Alexander’s Conundrum Reconsidered: The American Dimension in Newfoundland Resource Development, 1898-1910

W.G. REEVES

Once labelled by Lord Salisbury “the sport of historic misfortune,” Newfoundland has long struggled to develop its resources. Its efforts have produced at best uneven results, ensuring intense debate over choices made and not made. Central to the scholarly work dealing with Newfoundland development issues is that identified with economic historian David Alexander. In attempting to understand an overall pattern of "under-development and dependence," Alexander questioned early twentieth-century colonial economic strategies. He traced an apparent shift from a policy of import substitution to one which emphasized the exploitation for export purposes of mineral and forest resources; throughout, the fisheries seemed to take second place. Alexander summed up the problem: "The major conundrum of the Newfoundland economy . . . is why the re-orientation towards export-led growth did not concentrate more effectively on the fishing industry."^2

Alexander’s conundrum entailed several elements. Principal among them is the assumption that inertia characterized the Newfoundland fisheries scene. He was especially critical of the "inability or unwillingness" of the colony’s elite to manage its resources better and "to manoeuvre more effectively in the space allowed by a metropolitan-dominated world."^3 In
addition, the Alexander approach, shared by others in the "Newfoundland School," pointed for comparative purposes to the successful marine-based development strategies of the colony's Scandinavian competitors, notably Iceland and Norway. This Scandinavian yardstick has provided — and is still providing — yeoman service in the analysis of Newfoundland's development problems. It has, however, also distracted attention from other perspectives, particularly that afforded by the colony's American connections.

A closer look at the relationship between Newfoundland and the U.S. suggests an adjustment is in order to Alexander's argument that the colony mistakenly concentrated on land resources to the neglect of its fisheries. Though he conceded the importance of the historical context in which Newfoundland's elites operated, Alexander overestimated the latitude or "space" open to them. In the fisheries, the colony's American ties brought into relief major organizational and technological problems; they also showed that the history of this industry was not one of unrelied stagnation and missed opportunities. Many Newfoundlanders — and some outsiders — made strenuous efforts to improve industry performance, especially in the first decade of the twentieth century. Though these initiatives enjoyed comparatively little success, they exerted an incremental impact and indicated new directions for the colony.

Meanwhile, the presence of deep-rooted obstacles to fisheries improvement made landward development more attractive. Here, too, the American connection proved crucial: American markets, capital, technology, and expertise all played a part, accentuating this alternative's promise — and soon its limitations. Indeed, even as the colony struggled to develop its mineral and forest resources, its demographic picture dramatized the insufficiency of its efforts. Constant population pressures, including a significant migration of Newfoundlanders to and from the "Boston States," underscored the need to improve the colony's lot in any way possible. In effect, Newfoundland's American relationship figured largely in the matrix of circumstances affecting development decisions, pointing up the restricted range of choices open to a tradition-laden colony in a modernizing world.

Newfoundland's isolated position to the northeast of Canada and its dispersed settlement patterns provided an inherent resistance to the swirls of change sweeping the North American continent. Particularistic socioeconomic patterns conditioned by dependence on a common-property resource were a hallmark of local society. Specializing in saltfish production, the colony's fishing economy supported a host of small operators functioning individualistically with only minimal capital investment and a limited capacity for technological innovation. Subject to the fluctuations of external markets, the fishing industry built a commercial structure geared to flexible response through the credit system. Its reliance on a product directed
towards low-price markets, however, put the colony at an increasing disadvantage in relation to nearby industrializing economies. Both import prices and the attractions of higher standards of living exerted pressure for domestic development.

Yet the traditional economy, as Alexander showed, had “reached a limit to its extensive growth” by the mid-1880s. Efforts to diversify through railway construction and the encouragement of secondary industry served only to widen a cash traffic and accelerate a steady erosion of the credit system. Furthermore, new communications and transportation infrastructure facilitated the penetration of outside commercial interests, principally Nova Scotian, which strengthened commercial centers on the south and west coasts — notably Burin district and Bay of Islands. As a spreading cash economy undermined the old system, a spokesman for the latter, businessman James Murray, portrayed its fate thus:

An ancient, once honourable, and affluent interest [was] crowded out before the strident aggressiveness of hard democracy — before the inexorable facts of Nineteenth Century “progress” — before the snort of the steam-engine and the throb of the railway. In a revealing prescription for the fishery, Murray argued: “There is nothing a Newfoundlander will not sooner do than go fishing; and the only chance to get that done as a successful industry is by excluding all other modes of industry along side of it.” Murray’s remarks expressed a yearning for order in an economy undergoing profound change.

As the pace of change quickened, the outlook for St. John’s as the dominant center remained positive. Technological innovation in the seal fishery, especially the change to steamships, weakened small northeast coast centers dependent on a sailing fleet and centralized trade in the capital city. Merchants there increasingly withdrew from direct involvement in the cod fishery to focus on the provision of services and wholesale supplying for outport operators, a process intensified by the bank crash of the mid-1890s. One consequence of trade centralization and technological change came in the use of steamers to carry fishermen to the Labrador and the saltfish product to overseas markets. The latter practice, in particular, added to an already excessive competitiveness in marketing which reflected disorderly conditions in the fishery as a whole.

The lack of “unified directing power” over its various phases from harvesting to marketing made the fishery a weak foundation on which to rest the colony’s future in the twentieth century. Still, pressures for reform were not compelling. The opportunities afforded by colonial development strategies in both domestic manufacturing and landward resource exploitation seemingly offered an out. These strategies, however, were beset by problems from the start and never fulfilled expectations for most of those involved. Yet even if the perceived opportunities had not exerted their distractive pull, it is difficult to see, given the conditions in the fishery, how
the colony could have made substantial improvement in its number one industry in this period.

In addition to obstacles intrinsic to the fishery, the character of the traditional society which had evolved around it militated against radical change. Highly scattered outports consisting largely of clusters of fishermen, often grouped by familial or denominational considerations, exhibited a strong sense of place. Since each settlement offered a different texture — its own peculiar arrangement of sea, landscape, fishing grounds, and even fishing techniques — overall social cohesion suffered. In the absence of a complex interdependence, fishermen and their families developed a wide variety of skills to cope with a demanding environment. Their dependence on external markets only accentuated this internal self-sufficiency, one prized even at the cost of often marginal living conditions.

The gulf which existed between fishermen on one side and government and mercantile elites on the other also threw into relief the rough equality characteristic of small-outport life. A society which lacked much in the way of formal governmental controls had worked out over generations a consensus approach to the achievement of individual goals, usually one antipathetic to excessive ambition in the interests of community harmony. These goals often reflected the pervasive influence of the one institutional framework which kept a more or less continuous contact with the community — namely, the churches, conducting worship and providing education under an inclusive world-view. For the most part, the Newfoundland social system displayed considerable stability in the face of encroaching modernity.

Such stability meant that the responsiveness of the society as a whole to externally imposed objectives remained limited. Alexander emphasized the "cumulative effect" of elites "defining economic, social and cultural goals and means independently of modal patterns emanating from metropolitan countries." Given the nature of Newfoundland society, the effectiveness of any such definition of larger objectives would have dissipated in the face of a multitude of individual decisions. If Newfoundlanders thought beyond survival from season to season, their goals were defined on a more personal basis. By the same token, if the pressures of a weak fishery pushed them to welcome alternative development approaches, they did so largely independently of any abstract formulation by colonial elites. In the end, the cumulative impact of numerous individual reactions proved more telling.

The pressures faced by the colonial fishery — and the resultant approaches to all development — were highlighted and partly shaped by the Newfoundland-American relationship. The American fishery which most affected Newfoundland, that based in Gloucester, Massachusetts, served as a yardstick for measuring the colonial industry. Though many Newfoundlanders perceived the Gloucester fishery as more advanced, even modern compared to their own, its character remained essentially traditional. Most
notably, it still relied in 1900 on the sailing schooner to harvest the principal species of cod, mackerel, halibut, and herring. Despite the persistence of well-tried practices, however, the Gloucester fishery increasingly reflected newer influences from the larger society around it.

The Gloucestermen, for example, availed of their proximity to Boston to use its distribution networks to facilitate marketing. As transportation improvements extended market range, increased demand encouraged the development of a winter fishery on nearby George's and Brown's banks, making operations virtually year-round. Over time, centralized business structures evolved in response to a series of pressures: among them, a growing reluctance by native-born Americans to work in a dangerous industry; the loss of traditional customers because of high price levels; and a rapid overexploitation of resources. In the first instance, the Gloucestermen used their disproportionate voice in Washington — through Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and his son-in-law, Congressman Augustus Gardiner — to secure an unrestricted entry of personnel from low-wage areas, including Newfoundland, to man their fleet. More often, though, they adroitly combined political influence with timely innovation to ensure their industry's survival and prosperity.

The Gloucestermen's approach was also illustrated in marketing. As sales to traditional customers diminished, they concentrated on domestic markets requiring higher-quality products. Their political connections enabled them to resist reductions in American duties on imported fish and thereby attain market security. They could then confidently manipulate their product line through imaginative processing, packaging, and merchandising. In the early twentieth century, Gloucester led the state in food-fish preparation. Everything from boneless salt-cod fillets to codfish balls, all attractively packaged, emerged from its fish factories. Even fish waste went to good use. Reflecting the advantages of nearby industrial and scientific expertise, William LePage enlisted the help of a Harvard chemist to initiate a venture which eventually made his glues a household commonplace. This imaginative spin-off added to the sort of industry concentration seen by Harold Innis as permitting greater quality control on the production side. In effect, Gloucestermen exploited the humble salt cod to establish a sophisticated secondary-processing sector.

