Poaching in Newfoundland and Labrador: The Creation of An Issue

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INTRODUCTION

In September 1982, newspapers in St. John’s reported that the provincial government had declared a “war” on poaching, or illegal hunting. For example, “Much harsher penalties promised for poachers,” read the headline in The Evening Telegram, (17 September 1982), while The Daily News (18 September 1982) reported “Simms reveals all out effort: New ‘war’ on poachers!!.” It was reported that the “offensive” against poaching would include large fines, possible imprisonment, and the confiscation of property used in a poaching incident.

From a social constructionist viewpoint it can be argued that the “war” on poaching was not motivated solely by concern with wildlife conservation, but was at least partly precipitated by government’s rediscovery of outdoor adventure tourism as a potentially lucrative development sector. Poaching became an issue in Newfoundland in 1982, in large part because big game had become an important commodity.

This essay contributes to our understanding of game laws, suggesting that legislative changes are influenced by a variety of socio-political factors. Additionally, it makes a polemical contribution to discussions of natural resource management in this province, an important topic in the wake of the cod moratorium. Resource management policy is guided by much more than conservation issues. More generally, this essay adds to the literature on the politics of social problems and agenda setting, and contributes to our understanding of how a particular issue arises at a particular time. For example, the “war” against poaching parallels the recent “crackdown” on liquor smuggling from the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which lie off Newfoundland’s south coast. Finally, this paper contributes to a growing body of literature on game laws and poaching (for example: NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES, 12, 2 (1996) 08231737).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This analysis of why poaching became an issue in the early 1980's draws on the body of sociological research dealing with the "discovery" or "creation" of social problems. This work suggests that a social problem is a social construct. It results from a process of definition in which a given condition is picked out and identified as a social problem. A social problem does not exist for a society unless it is recognized (Blumer, 1971:301). Blumer (1971:302) asserted that it is a mistake to assume that any kind of harmful condition automatically becomes a problem. Certain conditions may be ignored at one time, yet without change in their form, become "matters of grave concern at another time." This "social constructionist" literature covers such diverse problems as the "discovery" of child abuse, fear of violence in Newfoundland, the emergence of satanism as a problem in Canada, the spread of mugging in England, and the "war" against social security abusers in Canada. This body of work raises important questions for the student of any social problem. Which individuals and what institutions gain from an issue being discovered? Who becomes responsible for attending to the problem (Gusfield, 1981:5)? What is government's role with regard to the issue? How has the government changed its stance toward the issue? What problems, fears and anxieties are reflected in the issue? What is the role of the media in the creation of the issue (Hall et al., 1978:viii)?

In 1941, Fuller and Myers made the important distinction that a social problem has two parts: an objective condition and a subjective definition. The two interact to form a social problem when an objective condition is defined by members of society as a problem about which something ought to be done (Fuller and Myers, 1941:320; Becker, 1967:2). Fuller and Myers suggested that sociologists must study both the objective conditions and the value judgments of people which cause them to define a problem (Fuller and Myers, 1941: 321; Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:146). There are difficulties in this approach, however, specifically concerning the role of objective conditions in the creation of a problem.

For example, what happens if we ask if a non-existent social condition can be defined as a social problem? This is indeed possible, as witnessed by the Salem witch hunt or the scape-goating of Jews in Nazi Germany. We know that Jews were not really a "problem" for Germany, however, Hitler's government had the power to define Jews as a problem, with devastating results. That is, social problems may or may not have a factual basis, and the social scientist must be attuned to this (Becker, 1967:6). Theoretically, objective conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause a social problem to be identified (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:146). Additionally, research has shown that a social problem often means different things to different interested groups, some of which may even use a
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particular problem to achieve their own agendas (see for example Lippert's [1990] essay on the construction of satanism as an issue in Canada). Having sketched some of the theory behind the construction of social problems, I now turn to a brief description of my research methods.

The research was based on a combination of interviews of key personnel and examination of secondary sources, especially newspaper reports. Work began in September, 1989 with two preliminary interviews of a Wildlife Officer and the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for wildlife. However, the main research period was from May to August 1990, and during those months five main sites, which housed Wildlife headquarters, and four regional offices, were visited. I used a "snowball" technique and conducted 43 unstructured interviews. The subjects were primarily former provincial government Cabinet Ministers, other government members, wildlife division officials, interest group representatives and media personnel. To protect my subjects' anonymity, I have tried, where-ever possible, to avoid identifying people by name. I now present a description of the "war" on poaching.

THE "WAR" ON POACHING

In 1982 the provincial government declared a "war" on poachers. This offensive was big news in both St.John's newspapers publishing at that time. "Much harsher penalties promised for poachers," read the headline in The Evening Telegram, (17 September 1982), while The Daily News (18 September 1982) reported "Simms reveals all out effort: New 'war' on poachers!!" The Telegram reported that the Minister of Wildlife, Len Simms, would be introducing amendments to the Wildlife Act, which would increase fines for first offenders to not less than $1000.00 and not more than $5000.00. In default of payment, a jail term of not less than one month and not more than six months would be imposed. If the first offender was not fined at all, the courts would have to impose a jail term. A second offender would be defined as somebody who had committed a second offence within a five year period after his last conviction. A second offender would receive a jail term of from one to six months, plus a fine of between $3000.00 and $10,000.00. In default of payment, additional jail terms from two to six months would be imposed. The confiscation and forfeiture of any vehicle used in any big game poaching incident was to become mandatory under the proposed regulations (The Evening Telegram, 17 September 1982; The Daily News, 18 September 1982; see also Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5473-5479).

The Minister also outlined steps the Wildlife Division would be taking to combat poaching. Protection efforts were to be increased by establishing checkpoints and using fixed-wing, helicopter and all-terrain vehicles for patrols. An information program was to be implemented to increase public awareness about all aspects of wildlife management. Royal Newfoundland Constabulary and RCMP officers would also be enforcing the Wildlife Act.
Later that fall, the proposed amendments were introduced in the House of Assembly, where they were widely supported by both government and the Opposition. The new legislation was given approval in principle (i.e. second reading in the House) on 23 November 1982 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982b:5243-50; 5489).

