The precept that war is an instrument of policy has been a basic premise of military writers since Karl von Clausewitz produced his famous treatise *On War* almost two hundred years ago. More recently the notion that armed forces reflect the societies that create them has become a second cardinal principle of military studies. Despite the universally acknowledged veracity of the two assumptions, however, military historians far too often focus on war as a purely military phenomenon. They allow policy discussions to intrude into their campaign narratives almost as reluctantly as soldiers admit policy makers onto the battlefield. Historians are more comfortable discussing strategy, tactics, and logistics than they are considering the effect of social attitudes and cultural values on the actual conduct of operations.

Whatever the value of the narrow approach to the history of conventional wars, it contributes little to the study of low-intensity conflict (LIC), which often touches the very core of a nation's attitude toward the use of force and its ability to solve political problems. The "new face of battle" requires a new approach to conflict studies, an approach based more on social and intellectual than on traditional military history. Only close examination of the social structure and cultural values of a nation will reveal its ability to respond to internal unrest. If the LIC experience of any nation is to provide enduring "lessons," then the historian must sort out what part of that nation's success (or failure) was due to a specific historical context never to be repeated, what resulted from the nation's social and cultural characteristics that are hard to duplicate, and what derived from methods and principles transferable to other times and places.

For the United Kingdom in the twentieth century low-intensity conflict has generally meant counterinsurgency. Significantly, the British distinguished between "small wars," limited conventional conflicts that could be fought with the standing army, and "great wars," which would require conscription. Internal conflict, first labelled "imperial policing," then "counterinsurgency," and finally "counter-revolutionary warfare" was not even classified with conventional war, limited or otherwise. Understanding insurgency as qualitatively rather than quantitatively different from other forms of conflict helped Britain develop effective means for combatting it. These methods and the principles upon which they were based evolved during the inter-war period and reached their fullest development during the Malayan Emergency. While some of the lessons of the inter-war conflicts made their way into official publications, the formulation and teaching of doctrine did not begin in earnest until after the last of the great post-war campaigns had ended. Carefully studied and correctly understood, however, these lessons are as valuable today as they were thirty years ago.
The British began with the vital assumption that insurgency was not primarily a military problem. Unrest must be dealt with through a combination of reform (winning "hearts and minds") and police measures. If necessary soldiers would be brought in to bolster the police, but the soldiers would always be acting "in aid to the civil power" and would be bound, like the police themselves, to use only that degree of force "which is essential to restore order, and must never exceed it." The need to use force in a highly selective manner required accurate information on the enemy, which could only be acquired from the police. The police in turn had to pass this intelligence promptly to the military, who conducted operations. Close cooperation between colonial administrators who implemented reform, police who maintained order, and soldiers who fought the insurgents was essential. This cooperation began informally and evolved into the elaborate committee system of the Malayan Emergency. To further facilitate cooperation the British adopted a system of area deployment in which military units were assigned a specific location where they remained for a long period, getting to know the locals and forming good relations with the police. Such deployment required a certain decentralization of command and control, which was further encouraged by the tendency of the insurgents to operate in small, highly mobile bands.

While certainly not flawless, the British approach to counterinsurgency has been more successful than that of any other nation. Following the disastrous Anglo-Irish War (1919-21), the British suppressed the Moplah Rebellion in India (1921), the Saya San Rebellion in Burma (1930-2), and the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-9). In the aftermath of World War II they defeated the Communist insurrection in Malaya and the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya. In Cyprus the security forces performed less well, although they did thwart the goal of Enosis (union with Greece) and preserved British bases on the island. During the immediate post-war period only the Zionist insurgency in Palestine was a complete defeat, and it may be argued that this campaign had to be conducted under highly unusual circumstances. Victory, however, usually meant handing over power to the most pro-British elements in a territory rather than maintaining colonial control. Counterinsurgency seems invariably to require some adjustment of political goals; compared with conventional conflicts, winning these low-intensity conflicts is as undramatic as fighting them.