The harvesting side also induced a display of innovation. Whether using refrigerated bait or trying far-distant grounds, the Gloucestermen sought to improve their fishing effort, often in the face of dwindling stocks. They received a helping hand from the U.S. government through the Fish Commission, which provided a statistical data base, publicized foreign techniques, and assisted in schooner design. The latter role in particular dramatized effective government-industry cooperation. Largely through the pioneering work of Commission expert Captain J.W. Collins, Gloucester-
area builders were able to take the sailing schooner to its ultimate expression. Ironically, they did so just at the time when steam and gasoline power began to make inroads. Even then, the Gloucestermen demonstrated an ability to adapt to new technologies.

Gloucester's most prominent captain, Twillingate-born Solomon Jacobs, led the way in experimenting with steam and gasoline. In 1900 Jacobs used an auxiliary gasoline schooner to break records, before losing it the subsequent year to fire while in Sydney en route to the Newfoundland herring fishery. In 1902 he tried a steamer, again breaking records, and again encountering disaster; this time, he ran his vessel ashore near Port-aux-Basques during a late 1903 snowstorm. Jacobs's much publicized ventures into power had an impact. Following his lead, the Gloucestermen turned increasingly to auxiliary schooners, particularly for use in the mackerel fleet. Though this approach meant the adoption of duplicate propulsive systems, it ensured the continuation of the Gloucester fishery in a recognizable form.

A changing Gloucester fishery soon faced another challenge in Boston's rapid emergence as New England's premier fresh-fishing port. The formation of the Bay State Fishing Company and its introduction in 1905 of America's first steam trawler, the Spray, signalled the advent of an industrial fishery more suited to the capitalist world. Against this backdrop, several core companies involved in the Gloucester fishery combined to form the Gorton-Pew Fish Company, a large, vertically integrated entity which seemed a natural progression from preexisting organizational structures. The consolidation allowed a better handle on technological change in the switch to auxiliary power; it also permitted a stronger front on the political scene to protect industry interests. Excessive competition in the Newfoundland winter herring fishery further underscored the need for rationalization. Organized at an opportune time, Gorton-Pew soon came to dominate the Gloucester salt cod and herring fisheries.

The formation of Gorton-Pew, together with the introduction of powered vessels, made the first decade of the twentieth century the most significant one in Gloucester's history. The Gloucestermen had grafted modern techniques onto their traditional fishery to make it more viable for decades to come. Inevitably, their penetration into Newfoundland waters alerted colonists to changes underway in the wider fisheries world.

The American fishery showcased to Newfoundlanders an industry in transition. Though in decline, Gloucester's offshore cod and halibut fisheries still exerted considerable impact, demonstrating new vessel types and carrying on a largely cash traffic for bait and supplies at centers around the island. Newfoundlanders generally welcomed the business created by the yearly arrival of several dozen American fishing schooners or "bankers." So frequent were American purchases at Cape Broyle, for instance, that one resident termed it "Newfoundland's Eldorado." Similarly, a report from
Conception Bay indicated that the supply of ice to American vessels represented "'a Klondyke for the people of Holyrood and Carbonear." From their first arrival in large numbers in the 1870s, the Americans distributed significant amounts of money among a cash-poor population. Gloucester gold provided many fishermen with a measure of independence otherwise impossible, thereby contributing to the erosion of the credit system.

The other American presence of note, that in the winter herring fishery, further accelerated the breakdown of the credit system. Each fall dozens of American vessels, "the largest and finest fishing schooners" in Massachusetts, came to procure the much-prized herring, used in the U.S. for bait and food. The Gloucestermen mostly purchased the herring, sometimes combining with Newfoundlanders in the fishing effort. At the turn of the century, a rising demand for herring as food and the depletion of stocks in Fortune and Placentia Bays led to an intensified fishery in the Bay of Islands. As the 1900s progressed, news of large earnings in the latter bay prompted a colony-wide migration every winter. Newfoundlanders used their small boats and newly completed transinsular railway to flock to the area. The extent of community representation became apparent in the 1902 season when in one item alone the Western Star reported men coming from

Greenspond, Bonavista, Twillingate, Tilt Cove, Trinity Bay, Carbonear, Harbour Grace, Bay Roberts, Brigus, Clarke’s Beach, Portugal Cove, St. John’s, Topsail, Bay Bulls, Placentia, Holyrood, Fortune, Grand Bank, Burgeo, Ramea, Isle aux Morts, Rose Blanche, Channel, Cape Ray, Codroy, Robinson’s Bay St. George, Stephenville, Port au Port, Bonne Bay and Flower’s Cove.

A modern transportation system allowed ordinary Newfoundlanders an unaccustomed mobility. Easier access, however, meant additional pressure on the resource.

A frenetically competitive atmosphere soon developed. An increased Nova Scotian presence and the introduction of a couple of steamers quickened the pace. Apart from inducing collective action by local residents to preserve stocks, the disorderly conditions in a geographically confined area encouraged the formation of Gorton-Pew. The new company sent auxiliary schooners to Bay of Islands, hired local steamers to assist its sailing vessels, and kept an accountant on the ground for months at a time. By the 1907-8 season, it was shipping nearly three times as many cargoes to Gloucester as its nearest competitor. In addition to fishing techniques, the Gloucestermen thus demonstrated the efficacy of their latest innovation in business practices.

Meanwhile, the fishermen of both nations maintained an identifiable community which transcended the cash nexus. Together, they coped with a harsh environment, working according to similar rhythms and interacting socially. Since a large number of the American fishermen were actually migrant Newfoundlanders, a natural affinity existed. Considerable press coverage of two dozen or so American captains of colonial extraction,
including the larger-than-life Solomon Jacobs, enabled many Newfound-
landers to share vicariously in the romance attached to the Gloucester fishery
in this period. On a more practical level, many colonists viewed that fishery
as superior to their own and wondered why the latter could not be just as
successful. Indeed, in their efforts at fishery improvement, Newfoundlanders
frequently displayed initiative in borrowing from the American experience.
In the sizable Gloucester fisheries presence in their waters, they had a close-at-hand yardstick for measuring progress.

Virtually every branch of the Newfoundland fishery felt some degree
of American influence. The colony, however, specialized much more heavily
in saltfish than did Gloucester, the bulk of its production coming from the
inshore fishery, particularly that along the populous northeast coast. In this
sector, the American impact was less apparent. A different situation applied
in the much smaller deep-sea or bank fishery. From the latter’s inception
in the 1870s, it enjoyed a direct relationship with the American fishery, one
characterized by a pattern of similarity, influence, and competition.

The Newfoundland bank fishery borrowed a great deal from its
American counterpart. The example of a successful American fishery offshore
had proved a catalyst in the start-up of the Newfoundland industry; local
merchants also purchased used American vessels and in some instances hired
fishermen with American experience to help get their ventures underway.33
When the colonial effort flagged after early expansion, observers looked to
the American experience for answers. School principal Vincent P. Burke,
a native of St. Jacques — long a stopover for American vessels — commented
in an 1899 speech to the Newfoundland Teachers’ Association that the bank
fishery

had dwindled down until there are only a couple of places that prosecute it to any extent,
and some predicting [that it will be] soon a thing of the past unless steps are taken to
educate our fishermen up to the Massachusetts standard of how to conduct it.34

What Burke saw was a fishery undergoing change of the sort earlier witnessed
in New England. Confronted with challenges ranging from vessel procurement
to labor scarcities, an initially dispersed industry became more highly
concentrated.

Though much less centralized than its Gloucester counterpart, the
Newfoundland bank fishery increasingly focused on a few key ports in Burin
district and on the north side of Fortune Bay, especially the former. Apart
from ice-free harbors and easy access to the banks, the Burin-area ports —
principally Burin, Fortune, Grand Bank, and St. Lawrence — enjoyed the
advantages of concentration around a small peninsula with its rudimentary
road links. Their relative proximity and ease of communication contributed
to a strong local economy in which larger business units emerged. These
businesses in turn exploited another locational advantage: their position
roughly midway between St. John’s and Halifax. Situated in the competitive
zone between two rival commercial nuclei, the businesses in question developed durable roots of their own. The bank fishery with its more expensive vessels required such commercial strength.

Attesting to that strength, the bank fishery generated sufficient surplus to enable the growth of auxiliary trades and specializations. A correspondent to a St. John’s paper in 1908 reported that in both Burin and Grand Bank “sailmakers, shipwrights and blacksmiths” worked throughout the winter to ready vessels for the fishing season. In addition, many of the firms participating in the bank fishery ran commercial establishments which supplied both their own vessels and the less extensive inshore fishery, often through branches in outlying settlements. As business flourished, so too did related services: in Grand Bank, leading merchants united in 1908 to form a mutual marine-insurance company; two years later, the town boasted a small bank. Throughout this period, the merchant elite of Grand Bank and the other ports aggressively exploited their various advantages.

To some extent, the aggressiveness of the business element in the Newfoundland banking ports resembled that displayed by their American counterparts. The resemblances were both deliberate and unconscious. As in Gloucester, the banking merchants headed up distinctively hierarchical societies which yearly welcomed sojourning fishermen from other areas — in this instance from around Newfoundland rather than the North Atlantic. In Burin, Fortune, and Grand Bank — the latter referred to as “the Gloucester of Newfoundland” — the merchant elites, mainly Methodist in character, set the tone. As in puritanical Gloucester, an emphasis on hard work, thrift, and sobriety seemed justified by apparent outward success. The merchants and their communities shared with the Gloucestermen a remarkable pride of accomplishment, one perhaps attributable to the active character of their fishery which required a challenge to the environment on its most difficult terms.

The Newfoundland banking ports, though, never approached Gloucester’s importance. For one thing, they lacked a large, secure internal market to take a high-quality product: bank fish underwent only the most basic treatment — salting and drying — before going to traditional markets developed for the inshore fishery. The Newfoundlanders also labored under another comparative disadvantage: the absence of an auxiliary fishery to occupy vessels after the cod fishery ended in the fall. From the 1880s onward, colonial interests tried to slice away part of the winter herring fishery in south coast bays. These initiatives failed, principally because of the American duty on herring and the superior quality of the vessels required. As a consequence, unlike in Gloucester, expensive banking schooners lay idle for most of the winter period.

