

Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism

by
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INTRODUCTION

Since 1975, Armenian terrorists have deliberately murdered some 35 Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families, while killing an equal number of non-Turks simply because they happened to be in their line of fire. In addition, more than 300 others have been wounded.¹

Most Turks, including their government, feel that these Armenian terrorists have been receiving aid and sympathy from various groups and states around the world. Indeed, there is a tendency to blame anyone who might favor a weakened Turkey. In taking this position, the Turks have no doubt been influenced by the memories of how Armenian aspirations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often instigated by European imperialist schemes to weaken and eventually divide the Ottoman Empire.² It must be emphasized, therefore, that the vast majority of today's transnational Armenian groups and organizations have nothing to do with terrorism. Nevertheless, some of them at times, and a few of them often, pursue their work in such a manner as to support terrorism against Turkey implicitly and even overtly. The purpose of this article is to analyze this situation.

THE TRANSNATIONAL SETTING

Deported in the distant past by the Byzantine Empire and Iran, deported more recently by the Turks during World War I, and subject to other, more voluntary migrations, Armenians presently find themselves living in a number of different countries. There are, for example, significant Armenian communities today in such disparate states as: the Soviet Union (4,000,000); the United States (600,000); France (350,000); Iran (200,000+); and Lebanon (200,000). In addition, smaller Armenian communities exist in Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Greece, India, Iraq, Romania, Syria, and the United Kingdom, among others.

Since Armenians tend to be a closely knit group who in their own language distinguish themselves from *odars* (non-Armenians), the Armenian diaspora around the world has provided a unique, transnational system of contacts and support. Thus, while the actual terrorists are few in number, they often are able to draw tacit support from this broader, transnational Armenian community. Recently, for example, an Armenian American newspaper published "An Appeal to all Armenians," which declared: "Since 1975, underground groups have been formed to use effective forceful means to pursue the Armenian cause. Armenians have a moral responsibility to support these activities with all available means."³ The fact that over \$250,000 in small donations was raised in the United States to defend Hampig Sassounian,⁴ who was eventually convicted of murdering the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles in 1982, further illustrates this substantial aid.

Particularly, one should note a number of specific, transnational Armenian organizations. Three traditional Armenian political parties still have numerous branches throughout the world: the Dashnaks (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation); the Hunchaks; and the Ramgavars. Evidence indicates that the Dashnaks, by far the largest of the three with affiliates among youth groups, sport clubs, and political activist groups, sponsored one of the two main contemporary Armenian terrorist groups, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG).⁵

The Armenian church is an even more important transnational Armenian organization. Since 301 A.D., when the Armenians became the first people in the world to adopt Christianity as their official state religion, the church has played probably the key role in the survival of the Armenian identity. Today the Armenian apostolic church is divided into two rival branches: the Mother See in Etchmiadzin, Soviet Armenia, and the Cilician See in Antelias, Lebanon. Each is headed by a Catholicos or Pope who presides over a transnational, ecclesiastical hierarchy. In recent years, the Cilician See has been under the tight control of the Dashnaks. One must assume that the Mother See in Soviet Armenia has close ties with the Soviet government. In addition, one should note the existence of Armenian Patriarchs in Istanbul and Jerusalem, each of which has been in existence for hundreds of years and owes allegiance to the Mother See.

Although much smaller in numbers, there also are Armenian Protestant and Roman Catholic churches. Particularly important are the Mekhitarists, a Roman Catholic Armenian congregation which established the noted island monastery of San Lazzaro in Venice in 1715. On their island sanctuary, the Mekhitarists have long operated a printing press, possessed a fine library and issued a noted scholarly journal. Another Mekhitarist order has operated from Vienna since 1811.

Further, there are a whole array of Armenian charitable and educational organizations. Possibly the most famous is the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) which operates in a number of different countries. Its current President for life is the noted Armenian American philanthropist, Alex Manoogian. The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation is a similar organization.

Finally, it should be considered that Armenian aspirations against Turkey tend to elicit a great deal of public and private support and sympathy around the world from non-Armenians because of the widespread belief, referred to above, that the Ottoman Turks ruthlessly massacred tens of thousands of Armenians in the latter part of the nineteenth century and then undertook their deliberate extermination during World War I. Add to these damning accusations that the Islamic Ottoman Empire was one of the leading historical enemies of Christian Europe, while the Christian Armenians were usually viewed much more sympathetically, as well as the fact that Armenians enjoyed a much better facility with different languages than the Turks and thus were better able to get their views across to the rest of the world, and one can readily appreciate the Armenians' special transnational position today.