Even in the post-imperial period Britain has continued to enjoy considerable success in combating insurgents. From 1963-66 Commonwealth forces resisted a mixture of conventional war and insurgency in what came to be called the Indonesian Confrontation. British advisors trained and led the Sultan of Oman's forces in a highly successful campaign against Dhofari insurgents from 1970-5. Since 1969, British regulars acting in support of the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Ulster Constabulary have maintained order in Northern Ireland while combatting the Provisional Irish Republican Army. While this desultory conflict can hardly be called a victory, the security forces have proven capable of reducing the violence to levels that London considers acceptable and can continue to do so as long as Westminster maintains the will to keep the province within the United
Only the evacuation of Aden in 1967 represents a clear defeat for Britain in the post-colonial era, and in this campaign the security forces were hampered by the lack of a clear, consistent policy from Whitehall.

Even with the defeats in Ireland and Palestine, the withdrawal from Aden, and the errors made in even the most successful campaigns, the British record remains impressive. Why then has it been so hard to imitate? The failure to learn and apply the lessons of British counterinsurgency stems from a combination of historical amnesia and insufficient attention paid to the context in which British campaigns were fought. The conclusion that insurgency was a Communist phenomenon caused western analysts to overlook the prewar development of British methods. Observers who hailed the Malayan Emergency as the great anti-communist crusade failed to realize that for the British the campaign did not differ significantly from those in Palestine, India, or Ireland, ideology notwithstanding. The victory in Malaya represented the culmination of a half century of experience, not a formula derived from a single experiment.

Observers have also overlooked the highly favorable circumstances under which the British conducted their campaigns. As an imperial power Britain exercised extensive control over the territories in which the insurgencies took place. Control of the legal machinery of the colony enabled them to promulgate emergency legislation giving the security forces extraordinary powers of search and seizure, suspending habeas corpus, and providing stiff penalties, including death for possession of weapons. The cardinal principle of counterinsurgency, articulated by Sir Robert Thompson, that "the government must function in accordance with law" is much easier to follow when the government can adapt that law to meet the needs of an emergency. Colonial control also facilitated civil-military cooperation and intelligence gathering. The soldier called upon to aid the civil power could often rely on a district magistrate and police commissioner who had been stationed in an area for many years, spoke the native languages fluently, and had in some cases collected detailed information on the dissidents in their district. This well-established British presence in a colony made the long-haul, low cost approach to counterinsurgency practical.

The importance of colonial control to British counterinsurgency is best illustrated by the one campaign in which that control was most notably lacking: the Zionist insurgency in Palestine from 1945-8. Although Palestine came under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office, it was technically a Mandate of the League of Nations. Article 4 of the Mandate called for the creation of a Jewish Agency in Palestine. As an arm of the World Zionist Organization, the Agency was supposed to look after the needs of Jewish immigrants, but during the insurgency it also became a shadow government. The existence of tacitly sanctioned paramilitary forces, especially the Haganah and the Palmach, which had been trained and in some cases armed by the British during the Second World War also helped the insurgents enormously. During the imperial era the British also benefitted from the low-profile of most of their campaigns. Few people within the United Kingdom or the international community paid much attention to the obscure conflicts on the
Northwest Frontier or in the jungles of Burma. Britain thus had the luxury of working out acceptable methods by trial and error in very controlled circumstances free from intense scrutiny. Most of the post-war campaigns were also fought before the era of extensive television coverage, and British soldiers had long before learned how to manage newspaper correspondents. The ability to keep the massacre at Batang Kali, Malaya in 1948 under wraps until 1970 attests to Britain’s ability to deny information to the press. Western opinion, which in the post-war era increasingly meant American opinion, was generally favorable to the anti-communist crusade in Malaya. Significantly, in two of Britain’s defeats, Ireland and Palestine, the insurgents had a sizable body of sympathizers in the United States. In a third, the Aden campaign, considerable television and newspaper coverage created adverse publicity that contributed to the British defeat.

