Newfoundland's "Dangerous" Internees Who Never Were: The History of Victoria Camp, 1940-43

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Despite the growing scrutiny of Newfoundland's role in World War II and an abundance of local tales about the antics of alleged German spies and fifth columnists in even the most remote parts of the island, the internment of so-called "enemy aliens" in Newfoundland has remained unexplored.

Few know about the internment camps in downtown St. John's, at Pleasantville, and at Victoria, near the town of Carbonear. Between 1939 and 1945 the Commission of Government in Newfoundland was involved in at least three different types of internment operations in response to security concerns from its own population and from the United Kingdom. At Pleasantville, near St. John's, an internment camp was operated for a group of thirty-eight enemy aliens who were arrested in Newfoundland during the first year of the war. These consisted of local German residents as well as of German and Italian merchant seamen, all of whom were transferred to Canadian camps by 1941. In downtown St. John's, various spacious facilities (such as the YMCA building, West End Fire Hall, the Sudbury Building, and Caribou Hut) were converted to temporary internment facilities for Norwegian, Finnish, Danish, French, Greek, Dutch, Hungarian, Romanian, and Japanese seamen between 1939 and 1943. Some of these internees were eventually deported to Canadian internment camps as well.

The subject of this article is the history of a large camp built for 1,000 internees in 1940. Its location was at Victoria, near Carbonear, about eighty...
miles northeast of St. John's and two miles inland from the shore of Conception Bay. The camp was originally planned for 1,000 civilian internees to be received from the U.K. When these were shipped elsewhere, the camp was modified for POW use. When Canada objected to this use, the camp was completed for the detention of merchant seamen. Canada was instrumental in having this plan vetoed too. In their search for a purposeful utilization of the camp, the Newfoundland and British governments reviewed all the options available at the time, each of which turned out to be either unacceptable to Canada or not viable. Ironically, although Victoria Camp was on Newfoundland soil and Newfoundland wanted the camp to be used and was unconcerned about the alleged danger to her own security, outside powers imposed on Newfoundland the decision not to use it.

The history of Victoria Camp affords a glimpse of the range and complexity of the enemy alien and POW problem, and its entanglement with other issues in the British Commonwealth during World War II. One of these issues was Newfoundland's defence, which had traditionally been entrusted to the Royal Navy. With her entry into World War II, however, Canada had officially and unilaterally declared the defence of Newfoundland an integral part of her own defence. But it was not until the fall of France in June, 1940, that the Dominions Office in London permitted and encouraged Canada to assume concrete military responsibilities for Newfoundland, such as the stationing of Canadian troops there and control of the airports at Gander and Botwood. The overriding need for military coordination between Britain and Canada in 1940 strengthened the hand of Canada with regard to defensive measures concerning Newfoundland. The defenceless condition of Newfoundland and the limited sovereignty of its London-appointed Commission of Government reinforced this tendency. That was why Victoria Camp, although intended to relieve the U.K. of a security risk, could not be used as long as Canada considered it a threat to her own security. The following account is based on the records of the Newfoundland, British, and Canadian governments, as well as on newspaper reports and interviews.

Construction for Victoria Camp was started in response to an urgent despatch from the British government on June 14, 1940, pleading with Newfoundland to take 1,000 of Britain's civilian internees "at earliest possible date." (Heart's Content, Argentia, Port au Port, Whitbourne, and Random Island had also been considered as possible sites.) German male internees in Britain exceeded 12,000, and Italian male internees numbered about 10,000, the despatch reported, not counting POWs and German seamen taken off ships. The despatch characterized the large number of internees in Britain as "dangerous or potentially dangerous," and as a serious security risk. In the event of an attack on England, "if given opportunity, they might assist the enemy." Furthermore, they were held responsible for tying down a considerable number of service personnel who were needed for other, more
essential purposes. Newfoundland was assured that Britain was prepared to meet all expenditures and to supply initial guards, and that Canada had also agreed to take immediately 4,000 civilian internees and 3,000 Pows. The British government issued the request to Newfoundland despite reservations about the adequacy of Newfoundland's military resources to guard a camp of 1,000 "potentially dangerous persons." Newfoundland had become indispensable in a hastily improvised British arrangement which initially envisaged 8,000 internees, with guards, to be sent to Canada, 9,000 to Australia and New Zealand, and 2,000 to Newfoundland by the beginning of July, 1940.4

