Democracies, Dictatorships and Counterinsurgency:  
Does Regime Type Really Matter? 

by  
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"Khruschev was right in 1960. He said that democracies were soft and could not fight against wars of national liberation."  
Thomas Schelling, 1981

INTRODUCTION

Thomas Schelling's pessimistic appraisal is shared by many analysts of small wars and counterinsurgency. Richard Gabriel, comparing America's experience in Vietnam with Israel's in Lebanon, suggests that both are "classic examples . . . of a democratic society's inability to sustain a military effort for political goals in the absence of a strong argument rooted in national security concern." As Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, Caspar Weinberger responded to such concerns by developing a "doctrine" that practically ruled out American participation in future counterinsurgency wars.

If democracies cannot fight counterinsurgent wars effectively, it is best that they know it so that involvement in such wars can be avoided. On the other hand, some analysts suggest that a democratic society could actually have unique advantages in such a war. Still other writers contend that democracies and authoritarian regimes have been equally unsuccessful at counterinsurgency. The analysis presented here seeks to test the accuracy of widely held beliefs about the importance of the domestic regime type to the outcome of counterinsurgent wars.

CONFLICTING VIEWS

Scholars of counterinsurgency advance several reasons why democracies might be uniquely vulnerable to defeat in small wars. One of these relates to the costs of war and their effects on policy. Guerrilla forces may win a war in one of two ways; by transforming themselves into conventional forces and defeating the enemy in the field (like Mao Zedong's forces in China in the late 1940s), or by protracting the conflict long enough to exhaust their adversary's political, as opposed to military, capability to fight on. Against a democracy the second approach is held to be especially promising, since the human and economic costs of the war are openly discussed, while in an authoritarian regime people "may not even know what the costs are." Even if casualties and other war costs are known to be heavy the nondemocratic regime may care less, since it would take a coup or revolution to turn the government out.

There is substantial evidence that public opinion in democracies does indeed turn against war, and especially limited wars, as casualties and costs rise. What is less certain is its impact on government policies. The same studies that
show the erosion of popular support for the Vietnam war in the United States show that Presidents Johnson and Nixon were consistently able to rally public opinion to support their actions, whether they involved escalation or withdrawal. Moreover, the influence of public opinion on foreign policy varies from one democracy to another, with the United States being described by one scholar as "pluralist" and France as a presidential "monarchy" where foreign affairs is concerned. Perhaps democracies with more open policy-making are the most disadvantaged.

Democratic governments must also face the challenge of antiwar movements. Such movements may arise during conventional wars (as in the United States during the Civil War and World War I), but are more likely to occur during counterinsurgent wars, because the nation's survival is clearly not at stake. The impact of such movements, which always involve a minority of the population, may be more significant than that of general public opinion. Alistair Horne states flatly that the French war in Algeria was "virtually won on the ground" by 1961 but lost "in France itself, where protest had risen to unacceptable levels." Sam Sarkesian calls antiwar protest over Vietnam "crucial" to the American defeat. On the other hand, one study based on interviews with former Johnson and Nixon administration aides suggests that the antiwar movement imposed some "constraints" on escalation but did not decisively affect policy. It is even possible that an antiwar movement may increase public support for a war by inducing a patriotic backlash.

A third reason suggested for democratic failures in counterinsurgency is an alleged unwillingness of democracies to "play rough." Sarkesian notes that "American military men and women are (and were) expected to perform within the context of democratic rules and norms, with all the moral and ethical implications these suggest. Unfortunately, guerrilla war, insurgency, revolution and counter-revolution hardly adhere to such simplistic, liberal-democratic notions." Applying the same reasoning to Israel's difficulties in Lebanon, Richard Gabriel asserts that "low-intensity guerrilla wars require ... terror, destruction of civilian homes, ruthless interrogations and even executions," which make it impossible for a democratic army to "retain a strong sense of national support." The suggestion here is that "nice guys finish last" in counterinsurgent warfare, and that democracies are inherently prone to being too benevolent. The record tends to support the view that democratic governments choose less harsh counterinsurgency tactics, though there are clear exceptions and lapses. However, a host of authorities contend that such tactics are in fact the kind best calculated to win in counterinsurgency warfare. The literature on counterinsurgency is filled with admonitions that winning the support of the population in a country is much more important than winning battles. Sir Robert Thompson spoke for many guerrilla warfare specialists when he wrote:

There is a very strong temptation in dealing with both terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law
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forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law.\textsuperscript{18}

Indeed, observers as far back as the American Revolution have noted the disastrous effects upon armies when civilians are alienated and driven to side with hostile guerrillas.\textsuperscript{19} Democracies, with military accountability to civilian authority, are usually better able to limit the counterproductive overuse of force in counterinsurgent warfare, and so may have a better chance of success than nondemocratic regimes.