The Newfoundland bank fishery presented a mixed picture. One indicator of its failure to match Gloucester’s standards appeared in a constant
wrangling over the payment of crews. While the American port used longstanding share plans, its colonial counterparts employed a hodgepodge of schemes, many of which created dissatisfaction.\textsuperscript{39} Apparently, the uneven returns from deep-sea fishing militated against the evolution of any set distributive system. Yet despite obvious difficulties, the Newfoundland banking ports differed from Gloucester in one vital area, that of morale. Because of their isolation, newness, and relative success, they displayed little of the uneasiness which so pervasively affected the American city's traditional fishery in the early 1900s.

Indeed, as the Gloucester industry struggled to stave off decline, the Newfoundland bank fishery — along with other branches of the cod fishery — absorbed a wide range of American influences, particularly in harvesting technology. Everything from dories to netting and twine reflected these influences; even the ubiquitous cod trap could claim an American connection through its inventor, Boston-born William Whiteley, who no doubt was familiar with trap or pound devices used along the American coast.\textsuperscript{40} Though the cod trap's exact history remains unclear, the New England ties of its inventor symbolized the broad range of American influences operative in the Newfoundland fishery in this period.

The most direct American influence on the harvesting side appeared in vessel design. The decentralized and unsophisticated Newfoundland shipbuilding industry looked to North American models, especially American ones, for their "modern" features. One early testament to the superiority of American vessels came from Judge D.W. Prowse, who, after a tour as fisheries inspector along the south coast, reported to the press:

> Around these Southern and Western shores there is a curious mingling of modern civilization and old fashioned types and ideas. Side by side with the elegant American seine boat, Gloucester's latest production in beautiful boat building, you will find old punts and pot rackets, models brought from Poole in Dorset a couple of centuries ago.\textsuperscript{41}

Yards around the island copied specific schooner types, in some instances employing craftsmen with New England experience.\textsuperscript{42} Such prominent builders as John R. Cluett of Belleoram and Thomas Winsor of Exploits were among those using American designs.\textsuperscript{43} In doing so, they stamped an imprimatur of quality on their vessels.

Newfoundlanders also purchased American (as well as Nova Scotian) vessels. Taking advantage of higher fish prices in the early 1900s, colonists acquired dozens of secondhand schooners from Gloucester. These were prized for their speed, beauty, and strength. A classic demonstration of the latter occurred in 1897 when the \textit{Helen G. Wells}, with a Newfoundland captain and mostly Newfoundland crew, turned "completely over"; though badly battered, the \textit{Wells} managed to limp into St. John's.\textsuperscript{44} Yet curiously, even as colonists lauded the sailing qualities of American schooners, some among
them appreciated the inroads being made by power in the North Atlantic fisheries world.

Newfoundlanders had already experienced the advent of power and its resultant dislocations in the seal hunt. In addition, the rapid emergence of a colonial whaling industry after 1898 showed through the use of Norwegian technology the advantages of powered vessels. In the early 1900s Newfoundlanders also knew of the developments underway in North Atlantic ground and pelagic fisheries, from Solomon Jacobs’s experiments in Massachusetts to those of the English industrial fishery. Exposed to modernizing impulses emanating from many centers, they too tried new approaches, particularly in propulsive systems.

A prominent St. John’s firm, Bowring Bros. Ltd., led the way. Four years before Boston parties launched the *Spray*, Bowring’s attempted to introduce an English steam trawler in the cod fishery. The *Magnific* began fishing offshore in the 1901 season; but unlike the later venture in Massachusetts, this experiment failed. Part way through the 1902 season, Bowring’s withdrew the vessel from the fishery. Some of the problems the *Magnific* encountered anticipated those experienced by the *Spray* in 1906—for instance, the fouling of trawls on unsuitable bottoms which led to lost time and costly repairs. The *Magnific*, though, lacked the *Spray’s* advantages.

The major difference involved marketing. Unlike the *Spray*, the *Magnific* was unable to prove its viability by landing huge volumes of fresh haddock, or any other fresh fish, to a nearby metropolis. Bowring’s had no readily available market for the flatfish species the vessel seemed best able to harvest, and returns from its limited cod catches could not justify expenses. At the time, local commentators expressed misgivings about the type of trawl used and the arrangements made for handling catches. A few years later, the apparent success of French steam trawlers on the Grand Banks only underscored the Newfoundland failure. Given the circumstances, though, it is difficult to see how Bowring’s venture could have ended differently. Meanwhile, the resale of the *Magnific* to English parties meant a lasting setback in the application of power to the Newfoundland deep-sea fishery.

The other option for power in offshore operations, the American-type auxiliary gasoline schooner, also attracted attention. Following Solomon Jacobs’s successful introduction of such a vessel in the mackerel and winter herring fisheries, many Gloucestermen shifted to this mode. As the decade progressed, the number of “gasoliners” coming to Bay of Islands increased. A Newfoundland attempt at adoption soon followed. In 1903 John Penny & Sons, a Ramea firm accustomed to fishing alongside Americans on the Rose Blanche grounds and in Bay of Islands, built a small schooner, the *Shamrock*, and equipped it with a gasoline motor. Like the *Magnific*, the *Shamrock* proved something less than the harbinger of a new age.
According to press accounts, the Pennys envisaged using the vessel in the collection of various species for transshipment fresh by the railway ferry to the Halifax market. That plan apparently came to nought, but other press items indicated some involvement in the bank fishery, presumably on the midshore banks off the southwest coast. Even then, the Shamrock attracted more attention for its employment in such nonfishing tasks as freighting and passenger transportation. Evidently, the Pennys found the vessel's duplicate propulsive systems too expensive for the regular fishery; the returns from cod, unlike those from mackerel or winter herring, could not justify the outlay. Like the Magnific, the Shamrock spawned no imitators. Yet both initiatives suggested something other than society-wide inertia.

Similarly, the rapid spread of motors in the inshore fishery demonstrated a capacity and willingness to adopt new methods. Encouraged by higher fish prices and a growing use of small motors for industrial purposes, many Newfoundlanders began adapting such devices to their fishing boats in the second half of the decade. Again, the American experience provided a key model. Items about motorboats at work in the New England inshore fishery appeared in the colonial press, and returning travellers added firsthand accounts. Most prominently, the employment by American fishermen of gasoline launches in the Bay of Islands exposed hundreds of Newfoundlanders to their advantages. It also afforded colonial suppliers of marine engines an excellent advertising opportunity. In a Western Star advertisement captioned "Enterprising Yankee Fishermen," Angel Engineering and Supply of St. John's, a pioneer in this field, stated:

Four of the American Fishing Admirals here are provided with gasoline boats which are of great benefit to them. The best of the number is in charge of Captain Peebles. She is fitted with a 12 h.p. engine and can make 10 knots.
The motorboat has evidently come to stay.
The progressive Newfoundland fisherman must have one if he would keep abreast of the times.

In a myriad of ways from personal experience to the provision of promotional material, the Bay of Islands winter herring fishery became a conduit in the transmission of new technology.

By 1908 the penetration of small motors along the northeast coast was well underway. There, the collective-labor organization characteristic of the trap fishery provided the capital accumulation needed to make the purchases. From merchant William Ashbourne of Twillingate to fisherman Joseph Peckford of St. John's, the circle of ownership widened. Adding to it, nonfishing interests also used their capital to acquire motorboats. Companies in the forest and mining sectors, the various churches, and Wilfred Grenfell's medical mission helped pioneer the new technology. Often the first motors, which were mainly of American manufacture, were too complex for a society without much in the way of machine shops. Many Newfoundlander,
though, soon began to augment their handyman skills with experience in mechanical work; that, and a switch to simpler Nova Scotian makes, eased early problems. Since the new technology improved upon rather than replaced older approaches, its introduction into the inshore fishery met little real opposition. In that context, as Sager suggested, Newfoundlanders demonstrated "the ability and the incentive to apply new techniques" in harvesting their marine resources.56

Yet technological innovation did not proceed without challenge, particularly as it related to the use of power in larger vessels. Newfoundlanders shared in the North Atlantic-wide anxiety created among traditional fishermen by the advent of steam trawling. More specifically, the presence of French steam trawlers on the Grand Banks from 1906 onwards highlighted the potential for disruptive change.57 Unlike their Gloucester counterparts, however, apprehensive Newfoundlanders focused not so much on the bank fishery as on the Labrador fishery, a sector critical to the viability of the northeast coast. Already, fishermen on the Labrador perceived a threat in the growing use by St. John's firms of sealing steamers to transport men to the area and the actual involvement of several small steamers in its fishery.58 From such concerns the twentieth-century debate on the trade-off between modernization and the maintenance of a way of life began to assume recognizable shape.

The American connection added to the mix of elements in the debate. Following their exclusion from familiar island waters by the 1905 Foreign Fishing Vessels' Act, Robert Bond's legislative response to the United States Senate's emasculation of the Bond-Hay Treaty, some American fishermen turned for the first time to Labrador. In 1908, an election year, the opposition Daily News predicted that with the Americans "gradually going there, and by the introduction of gasoline, steam, and all modern improvements, it is in measurable distance when the Labrador fishery will be a thing of the past for our own people."59 The debate intensified when one W.F. Coaker charged that Bowring's was preparing another steam-trawler experiment, this one in Labrador waters — a charge the firm promptly denied.60 Coaker's expression of concern, however, signalled the arrival on scene of a vital new player.

