¹⁶²

Roche and many others who knew their Newfoundland history had come to expect that the Church would be identified as a target by politicians. That had often been part of the cut and thrust of politics in Newfoundland. But they simply did not expect the confederates to do what they did to win the referendum campaigns. Underestimating one's opponents was a characteristic common among anti-confederates during the late 1940s: even the wily merchants and old-time politicians of the RGL did not expect Britain to put confederation on the ballot against the recommendations of the National Convention. Roche was principled, Smallwood was ruthless.

After the summer of 1948, Roche's health seriously deteriorated, and his death in September 1950 allowed the Canadian hierarchy to take steps to culturally integrate the Newfoundland church into Canadian Catholicism through the appointment of a Canadian-oriented archbishop — Patrick James Skinner — who, although a Newfoundlander by birth, had been educated in Nova Scotia and spent most of his ecclesiastical career in Canada. Thus the institution which most opposed confederation warmed to the concept of Canada. So warm did the relationship become that by 1955, the centenary year of the consecration of the St. John's Cathedral, Cardinal James McGuigan of Toronto was the guest of honor at the celebrations. But there were signs that the process was already underway before Roche's death. In May 1949, Roche wrote McGuigan to find out how Catholic schools were funded in Ontario. Roche's letter of thanks in June turned out to be his last recorded comment on education, and it reveals a shrewd observer for whom confederation's guarantees of Newfoundland's educational future would always be uncertain. Roche wrote:

The situation is somewhat different in Newfoundland in that we have no direct educational tax, the grant for education being provided entirely from general Provincial revenue. As long as the Province remains solvent, and can maintain our grants at a level sufficient to provide for present and prospective educational needs, it is not probable that any great difficulty will rise. There are, however, a great many factors, uncertain and unpredictable, that may at any time alter the whole situation.

It seems almost too much to hope that our present educational setup, in which the rights of the Church and of parents are in every way protected and safeguarded, should continue indefinitely.¹⁶³

In his own time, Roche had witnessed enough social, cultural, political and constitutional change to last several lifetimes. To begrudge him and the anti-confederates their nationalism is to discount their culture, and to judge it more by present-day concepts of Newfoundland in a Canadian context than in fact what Newfoundland was: a separate country, with its own traditions, its own culture of politics, a country in which there were competing views of what it meant to be a Newfoundlander. *The Monitor's* dire predictions of a "flood of immoral literature" notwithstanding, it is unlikely that even Roche would have expected time to stand still. But perceived threats to culture, identity, and education were other matters, about which he could hardly have been expected to remain both quiet and faithful to his inherited responsibilities. Roche's opposition to confederation was not the opposition of a contrarian, but the principled, long-term opposition of a leader who was a thinker, an opposition based on a sane appraisal of the information which had and had not been presented to the Newfoundland electorate. Faced with the inexorable grind of the constitutional machinery cobbled together by Britain and oiled by Canada, his was also an opposition based on fears — which, given the education referenda of the late 1990s, turned out to be legitimate — that the educational prerogatives of Roman Catholics could and would come under attack if educational guarantees, or funding, were not firm.

Having set up a monolithic Catholic Church as the straw man in the second referendum, Smallwood knocked it over in his relentless pursuit of confederation and political power. Using sectarianism to polarize the situation, in effect as a smokescreen, probably did not upset the Department of External Affairs, which in the event was spared from having to supply Smallwood with answers to what otherwise might have been difficult questions about financial relations and resource ownership. These were the kind of questions which *The Monitor* started to ask, but which were dismissed as mere sectarianism because of the quarter from which they came. They were the kind of questions which Smallwood avoided, and they were the kind of questions which during the last fifty years have come back to haunt the province. Smallwood guessed that he would be able to get away with his alliance with the Orange Order, but he also knew it would make little sense to attempt to govern a fractured society, with a permanently-aggrieved minority. Hence his strident advocacy, and Canada's support, of Term 17, which was developed not

only in spite of, but in response to the Catholic Church's position on educational rights.