In January, 1983 it seemed there was an escalation in the "war." At that time, a non-refundable five dollar fee on big game licences was introduced, which was to be used to improve the Hunter Education program and hire additional WPO's (The Evening Telegram, 25 January 1983). The hunter education program expansion was intended to "promote responsible hunter conduct, emphasize the importance of wildlife management, laws and regulations and to encourage the safe handling of hunting equipment" (Newfoundland, 1984c:1). Also in October 1983, Operation SPORT (Stop Poaching Report Today) was begun on a trial basis in the Corner Brook, Deer Lake, Bay of Islands area (Newfoundland, 1984c:3). This was a toll-free, twenty-four hour anonymous "hotline" for reporting poachers. By the end of 1984, Operation SPORT was made available to all residents of the province. Thus, from September, 1982 until the end of 1984, the provincial government and the Wildlife Division seemed to be increasing their efforts against poachers. Having outlined some of the contours of the "war" on poaching, I now present reasons it is logical to question the declaration of "war."

DEBUNKING THE "WAR" ON POACHING

There are at least four pieces of evidence which make it reasonable to critically question what the 1982 "war" on poaching was about. First is the fact that legislation governing poaching had first been enacted in Newfoundland in 1845 (Peters and Burleigh, 1951:31). Why did poaching, which had been a crime for one-hundred and fifty years, emerge as an issue in 1982? There is much evidence which demonstrates that poaching had been occurring for many years in Newfoundland and that wildlife conservation had been a public issue long before 1982. For example, media reports from the turn of the twentieth century discussed poaching (see for example: The Evening Telegram, 3 August 1891; The Daily News, 28 December 1909; The Evening Chronicle, 18 February 1910). Other examples of concern about poaching can be found in the 1914 Report of the Game and Inland Fisheries Board. This document states that deer (caribou) were being killed throughout the year, for both food use and sale. The Game Board also called for stricter wildlife protection in its Reports for 1910, 1911 and 1912. Similarly, elected government representatives also called for tighter wildlife protection (see for example: Government of Newfoundland, Legislative Council Proceedings, 1910:686-7). Additionally, in the early twentieth century, sportsmen like Millais (1905) and Admiral Sir W.R. Kennedy (1905) wrote about "the slaughter of caribou" by settlers, while Sir Wilfred Grenfell lobbied the Game Board to amend wildlife laws and better protect his introduced reindeer herd (Grenfell, 1967).
Clearly, game and fish protection was an issue for government and various individuals and groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Poaching was not a newly discovered problem in Newfoundland, therefore it is reasonable to ask why, in the early 1980s, the provincial government declared "war" on poachers.

A second factor which makes it reasonable to question the "war" on poaching was the political/economic climate at the time the "war" was fought. By the end of the 1970's, the provincial government was entering a period of spending cuts which was maintained into the 1980s. This attempting to follow a policy of limiting or cutting spending was highly important in the "war" on poaching. The need for budgetary restraint was clearly evident in May, 1982 when the provincial government brought down a "Hard-times budget," which included increased taxes and fees for government provided services. In addition, a "Salary and Wage Restraint Program" was implemented (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1982a).

Thus, by the early 1980s government was cutting spending and declaring a "war" against poachers, and at the same time, taking away the resources necessary to fight or win that "war." In fact, while certain measures were implemented (such as the Wildlife Act amendments) government did not really try to win the "war." It did not provide adequate resources to the Wildlife Division for either counting big game animals, or for the protection and enforcement of the wildlife regulations. The declaration of "war" raised expectations of both wildlife agents and hunters that increased protection efforts would be implemented. However, by the mid 1980s, resident hunters, sportsmen's groups, the news media and Wildlife Division staff publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with government's steadily diminishing efforts to combat poaching.

For example, by the mid-1980s the Wildlife Division was apparently operating under continued budget reductions. This fiscal restraint and its adverse side-effects were acknowledged in the Division's Green Paper on Hunting (1985):

... information required to improve habitat and increase available food supplies, to harvest animals in a way to make the best of their breeding potential and to understand natural losses and poaching, is far from adequate....

At present we do not have the funds to either adequately determine the size of our moose and caribou populations, or address the important questions about habitat, reproduction, and natural losses. Meanwhile the increased demand for hunting, loss of habitat to roads, industrial projects and certain logging activities are all putting new stresses on our big game populations at a time when money to manage them is becoming scarce. Big game research is very expensive..." (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985a:3).

That is, wildlife biologists publicly acknowledged that they were under-funded. While this claim may have been a pressure tactic to lever more funds from government, it is significant to note the admission that the Division's understanding of poaching was "far from adequate." This disclosure is important since it highlights the dilemma biologists faced in estimating the amount and effects of
poaching. (The problematic nature of big game science is discussed in more detail below).  

Like wildlife biologists, the Protection staff were also asked to do more with less during the "war." For example, in 1982 there were 48 full-time Protection Officers and 17 part-time officers employed during the peak seasons (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:156). In 1983, there were only 45 full-time Protection Officers and this number had dropped to 36 Officers by 1990 (Brief Dealing with the Concerns of Wildlife Officers: Presented by NAPE, 1990:30). One has to wonder about a "war" on poaching in which we see the number of front line troops (Protection Officers) actually being decreased!

Significantly, the "war" made WPO's jobs more dangerous, as the harsh new penalties meant poachers had more to lose and thus may have gone to extremes to avoid capture. When it became clear that wildlife protection was not high on government's priority list, WPO's militancy increased. For example, Protection Officers participated in a strike with other government employees to protest wage restraint (The Evening Telegram, 26 September 1986).

Like the big game biologists, WPO's complained about the manner in which the poaching "war" was being conducted. This became evident when they made a representation to government in May, 1987 after an annual meeting (Brief Dealing with the Concerns of Wildlife Officers: Presented by NAPE, 1990:2). A WPO who was involved in this action told me the 1987 meeting raised the same concerns (officer safety, equipment, manpower and salaries) as a document presented to government in 1990. He also stated that the WPO's Association, established in October 1988, was "two years in the making." That is, the Association was begun in 1986, the same year that WPO's were on strike. Having sketched the poor economic times the "war" was fought in, I now turn to a third reason it is sensible to question the declaration of "war" on poachers.