In late 1908, under Coaker's leadership, the Fishermen's Protective Union came into being. Apart from representing an immediate reaction to plunging fish prices, this organization, at its strongest on the northeast coast, tapped a deep uneasiness about technological change and the industrial-type fishery it entailed. Two weeks after its inception, Coaker informed the Daily News that "the Fishermen's Protective Union are of the opinion that the introduction of steam trawlers, gasoline fishing launches, and Labrador steam fish-killers would be very detrimental to the interests of the fishermen and the colony and must be prevented."61 At this point, Coaker's vision of a
remade fishery appeared cool toward technological innovation; like populist movements elsewhere, his union reflected a strong backward-looking strain. Its formation in the early 1900s attested to the pressures for change, and the defensive reactions, then evident in Newfoundland’s traditional economy.

One such pressure stemmed from a perceived need to improve fish processing and marketing. In these sectors, as in harvesting, near frantic activity, much of it with an American dimension, added to the debate over the merits of fishery-related innovation. Here, though, the role of government assumed greater importance. Given limited resources and a well-refined sensitivity to both the interests of the trade and the colony’s political arithmetic, governments usually avoided leadership in the promotion of any new technology which might disrupt the social fabric. In contrast to harvesting, changes in processing and marketing seemed to pose little threat, and government action extended beyond support to initiation. This became especially evident after Robert Bond’s accession to power in 1900 when he attempted to reorient more of the colony’s fish production toward the American market.

Throughout the late 1890s, politicians and promoters alike identified penetration into the American market with cold-storage technology. As the transinsular railway neared completion, inveterate Newfoundland boomer Judge Prowse felt himself on the verge of vindication when he wrote: “My prediction of years ago, ‘fresh fish and Fulton Market,’ will soon cease to be the dream of an enthusiast; the railway and steam ferry will soon convert it into a reality.” When the railway opened in 1898, the government of the day, that of James Winter, was already anticipating Bond’s more intense efforts of a few years later.

For the participating Winter government, one of the positive aspects of its much maligned Railway Contract of 1898 related to the Reid family’s commitment to multi-resource development. As part of their plans, the Reids envisioned an expanded Gulf ferry service, cold-storage-equipped railway cars, and “refrigerator chambers on the steamboats.” When the family became mired in controversy over the Contract, however, the Winter government acted independently to lure operators into the field. In 1898 it passed legislation offering a range of subsidies to any firm which would establish a colony-wide cold-storage system. The government looked to cold storage, not only as a means to open the American market, but to overcome chronic bait shortages in the fishery. With this double incentive, it turned to an American entrepreneur involved in a small cold-storage operation in Placentia Bay.

In late 1898, Captain J.J. Polson, a pioneer in the Gloucester cold-storage industry, towed into Placentia Bay the hulk of a barque fitted for refrigeration. His intention was to freeze herring for the American market. After a misfortune-filled first winter, he obtained a small subsidy from the
colonial government on condition that he provide frozen bait to local fishermen. Amidst intermittent press attention, Polson’s venture limped on for a couple of more years before it ended. At one point, Michael P. Gibbs, a member of the House of Assembly, suggested that he relocate to the island’s southwest corner to avail of the new ferry facilities. Already, local operators in the Port-aux-Basques area were exporting fish in ice to the United States. A longtime advocate of cold storage and student of American methods, St. John’s-born Joseph Downey initiated this practice by shipping small lots of several species two or three times a month. As Downey and at least one other equally small competitor struggled along, Robert Bond acceded to power in late 1900, a political change which set the stage for renewed attention to larger-scale enterprises.

In its first term, the Bond government sought a breakthrough union of cold-storage facilities and the new railway-ferry system. It turned to Canadian promoter James Wright, who arrived in St. John’s in late 1902, pushing the benefits of mechanical refrigeration and a large-plant approach. After the Legislative Council killed its 1903 attempt to pass subsidy legislation, the government tried again a year later. Its 1904 bill specifically mentioned Wright’s Newfoundland Cold Storage and Reduction Company, an entity incorporated in Maine and with a Cleveland-based Board of Directors. The Cleveland connection reflected the underlying concept. As Opposition leader A.B. Morine acknowledged, “The great hope of the whole project was the possibilities opened up by the American market.” This time, amidst many expressions of government confidence, the legislation passed. Its supporters, though, soon saw their hopes dashed. Following an American party’s visit later in 1904 to make “practical arrangements,” the whole project degenerated into political controversy. No construction ever occurred.

The cold-storage fiasco demonstrated the disadvantages under which a largely traditional society worked in introducing new technologies. Government lacked the expertise to appreciate that an effective method to transport fragile cod in a frozen state over long distances did not yet exist. Nor did Newfoundland have an indigenous technological community sophisticated enough to assess adequately any such proposal, let alone develop its own systems. In its rush to expand American sales to offset immediate market pressures, the Bond government had allowed itself to be wangled into supporting a large-scale venture without sufficient preparation.

A similar recourse to outside fisheries expertise characterized Bond’s second term. Once re-elected in 1904, he directed his attention to the need for more effective exploitation of the colony’s rich herring resources. This new initiative formed the obverse side of his attempts from 1905 onward to restrict American activity in the winter herring trade. As with cold storage,
the major goal was development of the American market. To help achieve that end, Bond enlisted Scottish expert William Mair.

A man with both "scientific and practical knowledge," Mair planned to introduce new fishery techniques, including suitably cured and packaged herring products for American consumers. In preceding decades, a number of small ventures had tried — with lackluster results — to apply the "Scotch cure" to Newfoundland herring. Now, amidst intimations of a "great future," Mair recommended that instead of waiting for herring to come to shore, Newfoundlanders should use larger vessels in an active, open-sea driftnet fishery. When the government followed with a subsidy bill in 1906, it faced criticism that this approach would mostly mean a "capitalistic venture." In rebuttal, Bond emphasized the employment opportunities to flow from the new fishery and its related trades. The legislation passed, and shortly afterwards the government arranged with the Scottish firm of George Flett and Company to begin operations.

Once again, however, execution failed to match design. The Fletts brought out a number of Scottish fishermen, cooperers, and girls to pack the herring. They were less successful in enticing a Scottish crew to bring a steam drifter across the Atlantic, and had to settle for two specially adapted local schooners. Further disappointments soon followed. Despite positive reports on product quality from New York, the firm's branches in Notre Dame Bay and Bay of Islands faltered. Beset by political controversy, George Flett abandoned the project in 1908. Bond then had to contend with the addition of the name "Flett" to that of "Wright" as opposition code words for his failure to improve American sales. Yet if nothing else, the episode helped focus attention on the implications of a technologically oriented and capital-intensive fishery for the Newfoundland way of life.

While Bond tinkered with government supported projects, private parties also struggled to introduce new, more highly processed fish products into the American market. A number of the people involved either had American connections or an interest in American techniques. Frank Carter, for instance, had worked in Boston and for two American firms which ran short-lived operations in his native Bay of Islands. For three years or more in the early 1900s, he used methods learned in the U.S. to produce a limited range of boneless salt-cod products attractively packaged in boxes. Described by Michael Gibbs as "a man revolutionizing modes of fish curing," Carter even departed from the credit system in purchasing fish with cash on the spot — a signal that new processing methods would likely lead to different financial arrangements. Carter's venture, however, would not be the one to transform the local economy; by 1904, it too had ended in failure. Though a number of small excursions into boneless salt-cod production followed Carter's, no sizable trade involving this method developed.
Alexander's Conundrum

One other thrust in cod processing related to the preparation of the product in a fresh state. The decade's most remarkable venture in this direction originated with a Pennsylvanian dentist practising in St. John's, Dr. Walter Lamb. In 1904 Lamb developed a steaming process to preserve fresh cod in cans. Amidst much ballyhoo, he sold his patents for "fish cheese" to a new firm involving a Who's Who of the local merchant and professional classes; but like so many other enterprises, Newfoundland Fish Packing Ltd. never really got off the ground. As one of the participants, F.H. Steer, later suggested, perhaps "the only one to make money out of it was Lamb." 82

Nevertheless, the dream of placing fresh cod in cans on the American market refused to die. Most prominent among several other parties pursuing it was the Lake family of Fortune. Acquainted with American approaches through their participation in the bank fishery, the Lakes introduced the Lake Cod Steak. Taking product from their Fortune factory, family members made marketing trips to the U.S. in 1906 and 1907. 83 Like Carter and Lamb, though, the Lakes never made a breakthrough. Their operation continued at a low level for several more years, a testament to the appeal exerted by the prospects of American market penetration.

While such initiatives involved only a tiny proportion of the traditional industry, they reflected an awareness that the existing fishery constituted a weak vehicle to take the colony into the twentieth century. As a continental-style cash economy encroached on the credit system, the transition to a new order appeared well underway. The real questions pertained to that order's character and the timing of its introduction.

The type of informal economic order provided by the credit system seemed increasingly unworkable. No real control existed in harvesting the resource; an upturn in prices and external earnings encouraged numerous new participants, many of whom by 1907-8 were obtaining motorboats. Moreover, prevailing social attitudes joined with political expediency in contributing to this open-ended participation. Witness the Evening Telegram's comment on Newfoundlanders leaving Sydney Mines and other places to return to the fishery:

They realize that they can earn bigger wages at the fishery than at any other occupation, and that they need only work about three months of the season, and that the work is more congenial and not so dangerous or so difficult as mining. 84

Problems of control also characterized curing and marketing. In curing, the debate over tal qual purchasing — without regard to cull — was indicative of such problems; in marketing, there were difficulties in getting and maintaining inter-merchant agreements. Clearly the industry lacked, not just control within each of its three main sectors, but also coordination between them. To be effective, and to facilitate greater specialization and technological adaptation, any new fisheries regime would have to establish more orderly conditions in which to operate.
The potential for a "unified directing power" of the fisheries appeared to exist in terms of capital. Though diversions offered by land resources were real, the businessmen involved in the construction of whale factories, in the purchase of steel sealing steamers, and in the *Magnificent* experiment obviously had money at their disposal. On the other hand, the balance sheet for entrepreneurship was not as clear. The entrepreneurial ability that existed all around the island was reflected in the careers of such people as Burgeo's Robert Mouton, who outfitted at least one sealing voyage to the Falklands, and St. John's hotelier John Crosbie, who built in this decade a fisheries empire virtually from scratch. Yet Mouton and Crosbie were "new men" who remained at a level below the older merchant houses, which had largely withdrawn from the harvesting side of the fisheries in the late nineteenth century in order to focus on marketing and supplying. A press item about St. John's suppliers reacting with displeasure to the receipt of poorly cured fish illustrated the separation of functions; the suppliers complained about being put in the position of "fish maker" as well as that of "merchant." Apparently, as the merchant retreat from production occurred, a corresponding shift in attitudes took place.