Notes

¹Research for this essay was supported by the Institute for Social and Economic Research and the J.R. Smallwood Centre for Newfoundland Studies at Memorial University. This essay draws on chapter 2 of my "The Confederation of Newfoundland With Canada, 1946-1949," unpublished MA thesis, Memorial University, 1992; on my "Denominational Education, The Roman Catholic Church, and Newfoundland's Confederation With Canada," an historical brief tabled in the Supreme Court of Newfoundland 1997 St. J. No. 2526, Robert Hogan *et.al.* v. Attorney General of Newfoundland *et.al.*; and on my "Archbishop E.P. Roche, J.R. Smallwood, and Denominational Rights in Newfoundland Education, 1948," *CCHA Historical Studies* 1999, (Vol. 65): 28-49. I thank Ronald Fitzpatrick and James Hiller for comments on earlier versions of this essay.

²A recent quantitative study is Mark Graesser, "An Analysis of Sectarianism in the Referendums," a paper presented to the "Encounters With the Wolf" Confederation Symposium of the Newfoundland Historical Society, 20 March 1999, St. John's.

³The most important historical accounts by confederates are J.R. Smallwood's articles "Happy Province," "The Story of Confederation," and "Let Us Draw Close To Canada" in his *Book of Newfoundland* (hereafter *BNF*), Vol. III (St. John's, 1967) and his autobiography *I Chose Canada* (Toronto, 1973); Harold Horwood, *Joey* (Toronto, 1989), and Richard Gwyn's biography *Smallwood the unlikely revolutionary* (Toronto, 1968, 1972, and 1999), a work researched under instructions from Smallwood not to consult his political enemies.

⁴Joseph R. Smallwood, *I Chose Canada* (Toronto, 1973), p. 306.

⁵Gwyn, *Smallwood* (1972), p. 107.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁷Horwood, *Joey*, pp. 119-30.

⁸National Archives of Canada, Ottawa (hereafter *NAC*), Sound and Moving Image Archives, Charles Granger Collection, tape: 1980-11/2/9, interview of Gregory J. Power by Charles Granger, 27 April 1989.

⁹George Alain Frecker, "Most Reverend Edward Patrick Roche 1874-1950, Archbishop of St. John's (1914-1950)," *The Centenary of the Basilica Cathedral of St. John the Baptist* (St. John's: Robinson and Company, 1955), p. 187.

¹⁰Archives of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. John's (hereafter *ARCASJ*), Roche Papers, Box 18, file: "1916-1930 - Denominational Schools," Roche to priests of the Archdiocese, 5 September 1905. On the 1905 Committee also see Malcolm MacLeod, *A Bridge Built Halfway* (Montreal, 1990), p. 10.

¹¹Inscribed on Roche's memorial tablet in the Basilica, St. John's.

¹²See Edward-Vincent Chafe, "A New Life on Uncle Sam's Farm: Newfoundlanders in Massachusetts, 1846-1859", unpublished MA thesis, Memorial University, 1984; and William G. Reeves, "'Our Yankee cousins': Modernization and the Newfoundland-American Relationship, 1898-1910", unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Maine at Orono, 1987.

¹³FitzGerald, "Confederation," p. 47.

¹⁴MacLeod, *A Bridge Built Halfway*, p. 10.

¹⁵ARCASI, Roche Papers, Box 18, file: "Catholic Education Council 1915," notes of the archbishop for an address to the meeting, 4 October 1915.

¹⁶MacLeod, *A Bridge Built Halfway*, p. 12.

¹⁷Edward Patrick Roche, "Address to the Clergy of the Province, given to the annual priests retreat in 1916," *St. John's: Newfoundland Quarterly Print*, 1916, pp. 4, 5, 9-10.

¹⁸ARCASI, Roche Papers, Boxes 18-21, various documents, *passim*.