LEBANON AND THE PLO

As a result of the upheavals of World War I, Lebanon came to serve as the host for the largest group of displaced Armenians in the Middle East. They soon numbered some 200,000 or approximately 6 percent of that country's population.⁶ After 1934, these Armenians were represented in the Lebanese parliament, which was organized along confessional lines. Despite many positive achievements in their adopted country, however, the Armenian Lebanese gradually fell into the internecine power struggles that were to turn Lebanon into a country where violence was a way of life. Under these circumstances the Dashnaks formed close alliances with the right-wing Christian Phalangists of Pierre Gemayel and the National Liberals of Camilla Chamoun. Left-leaning Armenians such as the Hunchaks, on the other hand, drew close to Kemal Jumblatt's left-wing Progressive Socialist Party and various factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).

Behind the rampant anarchy in Lebanon, it was not surprising these leftist Armenians formed ASALA with the aid of a Palestinian ally which already had demonstrated the possibilities of terrorism and with which they shared such common attributes as a lost homeland and a scattered population. As ASALA's leader, Hagop Hagopian himself, asserted: "Many Armenians since 1966 participated in the Palestinian Arab struggle from which they learned many things."

The Lebanese roots of contemporary Armenian terrorism were further illustrated during the Paris trial of the four ASALA agents who had seized the Turkish consulate there on September 24, 1981, killing its Turkish guard and wounding the consul himself. Kevork Guzelian, who was charged with the murder, was born and raised in Beirut as were two of his three accomplices. Hampig Sassounian, the convicted murderer of the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles in 1982, hailed from Lebanon. Levon Ekmekjian, the ASALA terrorist captured by the Turks during the attack on the Ankara airport in August 1982, which left nine dead and over seventy wounded, was a Lebanese national who was recruited by ASALA in Lebanon. All of the so-called "Lisbon Five," who died in an explosion when they seized the Turkish embassy in Lisbon, Portugal, on July 27, 1983, came directly from Bourj Hammoud, the teeming Armenian quarter in Beirut. Both Sonner Nayir and Varoujian Garbidjian, the two main ASALA agents accused of the Orly airport bombing in July 1983, which resulted in seven dead and over sixty wounded, were recruited by ASALA in Beirut. As Martin Halabian, the Director of Information for the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts, explained: "Armenians recently arrived from Lebanon and other Mideast countries ... are more used to militancy as a way of life."⁷

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) — a small, radical faction of the PLO led by George Habash — has almost certainly provided training and logistical support for ASALA. "An observer would notice the similarity in the tactics of the Armenian Secret Army and the Popular Front ... with which it has close ties,"⁸ began a

1982 interview with ASALA leaders. According to Claire Sterling, Habash had been "training his Armenian wards in Lebanon and South Yemen for years."¹⁰ On April 8, 1980, Habash's PFLP held a press conference for ASALA and a "Kurdistan Worker's Party" at a hideout in the ancient Casbah of Sidon, Lebanon. The fourteen hooded ASALA representatives, protected by Palestinians, "emphasized their links with Marxist Palestinian formations."¹¹

The ASALA terrorists who seized the Turkish consulate in Paris in September 1981 told the police they were trained in Palestinian camps.¹² Evidence exists that "extremist [Palestinian] factions" collaborated with ASALA in its bloody attack on the Ankara airport in August 1982.¹³ After its forces overran the PLO strongholds in Lebanon during the summer of 1982, Israel reported that captured PLO documents confirmed the ASALA-PLO connection.¹⁴

A detailed *Wall Street Journal* report stated that ASALA "trained with radical left-wing Palestinian groups (the PFLP and PDFLP) and sent more than 100 members through Fatah's schools for foreign terrorists in Hamouriah, south of Damascus in Syria."¹⁵ A high-ranking Turkish officer, who had access to the testimony of some 43,000 Turks who had been detained after the Turkish military came to power in September 1980, told Claire Sterling in early 1982: "The Palestinians gave training, aid, ammunition, and arms to leftists, rightists, Kurdish separatists, and Armenians."¹⁶

Despite this evidence, ASALA has denied a Palestinian connection, claiming that while it "considers the Palestine cause to be its own cause," the relationship was one of "comradeship, not organizational.... But we have no links whatsoever with the PLO."¹⁷ Farouk Kaddorimi, the head of the PLO's political bureau, has also denied that his organization has supported ASALA.¹⁸ The reader may judge for himself whether such denials ring true or not based on the admittedly incomplete evidence presented above.