One commentator in the 1880s expressed a rather jaundiced view of the attitude toward business evinced by the "would-be gentry" of St. John's. A Captain Shelley suggested to American traveller S.W. Benjamin, a former ambassador to Persia, during the latter's stop in Bay of Islands that "they bring up their sons to despise business; they educate them for lawyers, and they become mere two-penny ha'penny button tossers, without brains enough to last them till morning, be the night ever so short." Whichever attitudes prevailed, the retreat of the St. John's merchants from catching and curing remained incomplete. For instance, Bishop and Monroe's operation in Burin and Job's in Harbour Breton permitted some potential for direct involvement. Also, Bowring's *Magnificent* venture and Job's support of Lamb's "fish cheese" experiments indicated interest in the catching and curing functions. An air of unreality, though, particularly in the Lamb episode, suggested something less than an ideal articulation between curing and marketing.

Meanwhile, the corporate rationalizations so evident in other fishery jurisdictions around the North Atlantic must have enhanced the awareness of some Newfoundlanders of the need for more orchestration among the main components of their own industry. In Britain, Iceland, St. Pierre, Nova Scotia, and New England, larger-scale business units were emerging. Newfoundlanders, for instance, received periodic press reports about New England combinations, especially Boston's Bay State Fish Company and Gloucester's Gorton-Pew. The *Evening Herald* put the latter into context with a St. Pierre combination and observed: "This is, assuredly, the day of the trust." Yet nothing really comparable from capital's point of view happened in Newfoundland.
While combinations occurred or were speculated about in the smaller seal and whale hunts, there was no real movement in the colonial codfishery. The St. John’s merchants made some attempts to combine in marketing and pricing, but these failed to produce any lasting structures. Such combinations usually broke down when one or more major exporters refused to join—or violated rather loose arrangements. In 1900, for example, the Fish Exporters’ Association fixed marketing arrangements in Brazil, only to see Bowring’s break the agreement six months later.69 Evidently, Bowring’s worked the credit system to its advantage and saw no pressing need to cooperate with its competitors.90 Moreover, this firm, like Job’s and Harvey’s, was part of a large multinational enterprise which included houses in both Britain and New York. While the relationship between the branches of individual concerns remains unclear, the international connections of leading St. John’s firms almost certainly contributed to their strong identities and competitiveness. In contrast to their Gloucester counterparts, these firms could not even agree to form a Board of Trade until 1909. Obviously, the absence of preexisting organizational structures militated against effective unity in harmonizing the various sectors of the fishing industry.

Wider circumstances than those peculiar to individual firms also worked against real cooperation. High fish prices in the early 1900s meant that the colonial industry lacked the pervasive sense of decline so evident in Gloucester and could delay action on deep-rooted structural problems. The anti-combination bias of English common law, together with an anti-monopoly sentiment aroused by the Railway Contract, further deterred initiatives toward rationalization.91 Newfoundland politicians proved only too ready to manipulate popular anxieties over the breakdown of traditional patterns. The Bonavista member of the House of Assembly, A.B. Morine, for instance, argued on the issue of introducing steam to the Labrador fishery that:

There is danger of this monopoly. Capital is coming together more and more every day. It is a sign of the times. Limited liability companies with large capital spread over large areas of the coast could freeze out the independent man and it would be almost impossible to wrest their position away from them, once they had secured a strong foothold.92

Though somewhat ironic in coming from Morine, the former Reid solicitor, these sentiments surely struck a responsive chord among his constituents on the northeast coast, an area already blighted by centralization in the seal fishery.

In a less than congenial atmosphere, the Fish Exporters’ Association limped along, inching the trade towards greater order in pricing and marketing. In the period 1903-5, for instance, it maintained an agent, F.W. Bissett, in Mediterranean markets, the first of many that the trade would send overseas in ensuing decades.93 Yet the absence of solid fisheries organization was all too apparent when fish prices collapsed in 1908. The Newfoundland industry possessed inadequate information about the catches
of its competitors and even about its own catch at any given time. Pointing to this lack of a sound data base — a prerequisite for effective fisheries management — businessman W.G. Gosling argued: "The moral, therefore, is to combine." More specifically, Gosling called for a Board of Trade to oversee the colony's economy, including a fish marketing mechanism similar to those he saw elsewhere for other commodities. As it was, the St. John's merchants formed a more modest Board of Trade in 1910. And while that body stopped well short of Gosling's all-inclusive vision, it helped move the trade in the direction of more orderly marketing.

If merchants found it difficult to establish order in the marketing sector, where they were directly involved, there existed little prospect of exerting control in catching and curing from which they had largely withdrawn. Also, given government's minimal apparatus, the public sector was not up to the task. The Daily News unwittingly revealed the latter's limitations when it described the Fisheries Department as including, apart from the Minister, "a thoroughly qualified deputy, who is Superintendent of Fisheries; an accountant, a typewriter and messenger." Since government could hardly provide top-to-bottom management, that left only one other source of initiative: the fishermen or those most directly involved in catching and curing.

As the credit system eroded, particularly along the northeast coast, ordinary fishermen became more vulnerable to market fluctuations. The record catches of 1907-8 only made the price collapse of 1908 that much more severe. In consequence, large numbers of fishermen threw their support behind the new Fishermen's Protective Union. Coaker's organization pushed for reform from below, viewing the fisheries holistically rather than in a piecemeal way. While the FPU's dream of a revitalized fishery eventually fell short, its efforts, along with those of the trade, added incrementally to an ordering of the industry. Meanwhile, the basic contours of the fishery remained intact for decades to come, serving as a backdrop for those advocating and adopting new techniques to turn the fishing economy more towards the American market. When reorientation eventually came, after World War II, several of the families prominent in the transition built on the experience of their forebears — among them, the Jobs, the Monroes, the Pennys, and Lakes. Many Newfoundlanders realized early that business as usual could lead to the loss of a major resource by default.

Still, given the slow pace of progress, it is little wonder that a considerable number of Newfoundlanders, including some involved in fishery initiatives, welcomed other opportunities which opened up in land resources. These new options came largely in the wake of a late 1890s upturn in the Western industrial economies, especially the American. An intense demand for raw materials attracted both outside and local entrepreneurs to Newfoundland's forest and mineral wealth. To many Newfoundlanders, and their government, the accompanying land sales and employment represented a form
of deliverance. And though no Newfoundland Klondike ever occurred, multiple initiatives in landward development, as in the fishery, contributed perceptibly to the changes underway in the colonial economy and society.

As the American mining frontier spread northward across the Canadian border and spilled over into Newfoundland, the major signal for increased attention to the colony came from Boston entrepreneur Henry M. Whitney's 1899 acquisition of Bell Island iron ore properties. Whitney planned to use Bell Island ore to supply the gigantic steel works which his Dominion Iron and Steel Company would soon start in Sydney.66 By turn of the century standards, the scale of both Bell Island and Sydney was colossal. In ensuing years, thousands of Newfoundlanders would find employment at the two sites; also, others hoped to find more Bell Islands and perhaps develop a Sydney-like industrial complex for Newfoundland itself. As Edward Morris put it, one Bell Island was "four times as valuable as the whole seal fishery."197 For a time at least, the presence of Whitney's enterprises permitted Newfoundlanders a sense of participation in a bright new world.

The publicity generated by Bell Island, coming on the heels of that surrounding the controversial Railway Contract, piqued the interest of Americans. The leading organ of the American mining community, *The Engineering and Mining Journal*, for instance, gave prominent play to Newfoundland developments in two 1900 articles, observing that "the great island is one of the largest accessible regions as yet practically unexploited, and as such is of great interest to both miners and geologists."198 While the *Journal*'s impact is impossible to measure, a connection between its coverage and increased American mining activity in Newfoundland in subsequent years seems plausible.

An American move into colonial mining development soon overshadowed a continuing English involvement, led by the Cape Copper Company at Tilt Cove. In the early 1900s two American companies, the Newfoundland Exploration Syndicate and the Humber Consolidated Mining and Manufacturing Company Limited, dominated new activity. By 1902 Newfoundland Exploration had become "the most ubiquitous mining company then operating in Newfoundland."99 From the start, it established a preference for obtaining known mining sites rather than opening new ones. After acquisition of the Pilley's Island pyrites mine, it began work at old and abandoned sites at Bett's Cove, Little Bay, and Baie Verte, prompting the *Herald* to term it "the Old Mine Syndicate."100 In the meantime, Humber Consolidated concentrated its efforts on several west coast sites, most notably the York Harbour copper mine. Even though they lasted only a few short years, the operations of these two American companies encouraged a much wider participation in the mining sector.

In addition to Newfoundland Exploration and Humber Consolidated, a plethora of smaller American or American-related companies mined a range
of ores around the colony in this period. From North American Talc’s mid-decade operation at Manuels to a 1904-5 Du Pont sulphur mining venture at Rowsell’s Harbour in northernmost Labrador, the American presence attested to the lure of a largely unknown land’s mineral resources. Yet for all the activity, within a few years most of the work had petered out. Nevertheless, the upsurge in mineral exploitation, most of it with an American element, helped delineate the larger issues surrounding colonial development.