What the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs had concealed from the governments of the dominions was that most of the allegedly dangerous enemy aliens to be dispatched to the colonies were innocent refugees from Nazi persecution. After the outbreak of the war, the British government did not contemplate general internment of enemy aliens as in World War I. Instead it established tribunals to categorize all enemy aliens according to the level of danger they represented: "A" to be interned; "B" not to be interned but subject to restrictions; and "C" to remain at liberty. By the end of October, 1939, the tribunals had interned some 600 of 74,000 persons over the age of sixteen who were registered as German citizens in Britain.5

Among the growing number of interned Germans were German Jewish refugees like Ernst Deutsch, who has been on the faculty of Memorial University of Newfoundland as a distinguished geophysicist since 1963. At the age of fifteen, he managed to flee Germany shortly before the outbreak of the war with the help of a passport obtained on the black market. (He and his parents, Austrian citizens until the Anschluss of March, 1938, were refused official passports on the grounds that his physicist father had done sensitive work.) Even though Ernst's parents were classified as C aliens and not interned, he was below the minimum age for admission to the tribunal which would have exempted him from internment. As a result, he was treated as a class B alien and interned in May, 1940.6

The sudden change from Sitzkrieg (phony war) to German Blitzkrieg in western Europe and the surrender of the Low Countries and France in May, 1940, had intensified anti-alien feeling in Britain. The swiftness of German victories in western Europe was erroneously attributed everywhere to the subversive activities of a German fifth column which had allegedly paved the way for the invading forces.7 In the weeks following the Dunkirk evacuations, the fifth column panic gained such wide currency that even bona fide Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria were suspected of aiding and abetting the enemy. Prime Minister Winston Churchill thought he had evidence of the existence of 20,000 German Nazis in England, and the British public demanded that all of England's 80,000 refugees from German-speaking and German-occupied Europe be put in concentration camps. Even though
the German espionage network in England was negligible and so penetrated by British security services that it was actually run in the service of the British war effort, the British government began mass internment of category B Germans in May and category C Germans in June, 1940. The great majority of those interned in makeshift camps in May and June, 1940, were Jewish refugees.8

Readers of the St. John’s Evening Telegram of June 4, 1940, learned that the British government was planning to “export” interned aliens and Pows to places remote from the British Isles, out of fear that they might collaborate with German aircraft or parachute troops. The British government’s sudden impatient urge to deport a large portion of its suspected fifth column is indicated by Churchill’s frequently quoted question to his Cabinet Secretary on June 3: “Has anything been done about sending 20,000 internees to Newfoundland or St. Helena? . . . I should like to get them on the high seas as soon as possible, but I suppose considerable arrangements have to be made at the other end. Is it all going forward?”9

Although Newfoundland was never approached to take 20,000 internees, a surprisingly well informed letter in the Daily News of June 29, 1940, by C.F. Garland, declared that “we have plenty of space to accommodate hundreds of thousands.” Proposing that Newfoundland help relieve congestion in the British Isles by taking large numbers of interned aliens, Pows, refugees, and evacuees, the writer claimed to have the support of a large number of citizens. He suggested that lots of smaller islands around the coast could be utilized for that purpose, provided the British government would pay for all the expenses incurred. Random Island, he estimated, could accommodate 50,000 interned aliens. The prisoners would create a lot of trade, jobs, and profits for Newfoundland: “There are so many angles to advantage they become more evident with thinking about the scheme.”

On June 18 Governor Humphrey Walwyn said he was prepared to receive “all German or all Italian” internees within two weeks, provided sufficient tents and wood floors were sent ahead of them. “And please send any further information as to regulations governing general treatment and discipline of internees not already here,” he reminded the Dominions Secretary; adding, “You will no doubt realize that construction in great haste of a camp for 1,000 men will present considerable difficulties which we shall have to overcome by improvised methods which may not in all cases be the best from the point of view of economy.” The governor had every reason to expect real or potential enemy agents of the category A type interned in Britain to be sent to Newfoundland. He therefore warned that Newfoundland would be unable to provide military guards for about two months and would gladly accept an offer to have the accompanying British officers train local forces. He also requested advice on design and construction of a camp for 1,000 internees, and received from External Affairs in Ottawa detailed plans
and photographs of Petawawa (Ontario) and Kananaskis (Alberta) camps. On June 19 Newfoundland was ready to receive up to 1,000 male internees within three days, provided their disembarkation could be delayed for three days in St. John’s while the canvas camp was being erected. On June 29 the shipping date for the tents was announced to be June 30, and on July 1, 1940, the sailing date for Newfoundland’s 1,000 German internees was set for July 4. The internees were to arrive in St. John’s on July 10 in the company of seven officers and 148 NCOs and men.10