THE SOVIETS

The Russians and the Turks have been enemies for centuries. Over the past 200 years, no country has benefitted more than Russia from the decline of what Tsar Nicholas I once termed "the sick man of Europe." Indeed, the Russians waged three successful wars in the nineteenth century to gain Turkish territory. In each one, the Russians attempted to use the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire as a fifth column with varying degrees of success. Even Lord Bryce, the great friend of the Armenians, admitted this: "When foreign armies enter [the Ottoman Empire] whether it be Bulgaria or Armenia, they are welcomed as deliverers by the subject population."¹⁹ The famous commander of the Russian army which invaded eastern Anatolia in 1877 was a Russian Armenian, General Loris-Malikoff. His original surname "Melikian" simply had been Russianized. The deportations and massacres of Armenians in World War I took place against the background of Ottoman-Armenian support for the invading Russian armies.

After that struggle, the new Soviet regime eventually established an Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic on the Turkish border as one of its constituent federal entities. In time this new Soviet Armenia became a magnet for Armenian support throughout the world because the Soviet authorities allowed the native Armenian genius an amazing amount of free expression and development. The result has been "perhaps the most thriving, vigorous and open society anywhere in the Communist world.... Its economic performance can today compare with that of advanced industrialized nations of similar size."²⁰ Many Armenians have played leading roles in Soviet society, operating as dentists, doctors, engineers, generals, and scientists throughout the country. The former President of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, was probably the best known.

The Soviet authorities also have permitted Armenian national feelings to manifest themselves by allowing Mt. Ararat, a symbol of Armenian nationalism and now located just across the border in Turkey, to be represented on the insignia of the Armenian SSR. On the outskirts of Erevan, a somber, impressive monument to the Armenian victims of 1915 testifies to the Soviet support of a cause often forgotten by others. In the village of his birth, a small bust of General Antranik, an Armenian hero in the struggle against the Turks during and after World War I, now stands. Not surprisingly, Armenians around the world tend to have a positive and even grateful feeling towards the Soviet Union, and, therefore, can be used by that state to whip up support or at least win favorable acquiescence for certain types of policies.

Immediately after World War II, for example, the Soviet Union made territorial demands on portions of eastern Turkey which had been held by Russia from 1878 until the end of World War I. Since these lands were part of Armenian territory, Armenian communities around the world threw their support to the Soviet cause.²¹ Only the beginnings of the Cold War and the support given Turkey by the United States under the Truman Doctrine probably prevented the enlargement of Soviet Armenia at the expense of Turkey.

Now that Turkey is a member of NATO, that alliance guarantees the existing border. Any Soviet attempt to encroach upon it, therefore, has to be more subtle. Many Turks feel that in ASALA the Soviets have found a "proxy"²² to accomplish just this purpose. "The same territorial demands are repeated this time by the Soviet-supported terrorists ... I refer to the Armenian terrorists, Asala, who said this openly...."²³ Since it is an avowedly Marxist group which feels, in its own words, that "Soviet Armenia should be to us, what Hanoi was for the Vietnamese during their liberation war,"²⁴ ASALA would indeed make a natural proxy for Soviet ambitions towards Turkey. Similarly, Paul Henze has argued that "to exacerbate Turkey's relations with her [NATO] alliance partners" is one of the real aims of ASALA. "We see this happening over and over again as each Armenian assassination of a Turkish diplomat generates strain in Turkish relations with the country where it has occurred."²⁵ As the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,

Fred Iklé, recently noted concerning ASALA: "If it were to be successful in its aims it would lead directly to the expansion of the Soviet Union."²⁶

Dismantling the southeastern anchor of NATO is not the only benefit the Soviets would receive if ASALA's territorial aims were satisfied. A truncated Turkey would eliminate it as an attractive model for the Turkic and Islamic populations of the Soviet Union which now constitute 27 percent of the entire Soviet population.

In her study of international terrorist connections, Claire Sterling devoted an entire chapter to detailing the extent of Soviet attempts to destabilize Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s.²⁷ The strong possibility of a Soviet hand in back of Mehmet Ali Agca's attempt to kill the Pope further illustrates how the Soviets might use proxies, such as ASALA, to serve their ulterior purposes.²⁸ Elsewhere, Henze asked: "Are these Armenians likely to have developed their deadly professional skill without benefit of training by seasoned professionals? Where else, except through the KGB, can such training be readily arranged — whether given under PLO or other auspices?"²⁹ In a letter to the author, Henze further argued that the killing of Turkish diplomats by Armenians is "designed only to anger and exacerbate — there is no basis ... for any kind of reconciliation, concessions or bargaining. The viciousness of that approach leads me to believe that there has to be Soviet encouragement, if not instigation, behind it."³⁰ As for Soviet denials of any role in the killings, Henze pointed out that "the Soviets have never had any problems in making contradictory statements or in covering their covert support for various groups by making pious and self-righteous denials. Consider for example the Soviet position on the massacre of Polish officers in Katyn Forest."³¹