The American influence became apparent in many ways. Numerous press reports suggested the importance of visiting mining engineers as advance agents of an expanding industrial economy. Experts such as Dr. George Maynard, who twice visited west coast chromite deposits, combined both scientific and practical knowledge. Also from the same pool of talent came many of the first managers, including W.S. Grammar of Baltimore, who had worked with the likes of Andrew Carnegie and H.C. Frick before heading up Dominion Iron and Steel’s operation on Bell Island. In 1907 the Daily News observed that whereas “a few years ago a mining man was a rara avis, he arrives today by almost every boat.” Along with their expertise, the newcomers brought American mining technology ranging from Davis-Calyx diamond drills to concentrating machinery from Edward P. Allis Company. In doing so, they further exposed Newfoundlanders to a world which put an increasing premium on technical skills.

The accelerated mining activity attracted Newfoundlanders from all walks of life who rushed to get a piece of the action. Ordinary citizens, specialized land-resource promoters, and a Who’s Who of the merchant elite participated in mineral-related ventures. Also, prominent lawyer-politicians such as Edward Morris, Donald Morison, and Michael Gibbs shared in the legal work generated by American interest. Amidst the hoopla, minimal deposits often led to extravagant hopes and claims — and eventual disappointment. English expert Brenton Symonds traced the inflation of claims to one source: he noted that “there are hundreds of leases and licenses in the hands of speculators who are so fully immersed in the fishing industry that they are indisposed to undertake any works of development.” In general, the role of local elites and the related diversion of capital drew into question the value of conducting multiple economic activities without adequate support structures in an age of increasing specialization.

Newfoundlanders perhaps spent more time and energy than money on mining projects. A high-risk field at best, mining required an initially large capital outlay. In these circumstances, Newfoundlanders usually extended a warm welcome to outside interests. In praising C.E. Willis, the entrepreneur involved in Humber Consolidated, Michael Gibbs wrote: “Come on then, American capital, and do good.” In the hands of men like Mr. Willis, capital must do good.” Similarly, the Twillingate Sun saw no problem with the acquisition by Americans of properties in the Notre Dame Bay region.
It editorialized: "The general public, the great majority won't object to the introduction of American, or any other labour giving capital. They say, 'The more the merrier'."\[^{106}\]

Yet some Newfoundlanders expressed reservations. The Herald, for instance, wanted a stop to the export of the colony's resources in a raw state.\[^{107}\] Also, according to 1902 press reports, Robert Bond flirted with the idea of imposing an export tax on Bell Island iron ore.\[^{108}\] Evidently, a fear of discouraging further development proved stronger, and Bond retreated.\[^{109}\] In 1903 the premier took a different tack; he introduced legislation to provide bounties to any entrepreneur who would establish an iron and steel industry in Newfoundland.\[^{110}\] Like so many others, this initiative too came to nothing, principally because of the lack of viable coal reserves. In an age when iron and steel were indicators of national greatness, though, the dream of a colonial "Pittsburgh of the North" died hard.

As it was, even a limited mining sector exerted considerable impact. The actual number of jobs involved — a couple of thousand — remained small; however, in many instances, worker rotation increased their significance.\[^{111}\] Ordinary colonists wanted mines, whether to obtain semi-permanent work or to supplement fishery incomes. Often, mine workers used monies earned to equip them for the fishery, thus adding to the labor inputs in that industry. At the same time, mining created a more mobile labor force, one with skills other than those found in the fishery; it also stimulated appetites for even further development. In effect, mining contributed to the multiple pressures which encouraged the Bond government to launch its futile attempt to attract American-style heavy industry. These same pressures in turn caused colonial politicians to welcome primary manufacturing in another resource sector.

As in mining, the expanding arc of America's resource frontier directly touched the Newfoundland forest industry. Before 1900 that industry consisted mainly of the scattering of small lumber mills, many of them Nova Scotian-owned. One small pulp mill existed, built by a Vermont contractor for Harvey & Co. at Black River, Placentia Bay.\[^{112}\] As the Harvey operation struggled to survive, the Reid family developed plans to establish much larger mills on their holdings in the Exploits-Red Indian Lake watershed and the Grand Lake-Humber system. These first steps toward a newsprint industry dovetailed with an increasing American interest in northern forests. An 1899 editorial in the Paper Trade Journal, a leading organ of the American industry, noted that "the forests of Newfoundland are almost inexhaustible, and as yet have been scarcely touched by the pulp makers."\[^{113}\] Though English concerns, principally the Harmsworths, eventually established the Newfoundland industry, American or American-related companies paved the way for their arrival.

After the first tentative steps in the late 1890s, something of a lull
occurred in the movement towards pulp and paper. Because of their bitter feud with Bond over the Railway Contract, the Reids had to curtail their plans. As interest temporarily waned, attention shifted to lumbering. In 1901 Scotsman Lewis Miller established a large venture in central Newfoundland, only to see it fail a short while later. Shortly after, three new companies appeared.

The first to arrive was Wood, Barker of Boston, which took over the Botwoodville-based Exploits Lumber Company from Nova Scotian interests in 1903. A short while later, New Land Lumber, headed by Nova Scotian promoter Harry Crowe and with the participation of Adirondack interests, established operations. New Land acquired a range of properties, among them key holdings in the Norris Arm area and north of Gander Lake. Then, following the purchase of several smaller concerns, Newfoundland Timber Estates, managed by Crowe and with Henry Whitney as president, came into existence as the largest enterprise. Timber Estates had acquired all the Miller properties at Lewisporte, Millertown, Glenwood, and Indian Bay, along with the holdings of others at Point Leamington, Grand Lake, Gambo, and on the Gander River. A notable player in these complex transactions was the Reid family, with W.D. Reid becoming treasurer of the new company; through it, the Reids were now able to have a role in shaping the colony’s forest industry. By 1903 Timber Estates and the other two companies dominated that industry, carrying on active, large-scale lumbering operations. The promoters, though, had even more ambitious plans.

Over the next two years or so, Timber Estates under Crowe and Whitney negotiated to sell a large portion of its holdings to the Harmsworths of Britain who wished to establish a massive pulp and paper complex at Grand Falls on the Exploits River. Shortly after this deal was completed in 1905, the outlines of a second major project on the Exploits, this one at Bishop’s Falls and involving competing British interests, began to emerge. Again, Crowe and Whitney played leading roles; by 1907 they had used much of their remaining properties and those of Exploits Lumber to put together another deal. Thus in both instances, American or American-related companies were crucial to the land assemblies which helped set the stage for pulp and paper.

These dealings which involved prominent trans-Atlantic names, attracted considerable external and internal attention to Newfoundland’s forest potential. Numerous reports of American transactions in colonial timber limits suggested much speculative maneuvering. On the Newfoundland side, such old-line firms as Harvey’s and Job’s participated in different ventures. And as in mining, specialized land-resource promoters such as J.J. Murphy and Thomas Freeman tried to put together large deals, the former with Eau Claire, Wisconsin, interests and the latter with the Hearst empire. While neither of these initiatives succeeded, the climate of pro-
motionialism surrounding them complemented that evident in the mining sector. Indeed, many of the same people, including prominent members of the legal fraternity, were involved. Throughout, a wide-open, wheeler-dealer atmosphere contrasted with that normally seen in a traditional fishing society.

As part of the new atmosphere, and a parallel to events in mining, American experts and technology appeared in the wilds of Newfoundland. Lumbermen from Maine and New York filled management positions and encouraged the introduction of improved sawmilling techniques. Even the gigantic Harmsworth venture reflected the penetrative power of American technological know-how. New York architect George Hardy headed the project, and fellow countryman and engineer H.F. Lincoln assembled a staff to install the dam. Also, American companies won contracts to install everything from penstocks to boilers. While the town itself was built "after the English rather than the American fashion," the same did not hold true for its technological base.

The impact of Grand Falls and the various logging ventures proved considerable. Above all, these enterprises created employment, most directly for people in adjacent northeast coast districts, but not exclusively so; indeed, job seekers flocked in from all around the colony. While some Newfound-landers found more or less permanent positions, many others took seasonal work. As in mining, the relatively small number of jobs masked the influence of frequent seasonal rotation. In this way, the forest ventures added a much needed element of diversification to the colonial economy.

Other influences were less immediately evident. Though company stores often accompanied such ventures, more money found its way into the local economy, thus contributing to the erosion of the credit system. Even the operation of company stores sometimes failed to live up to expectations. In a 1907 court case described as "one of the most interesting in years," a store owner sued George Barker's Exploits Lumber Company over an alleged breach of an agreement to operate a monopoly. Apparently, Exploits Lumber had followed an independent route, including the payment of cash directly to its employees. As in the fishery, any maintenance of the truck system or variant of it faced increased pressure in this period.

The larger implications of forest-resource exploitation for the fishery were problematic. While on the one hand providing the supplemental incomes many colonists needed to reenter a crowded fishery, such activity also relieved overall employment difficulties. The lumber companies, and later the pulp and paper operations, also encouraged a migration inward from isolated coastal settlements and exposed residents to alternative work patterns and more polyglot labor forces. In essence, Grand Falls, as the "city in the forest," represented an active mastery over the environment largely foreign to the more reactive approaches characteristic of inshore fishing communities.

Moreover, as the largest pulp and paper complex in the world, Grand
Falls must have exerted tremendous impact socially and psychologically in adjacent northern bays more noted for their purely fishing districts. On one level, it seems more than coincidence that just at the time Grand Falls got underway, the Fishermen's Protective Union emerged. A perception in some quarters of being threatened or even bypassed in a quickly changing world likely contributed to its appearance. On another level, as with Bell Island, the success of Grand Falls whetted appetites for additional development. The welcome accorded American and other capital by both government and large elements of the population reflected a conviction that better opportunities lay outside the traditional fishery.