Success during the post-imperial period has, of course, owed something to the colonial legacy; the British chose or were forced to fight only in areas where they had enjoyed a long-term presence. The Indonesian Confrontation was conducted from within a former colony that had only recently achieved independence and which still employed former British colonial civil servants. The Sultan of Oman was a Sandhurst graduate, his army British-trained and -led. Northern Ireland is, of course, part of the United Kingdom. The British have thus avoided the problems of liaison with a truly foreign government that plagued the Americans in Vietnam.

While past experience and colonial control contributed considerably to British success in counterinsurgency, they could not alone produce victory, as the French defeats in Indochina and Algeria demonstrate. The success of British methods also owed a great deal to the society that had created an army ideally suited to counterinsurgency and to cultural attitudes about how that army might be used. Foremost among these attitudes was a legal principle governing the use of force in internal security operations. The common law principle of “minimum force” initially applied to all situations up to and including riot, but did not apply to insurrection. However, in the aftermath of the massacre at Amritsar, India in 1919, the principle was expanded to cover most forms of internal unrest, except those aspects of anti-guerrilla operations that resembled conventional combat. Restraint, the highly selective use of force, is absolutely vital to the success of counterinsurgency operations, which require the security forces to strike at the insurgents without harming the larger population in which they hide. The Hunter Committee, convened to investigate the disturbances in the Punjab, thus realized in 1919 what America was to discover half a century later in Vietnam that, “The employment of excessive measures is as likely as not to produce the opposite result to that desired.”

Ironically, racial attitudes towards colonial peoples sometimes further encouraged restraint. The British tended to view their subjects as children whose civil disobedience reflected an innate human tendency to rebel. Rebellious “natives” thus had to be chastised just as English school boys needed to be caned. William Hay Macnaughten, secretary and civilian representative in Kabul during the ill-fated expedition of 1840-1 put the matter succinctly: “These people are perfect
children and should be treated as such. If we put one naughty boy in the corner, the rest will be terrified." Deplorable as such an attitude was, it did help to mitigate against the use of excessive force. Just as it would be counterproductive to kill one’s children in the process of disciplining them, it would be unwise to slaughter one’s own colonial subjects in the process of suppressing rebellion. In the aftermath of Amritsar and the Anglo-Irish War the British generally exercised restraint during internal security operations. Atrocities did sometimes occur, but there was never a tacitly sanctioned policy of brutality, such as that employed by the French in Algeria, nor the over-reliance on indiscriminate firepower used by the Americans in Vietnam. Only in Kenya were excesses committed on a wide scale, and these were primarily the work of settlers and hastily assembled paramilitary forces.

The nature of the British Army also facilitated counterinsurgency operations. Since insurgents generally adopt guerrilla tactics, success in combating them requires the ability to decentralize command and control and to deploy small units on an area basis. Officers whose conventional war training has taught them to concentrate their forces quite naturally resist such dispersion of their troops. Fortunately for their counterinsurgency operations, the British had a rather unconventional army. With the navy as its first line of defense, the island nation could have, indeed preferred, an imperial police force instead of a large conventional establishment. While conventional war is the primary task of most armies and internal security an interruption, internal security was the norm for the British army and large-scale conventional war the exception. The regimental system further encouraged decentralization. The Cardwell army reforms of 1870 created the linked battalion system by which, in principle, one of a regiment’s two standing battalions would be stationed at home and the other based abroad, often for years at a time. The British were thus used to deploying smaller units throughout the empire for extended periods, which enabled these units to mesh with the civil administration and police within an area.

In the actual conduct of operations, however, decentralization must proceed beyond battalion level to the company and even the section. While all armies pay lip service to the need to decentralize command and control, few have done so as successfully as the British. The command structure, which has company commanders out-rank the staff officers above them, facilitates control of operations from the ground. The willingness to relinquish control from the top, however, probably owes more to cultural attitudes than to structure. The soldiers who fought the great counterinsurgency campaigns of the post-war era had been born into a world in which social status reinforced rank. The “habit of authority” meant that officers, NCOs, and the rank and file knew that their positions owed as much to the accidents of birth as to their own ability. They could thus be more comfortable interacting with one another within limits; a superior was less threatened by a subordinate with a better idea and more willing to allow him initiative in the conduct of operations. In an egalitarian society such as that found in the United States rank is mistakenly perceived to depend entirely upon ability and hard work. Officers who perceive that they have earned their rank may be less willing to listen to “less successful”
subordinates and to allow them initiative. The social structure of the United Kingdom thus encouraged decentralization to an extraordinary degree. Only in an army such as Britain’s was it possible to find a brigadier who would admit that the only function for a divisional commander in a counterinsurgency campaign was to “go around seeing that the troops have got their beer.”