A third factor which raises questions as to the nature of the "war" on poaching comes from considering the efforts of the Protection Branch of the Wildlife Division during the early 1980's. As discussed, the Wildlife Division was experiencing budget cuts and its agents were publicly complaining about lack of resources. Despite budgetary restraint, the Protection Branch intensified its policing efforts. One would expect to see such an increase, after all a "war" had been declared. For example, the number of investigations carried out in 1982-83 was increased from the previous year in all regions except Labrador (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a: 157). The Protection Section also enlarged its public relations program, making 484 speaking engagements in 1982-83 compared with 431 in 1981-82 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:163). However, it is significant to note that despite this increased effort by the Wildlife Protection staff, the number of charges laid for violations of the Wildlife Act in the period 1980 - 1985 decreased (see Table 1).
Table 1
Violations for Hunting
1980 - 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Charges</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>297</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taken from Table U-2, Historical Statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador (1990)

It is important to consider the figures in Table 1, in light of the declaration of “war” on poaching. One might think that an intensification in wildlife policing would be accompanied by an increase in charges and convictions. However, as seen in Table 1, this was not the case. From 1980-1982, we see a steady decline in convictions for wildlife offenses, and while there was an increase in 1984 and 1985, the number of violations (440 and 465 respectively) was not close to the 554 charges pressed in 1980 (and nowhere near the 611 offenses recorded in 1976, the peak for the fifteen year period considered). Unfortunately, the number of charges for 1983 were unavailable.

Official statistics on crime or deviance are problematic (Gomme, 1994; O’Grady, 1992). For example, not all poachers get caught, and thus Table 1 does not give us an accurate picture of poaching. However, we should think critically about a period in which it was claimed that poaching was worsening and a “war” on poachers was occurring, and yet there was no evidence of an increase in poaching based on recorded violations for the period 1980 - 1983. Various sources suggest that as policing efforts grow, the number of charges laid increases. For example, Gomme (1994:160) states:

The volume of crime that a police force officially registers is partly a function of its size and the way in which it is organized.
O'Grady's discussion of crime/violence in Newfoundland follows this line of thought and argues:

The proportion of police per persons in an area may be related to the number of crimes which are detected by, or reported to police (1992:5).

O'Grady (1992:85) shows that in the period 1962-1984, the number of RCMP officers in Newfoundland doubled from .9 officers per 1,000 population in 1962, to 1.8 per 1,000 population in 1984. The number of Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (RNC) officers per population decreased from 2.7 RNC per 1,000 population in 1962, to 2.2 RNC officers per 1,000 population in 1984. This decline in the ratio of RNC officers per population was due largely to the force expanding its jurisdiction and taking over policing in Mount Pearl in 1981.

O'Grady (1992:85) then suggests that in 1962 the RCMP detected 479 violent crimes per 100,000 population, while the RNC detected 158 per 100,000 population. In 1984, the RCMP (which had doubled in proportion to the population policed) detected 2,893 violent crimes per 100,000 population, while the RNC detected 1,042 violent crimes per 100,000 population. O'Grady suggests that the differences noted between the RCMP and RNC are the result of the increased surveillance (more detachments and more police) which improved the ability to detect crime. Additionally, the increased police presence made the police more accessible to the public and this may have led to more crimes being reported. At the same time, the growth in communications, and improved transportation in rural Newfoundland made contacting the police easier.

O'Grady's research can be easily related to this analysis of the "war" on poaching. If poaching was such a "problem" in the early 1980s, would not an escalation of wildlife policing (recall that in 1982-83 the number of investigations carried out increased from the previous year) have nabbed more poachers? One might also expect to have seen an increase in the number of charges laid for poaching resulting from the heightened public awareness that accompanied the "war," and from the implementation of the telephone "hotline" which made it possible for anyone to anonymously report poachers. However, the figures in Table 1 show that this did not happen. Significantly, if we recall from the discussion of budget cuts above that the number of full-time Protection Officers decreased from 1982-1990, we might say that based on Gomme (1994) and O'Grady's (1992) work on policing, the decrease in big game charges in the period 1980-1985 was perhaps related to the shrinking number of full-time Wildlife Officers.

A fourth factor which invites us to be critical of the "war" on poaching is the fact that there are no indications that poaching actually worsened in the late 1970's and early 1980's. That is, there is no indication that the objective conditions of poaching changed. In fact, research revealed that the Wildlife Division was unsure of how much poaching was actually occurring, or its effects on animal populations. This uncertainty is heightened when considering poaching, partly because of the "dark figure" of crime. That is, not all crime is detected, much remains
hidden. Big game managers were unsure how much poaching was occurring, and the Wildlife Division’s Management Section admitted (albeit after the “war” had started) that “information required to ... understand natural losses and poaching is far from adequate” (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985a:3). Such evidence suggests that a critical viewpoint is warranted when investigating claims that a “war” on poaching was necessary.

Not only were big game managers unsure how much poaching was occurring, they were also uncertain about the exact size of big game herds. This was partly due to the difficulties associated with counting wildlife. One Wildlife Division study suggested that “less than one-half of the moose in any given area are generally seen by observers from either helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft” (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:137). Similarly, well-known wildlife biologist Tom Bergerud and co-author Frank Manuel (1969) wrote that:

The quadrat census method can provide accurate results in Central Newfoundland. However, the necessary conditions are extremely rigorous (1969:914).

Bergerud and Manuel (1969) specified that counts be conducted within a few hours of a fresh snowfall, before tracks of animals mingle, and that experienced pilots and observers and highly maneuverable aircraft are also highly significant with regard to influencing estimates.

Other sources also suggest that estimates of big game herds are highly speculative. For example, the Wildlife Division’s black bear and caribou biologist, in a brief to the independent review panel on northern cod, stated:

The Grey River Caribou herd inhabits a region of the south-central Newfoundland barrens, an area of open, gently undulating terrain comprised primarily of extensive bogland and heath communities....