The literature thus presents contradictory positions; democracy is viewed as both an asset and a liability for a state fighting a guerrilla war. A third position is possible, of course; that the domestic regime of a state has no bearing on its success or failure in counterinsurgency. While as recently as 1987 David Isby could write that "[i]t may be that the Soviets are in fact satisfied with the way the war is going in Afghanistan,"\textsuperscript{20} their subsequent withdrawal indicates that authoritarian regimes are far from immune to defeat in guerrilla wars. Perhaps such wars are inherently difficult, and often unwinnable for all modern states.

\section*{AN EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE: TEN COUNTRIES, TWENTY-FIVE WARS}

To test the validity of these assumptions about the centrality of regime type to the outcome of counterinsurgency wars, the present analysis examines the experience of ten nations that have fought counterinsurgent wars since 1945. Since it is impossible to study all cases of counterinsurgent warfare the states that have fought the most and largest wars were selected. Five are democracies: the United States, Great Britain, France, Israel and India. They range from those with a relatively pluralistic approach to foreign policy (United States) to those that concentrate power in the executive (Great Britain and France). The five nondemocracies selected were the Soviet Union, China, Portugal (pre-1974), Cuba and South Africa. The last is a middle case, a "whites only" democracy with serious limits on freedom of speech and reporting during the time of the Namibian war. The democracies fought sixteen counterinsurgent wars since 1945, the dictatorships nine. The analysis excludes all conventional conflicts, as well as shows of force and demonstrations that did not lead to combat, such as the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. Also excluded are conflicts still in progress, such as the "troubles" in Northern Ireland and the Palestinian intifada.

The results presented in Tables 1 and 2 are based upon a reading of the extensive literature available on these conflicts. All have had books, parts of books or articles written about them, though there is wide disparity in the availability of source material. Following a reading of the literature wars were coded as successful, unsuccessful or partially successful, depending on whether the goals sought by the nation involved at the beginning of the conflict were achieved. For example, if the British goal in Malaya or Kenya had been to hold those countries as permanent parts of the British empire, the wars would have to be counted failures. However, the literature clearly indicates that the goal was independence under a regime prepared to maintain economic and other ties with
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Britain and, in the case of Malaya, thwarting a communist takeover; by this
criterion the wars were successful. On the other hand, the case of Cyprus
presents a more difficult problem, since the British failed to suppress the EOKA
guerrillas but did prevent enosis (union with Greece) and maintained military
bases on the island. This war was coded as partially successful. By some
standards the Soviet effort in Afghanistan could be judged a partial success,
since the government there did not fall from power until recently. However, in
view of the heavy costs incurred and the debilitating effect of the war on Soviet
foreign policy generally this war has to count as a failure. The tables also present
such data as is available on the human and economic costs of the wars incurred
by the counterinsurgent power.

EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE?

The outcome of the counterinsurgent wars listed below hardly appear to
show the democracies at any disadvantage. In fact, the percentage of successes
achieved by the democracies (6 of 16, or 37.5%) is slightly higher than that achieved
by the authoritarian regimes (3 of 9, or 33%). Each had one partial success. Victory
in counterinsurgent wars seem to have been elusive for both democracies and
nondemocracies, but no more so for the democracies. A second look, however,
reveals that differences do appear in the behavior of the two types of regimes. For
the democracies, the successful small wars were very small, with exceptionally low
casualties. For the five successes and one partial success for which casualty data are
available, killed in action averaged 639. For the seven failures by democracies,
killed in action averaged 14,508, over twenty-one times as high. Financial costs for
the failed wars also exceeded those of the successes by a substantial margin. Indeed,
the only successful war that cost over $1 billion (US) was the Malayan Emergency
of 1948-60. Malaya, however, was the site of important British economic interests,
Indeed, half of the war costs were paid by the Malayan government) and the British
had the support of the Malay majority against the Chinese communist insurgents.