Britain’s success in counterinsurgency thus owed a considerable amount to the advantages of empire and still more to its society, which produced a military establishment well-suited to internal security operations. It remains to consider what lessons of British counterinsurgency are applicable to other times and places. Past efforts to learn from British experience have suffered from a tendency to focus on methods rather than on the principles which underlay them. The abortive strategic hamlet program in Vietnam was in case in point. The South Vietnamese tried to transplant a technique developed in one context to a very different setting with disastrous results. They copied the method without grasping the underlying principle of hearts-and-minds.

The broad principles of British counterinsurgency remain a firm foundation upon which to build. First, the threatened government must recognize that insurgency is not primarily a military problem. At the root of any rebellion lie legitimate grievances which must be addressed. Second, the campaign must rest firmly on the civil-police apparatus with the military acting in a support role. Counterinsurgency, perhaps more than conventional operations, depends on sound intelligence. The police, who know an area and its population well, gather information and pass it on to the military, who pursue the elusive guerrillas. Close cooperation between the two at all operational levels is essential. For such cooperation to occur, forces need to be deployed on an area basis, and junior commanders must be allowed considerable initiative. Finally, in the actual conduct of operations the security forces must exercise restraint. Excessive force is always counterproductive in the long run. From these broad principles methods applicable to each situation can be derived, but the government must be patient in applying them as counterinsurgency campaigns take years rather than months to produce victory.

The British experience in counterinsurgency has yielded some negative lessons as well. Just as the British applied tried and true methods over and over again, they stuck to some bad habits with remarkable tenacity. Foremost among these errors was an over-reliance on special auxiliary forces, or what might be called the “Black and Tan phenomenon.” During the Anglo-Irish War the British recruited demobilized soldiers into the Royal Irish Constabulary and later created an Auxiliary Division of the force. These recruits were armed with military hardware and lacked traditional police discipline. Given what they believed was a special mandate to clear up the trouble in Ireland, the force committed atrocities that alienated law-abiding citizens and encouraged them to support the gunmen.

Rather than learn from their mistake in Ireland, the British continued to create such irregular forces with the same results. The Palestine Police Mobile Force, the
Kenya Police Reserve and Kikuyu Home Guard, and the B Specials in Northern Ireland repeated the Black and Tan pattern. Although attached to the police, each of these forces carried military weapons and lacked the traditional discipline of either the soldier or the bobby. Even purely military special forces have been open to criticism for their failure to exercise restraint. While the Special Air Service has enjoyed notable successes in counterinsurgency, it has also been embroiled in controversy, particularly in Northern Ireland. J. Bower Bell maintains that, "Shooting unarmed suspects in Gibraltar is resort to state terrorism if a mere police matter but a splendid and effective ambush if considered as purely a military matter." Whether or not this is an accurate assessment, the use of commandos as counter-commandos will always be problematic; training for the first role might actually impede their ability to perform the second.