Between 1979 and 1987 a total of 26 complete or partial surveys of this population were conducted, providing estimates of population size which varied by as much as 3 times! The variance about each estimate was as much as 30 percent and therefore many surveys provided overlapping results... (Mahoney, 1989:6-7).

Freeman (1989) also discusses the imprecision of big game science and the problematic nature of the estimates produced by biologists. Similarly, in their examination of the cod crisis Steele, Andersen and Green point to the “errors and uncertainties inherent in stock estimates” (1992:65).

Like fisheries scientists, big game biologists are not only required to produce an estimate of the size of big game herds, they are also asked to set sustainable hunting quotas. These quotas try to maximize hunter participation and economic benefits, and at the same time ensure the future viability of herds. The management tool used to set big game quotas is significant because it again demonstrates the uncertainty involved in big game management. Hunting quotas are established using the following formula:

Clearly this formula involves many estimations which are often extremely imprecise. It includes big game mortality due to poaching. However, since there is no precise way of determining how much poaching occurs, the results obtained from this formula are inaccurate (McGrath, 1992).

What happens if we ask if there was a decline in big game herds in the late 1970s-early 1980s, and if poaching was the cause of this decline? To properly answer this question, it is important to briefly consider the history of caribou and moose populations in Newfoundland. It is estimated that around 40,000 native caribou inhabited Newfoundland at the turn of the twentieth century. A decline in numbers began in 1915 and by 1930 there were approximately 3000 remaining on the island. However, since then an increase has occurred; by 1967 caribou numbers were estimated at around 8,000 animals and by 1982 Newfoundland was conservatively estimated to have 33,433 (Mercer, et al., 1985:20). Moose were introduced to Newfoundland in 1878 and 1904, and from the latter date to 1960 moose numbers steadily increased (Mercer, et al., 1988:46). In 1960 a decline began, which continued until 1973. Then moose numbers began to increase, but around the late 1970's Wildlife Division estimates showed a slight decrease, which continued until 1982, when moose again began to increase (Mercer, et al., 1988:46; Mercer and Strapp, 1978:229-230; Mercer and Manuel, 1974).

It is vital to consider the explanations given for declines in the caribou and moose herds. Moose are believed to have declined rapidly after 1960 due to over-harvesting (both legal and illegal) and from over-browsing in inaccessible areas. Over-browsing essentially means that there are too many animals for the available food supply and that food quantity and quality will diminish resulting in a decrease in animals (Mercer and Strapp, 1978:230). Caribou are believed to have experienced a dramatic decline due to over-harvesting and high predation by lynx on calves (Bergerud, et al., 1983; Peters and King, 1958). Thus, over-harvesting (including illegal hunting) was not the only factor believed to have precipitated herd declines in the past.

By the early 1980's reports indicate that wildlife biologists generally thought caribou populations were doing very well; Newfoundland was conservatively estimated to have 33,433 animals (Mercer et al., 1985:20). The Avalon Peninsula caribou herd had increased from approximately 700 animals in 1967 to 3,000 by 1979 (Bergerud, et al., 1983:989). Moose populations were thought to be experiencing a slight decline in the late 1970's (Mercer et al., 1988:46; Mercer, interview, 25 July 1990). As mentioned above, previous declines in big game herds had been precipitated by more than illegal over-harvesting. Caribou populations were estimated to be increasing, and moose populations were thought to be experiencing only a slight decline, so why was a "war" declared on poaching? Maybe concern
with the decline in moose numbers led to the “war” on poaching. However, this explanation does not carry much weight because, as we will see below, caribou seemed to be the main concern of claims-makers, and both caribou and moose quotas to resident hunters were reduced in the early 1980s. Perhaps other considerations, such as a desire to expand the outdoor tourist industry, precipitated the poaching offensive.

EXPANDING OUTDOOR TOURISM IN THE LATE 1970s - EARLY 1980s

Long before the late 1970s, the government of Newfoundland had attempted to use wildlife and wildlands as part of the tourism industry. For example, by the turn of the twentieth century the railroad was completed across the island and the Reid Newfoundland Company became involved in promoting tourism based on hunting along the track (see for example: Overton, 1996; Pocius, 1994; McGrath, 1994; Seymour, 1980). However, as caribou herds declined, tourism suffered and the marketing focus shifted to a more general type of tourist. In the 1940s, the presence of sports-minded American servicemen may have helped freshen interest in hunting and fishing tourism (Overton, pers. comm.). Around this time, the Tourist Development Board of the Department of Natural Resources hired professional sportsman Lee Wulff to promote sporting opportunities in Newfoundland. Government interest in consumptive outdoor tourism may have waned a little in the 1950s and ‘60s, as mega-projects were looked to as economic generators.

However, this is not to imply that this sector (or tourism in general) was completely ignored by government at this time. Overton’s (1996) work on tourism and development in Newfoundland suggests that Premier Smallwood’s government was interested in developing the tourism sector, but approached it slowly and cautiously. Overton (pers. comm.) says that Smallwood had a “go-slow” approach to tourism development, waiting for improvements in transportation like the TCH. However, by the late 1970s, this hesitancy had been transformed into a more decisive attitude toward tourism development.

Evidence to support this assertion comes from a major study of the industry conducted in 1976 by the provincial government. This study set the stage for the formulation of a cost-sharing program with the federal government to expand tourism in this province (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:48). This agreement, the Canada-Newfoundland Tourism Subsidiary Agreement, was signed on 22 February 1978. One of its main objectives was to “promote the expansion of, and to assist in the development of the private tourism industry” (Canada-Newfoundland, 1978:2).

The 1978 provincial Budget also made clear that emphasis was being placed on the tourist industry. It stated that “Over $13,000,000 will be spent over the next five years to improve tourist attractions and to improve accommodations” (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978a:11). Accompanying the Budget that year was a
Blueprint for Development, which singled out tourism as an important area for economic growth and expansion in the coming years (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978a:1-2;11:15). Government continued to nurture the tourist industry into the 1980's. The 1980 provincial budget was accompanied by Managing All Our Resources, a development plan for the period 1980-85, in which tourism was given a prominent place (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:47).