It might seem self-evident that high-cost wars not involving the nation’s
survival would be prone to failure. This pattern does not hold true, however, for the
authoritarian governments. Their three successful small wars (Baltic States, Ukraine
and Tibet) produced higher numbers killed in action than any of the democracies’
small wars except the two Vietnam wars and Algeria; yet the Soviets and Chinese
persisted to victory. Even in defeat, authoritarian regimes showed uncommon
tolerance for suffering. Portugal’s spending on its African wars reached 6% of GNP
by 1968, twice the percentage being spent by the United States in Vietnam at the
same time. Proportionate to population, Portuguese losses were five times as great.
Yet, only the overthrow of the dictatorship in April 1974 brought an end to the war.
By contrast, democratic Israel, with a third of Portugal’s population and more direct
security interests at stake, experienced massive popular dissent as a result of losing
600 men in Lebanon.

Another difference between the democracies and the dictatorships is that
the authoritarian great powers did better than the small powers (three victories
out of four for the Soviet Union and China, versus only one partial success out
of five for Cuba, Portugal and South Africa). Obviously, the ability of a small
nation to bear costs is more limited, whatever its political system. Democracy may indeed be a disadvantage when the size of the counterinsurgent country is controlled for. However, all the democracies fighting small wars, except Israel, were large states, making any such conclusion doubtful.

The willingness of authoritarian regimes to fight on despite heavy costs itself carries a cost. While persistence may bring success, it may also excited discontent and war weariness sufficient to destabilize the regime. The clearest case of this is Portugal, where disillusioned veterans of the African wars led the 1974 coup. War costs may not have affected the decisions of the leadership, but they clearly undermined loyalty to the regime. While the collapse of the Soviet Union had many causes, especially economic, disgust with the “bleeding wound” of Afghanistan arguably played a major role in advancing the case for reform. The closest a democracy has come to destabilization over a counterinsurgent war is the Algerian case, in which a seizure of power by the military twice appeared imminent. In the end, a new republic rather than a dictatorship was the result. Democracies may be less able to incur costs, but freedom of expression and relative tolerance for antiwar dissent may also prevent them from self-destructing over small wars.

DOES HARSHNESS OR BENEVOLENCE PAY?
SOVIET VERSUS BRITISH TACTICS

The literature confirms the assumption that nondemocratic regimes are free to use much harsher tactics in dealing with insurgency than are democratic regimes. There could even be said to be a Soviet model of counterinsurgency that relies on the depopulation of the hostile countryside rather than on winning the “hearts and minds.” In the Baltic States after World War II the Soviets broke nationalist resistance by deporting 665,000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians — 11% of the population — to Siberia. This effectively deprived the guerrillas of the food and supplies needed to sustain the struggle.

Other authoritarian regimes appear to have followed the Soviet model closely. The Chinese are said to have employed even harsher tactics against the Tibetan rebels, including “the obliteration of entire villages” and “crucifixion, dismemberment, beheading, burying, burning and scalding alive” civilians who supported the guerrillas. The Portuguese reacted to the beginning of insurgency in Angola in 1961 with a repressive campaign that resulted in the massacre of over 50,000 Africans. The record of the democracies in counterinsurgency is certainly morally checkered; however, there is only one case in which a democratic state resorted to similar measures, that being the French in Madagascar in 1947-48.

Do the abhorrent tactics adopted by dictatorships work? Sometimes they do, as in the Baltics; sometimes they do not, as in Afghanistan. However, the experience of Great Britain suggests that the benevolent approach may
indeed work best. The British account for four of the six successes won by democracies and are the only one of the ten countries to have a consistent “winning record” in counterinsurgency.

Drawing on the experience of decades of imperial policing, British counterinsurgency tactics have consistently emphasized the “hearts and minds” approach over military considerations. In Malaya, this required substantial restraint in the use of firepower, as Major General Richard Clutterbuck explained:

Inhabited villages were never shelled, strafed or bombed in Malaya. It can be argued that such attacks are justified if troops entering the village are likely to be fired upon, or even as a punishment for harboring communist guerrillas…. Fortunately, however, such arguments never prevailed in Malaya; if they had, I am quite sure that any villages so attacked would never have cooperated with the government again.”

A similar approach underlay other British successes. In Kenya, land reforms and movement toward independence drew African support away from the “Mau Mau” movement. In Borneo, commandos of the Special Air Service (SAS) won the allegiance of North Borneo tribes with medical care and other benefits, and trained them as scouts for use against Indonesian infiltrators. Consequently, according to one historian, “the enemy was never in a position to swim like a fish in the friendly pool of an indigenous population” and was “soon rounded up by ground forces, aided by the local population.” In Oman, the British had to engineer a change of government to carry out their strategy; they replaced the reactionary sultan with his son, whose economic development efforts brought Oman its first paved roads, hospitals and modern education. As a result, many guerrillas deserted the opposition to join the sultan’s forces. The British record is not spotless, however; there are documented cases of torture and abuse by security forces in Kenya, Palestine and Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, on the whole, they seem to have demonstrated that the benevolent approach to counterinsurgency, which is more attractive to democracies, can also be effective.