¹⁹In Peter Neary, ed., *White Tie and Decorations: Sir John and Lady Hope Simpson in Newfoundland, 1934-1936* (Toronto, 1996), it becomes apparent that the Hope Simpsons held Roman Catholicism responsible for much which they believed to be wrong with Newfoundland, and for many of the things on which they as socialists hoped to bring "a revolution in public morality" (p. 56). Hope Simpson wrote his son Ian on 18 February 1934 that "the R.C. community is very strong and very bigoted" (p. 33), while his wife Quita in her letters wrote Catholic jokes to her friends (p. 103), identified the religious persuasion of every significant Roman Catholic of note, observed that being "Catholic-Irish" was "a bad combination in a country where sturdy hard work and thrift are essential to comfort" (p. 193), advocated birth control to stop Newfoundland from "seething" with Catholic children (p. 330) and wrote that "The Roman Catholics teach, I am told, that an RC who produces seven little RCs is certain of his ticket to heaven" (p. 73).

²⁰John Hope Simpson to his son Ian and his daughter-in-law Sheila, 18 February 1934, in Neary, ed., *White Tie*, p. 33.

²¹For example see J.A. Winter to V.P. Burke, 18 March 1937 regarding revision of the Education act "while not interfering with the denominational system," in *Exhibits for Policy Grievance — Newfoundland Teachers' Association vs. the Roman Catholic School Board for Exploits-White Bay*, Vol. E2, p. 139; ARCASI, Roche Papers, Box 19, file: School Grants, Roche to J.A. Winter, 15 October 1938, acknowledging draft of proposed Education legislation.

²²Cited in Hans Rollmann, "Bishops disagree on union with Canada," *The Telegram*, 28 March 1999.

²³Paul Bridle, ed. *Documents on Relations Between Canada and Newfoundland*, Vol. II (Ottawa, 1984), p. 165, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 21 August 1945. Subsequent references to Bridle, *Documents*, are to this volume.

²⁴William J. Browne, *Eighty-Seven Years a Newfoundlander* (St. John's, 1984), p. 44.

²⁵Bridle, *Documents*, p. 227, J.S. Macdonald to Norman Robertson, March 15, 1946. As early as 1942 Robertson was told by Scott Macdonald's predecessor, Charles J. Burchell, that "Mr. Justice Dunfield is a very strong advocate of confederation, so also is Cyril Fox," *Ibid.*, p. 10, Burchell to Robertson, 21 February 1942.

²⁶Archives of the Congregation of the Presentation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Presentation Convent, Cathedral Square, St. John's, Address of His Grace the Archbishop, given at the close of the priests' retreat, 1936, p. 3.

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

²⁸Archives of the Diocese of St. George's, Corner Brook, Newfoundland, Bishop O'Reilly Papers, letter of Coadjutor Archbishop Thomas J. Flynn of St. John's to Bishop M. O'Reilly, 11 October 1947, noting that Higgins had told Flynn that Convention member W.J. Keough had informed the National Convention Delegation to Ottawa that O'Reilly was "strongly pro-confederate."

²⁹Smallwood, "The Story," *BNF*, p. 8.

³⁰Gregory J. Power to J.E. FitzGerald, 27 March 1989. O'Neill was considerably younger than Roche, having just graduated from St. Bon's in 1921, when Roche was already archbishop.

³¹A co-adjutor archbishop assists another archbishop in the performance of his pastoral duties, but he may or may not have rights of future succession. Flynn did, but in September 1949 he predeceased Roche.

³²Bridle, *Documents*, p. 243, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 May 1946.

³³David G. Pitt, "Methodism," *Encyclopedia of Newfoundland and Labrador*, Vol. III, (St. John's, 1991) (hereafter *ENL III*), p. 525.