By the mid to late 1970's, the provincial government had taken a renewed interest in using wildlife and wildlands to attract tourists. In 1973 the Wildlife Division became part of the new provincial department of tourism, suggesting the status wildlife was given by government at this time. Another example of the attempt to link wildlife and tourism was the wildlife division's plan to implement a "caribou sports hunt in the northern management zone of Labrador" (Ames,1977:iv). In response to this proposal the Labrador Inuit Association¹⁶ commissioned a report, which voiced their concerns that the provincial game laws seem "to be geared for southern sport hunters"(Ames 1977:1):

...it [provincial government] regards hunting as a tourist attraction; caribou hunting for sportmen and sport salmon fishing are viewed as lucrative means of gaining tourist dollars (ibid., 8).¹⁷

The Tourism Subsidiary Agreement contains evidence of increasing government interest in outdoor tourism. Point (c) of that Agreement explicitly recognized that natural resources were important tourist resources. The "development of natural and scenic attractions" was identified as one of the programs that Newfoundland's government would carry out (Canada-Newfoundland, 1978).

The 1978 Blueprint for Development also emphasized the outdoors and natural resources as important parts of the tourist sector. This document acknowledged the importance of tourism, and emphasized cultivating the rural economy by development of the "primary resources of the forests, fields and seas" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978b:11). "Potential exists for continued growth in the tourist industry based upon historic sites and the natural scenic beauty of the province" (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1978b:15; my emphasis). Newfoundland's "great outdoors" was again being looked to as a source of revenue.

Late 1978 and early 1979 saw government attempting to increase standards in the outdoor tourist industry. A newspaper article announced that an "Inspector will be appointed for hunting and fishing camps" (The Evening Telegram, 13 November 1978). It was reported that this move was to coincide with a crackdown on camp operators who "ripped off tourists." Evidently, the provincial government (or at least the Department of Tourism) was increasing its regulation of the outdoor tourist industry. The "increased emphasis on the inspection" of tourist facilities was mentioned in Managing All Our Resources (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:48) and, a government report on hunting and fishing camps in Newfoundland and Labrador states that around the early 1980s, demands were made of outfitters to improve their facilities (Earles, et al., 1987:12). Clearly, government was
shaping the outfitting industry and was attempting to increase and regulate the quality of tourist facilities. 18

Another example of the growth of outdoor tourism occurred in May, 1980 when “The Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Act” was passed in the provincial legislature. The act gave government the power to set aside important natural areas throughout the province “for the benefit, education and enjoyment of our people today and tomorrow” (The Evening Telegram, 2 May 1981). Wilderness Reserves were to be “areas that show little permanent evidence of man’s presence;” they were to be maintained in their natural state, free from industrial developments (Newfoundland and Labrador Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council, 1983:iV). People were to be allowed access to Wilderness Reserves to camp, hunt, fish, pick berries and use them for “adventure and recreation.” Wildlife, like caribou, which need large wild living spaces would be protected, as would important rivers and other special landscapes. Ecological Reserves, which would generally be smaller than Wilderness Reserves and serve a more specific purpose, like protecting a seabird colony or rare plant or animal, were to be more numerous than Wilderness Reserves (Newfoundland and Labrador Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council, 1983:iV). While it may seem that government was concerned chiefly with wildlife/wildland conservation and preservation, government was also interested in potential economic returns from outdoor tourism:

Reserves also provide important economic returns. They will attract increasing numbers of tourists from all over the world as wilderness and natural areas grow scarce elsewhere. In this way our reserves can provide the foundation for outfitting and guiding enterprises (Nfld. and Lab. Wilderness and Ecological Reserves Advisory Council, 1983:vii).

Government’s continued efforts to expand the outdoor tourist industry were accompanied by the persistent lobbying of pro-tourism claims-makers. Government had demanded that outfitters improve their facilities around early 1980, and in response to this demand, the province’s outfitters “asked for and received a five year guarantee on licence allocations beginning in 1982” (Earles, et al., 1987:12). It is significant to note that this guarantee on licence allocations began the same year that “war” was declared on poaching. The province’s outfitters made at least two more representations to government concerning licence allocations which resulted in an increase in non-resident caribou licences and the opening up of a new area, Middle Ridge, to non-resident hunters (Earles, et al., 1987:13).
Table 2
Moose and Caribou Licence Sales
1975 - 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moose Resident</th>
<th>Moose Non-Resident</th>
<th>Caribou Resident</th>
<th>Caribou Non-Resident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>10,535</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9,863</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>11,210</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>12,815</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>11,974</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>2,023</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>11,420</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>10,206</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9,298</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>9,166</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>10,490</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1,147</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>10,940</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wildlife Division (4 February 1993)

From Table 2 it seems that in the 1980s non-resident quotas generally increased. However, some of the figures in Table 2 are contradicted by numbers gathered from other sources. For example, a government paper on the outfitting industry states that 815 moose licences were allocated for non-residents in 1981 (Earles, et al., 1987:12). Despite such contradictions there is a clear trend of increasing licence allocations to non-residents in the early 1980s. It is significant to note that from 1979 - 1983 resident caribou licences decreased by almost 1000, while non-resident licences grew by almost one hundred. Similarly, from 1979 - 1982 resident moose quotas went down by almost 2,700 licences, while non-resident moose licences increased by almost 100.

From the discussion of big game herds above, we know that biologists believed that caribou herds were doing well by 1980, and that moose stocks had experienced a slight decline in the late 1970s. The reduction in resident moose licences can perhaps be explained in light of the supposed dip in herd growth. However, it is important to question why non-resident licences increased at the same time. It is even more important to examine the question in relation to caribou. In light of the figures in Table 2, and recalling that the island’s caribou populations were thought to exceed 30,000 animals in the early 1980’s, and were generally believed to be stable and increasing (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1983a:140; Mercer, et al., 1985:16-20), we must ask why resident caribou quotas were reduced by 1,017 licences between 1979-1982, and non-resident quotas were increased in that same period by 115. If conservation and concern with the herds was the reason for the
cuts to resident quotas, shouldn't the same logic have applied to non-resident quotas?