The announced internees never arrived because the 15,000 ton luxury liner Arandora Star, which was supposed to bring fifty tons of tentage to Newfoundland and then continue with 1,200 category A, mostly Italian, internees to Canada, was torpedoed off the Irish coast and sank with heavy loss of life. The internees destined for Newfoundland, who were to follow the Arandora Star on the 11,000 ton former Polish passenger liner Sobieski, were therefore rerouted to Canada instead. The Sobieski, with Ernst Deutsch on board — he had been separated from his parents and had no idea where he was being sent — departed from England as planned on July 4 and reached Quebec on July 15. On its way to Canada the Sobieski entered St. John’s harbor on July 12 for three hours (allegedly for repairs) without docking or allowing anyone to disembark and without identifying the port to its passengers. Had it not been for Ernst’s ability to decipher Morse code signals and a German sailor on board the Sobieski who had bad memories of Newfoundland, Ernst would not have known he was in St. John’s. He wrote in his diary that he saw kids in boats pulling fish out of the harbor, lots of British patriotism — it turned out that he saw school children waving the Union Jack on the occasion of Orangemen’s Day — and fog.11 Ernst’s refugee friend Henry Kreisel, a sixteen-year-old native of Vienna, noted that “the harbour is beautiful but the town itself seems very primitive.” Other refugee internees on board the Sobieski found St. John’s rather gloomy and desolate and were glad they did not have to debark there.12

The Sobieski’s passengers consisted of 982 internees, as well as 584 POWs who had from the outset been destined for Canada. The two groups were separated by a barbed wire which divided the boat in half. The ship’s crew was Polish and “very” anti-Semitic. The internees were, however, not the expected dangerous category A type spies, but category B and C internees, i.e., mostly refugees who had fled Nazi oppression. Had they been sent to Victoria Camp as planned, Newfoundland would, unwittingly, have become a haven for refugees from the Third Reich.13 They would undoubtedly have caused as much consternation and confusion as they did on their landing in Canada. Assumed to be spies and saboteurs of the kind to be delivered by the Arandora Star, they were at first put with merchant seamen and category A pro-Nazis in a makeshift camp at Trois Rivières. There they were robbed of valuables by their Canadian guards and made to suffer the anti-
Semitic threats and insults of their pro-Nazi fellow prisoners. It took nearly one month for the Canadian authorities to realize they had made a mistake; they then transferred the interned refugees to a purposely built camp at Fredericton. Like Ernst Deutsch, many of the other Sobieski refugees remained imprisoned in Canadian internment camps as late as January, 1943.¹⁴

In London, meanwhile, “serious difficulty” was anticipated over the accommodation of internees in Newfoundland, not only owing to the “unsatisfactory climate and the necessity of erecting huts,” but also to the scarcity of guards because of the “very small military resources of the Island,” as Canada’s High Commissioner in Great Britain, Vincent Massey, reported to Ottawa on July 22, 1940. While awaiting new dates for the shipment of tents and internees, Newfoundland on July 16 sent London an estimate of $150,000 for the erection of the camp and a projected cost of $2,500 weekly for food. Payment was requested immediately. In reply, on August 3, the Dominion Secretary cancelled all plans to send internees to Newfoundland and asked that no further expenditure be incurred in connection with the camp. Worried about its ability to collect the amount it claimed in alleged disbursements, the Commission of Government demanded £20,000 “at once” instead of the £40,000 originally asked for. Payment of £20,000 was confirmed on August 19, 1940. At the same time, the Commission government inquired twice in London whether the camp should not be finished before winter in case “present decision not to send internees here was reversed before 1 September next.”¹⁵