³⁴On this see Frederick W. Rowe, *Into the Breach — Memoirs of a Newfoundland Senator* (Toronto, 1988), p. 108.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶On the strength of Methodism on the south coast and its ties with Canada see Eugene Forsey, *A Life on the Fringe — The Memoirs of Eugene Forsey* (Toronto, 1990), pp. 2-4, 10-11, 15.

³⁷See Rowe, *Into the Breach*, p. 109, and James Wade, "Literary Institute, Methodist College," *ENL III*, pp. 319-20.

³⁸Hans Rollmann, *Religious Studies 3901 — Religion in Newfoundland and Labrador: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (St. John's, 1990), pp. 4-5; also see Rollmann, "Organic Union With Canada," *The Telegram*, 28 February 1999.

³⁹*Ibid.*

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archives, Memorial University (hereafter CNSA), J.R. Smallwood Papers, 1.32.001, Port de Grave Pre-Confederation, J. Dawe, Coley's Point, to Smallwood, 4 May 1948; Horwood, *Joey*, p. 114.

⁴²Hiller and Harrington, *National Convention I*, p. 57.

⁴³Report of the Committee on Education, in Hiller and Harrington, *National Convention* Vol. II, pp. 65-74.

⁴⁴These were Kenneth Macdonald, Rev. Lester Burry, and Charles Bailey. See Hiller and Harrington, *National Convention* Vol. I, pp. 162, 163, and 167.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 577, 22 May 1947.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 579.

⁴⁷For example see *ibid.*, p. 678, 7 November 1947, speech of Edward Reddy.

⁴⁸NAC.MG 30 Vol. 6, file: Semi-Official and Personal Correspondence re: Newfoundland 1944-1950, R.A. MacKay to Paul Bridle, 2 May 1947.

⁴⁹NAC.MG 30 E 159 Vol. 5, file: Legal Procedure for Admission of Newfoundland, 1947-1949, Paul Bridle to R.A. MacKay, 29 August 1947, p. 2 and ff.

⁵⁰Smallwood, *I Chose Canada*, p. 306.

⁵¹This may have occurred because Higgins was not an intimate friend of Roche's, and Roche was "not an admirer" of Higgins (Robert S. Furlong to J.E. FitzGerald, 21 November 1991).

⁵²Smallwood later noted that Bradley "was a vigorous Protestant" and a former Grand Master of the Loyal Orange Lodge of Newfoundland, with "a strong antipathy to any possibility of domination of Newfoundland by the Roman Catholic Church." See Smallwood, *I Chose Canada*, p. 307.

⁵³*Ibid.*, pp. 307-8.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 572.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁵⁶Bridle, *Documents*, p. 543, minutes of meeting, 2 July 1947.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 558, minutes of meeting of 7 July 1947.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 618, minutes of meeting of 11 August 1947.

⁶⁰Frank O'Leary to J.E. FitzGerald, 12 May 1992, and William J. Ryan to J.E. FitzGerald, 13 September 1991.

⁶¹The address was printed in the July-August issue of *The Monitor*, and may also be found in NAC, MG 27 III B20, Vol. 58, 26 British Government, file 1.

⁶²*The Monitor*, July-August 1947, p. 1.

⁶³NAC, MG 27 III B20, Vol. 58, 26 British Government, file 1, Britton to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 28 August 1947.

⁶⁴Bridle, *Documents*, p. 669, undated note of King.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 669, Memo of J.R. Baldwin, Assistant Secretary of Cabinet to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 10 October 1947.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 669-70.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 720, notes on St. Laurent to the Press Gallery of the House of Commons, 6 November 1947.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 675-6, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 17 October 1947.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*The Monitor*, 20 September 1947, p. 4.

⁷²Smallwood, *I Chose Canada*, p. 309. Ki Su Kim, "J.R. Smallwood and the Negotiation of a School System for Newfoundland, 1946-1948," *Newfoundland Studies* (hereafter *NS*), 11(1): 60 claims that Smallwood "conversed" with Archbishop Roche over the education question. There are no records to indicate that any such meeting ever took place.