Significantly, the caribou is an important species for the outdoor tourism industry. When moose were introduced to the island in 1878 and 1904 (Pimlott, 1953:563) they subsequently replaced caribou as the most important meat source for residents. However, the caribou, particularly the large, heavy-antlered stags remained important trophies. A 1958 caribou study by the Department of Mines and Resources stated that:

The caribou's worth now lies in its importance as a much sought trophy by native and foreign sportsmen, and for its aesthetic importance (Peters and King, 1959:4).

Similarly, a 1987 government policy paper on the outfitting industry discussed the importance of caribou to sportsmen

who are challenging world records or working on completing the North American Grand Slam (the woodland caribou and the Labrador caribou are 2 of 27 required animals). (Earles et. al., 1987:49).

To a province promoting itself as a "sportsman's paradise," the caribou was an important species. It is not surprising that so much emphasis was placed on these animals in the early 1980's by claims-makers, or that one goal of the development plan, Managing All Our Resources, was to increase caribou herds to 35-40,000 animals by 1985 (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980:158). Given the government's interest in outdoor tourism, and given the animal's trophy value, it is logical that the caribou was considered an important natural resource in the early 1980s.

Increasing licence allocations to non-residents at a time when resident licences were being reduced was potentially explosive politically. The reduction in resident quotas corresponds with the stated motives of the "war," and may have been generated by concern with wildlife populations. However, if wildlife conservation necessitated reductions in residents' quotas, shouldn't this have applied across the board and included non-residents? We need to recall that wildlife biologists were uncertain as to how much poaching was occurring, and of its effects on herd growth (Newfoundland and Labrador, 1985a:3). We know that the outfitters had been guaranteed more licences beginning in 1982 (Earles, et al., 1987:12).

This might suggest that the provincial government was facing a dilemma in 1982. Government wanted to enlarge the non-resident big game hunt and outfitters had received a five year guarantee on licence allocations beginning in 1982 (Earles et al, 1987:12). At the same time, resident demand for big game licences was increasing (Brief Dealing with the Concerns of Wildlife Officers: Presented by NAPE, 1990:30; Earles, et al., 1987:12). The government recognized the tension between resident/non-resident demands in a 1987 document on outfitting:

The challenge to Government is to find a balance between protecting the economic viability of the outfitting industry and meeting the resident demand for wildlife resources (Earles, et al., 1987:1).
As mentioned, government wanted to expand outdoor tourism, particularly non-resident big game hunting. That is, government (or at least the Department of Tourism) needed more big game licences for outfitters to sell to non-resident hunters. Of course, only a fixed number of animals could be allocated for culling without jeopardizing the future viability of the herds. Due to budget reductions and the imprecise nature of wildlife science, the exact size of big game herds was not known. That is, big game managers were unsure exactly how many animals there were, and how many were being lost to poachers. Thus, government faced a dilemma: how could non-resident licence allocations be increased without jeopardizing stocks? Where were the animals needed to immediately expand the non-resident hunt to be found, given that resident demand for big game licences was increasing? One way was to implement programs like hunter education, which involved shaping hunter’s attitudes so that they behaved ethically and policed themselves. However, this was a long term solution and would not have produced the necessary animals quickly enough. The figures in Table 2 suggest that in order to promptly increase non-resident licence allocations (or at least maintain them at existing levels) government may have reduced resident allocations and shifted some of these licences to non-resident hunters. However, reducing quotas to residents was politically dangerous and produced complaints as seen in letters to the editor, and so, government did not publicly state it was reducing resident quotas and increasing non-resident quotas; it blamed the reduction in resident allocations on illegal hunting and declared “war” on poachers.

It is important to consider that poaching was what Nelson (1984) calls a valence issue. Such an issue “elicits a single, strong, fairly uniform emotional response and does not have an adversarial quality” (Nelson, 1984:27). Those who argued that poaching was a serious problem did not face controversy or competing viewpoints because of the nature of the issue. Poaching was a “motherhood issue;” it was unlikely to generate formal opposition. In addition, powerful primary definers framed the issue in such a way that poaching was identified as the problem affecting big game herds and deserving attention. For example, poaching was claimed to be a problem by a variety of powerful claims-makers including Cabinet Ministers, Wildlife Biologists, and the Hunter Education Officer. [See Hall, et al. (1978); Spector and Kitsuse, 1973 and 1977; Lippert, 1990 for discussions of the politics of issue definition].

This is not to suggest that this “war” on poaching was a conspiracy designed to cover up some bureaucratic sleight of hand. I share the view put forth by Elliot Leyton’s (1992) examination of agencies contributing to fear of violence in Newfoundland. Leyton (1992:119) says the interest groups were “progressive in ideology and altruistic in intent with no conscious plan to promulgate fear.” Likewise, I think that the staff of the Wildlife Division, government members and interest groups involved in the “war” on poaching were well-intentioned and were not plotting to mislead Newfoundlanders. The “war” on poaching did not happen
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smoothly and fluidly. Research revealed that there was tension and conflict within the structure of government concerning the outdoor tourism industry.\textsuperscript{21}

For example, some of goals of the Wildlife Division may have conflicted with the goals of the tourist development people. The Wildlife Division operated under the so-called “Walters’ Wildlife Policy,” named for former head of the Division, Captain Harry Walters. Two main points of this policy were to regulate wildlife surpluses for “the use of the people” and “to provide wildlife...for the recreational needs of the people” (Mercer, \textit{et al.}, 1988:5). The phrase “the people” seems to imply that residents of the province are the first priority for wildlife managers. My research found that there were apparently differences of opinion between wildlife managers and tourist development managers over how to use wildlife stocks.

For example, a former high ranking civil servant who worked in hunting and fishing development told me that non-resident hunting was last on the Wildlife Division’s priority list. He also said that the Department of Development’s attempt to secure more non-resident big game licences was “a real, ah, real touchy thing with the Wildlife Division” (personal communication 13 June 1990). This former civil servant’s comments suggest that the Wildlife Division was recalcitrant in allocating more non-resident big game licences. Support for this assertion can be inferred from the above mentioned “Walters’ Wildlife Policy” under which the Wildlife Division operates.