Closely related to the Black and Tan phenomenon was "the naughty-boy" approach to counterinsurgency. Believing that colonial peoples were too uncivilized to understand western concepts of individual responsibility, the British practised collective punishment in most of their campaigns. They burned the houses of alleged IRA sympathizers in Ireland, flogged Indians in the Punjab, and destroyed crops in Burma. Even in the more publicized campaigns of the post-war period, they clung to this archaic and ineffective method. When the town of Tanjong Malim failed to give information on a nearby ambush, General Templer, the High Commissioner and Director of Operations, imposed a twenty-two hour curfew and halved the rice ration. On another occasion he had an entire village levelled and reassembled elsewhere. Such heavy-handed methods did not help Britain’s cause in the propaganda battle, and Templer himself later admitted that collective punishment had not worked. In spite of this realization the technique continued to be employed. During the Cyprus emergency the Colonial Office began to realize that such methods were counterproductive. Governor John Harding was allowed to levy collective fines, but he was also warned that collective punishment

...is an extralegal method of punishment and therefore perhaps a confession that the police and legal machine are not fully effective. It might punish a few innocent people along with the guilty, and might alienate other sections of Cypriots, in a way that strict enforcement of the law would not.

Only as the post-war campaigns were drawing to a close did the British realize the ineffectiveness of collective punishment. Even so, the counter-productive tactic was applied during the Radfan operations of the Aden conflict.

The repetition of ineffective methods points to a corresponding failure to formulate doctrine and transmit it in an orderly fashion to succeeding generations of soldiers. Ironically, the very decentralization of the regimental system that encouraged tactical flexibility may have impeded learning. In both the army and the colonial service information tended to get bottled up in compartments as officers and administrators serving in one part of the empire did not communicate effectively with those in another. Compounding this problem was a Carlylian view that leaders
are born and not made. Too much emphasis on formal learning might, it was feared, discourage initiative. Military manuals had always provided instruction on specific techniques, such as crowd dispersal and cordon-and-search operations, but it was only during the late 1960s that the British army began to pay serious attention to the formulation of a comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine. In spite of this effort, old lessons had to be relearned the hard way when the regulars moved into Northern Ireland in 1969. An almost continuous string of similar campaigns insured that successful methods would be developed and passed along, not via formal channels, but in the person of junior officers who learned their trade in the inter-war years and became the battalion commanders of the post-war campaigns. While this method worked well-enough, it left too much to chance and cost time, money, and lives during the period of trial and error at the outset of each campaign. Perhaps the most valuable lesson of Britain’s counterinsurgency mistakes is the importance of teaching both history and doctrine.

The success of British counterinsurgency has stemmed from a combination of fortuitous circumstances and historical development that produced a military establishment well-suited to combating internal unrest. Out of this favorable context the British developed methods and, more importantly, principles on which these methods were based. Correctly understood and carefully applied, these principles still provide a firm foundation upon which to build a counterinsurgency campaign.

Endnotes

1. Memo from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 3 July 1923, War Office 32/5295, Public Record Office (PRO). Crown copyright material in the Public Record Office is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.


11. See Townshend, \textit{Britain’s Civil Wars}, pp. 15-23 for an excellent discussion of the evolution of this legal machinery.


14. See David Ben Gurion, “Britain’s Contribution to Arming the Haganah,” in W. Khalidi, ed., \textit{From Haven to Conquest: The Origins and Development of the Palestine Problem, 1897-1948} (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1971), pp. 371-74. David Charters maintains that the British Army was further handicapped by manpower and unit “turbulence” as it down-scaled after World War II. This disrupted continuity and the “learning curve,” limiting the army’s ability to adapt to the insurgency. \textit{The British Army and the Jewish Insurgency}, pp. 145-49.


17. This extension of the principle of minimum force may be seen in comparing \textit{Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934. Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, 1949.}, and \textit{Staff College Counter-revolutionary Warfare Handbook} (Camberley, 1986). See Mockaitis, \textit{British Counterinsurgency}, pp. 23-26, and Townshend, \textit{Britain’s Civil Wars}, pp. 15-23, which traces the evolution of the principle and the problems with it as a practical guide to action.


24. I am grateful to Nigel de Lee of the War Studies Department at Sandhurst for helping me understand the key differences between the two societies and their armies. See Mockaitis, \textit{British Counterinsurgency}, pp. 173-6.


29. Punishment of the town of Tanjong Malim, 25 March 1952, Colonial Office (CO) 1022/54, PRO.
30. Note for the Secretary of State, 21 Nov. 1955, CO 926/561, PRO.