⁷³ARCASJ, Roche Papers, W. Gordon Warren to Father O'Mara, 17 December 1947.

⁷⁴*The Monitor*, November 1947, p. 1.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 1. Possibly *The Monitor* was referring to the National Convention elections, and the subsequent domination of that body by the confederates.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁷⁷Robert S. Furlong to J.E. FitzGerald, 30 April 1992.

⁷⁸See, for example, the speeches of Hollett and Cashin in Hiller and Harrington, *National Convention I*, pp. 984, 1018-1019, and 1078.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 1119.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 1179.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 1371. Cashin spoke on 23 January 1948.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 1443.

⁸³Smallwood, *I Chose Canada*, p. 572.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 573.

⁸⁵Horwood, *Joey*, p. 101.

⁸⁶*The Monitor*, February 1948, p. 2.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁸⁸*The Monitor*, March 1948, p. 1.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

⁹⁰Bridle, *Documents*, p. 851, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 24 March 1948.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, p. 851.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 853, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 April 1948.

⁹³*The Confederate*, 7 April 1948, p. 2.

⁹⁴Smallwood, *I Chose Canada*, pp. 312-13.

⁹⁵*The Confederate*, 7 April 1948, p. 2.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*

⁹⁷*The Monitor*, April 1948, pp. 3 and 7.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁰²On this see Bridle, *Documents*, p. 868, J.S. Macdonald to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 May 1948.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, p. 857, "Memorandum by British Commonwealth Division of the Department of External Affairs, Minute on Despatch No. 167 of April 15th, by P.A. Bridle."

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, p. 857.

¹⁰⁵*The Monitor*, May 1948, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹¹⁰Bridle, *Documents*, p. 866, Bridle to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 12 May 1948. O'Reilly's independence was also noted in Smallwood, *I Chose Canada*, p. 310.

¹¹¹See, for example, CNSA, Smallwood Papers, 1.37.001, St. George's-Port-au-Port, Pre-Confed., list of key supporters.

¹¹²For referendum results see Bert Riggs, "Elections", *ENL* 1, 722-3; for referendum statistics see FitzGerald, "Confederation", 315-17.

¹¹³Smallwood, "The Story," *BNF* III, p. 31.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹¹⁵*The Sunday Herald*, 6 June 1948, p. 3.

¹¹⁶Horwood, *Joey*, p. 124. Only for the semi-cloistered Presentation Sisters was voting a new activity; the sisters themselves sought the archbishop's permission for a one-time release of the rule of the cloister that they might vote, and it was granted.

¹¹⁷Horwood, *Joey*, p. 124.

¹¹⁸Harold Horwood, "How We Got Confederation," *The Evening Telegram*, 28 March 1969, p. 37.

¹¹⁹Horwood, *Joey*, pp. 124-5.

¹²⁰Horwood, "How We Got Confederation," *Evening Telegram*, 28 March 1969, p. 37.

¹²¹Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smyth, *The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada* (Toronto, 1980), p. 83.

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¹²²Horwood, *Joey*, p. 124.

¹²³Gregory Power to J.E. FitzGerald, 27 January 1992; also see CNSA, J.G. Higgins Papers, 3.01.028, Correspondence J.G. Higgins, 1949-1951, Free Protestant, Grand Bank, to Higgins, 29 March 1950.

¹²⁴Gregory Power to J.E. FitzGerald, 27 January 1992.

¹²⁵NAC, MG 26 L, Vol. 61, file: N-19-2, James Johnson and C. Edgecombe to L.T. Stick, 9 June 1948.

¹²⁶A copy of this letter exists in Smallwood's papers. See CNSA, Smallwood Papers, 7.01.002, J.R. Smallwood Correspondence, 1948, Johnson and Edgecombe to L.T. Stick, 9 June 1948.

¹²⁷*The Evening Telegram*, 23 June 1948, p. 3.