The turbulence of the relationship between Wildlife and Development was made clear to me by a member of the executive of the Labrador Outfitter’s Association who stated that there is “not much spirit of cooperation between them” (different government departments). This person described the relationship between the different departments as a “catch twenty-two” situation (personal communication, 15 August 1990). Similarly, in a document presented to the provincial government in 1987, the Labrador Outfitter’s Association discussed the opposition they faced from within government and stated that they believed the same was true for the Newfoundland Outfitter’s Association. For example, the Labrador Outfitters claimed “it does appear that there are bureaucrats within the governmental structure who are unwilling to open additional licences” (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:23).\textsuperscript{22}

I suggest that the “war” on poaching had two main effects. First, it may have reduced the number of animals “lost” to poachers. While government and wildlife managers were unsure exactly how many animals were taken by poachers, every extra animal meant another potential licence sale. A second effect of the “war” was that it provided government with a scapegoat for its reduction of resident quotas. Government decreased the number of resident big game licences, publicly stating that this was done to help stocks recover from rampant poaching by residents. There was no mention of the increases in non-resident big game quotas, or for that matter, of poaching by non-residents. We might say that the “war” was perhaps an attempt to quiet unhappy resident hunters. As mentioned, the number of resident hunters
was steadily increasing in the early 1980s. That is, there was increasing resident demand for big game licences, at a time when the non-resident hunt was being expanded. A "war" on poaching helped direct attention away from the politically explosive situation of reducing resident quotas and increasing non-resident quotas.

Memorial University's Institute of Social and Economic Research provided financial support for the research upon which an earlier version of this paper was based (see McGrath, 1992). Dr. Peter R. Sinclair and Dr. James Overton provided helpful comments on various drafts of this paper and I gratefully acknowledge their assistance.

Notes

1Newspapers on microfilm were examined, and newspaper offices were visited, and any available files searched. This media coverage was used to frame the study and pinpoint the most visible actors and agencies involved in the "war." Since relying on media reports to gather preliminary data may have been somewhat problematic, steps were taken to offset possible methodological problems. Significantly, The Evening Telegram, which has an extensive library of clippings, did not begin a file on poaching until 1982, the year the "war" was declared.

2Babbie (1986:559;246;263) writes that the snowball sample is a non-probability sampling technique often employed in field research. Each person interviewed is asked to recommend additional people for interviewing, and each of the subsequently interviewed participants is asked for further recommendations. In this way the sample "snowballs."

3Babbie (1986:247) defines an unstructured interview as essentially a conversation in which the interviewer establishes a general line of questioning and pursues specific topics raised by the subject. The researcher typically has a general plan of enquiry, but no specific set of questions that must be asked in a certain order. Ideally, the subject does most of the talking and the researcher probes into what was said. Some of the interviews were highly formal, and occurred in the Confederation Building offices of an Assistant Deputy Minister, or the former Minister responsible for Wildlife. Others were more informal, such as an interview with a Wildlife Officer in his pick-up truck.

4From the late 1970s and into the early 1980s there was a growing body of interest groups which focused on wildlife issues. For example, the Salmon Preservation Association for the waters of Newfoundland (SPAWN) was established in Corner Brook in 1979. This group publishes an annual magazine, The Spawner, and has called for the recreation of a Ranger Force to better protect game and fish stocks. Thus, by the early 1980s a variety of individuals and groups were making claims concerning the province's big game herds. For example, the province's Chief Wildlife Biologist made such claims in an interview in Atlantic Insight (Zierler, 1980-1981); while the provincial Minister of Wildlife claimed that public concern was the best protection for the island's caribou herds (The Evening Telegram, 22 January 1981); and the Corner Brook-based Tuckamore Club expressed concern over west coast caribou (The Evening Telegram, 19 November 1980).
There are three main sections to the provincial Wildlife Division: Research and Management are mainly biologists responsible for estimating herd size and setting quotas, Protection and Enforcement are the field officers who enforce the Wildlife Act, and finally the Education Section handles wildlife/conservation education. Significantly, the Education Branch was established in 1980 and undoubtedly it played a role in the "war" on poaching. For example, the Chief of Wildlife Education was an "official source" on poaching, and this person was active in the "war," for example, in writing newspaper articles. However, this is not to imply that the Education Section acted selfishly and only out of institutional self-interest. I maintain that the emphasis placed on outdoor tourism was the key factor in precipitating the "war."

Media coverage of the issue contracted in 1985 and 1986 and then expanded vigorously in 1987. The issue continued to expand into the early 1990s (see McGrath, 1993).

Legal definitions of what constitutes poaching have changed considerably over this 150 year span. There has also been variation in the extent to which, and the enthusiasm with which the game laws have been enforced. Some evidence suggests that game laws have been enforced only minimally. However, there have been periods in which considerable effort has been made to enforce existing laws and change legislation. Usually these efforts have been accompanied by attempts to create public awareness of the importance of game.

I discuss the history of wildlife conservation in Newfoundland in detail in "Salted Caribou and Sportsmen Tourists: Conflicts over Wildlife Resources in Newfoundland at the turn of the Twentieth Century." Newfoundland Studies 10, 2 (Fall 1994), 208-225.

This statement concerning big game management is significant when we consider the very precise claims made in 1982 concerning poaching. At that time, specific arguments were presented which suggested that biologists had some idea of how much poaching was occurring and its effects on stocks. However, by the mid-1980s, wildlife biologists were admitting they were unable to gauge how many animals were lost to poachers. Perhaps wildlife biologists never possessed the means to accurately assess the extent and effect of poaching, yet went along with government's anti-poaching campaign in the early 1980s because they thought it would lead to a strengthening of the Wildlife Division. That is, Wildlife staff may have believed the rhetoric in the early stages of the "war" that more men, money and equipment would be pumped into wildlife management. However, by the mid-1980s it was apparent that this would not happen. Funding was decreasing and they were asked to do more with less. All the "war" on poaching meant for biologists was more work with fewer resources.