This raises the question of why other democracies have not done as well. One answer may be that democratic accountability may sometimes push governments in the opposite direction. For example, in Vietnam the American commanders put great stress on minimizing casualties. While this was a legacy from practices in past conventional wars, it was also a valid consideration in Vietnam, given that a democratic people have a low tolerance for casualties. However, the concern for saving American lives led to excessive use of firepower, which “alienated the population and provided the enemy with an excellent source of propaganda.” The Americans did a great deal to promote economic development and social reform in South Vietnam, often over the objections of South Vietnamese leaders. These efforts did ultimately weaken the Viet Cong, though analysts disagree on how much. Unfortunately, much of the good was cancelled by the inappropriate military strategy. On the other hand, following the British model of exercising greater restraint in using
firepower might have led to higher casualties and even more rapid disillusionment with the war. This is especially likely, since the Americans had to face large enemy regular units not present in any of the British counterinsurgency campaigns.45

Another problem with winning "hearts and minds" is that it may simply be impossible if the population is too strongly predisposed to hostility. This helps to explain the British failure in Palestine and the partial success in Cyprus. The British could hardly hope to win over the Jews of Palestine or the Greek Cypriots, no matter how conciliatory their policies, because both groups were committed to a nationalist ideology that clashed with British goals for their countries.46 (For similar reasons, the Israelis today cannot hope to win support among Palestinians with a negotiated compromise solution, since anything less than total independence is unacceptable to most Palestinians.) To some degree a similar dilemma may have existed for both the French and the Americans in Vietnam, since Vietnamese of varying political persuasions were so hostile to foreign domination. In such cases a harsh approach may be the only alternative to giving up.

CONCLUSIONS

If a state's form of government does not strongly influence success or failure in counterinsurgent war, then what does? No single factor is decisive, but international support for the insurgents seems to be a powerful influence.47 It is doubtful that either the Vietnamese communists or the Afghan resistance could have prevailed against a superpower without the help of the other superpower. It is equally doubtful that the British could have maintained their low-key, benevolent approach to counterinsurgency in Malaya if Malayan communists had been reinforced by a regular army from a "North Malaya."

Having a cause that can rally broad segments of the population is important to both government and insurgents. Insurgencies that spring from a minority group in the population, like the ones in Malaya and Kenya, are far easier to deal with than those which incorporate a nationalist appeal, as in Algeria and Vietnam.48 The counterinsurgent's economic strength can be a crucial factor: general economic problems, rather than the cost of the conflict, led to Britain's withdrawal from Aden after only 57 killed.49 Factors such as terrain and the quality of leadership on both sides can be as important in counterinsurgent war as in other conflicts. Taken together, such factors appear to dwarf regime type in importance.

The major difference in the behavior of democracies and nondemocracies seems to be the ability of the latter to accept heavier costs, at least human costs, in a guerrilla war. The propensity of democracies to liquidate costly commitments need not, however, be seen as a weakness. Instead, it may reflect the strength of a regime that is held to account by its people for mistakes. A great nation is unlikely to be destroyed by defeat in a small war; it may, however, be demoralized by struggling endlessly in a Vietnam or Afghanistan-style quagmire.
**TABLE 1**

DEMOCRACIES IN COUNTERINSURGENT WARS SINCE 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
<th>COSTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>338 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£80 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indochina</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>20,685 KIA*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-54</td>
<td></td>
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<td>$7.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>550 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>1983 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>590 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£55 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>20,386 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954-62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>F55 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>393 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-59</td>
<td></td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>£90 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>58,022 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961-72</td>
<td></td>
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<td>$140 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borneo</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>59 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£256 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aden</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>57 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank-Gaza</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>245 KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>12 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982-85</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>604 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>267 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982-83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>1,200 KIA</td>
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<td>1987-90</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Figures on killed in action are for intervening country nationals only.

### TABLE 2

**AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES IN COUNTERINSURGENT WARS SINCE 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAR</th>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>OUTCOME</th>
<th>COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltic States 1945-52</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>20,000 KIA (low est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine 1945-52</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibet 1956-72</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Success</td>
<td>40,000 KIA (low est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola 1961-75</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique 1964-75</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Combined total 13,000 KIA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6% of GNP (1968)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau 1963-75</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia 1966-89</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola 1976-90</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan 1979-89</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>13,310 KIA</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Endnotes