Another indicator of dissatisfaction with fishery conditions — and wider socio-economic circumstances — appeared in the rapid acceleration of out-migration from the mid-1880s onward. 125 Given the deep-rooted attachment to place so evident in Newfoundland society, emigration impinged sharply on the colonial consciousness. The emigrant destination which loomed largest in that consciousness was the U.S., especially the "Boston States." As more and more Newfoundlanders opted to move to America, their migration paralleled a larger one underway from the neighboring Maritime Provinces. The Newfoundland movement, however, had its own distinctive features and implications for colonial development.

The out-migration occurred in the context of larger trends in the North Atlantic world, among them a shift in labor and capital westward and a to-and-fro movement across the Canadian-American border. Inevitably, these currents pulled Newfoundlanders along. Also, as modernity made increasing inroads, whether through the introduction of steam in the seal fishery or the steady intrusion of a cash economy, many colonists perceived a greater security in relocation. Against these wider backdrops, a multitude of specific conditions varying from the hardships of women in the Labrador fishery to bitter labor strife in St. John's machine shops came into play. 126 In deciding to move, Newfoundlanders knew from relatives, friends, and the press that America was an attractive destination. They could make prior employment arrangements, travel there in groups, and upon arrival find communities of Newfoundlanders. The support patterns common to traditional society, though they encouraged a certain rootedness, often made the mechanics of emigration much easier.

Two streams were evident in the out-migration: those who went to the U.S. for short periods of time, and those who settled "permanently" in the country. Sojourners or "birds of passage" figured prominently in the first stream. Mostly male and usually less skilled or educated than their "permanent" counterparts, these migrants moved back and forth on a yearly basis, often in groups. Hundreds, for instance, travelled to Gloucester to ship on fishing vessels; still more hundreds worked on steamers employed in catching "porgie" or menhaden, an industrial fishery principally based
in Rhode Island. Smaller numbers fished for haddock out of East Boston and for bluefish out of New York. Other birds of passage opted for land employment ranging from construction in Boston and Brooklyn to cutting pulpwood in Maine. Most of these workers followed more or less set patterns; others, though, did not. They moved to the U.S. for indefinite periods, some perhaps intending a permanent relocation. Following a perceptible upturn in Newfoundland’s economy in the early 1900s, many such people became part of a large return migration, numbering in the thousands. This sizable repatriation likely had a double-edged impact on the home society.

Some of the returning Newfoundlanders brought new skills and savings which enabled them to engage in independent, entrepreneurial endeavors. In St. John’s individuals returned to start a variety of small businesses: among them, a grocery store, a boot-and-shoe shop, a saloon, a carriage works, a plumbing service, and a motor-bus company. In the outports, repatriates established themselves in pursuits as varied as blacksmithing and coasting. Sometimes those from a fishing background bought new boats and outfits — even a motor if available. Such additions to business and entrepreneurial activity, in whatever field, could only have raised the level of sophistication of Newfoundland’s society and economy.

Yet if out-migration served as a safety valve for a traditional economy which had reached its peak in the mid-1880s, the return of large numbers offset that function. Moreover, the repatriates’ exposure to more up-to-date standards of living undoubtedly contributed to at least a modest increase in their expectations from the home society. One personal story, told tongue-in-cheek, perhaps reflected a kernel of truth: it related how an outport girl returning from America “far more advanced in the world’s ways” consented to marry her “ignorant” fiancé only after he improved his education. In society at large, heightened aspirations for better job opportunities and services, if unfulfilled, must have enhanced the cumulative pressures on government.

Similarly, mixed blessings flowed from the presence of expatriate communities in the northeastern U.S., especially in New England. By 1905, 10,585 Newfoundlanders lived in Massachusetts, almost half of them in Boston. Suggesting its “permanence,” the Boston community contained a large number of females and children; also, young and relatively well educated or skilled adults were heavily represented. While the Newfoundlanders filled a somewhat lower niche than immigrants from the Maritime Provinces, their occupational profile still ranked higher than that exhibited by the home society. On the one hand, occupational achievement eased the immigrants’ adjustment and eventual assimilation into American life; on the other, it contributed to their considerable visibility, both in the “Boston States” and back in Newfoundland.

The Newfoundland community in Boston in particular publicized its
continuities with the society left behind. Family gatherings, receptions for visitors from home, and the supply of old-time foods attested to the strength of such ties. In addition, the expatriates' mutual benefit organizations and clubs provided institutional expressions of identity. More specifically, such organizations as the Newfoundlanders’ Mutual Benefit Association and the Boston Terra Novian Association offered both a basic insurance system and an amenable social environment, the latter through the sponsorship of annual balls and picnics. While the Newfoundland community in Boston — as in other American cities — never became excessively inward-looking, it still showed a remarkable persistence.

Coupled with the publicity generated by the to-and-fro movement of colonists for work purposes, the high profile of the Newfoundland communities in America exerted a strong political impact in the colony from the mid-1880s onward. Whichever faction or party attained power confronted controversy over the removal of appreciable numbers of colonists from their roots. The Evening Telegram, a supporter of the Liberal opposition, set the tone during the 1889 election when it printed day after day a drawing of a tombstone with the inscription: “Sacred to the Memory of 15,000 Newfoundlanders.” In this manner, the term “Exodus” became part of the colony’s political lexicon. Every government sought to deny responsibility for its occurrence — or even that it had occurred at all — but mostly without success. Understandably, in response politicians also tended to look for dramatic breakthroughs in economic development, often displaying an unseemly eagerness to accept any entrepreneurial initiative which might materially advance the colony’s welfare.

In more purely economic terms, the existence of the Newfoundland communities abroad also produced mixed results. On one hand, the many remittances from expatriates — $111,494.77 in American money orders in 1905-6 alone — assumed a disproportionate influence in a cash-short economy and meant further distortions in the credit system. Qualitative evidence indicates the experience of one community noted for its heavy out-migration. In 1905 a Harbour Grace observer commented that the money coming from expatriates “has been for years and is still a large contribution to the well-being of our people,” and that receipts “in the region of a thousand dollars weekly” around Christmas constituted “no mean factor in the wealth and to the trade of the town.” On the other hand, the comparatively small number of people leaving the colony — taken in context with the birds of passage phenomenon — again suggests the need for reconsideration of the safety-valve concept. As Patricia Thornton argued, New England’s “insufficient pull on the fishing population of Newfoundland” had profound implications for colonial development. Evidently, the emigration which did occur cut both ways, its very character adding to the pressures on traditional socio-economic arrangements.
Meanwhile, colonial governments as expressions of their society seemed singularly ill-suited to cope with these pressures. Lacking the sophistication and technical know-how for thorough evaluation of projects conceived by outside interests, governments generally played a reactive role in smoothing the way for their initiation. The relationships which then developed between government and entrepreneur entailed often unforeseen political implications. Robert Bond’s dealings with Henry Whitney provided a classic case in point.

In 1904 Whitney became directly involved in Bond’s long struggle to obtain free trade with the United States, the premier’s umbrella concept for the colony’s economic deliverance. When the American entrepreneur visited Newfoundland in connection with the Harmsworths’ negotiations, he discussed with Bond their common concern over the U.S. Senate’s holdup of the Bond-Hay Treaty. At the time, as President of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, Whitney headed a vigorous Massachusetts-wide campaign to persuade Washington to implement reciprocity with Canada and Newfoundland. After returning from the colony, he visited President Theodore Roosevelt to urge his support of the Newfoundland treaty. When Roosevelt reacted favorably, a successful outcome seemed imminent. The Senate, though, emasculated the treaty anyway, and a buoyant Bond had his hopes dashed.

The Premier’s disappointment contributed to his decision to implement strong and, in retrospect, rash retaliatory measures against American fishermen in Newfoundland waters. Bond’s later escalation of the quarrel also coincided with Whitney’s foray into Massachusetts gubernatorial politics, one which focused on reciprocity and the Bond-Hay Treaty in particular. This interrelationship of Newfoundland and Massachusetts politics occurred beyond the ken of the great majority of Newfoundlanders. Yet as a spin-off from Whitney’s involvement in Newfoundland resource development, it indicated how such ties with external entrepreneurs affected the colony’s history.

The Whitney relationship constituted one more American connection in a decade or so of intense activity, one which in the end appeared to make comparatively little difference in terms of the colony’s chronic problems. Nevertheless, even though advancement fell far short of aspirations, the decade witnessed new approaches which moved the process of change forward incrementally. The arrival of large numbers of experts, many of them Americans involved in resource exploitation, for instance, contributed to a perception that even though Newfoundland was moving ahead, it was still poorly prepared for the twentieth century. One editorial comment suggested that the colony break its reliance on external education for a few and establish a university to train its own experts. An openness to approaches of this sort, though difficult to measure, seemed a natural byproduct of all the activity then occurring.
In another related direction, the acceleration of land-resource development encouraged an in-drawing of people from more isolated areas. The *Herald* editorialized that a "healthy revolution" in the lives of hundreds of people had taken place, and, anticipating later twentieth-century debates, called for more "industrial centres" throughout the island:

it should not be difficult to transfer the coast folk on the bleak and impoverished shores of White Bay and other like sections, to more inviting areas where other industries will spring up which would pay them better, and thereby enhance the sum of the general weal.\(^{143}\)

Though Newfoundland would find it difficult to establish another "Pittsburgh of the North," a modest centralization was underway which would continue to chip away at the traditional society and eventually lead to greater integration with mainstream North American life.

Incremental change, however, proved insufficient to sustain governments faced with rising pressures for more dramatic development. Robert Bond discovered this unhappy fact when his own government unravelled in 1907-9. His controversial stand on American fishing rights triggered the process; however, other American-related elements — some more suggestive of systemic problems — likely played a part. The presence, for example, of thousands of repatriated Newfoundlanders, many of whom undoubtedly had heightened expectations, could only have added to the pressure on the Bond government during the economic downturn of 1907-8. Also, Edward Morris's new People's Party, Bond's major opposition, exerted a curious appeal. Populist in its propaganda, it pushed a more razzle-dazzle approach to development, one conditioned by a decade or more of American-style promotionalism. Its candidates even reflected this tilt on a more personal level; almost without exception, the most prominent among them either had business or family connections in the U.S., or at some point had lived in that country.\(^{146}\) Impatient with imperfectly understood societal obstacles, or wilfully oblivious to them, many of these politicians encouraged unrealistic hopes. Yet once Morris's party gained office in early 1909, it too found itself unable to deliver the goods, and the resulting disillusionment was so much the greater. In a society where change came gradually, there would be a wide disparity between political promise and government performance.