Both St. John's newspapers publishing in the mid-1980's, also made claims concerning the tight budgets the Wildlife Division was working under. For example, a Telegram editorial stated that the number of WPO's in Labrador was inadequate to catch many poachers (The Evening Telegram, 22 April 1987). Similarly, The Telegram's outdoors columnist argued that there were too few Wildlife Officers and that the government had promised to use a $5.00 fee to hire extra staff (The Evening Telegram, 14 March 1987). Similarly, the outdoor columnist with The Sunday Express bluntly stated: "Newfoundland cannot afford the level of protection it needs" (The Sunday Express, 22 March 1987).

The Protection officers interviewed generally expressed their dissatisfaction with the effects of budget cuts on the operation of the Division. Protection officers complained about things like the poor condition of their radios, or pick-up trucks, or the fact they had to deal with non-enforcement issues like road kills.
See the 1990 Brief Dealing with the Concerns of Wildlife Protection Officers in Newfoundland and Labrador: Presented by the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees.

Good discussions of the problems associated with counting big game can be found in Minty and Forsey (1982), Bergerud and Manuel (1969), and Bergerud, et al.'s (1983) work.

When interviewed, the Chief Biologist gave me a variant of this formula: Quota = Population x Recruitment* - Mortality**

* indicates the percent of yearlings
** includes kill by hunters, natural loss, crippling loss (shot but not retrieved by hunters) and kill by poachers.


The Native people of Labrador were highly visible in the late 1970’s in discussions surrounding big game management. Media coverage from that period makes this clear. For example, at least 15 articles or reports dealing with Native people and big game use appeared in The Evening Telegram, in 1977 and 1978. One of the focal points of this conflict was the Mealy Mountain caribou herd, which ranges south of Goose Bay. In the late 1970s this herd gained prominence when several Native people were charged with poaching. The Minister of Tourism at that time received much media coverage for his handling of the situation (see for example: The Evening Telegram, 25 and 27 August; 15, 20 and 26 October 1977; 1 July and 14 September 1978).

An important part of the context of using wildlife resources as tourist resources is opposition from local hunters. Historically, tension existed between those who would use big game resources for tourism and local hunters who viewed the same animals as food resources. As Ames’ (1977) report exemplifies, opposition to tourist/sport hunting was still very much alive in the late 1970’s. This opposition continued to be a factor throughout the 1980’s and into the 1990’s.

Outfitting is basically the hunting and fishing camp business. However, outfitters can also supply non-consumptive packages like snowmobiling in the winter, or back-country hiking. Since tourism is a highly competitive industry, quality of product is very important. And since government was placing so much emphasis on tourism, it is understandable that regulation of facilities was increasing.

The Discussion Paper on Commercial Hunting and Fishing Camps in the Province of Newfoundland (Earles, et al., 1987) was prepared by government departments dealing with the outfitting industry (Forest Resources and Lands; Culture, Recreation and Youth, and Tourism). It discussed many options to increase the efficiency and benefits of the industry. The document was tabled in the House of Assembly by Len Simms, who as Minister of Wildlife had declared “war” on poaching in 1982. Simms, by 1987, was Minister of Forest Resources and Lands, the department which initiated this document (Labrador Outfitters, 1987:14). It may not be mere coincidence that the same man who had declared “war” on poaching was Minister of the department responsible for the preparation and tabling of this policy paper on the outfitting industry. The document was significant since it demonstrated
government was highly interested in wildlife resources for tourism and it generated considerable controversy around the issue of resident/non-resident use of wildlife resources.

One such letter, a copy of which had been addressed to the Minister responsible for wildlife, claimed the proposed Bay Du Nord Wilderness Area would infringe on people's use of the area, and that "a few high profile personalities" would be given "carte blanche" use of the area (The Evening Telegram, 28 September 1983). Other letters to the editor called for the curtailment of non-resident sport hunting so that the licences could be distributed to residents (The Evening Telegram, 8 October 1982); or that the licence reductions implemented as part of the "war" on poaching were unjust and punished innocent hunters (The Evening Telegram, 5 March 1984). Another letter claimed moose quotas were too high and were an example of "wildlife mismanagement" (The Evening Telegram, 26 March 1984). Significantly, one newspaper editorial also opposed government's expansion of sport hunting. It argued that non-resident hunting should be cancelled "so that whatever licences are taken up with this can be allocated instead to people who need meat on the table" (The Daily News, 18 September 1982). It claimed that the licensing quota system did not consider the food gathering activities of outport families.

Research revealed there was even tension/rifts within the Wildlife Division. For example, the Protection Branch has very different objectives (law enforcement) and its members have very different training from the university educated biologists of the Management Section, who occupy the top positions in the Division. For example, the President of the WPO's Association publicly complained:

The Wildlife Division is run mostly by biologists who have no knowledge of what's involved in law enforcement ... and this is just one of the reasons our concerns have not been addressed (The Evening Telegram, 23 August 1990).

A Protection Officer interviewed made a similar point:

There are two branches in the Division; Research and Management, and Protection and Enforcement. Protection and Enforcement have to take the crap out in the field and they're involved in stuff other people could take care of like road kills or nuisance animals (personal communication 19 July 1990).

Clearly, by 1990, WPO's were dissatisfied with the running of the Division.

In fact, Protection Officers' displeasure received intense media coverage from 1987-1991 (example: The Evening Telegram, 5 November 1988; 27 July 1990; 4 February 1991; 17 December 1988; The Newfoundland Herald, 22 September 1990; The Sunday Express, 13 November 1988). WPO's argued that they needed sidearms to protect themselves, and they also asked to be transferred to the Justice Department since they enforce laws. By asking to be moved to the Justice Department because law enforcement was not understood by the biologists in charge of the Wildlife Division, WPO's were making clear their perception that they lacked respect and were misunderstood within the Division.

I have this document in my possession, however, I've avoided quoting at length from it to respect the wishes of the person who gave it to me.
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