¹²⁸*The Confederate*, 7 July 1948, p. 1.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 2. Malcolm Hollett was neither Irish nor Catholic.

¹³¹*The Evening Telegram*, 3 August 1948, p. 7.

¹³²Horwood, *Joey*, p. 129. Gwyn, *Smallwood*, p. 110 claims that Bradley "rarely acted except on Smallwood's instructions." This was not true, but Smallwood was probably consulted on Bradley's activities at the Grand Lodge.

¹³³*The Evening Telegram*, 29 June 1948, p. 1.

¹³⁴CNSA, F. Gordon Bradley Papers, file: Confederation Orange Letter, 12 July 1948.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*

¹³⁶Diane P. Janes, "Chesley Fillier," *ENL* II, p. 66; Jamieson, *No Place for Fools*, p. 122.

¹³⁷*The Evening Telegram*, 24 July 1948, p. 3.

¹³⁸The copy of Fillier's letter in the Bradley Papers bears the following handwritten note by Bradley: "several copies of this on hand."

¹³⁹Grace Sparkes to J.E. FitzGerald, 15 January 1992.

¹⁴⁰Gregory J. Power to J.E. FitzGerald, 27 January 1992.

¹⁴¹Don Jamieson, "I saw the fight," *BNF* III, p. 102.

¹⁴²R.S. Furlong to J.E. FitzGerald, 21 November 1991, 30 April 1992.

¹⁴³Harold Horwood, "I'd Do it All Again," *Call Me Joey*, pp. 62-3.

¹⁴⁴Bridle, *Documents*, pp. 979-91.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 989.

¹⁴⁶For the releases see *Ibid.*, pp. 993-8.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 1027, minutes of meeting of Newfoundland delegation, 28 August 1948.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 1081-2, G.A. Frecker, Secretary of Education to James Channing, Secretary of the Newfoundland Delegation, 22 September 1948.

¹⁴⁹ARCASJ, Archbishop Roche Papers, Box 20, file: Educational Affairs 1948, Hanley to Roche, 3 September 1948.

¹⁵⁰Bridle, *Documents*, p. 1082, memo of P.J. Hanley to G.A. Frecker, 22 September 1948.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 1132, Extracts from Memorandum by delegation of Newfoundland, "October 1948." While the delegation was in Ottawa, *The Monitor* reiterated the Church's stand on education for Education Week in its November 1948 issue, reminding readers that "to envisage education for a Catholic, divorced from religion, is to envisage a denial of full education to Catholic children." (*The Monitor*, November 1948, p. 4.)

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 1155.

¹⁵³For an early draft of Term 17 see NAC, MG 32 B5 Vol. 117, file: Newfoundland: Memoranda re: Cabinet Committee 1948, 29 October 1948.

¹⁵⁴Bridle, *Documents*, p. 1231.

¹⁵⁵St. Laurent assumed the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada and the prime ministership in August 1948 after Mackenzie King's retirement.

¹⁵⁶NAC, MG 32 B5 Vol. 117, file: Newfoundland: Material for Debate 1949, Memo of R.A. MacKay, 1 February 1949. Also see Bridle, *Documents*, p. 1231, fn. 83.

¹⁵⁷Bridle, *Documents*, p. 1439, St. Laurent to the House of Commons, 8 February 1949.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 1439, St. Laurent to the House of Commons, 8 February 1949.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 1440, St. Laurent to the House of Commons, 8 February 1949.

¹⁶⁰Ki Su Kim, "J.R. Smallwood," *NS*, 11 (1): 53-74.

¹⁶¹Hans Rollmann, "Where Once They Stood We Stand?," *Sunday Telegram*, 12 September 1999, p. 10.

¹⁶²Roche to O'Leary, n.d. My thanks to Hans Rollmann for a copy of this letter in his possession.

¹⁶³Archives of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto, Cardinal McGuigan Papers, Roche to McGuigan, 10 June 1949.