It was in response to these inquiries that on September 27, 1940, the Dominion Secretary proposed a new scheme for Victoria Camp, namely its utilization as a POW camp for 1,000 captured enemy airmen. England already had some 850 captured enemy airmen and the total was increasing daily, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs explained. The British government considered it desirable to move them overseas. The Newfoundland contingent would consist of 250 officers and 750 other ranks, mostly NCOs. The officers would need to have a separate camp from the other ranks. Arrangements as to guards would be the same as those proposed for internees, except that militia guards would not be appropriate for POWs. Newfoundland signified that work on the camp would restart on October 1 and that everything would be ready to receive the 1,000 airmen by November 15. However, as a result of rearrangements, the cost of completing the camp had increased to £50,000, inclusive of equipment and the supply of provisions for two weeks. The new layout provided for a separation of the officers from the other ranks by a fifteen-foot road with a strong wire fence on both sides. The two sets of prisoners would be able to see each other when outdoors, but no part of the camp would be common to both of them. According to a blueprint from London of October 8, 1940, the camp required 153 guards and an admin-
istrative staff of twenty-four, including four nursing orderlies, three batmen, three clerks, two interpreters, two electricians, and a hospital cook. Newfoundland's offer relieved Britain of the need to send POWs to Australia for some time.16

While construction was proceeding to modify and complete Victoria Camp, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) learned of the plans for a POW camp at Victoria and objected to the scheme. The PJBD had been created on August 17, 1940, at a meeting between Canadian Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King and American President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It consisted of representatives from each of the two countries; its mandate was to recommend to the Canadian and American governments courses of action for the joint defence of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere, such as the stationing of troops and the establishment of American bases at St. John's, Argentia, and Goose Bay, in addition to the Canadian bases at Gander and Botwood. Although half of the PJBD's recommendations during its first year of existence dealt with Newfoundland, members of the Commission of Government were not invited to attend PJBD meetings until October, 1940.17

Commissioners Edward Emerson and J.H. Penson appear to have had the first opportunity to inform the PJBD of their plans for Victoria on October 7. "The Board feel strongly," Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs warned Governor Walwyn on October 9, "that incarceration of German prisoners in Newfoundland would present a serious military hazard which might jeopardize the defence scheme for Newfoundland which the Board is now preparing and thus menace the safety of Canada and the United States." PJBD members feared in particular that German forces might be prepared to take grave risks to liberate captured airmen and might make the geographically vulnerable island subject to attacks, against which the neutral U.S. might find it difficult to intervene.

Neither the Dominions Office nor the Commission of Government had good reason to persist with their POW project in the face of such determined and irrefutable representations, especially since Canada offered to take the German airmen destined for Newfoundland. In the fall of 1940, however, Victoria Camp was nearing completion just as a German invasion of the British Isles appeared imminent, making it more desirable than ever for the British to transfer their growing number of German POW overseas. The Dominions Secretary, therefore, on October 12 proposed a third scheme for the utilization of Victoria Camp. The 1,000 enemy airmen intended for Newfoundland would be diverted to Canada, which would in turn send 1,000 of its interned merchant seamen to Newfoundland. Governor Walwyn eagerly seized upon the proposal and was confident that the Canadian government, while it might perhaps be able to object to naval seamen, would not object to merchant seamen. The camp, he wrote London and Ottawa, was not visible
from the sea and was approachable by only one road four miles long which for five months could be kept passable only by a snow plow. "A raider would have either to capture St. John's and use the railway to the road at Carbonar, some eight miles away, or enter Conception Bay and land forces at Carbonar," he said. The presence of Allied land and sea forces and the vicinity of two airports "would make this venture so hazardous that we can hardly imagine Germany undertaking it for merchant seamen."18

If there was objection to sending merchant seamen, the Dominions Secretary reminded Ottawa and St. John's on October 29, the camp "on which expenditure of £40,000 has already been incurred would not be utilized" and the money would have been wasted. The Home Office ruled out the transfer to Newfoundland from Canada of civilian internees other than merchant seamen sent from the U.K. From a list of 1,697 merchant seamen sent from Britain to Canada and held in "r Camp" — a code name for Red Rock Camp, near Nipigon, Ontario — 1,000 should be selected, the Dominions Secretary proposed on November 2, 1940. Transferees should not include men who by reason of age, health, or some other factor appeared unsuitable for transfer. Colonel O.M. Biggar, the Canadian chairman of the PJB, confided to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa his belief that no great expense had been incurred for Victoria Camp. No more than a small portion of the £40,000 included the cost of construction begun for other purposes. "If it was a bad idea at £10 it is no better at £10,000," Biggar was quoted as saying. However, he did not think the PJB needed this information in order to veto the merchant seamen proposal.19