The currents in Newfoundland life ran deeply and slowly. At the end of the period 1898-1910, though improvements were evident, the contours of Newfoundland's industrial and institutional life remained largely unchanged. Yet colonists had witnessed a great deal of activity in both the marine and land-resource sectors. Alexander's argument that Newfoundland elites should have concentrated more effectively on the fishery undervalued numerous industry initiatives. Then too, the relative lack of success enjoyed by these initiatives suggests that Alexander overestimated the maneuvering space and development options open to colonial leaders; the latter's turn to
land-resource exploitation, with all its limitations, made considerable sense. Throughout, as Newfoundlanders worked out their choices, the colony's American connections illuminated the problems involved. These same connections also demonstrated the incremental advantages of constant struggle on a wide variety of fronts. As the *Twillinge Sun* editorialized: "Good, in any sphere, is a plant of slow growth; very little can be accomplished in a day." 147

Notes

1David G. Alexander, "Development and Dependence in Newfoundland, 1880-1970"; also Alexander's "Newfoundland's Traditional Economy and Development to 1934." I am indebted to Robert Babcock of the University of Maine and Patrick O'Flaherty and George Story of Memorial University for their help at different stages in the preparation of this study.
4For use of the appellation "Newfoundland School" and a summary of its principal arguments, see Cannon 74.
5See for examples several of the articles in Sinclair.
6Alexander, "Traditional Economy" 56. The degree of individualism showed regional variations; see Neis 8, 10, 25.
7For the problem of external market fluctuations, see Ryan.
8Alexander, "Traditional Economy" 65.
9Murray 4.
11McDonald 12-13.
13Alexander, "Traditional Economy" 65. For details of the secondary-industry sector, see Joy. The phrase "unified directing power" is from Gordon 135.
14O'Flaherty 88.
15MacDonald 26.
16Alexander, "Development and Dependence" 6.
17Procter 46.
18See *Gloucester Daily Times* (Gloucester, Massachusetts) June 8, 1906.
20Howard 8-9.
21Innis 469.
22Allard.
23Thomas 57. Also, *The Fisherman* April, 1901, Vol. 5, No. 2; EH January 21, 1901; and *Daily News* (St. John's, Newfoundland) (DN) October 29, 1901.
24Thomas 78-80.
27*The Evening Telegram* (St. John's, Newfoundland) (ET) March 31, 1905.
28ET August 28, 1904.
29United States Commission of Fish and Fisheries, 1892 *Bulletin* 92.
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30 The Western Star (Bay of Islands, Newfoundland) (WS) October 22, 1902.
31 EH October 12, 26, 1906; DN October 28, 1907; WS January 15, 1908.
32 WS January 15, 1908.
33 For examples, see The Evening Mercury (St. John’s, Newfoundland) (EM) November 2, 1888; and Rowe 182.
34 DN July 24, 1899.
35 DN January 28, 1908.
36 Registry of Companies (St. John’s), file 149, Confederation Building, St. John’s. Also Neis 99.
37 EH May 24, 1899, for letter from M.H.A. and Fortune native J.E. Lake.
38 For examples, see EM December 14, 1888 and ET January 30, February 3, March 12, 1894.
39 See EH March 21, 23 and December 21, 1901; and March 10, 1902. Also The Evening Chronicle (St. John’s, Newfoundland) (EC) December 5, 1907.
40 Whiteley 56.
41 EM April 20, 1888.
42 See for examples, EH December 3, 1901 and DN November 9, 1907.
43 For references to Cluett, see EH April 26, 1899 and DN May 20, 1901; to Winsor, see DN May 13, 1908.
44 EH November 12, 1897. Also Thomas 34-35.
45 For problems experienced the first season, see EH May 20, 21, 1901. For problems in the second season, see DN June 12, 1902, and EH May 17, June 11, 1902.
46 See EH May 20, June 13, 1901; and DN August 20, 1901.
47 Letter from “Advance,” Placentia, July 26, 1901, in EH August 3, 1901. Also EH October 19, 1901.
48 WS February 4, May 6, 1903; and EH May 16, 1903.
49 EH May 16, 1903; also Halifax Herald extract in WS June 10, 1903.
50 See, for example, EH February 14, 1905.
51 For references to various functions, see EH May 1, September 4, 1905, and July 30, 1906; also WS February 17, September 21, 28, 1906.
52 For examples, see ET October 9, 1905, and EH April 6, 1906.
53 WS December 4, 1907.
54 For Ashbourne, see EH November 6, 1906, and July 15, 1907; for Peckford, see EH June 20, 1907.
55 For origins of early motors, see Great Britain, Dominions Royal Commission, Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty’s Dominions, Minutes of Evidence Taken in Newfoundland in 1914 98. For a comment on the complexity of early motors, see MacDermott 71.
56 Sager 21.
57 EH November 8, December 26, 1906; and April 2, 1907.
58 For details of steamer usage, see Newfoundland, House of Assembly, Journal, 1905, Appendix 222.
59 DN February 3, 1908.
60 DN November 23, 1908; also EC November 23, 1908.
61 DN November 23, 1908.
62 Prowse 631.
63 Testimony of W.D. Reid, Plaintiff’s Case, Anglo-American Telegraph Claim, in EH February 2, 1905.
65 ET August 30, 1898.
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66See letter, M.J. Carter to T.N. Cridler, September 20, 1899, in United States Department of State, Despatches from United States Consuls in St. John’s, Newfoundland, 1897-1906. Also, DN October 21, 1899.
67Letter, J.W. Downey to M.J. Carter, November 5, 1898, enclosure in Carter to Cridler, November 15, 1898, Department of State, Despatches.
68DN July 29, 1902, and EH July 29, 1902.
69Report of proceedings in House of Assembly, March 15, 1904, in DN March 16, 1904. See also EH August 15, 1904.
70DN March 16, 1904.
71DN September 19, 1904; EH September 19, 21, 1904.
72Gluek 47-51.
73ET August 4, 1905.
74For Mair’s report on the herring fishery, see Newfoundland, House of Assembly, Journal, 1906, Appendix 200-01.
76EH May 20, 1907.
78EC August 17, 1908.
79Letter, Michael Gibbs to editor, DN October 7, 1903.
80Ibid.
81See EH August 15, 1904, for a report of Carter’s employment elsewhere.
82Registry of Companies, file 122.
83EH September 18, 1906, and DN December 23, 1907.
84ET November 1, 1905.
85For Moulton, see EH September 16, 1903. For Crosbie, see Newfoundland Quarterly 32,2(1932):31.
86EH July 18, 1899.
87S.W.J. Benjamin, 110.
88EH April 10, 1906.
89For details of litigation involving same, see EH May 9, 1901. Also Neis 113.
90Ibid., 113-4.
91EH January 17, 1907.
93ET May 30, 1905.
95DN February 5, 1902.
96For background, see Macgillivray.
97Montreal Gazette extract in EH September 4, 1899.
98Engineering and Mining Journal (New York) August 11, 1900.
99Martin 25.
100EH June 10, 1904.
101Engineering and Mining Journal July 14, 1904. Also Maynard.
102ET March 4, 1939.
103DN July 27, 1901.
104London Mining Journal extract in DN January 18, 1908.
105DN September 22, 1903.
106Twillingerate Sun extract in EH October 6, 1906.
107EH November 13, 15, 25, 27, 28, 1901.
108EH August 26, 1902.
109Edward Morris interview in Montreal Gazette, extract in EH February 9, 1905.
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Newfoundland, Census, 1901, Table 1, xxvii; and Newfoundland, Census, 1911, xxix.

Also ET April 30, 1906.

EH August 2, 1897.


Paper Trade Journal January 8, 1903. Also EH January 6, 1903.

Hiller 46.

Newfoundland Timber Estates File, Reid Papers, Miscellaneous Group, Box 1 (Public Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador). Also EH May 14, 1903.

Hiller 52.

EH April 28, 1907; WS May 1, 1907.

EC November 26, 1907, and April 25, 1909.

EH June 28, 1907. Also Hicks 63.

Extracts from Springfield Republican in EC March 20, May 12, 1908. Also EC February 8, 1909.

Interview with Supreme Court Justice G. Emerson in Montreal Herald December 24, 1906, printed in EH January 3, 1907.

EC November 23, 1907. Also DN November 18, 21, 1907.

For appellation, see Sydney Post extract in ET September 18, 1906.

Alexander, "Traditional Economy" 63. Also Newfoundland, Census, 1901, Table 1, vii. For earlier migration, see Edward-Vincent Chafe.

EH April 13, 1907. Also EH September 16, 1905 and ET December 8, 1905.

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For references in order, see EH November 15, 1899; ET April 30, 1906; EH November 3, 1899; ET June 20 and May 23, 1906; and DN May 13, 1908.

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For examples, see DN February 27, 1908; EH March 26, 1900 and May 22, 1902; ET October 25, 1898; and EC June 25, 1908.

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For examples of each, see EH February 21, 1901 and Boston Globe extract in EH August 17, 1901.

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See Neary and Noel.

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The Feildian extract in EH January 18, 1905.

EH February 11, 1903.

A number of Morris's supporters who fell into one or more of these categories have
A number of Morris's supporters who fell into one or more of these categories have been mentioned in this paper. They are as follows: John Crosbie, Joseph Downey, Michael Gibbs, Donald Morison, Robert Moulton and J.J. Murphy.

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