External Affairs in Ottawa referred the final decision about sending enemy merchant seamen from Canada to Newfoundland to the PJB and urged Governor Walwyn to attach the same weight to the opinion of this Board as Ottawa intended to do. Walwyn feared that Ottawa might be unwilling to consider Newfoundland's commitments and Britain's investment, and requested that the Board also consider the purely military aspects from the American point of view. "The camp will be ready for occupation on 15 November," Walwyn angrily wrote External Affairs in Ottawa on November 8, 1940. "We are naturally most anxious not to withdraw our offer of assistance to Great Britain if we can possible avoid doing so. Having studied the matter from all angles, we do not ourselves attach the same importance to the practical difficulties which seem to disturb your mind." On November 15, the Canadian government relayed to London the opinion of the PJB "that the establishment of internment camps in Newfoundland would create an unnecessary and dangerous hazard." To help solve Britain's problem, Canada would be prepared to receive an additional 1,000 airmen on the same financial conditions as those pertaining to POWs and internees already transferred to Canada. Since the Canadian government did not bother to inform New-
foundland of its decision, Governor Walwyn had to obtain the anxiously awaited news by way of a despatch from London on November 25.\textsuperscript{20}

In bilateral discussions of defence questions with representatives of the Canadian government in St. John's at the end of November, 1940, the Commission of Government reiterated its wish to put Victoria Camp to use for internees. In what appeared to be more an empty gesture than a viable proposal, the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa on December 13, 1940, agreed that as far as the Canadian government was concerned, "the camp at Carbonar, of which Newfoundland was anxious to make use, might be utilized for civilian internees." The Committee was aware that the British government, so far, had not been prepared to intern civilians at Victoria. On December 14, 1940, the Dominions Office ruled out all possibility of Newfoundland being asked to receive civilian internees as the British government began to release the refugees it had hastily interned. Until April, 1942, the British government complained periodically about the depreciation of its assets near Carbonar. This caused the \textit{FD\&B} in April, 1941, and August, 1942, to reaffirm its opposition to an enemy POW camp as a "serious and unwanted menace to the security of Newfoundland, Canada and the United States of America."\textsuperscript{21}

Occupying an enclosed area of 600 x 1,100 feet, Victoria Camp was completed on time at a cost of $200,000 (Fig. 1). It consisted of twenty bunk houses and latrines for internees, five kitchen mess house blocks, one officers' mess and quarters, three bunk houses and latrines for guards, a kitchen mess house for guards, a guard house, an administration building, a hospital building, a quartermaster's store and offices, an underground vegetable store, and six sentry posts. The camp had electric floodlighting and electric wiring in all the buildings. A supply of blankets, drugs, cutlery, crockery, enameware, and tinware was ready for use. According to a watchman's report of January 12, 1941, the camp contained 1,224 mattresses and pillows, "all placed in readiness." The report also lists "quite a lot of boxes containing soap, hardware, cooking utensils . . . in the original packages."\textsuperscript{22} Considering it "unwise not to obtain possession of the land, at least for a period commensurate with the life of the buildings," the government of Newfoundland offered to purchase the twenty-acre camp site from the British government for $3,100 in December, 1940.\textsuperscript{23}

Since the summer of 1940 the Newfoundland government had been planning to move its own twenty-eight German and nine Italian civilian enemy alien internees from their small internment camp at Pleasantville near St. John's to the new large camp at Victoria. All except four of these internees were merchant seamen who had been taken off German and other foreign vessels since the outbreak of the war. They had been detained for three months in the \textit{YMCA} building in the center of St. John's and were then transferred to Pleasantville to hastily erected wooden barracks of 1,800 square feet, within
a 150 x 150 foot barbed wire enclosure. Pleasantville Camp had experienced constant problems, including two breakout attempts, refusals to obey the orders of the guards, chronic dissension among the German seamen, as well as fights between the Italian and the German inmates which even attracted the attention of the New York Times of November 25, 1940. On September 20, 1940, the site of the Pleasantville Camp was chosen by the U.S. authorities for their permanent military establishment, and internment operations therefore had to be closed down by the end of 1940. The only alternatives
available to the Newfoundland government, both less palatable than Victoria Camp, were either to construct another camp and provide separate guards for this small number of internees or to have them maintained in Canadian internment camps at Newfoundland's expense. The government opted for the second alternative. \(^{24}\)

In the spring of 1941, Commissioners Penson and Emerson as well as the Dominions Office hoped in vain that Victoria Camp might be taken over by the U.S. or Canadian military forces stationed on the island. \(^{25}\) The camp's location and inaccessibility made it undesirable to the Newfoundland government as training barracks for its militia. Throughout 1941 and early 1942, the Commissioners toyed with the idea of using the camp or some of its buildings either as a sanatorium and convalescent home or as a temporary accommodation for distressed and injured seamen, but were deterred by the cost of conversion and upkeep. \(^{26}\) One of the last options which the Commissioners considered for putting the camp to use was as an internment facility for French fishermen. In June, 1941, news was received that the Fleet had orders to capture four or five French bankers fishing on the Grand Banks. Suspected of sympathizing with France's pro-Nazi Vichy regime, the fishermen were to be interrogated and either be interned as enemy aliens or form a pool of Free French merchant mariners. Faced with a lack of accommodation for up to 200 French crew members of these vessels, the Newfoundland government made their internment contingent on the use of Victoria Camp, the provision of military guards, and the consideration of costs. \(^{27}\) But nothing came of this scheme.

In August, 1942, London finally decided to dispose of the camp for the benefit of army funds. The commanding officer of the Canadian Troops in Newfoundland, Major General L.F. Page, recommended purchase of the facilities, with all their contents and the barbed wire fence, for $50,000. His engineers had estimated that the structures were worth more than that amount. Since there was a shortage of building materials in Newfoundland owing to the Allied military construction boom, the camp's ultimate worth turned out to be the materials with which it was built. The camp — never ever used for anything — was sold to the Canadians and dismantled in the spring of 1943, with its recoverable assets credited to the British government. Not realizing that the camp had been torn down by the end of July, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs informed his High Commissioner in St. John's on August 2, 1943, of the possibility "that with the changing fortunes of war consideration may again be given to the use of this camp for Axis prisoners." \(^{28}\) But there was no longer a camp for a prisoner or internee to set foot inside.
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Notes

1The financial assistance of the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Memorial University of Newfoundland is gratefully acknowledged. See Neary, MacKenzie, Lynch, Murphy, Bridle, Straus, Stewart, and Nicholson for background on this period.

2See The Newfoundland Herald, February 20, 27, 1988; and The Evening Telegram (St. John's), May 30 to June 4, 1988, and August 5, 1989.

3Lynch 6-49, 68-9; MacKenzie 22-37; Neary, 129-33.


5PANL, GN 1/3/A, 1938, No. 694, File "Aliens—Treatment of"; GN 13/2/A, Box 413, File "Aliens No. 1."

6Ernst R. Deutsch, personal interview, November 25, 1983.

7The phenomenon of the fifth column scare, its foundations and ubiquity, are analyzed in Jong.

8See Kochan, Koch, Wasserstein, and Gillman.

9Wasserstein 96; Koch 27; Gillman 63.


11Deutsch interview. He was able to read the Sobieski's Morse signal to the convoy: "We are going to St. John's."

12Jones 19-21.

13On conditions on the Sobieski and the anti-Semitism of its crew, see Kochan 93ff.; Jones 21. The failure of earlier attempts to settle Jewish refugees in Newfoundland is described in Bassler, "Newfoundland and Refugees from the Third Reich, 1933-1941." See also Bassler, "Attempts to Settle Jewish Refugees."

14Koch 75ff., 95ff.; Gillman 204ff., 238ff.; Jones 21ff.; Kochan 94ff.; see also Draper. Ernst Deutsch was moved from Trois Rivieres to camps at Fredericton, Farnham, Sherbrook, and finally ile aux Noix.


16PRO, DO 35/996, File PW 19/82, Memorandum 5 October 1940.


18PRO, DO 35/996, File PW 19/84; Bridle 216-37, 1388. PANL, GN 1/3/A, 1938, No. 694(2), File "German Internees."

19NAC, RG 25, G 2, Vol. 2397, File 698-40 C, ANR to Skelton, 9 November 1940; PRO, DO 35/996, File PW 19/84.


21Bridle 171, 174, 182; PANL, GN 1/3/A, 1938, No. 694(2), File "German Internees."

22PANL, GN 13/1, File 34 "Internment Camp — Victoria"; GN 1/3/A, 1941, 1/41, File "Internees."


24Bassler, "The German Experience in Newfoundland."

25Bridle 182; PRO, DO 35/996, File PW 19/3/7.

26PANL, GN 1/3/A, 1941, 1/41, File "Internees."

27PRO, DO 35/996, File PW 19/3/7.

28NAC, RG 25, G 2, Vol. 2397, File 698-40 C.
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———. "The German Experience in Newfoundland." ms in progress.