After the military government of General Kenan Evren came to power in Turkey in September 1980 and cracked down on domestic terrorism, huge amounts of weapons were seized. The general consensus as to their origin was the Soviet Union.³² According to another report: "Much evidence is surfacing of the remarkably close tie-up between Asala, the Russians and extremist factions of the ... PLO, as well as possible links to Syria."³³ Based on his extensive experience with Armenian terrorism, the head of the Los Angeles Police Department bomb squad, Detective Arleigh McCree, recently declared that investigations have "developed a strong Russian connection."³⁴ Commenting about the recent work on "the tragic events of World War I" by Professor John Giragosian, who is also the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia, *The Armenian Reporter* asserted: "There is reason to believe that these articles are not coincidental to the surge of Armenian terrorism directed at Turkish diplomats."³⁵ Indeed, claims have been made that the Soviets have been trying to destabilize Turkey through the Armenians as early as 1928 when the "International Minority Movement Front" in Odessa gave financial aid to a combination of Armenians, Kurds, and anti-Kemalist Turks.³⁶ Yonah Alexander recently stated that he had seen evidence that the Soviets had planted whole families of Armenian émigrés in Lebanon as early as the 1930s so that they someday might be used against Turkey.³⁷

Thus, it is possible to make a strong circumstantial case for Soviet support of ASALA. Tangible proof, however, is not possible to achieve. What is most likely is that the Soviets simply have been playing their usual game of trying to destabilize their potential foes, actions not, it should be noted, foreign to American behavior as well. ASALA probably has been just one of many terrorist groups attempting to strike at Turkish stability that has received some covert Soviet aid.

As one of the two superpowers in world politics today, however, the Soviet Union often has an inherent interest in *not* promoting instability. Levon Manasserial and Vardan Voskanyan, two Soviet Armenian foreign affairs officials, have declared, for example, that Soviet "foreign policy must be made in Moscow, not in Armenia. Steps against Turkey, a NATO member, would involve our overall relations with NATO, and the need to maintain world peace."³⁸ A Russian journalist, who spent time in Soviet Armenia before immigrating to the West in 1977, stated that the USSR wanted to be "very careful about ... nationalist trends in Armenia which the Soviets are trying to check."³⁹ Certainly, too much Soviet support for the Armenians might cause ill-will among the Turkic and Muslim populations who vastly outnumber the Armenian population in the Soviet Union.

The question of Karabagh specifically illustrates how the Soviets have to be careful. Karabagh is an autonomous region contiguous to Soviet Armenia but politically attached to the (Turkic) Azerbaijani Soviet Republic with which it does not share a common boundary. Although some 85 percent of the population of Karabagh is Armenian, the region remains part of Azerbaijan. In recent years, the Armenians have tried unsuccessfully to have the boundary altered in their favor, but no action has been taken, "evidently for fear of arousing the ire of Muslim people."⁴⁰

That there may be less to the Soviet role in Armenian terrorism than some have concluded is possibly verified by ASALA itself. In the *Al-Majallah* interview, the ASALA representative declared that Soviet Armenia "should be a springboard for liberation, but this is not happening, apparently because they [the Soviets] believe only in what they call 'democratic struggle' as far as Turkey is concerned."⁴¹ In an earlier interview, Hagop Hagopian replied to the query: "Does the USSR agree with your program?" in the negative. "Unfortunately no. To fight Turkey, which is a part of the Western bloc, we need the support of the socialist countries, but the Soviets consider efforts to liberate Armenia from the Turks as being directed against them and last year, to give you an example, they hanged three Soviet Armenian patriots."⁴²

Therefore, the verdict on the Soviet role must be postponed, probably indefinitely. It seems unlikely that a group deliberately designed by a secretive, totalitarian government to be known to only a very small circle in the KGB and upper Soviet hierarchy, and purposely programmed to leave no evidence, could be documented much better than has been done here.

THE UNITED STATES

Although estimates vary, there are probably some 600,000 people of Armenian descent living in the United States today.⁴³ This constitutes a figure second only to the well over 4,000,000 Armenians reported by the 1979 Soviet census as living in the USSR.

Armenians have achieved prominence in virtually every avenue of Armenian life in numbers much higher than their relatively small percentage of the American population.⁴⁴ The United States hosts, for example, an estimated 10,000 physicians, 5,000 attorneys, over 2,000 university professors, thousands of engineers and businessmen, and over 100 millionaires of Armenian descent. In addition, Armenians are present in the entertainment industry, sports, politics, the military, and mass media. Author William Saroyan, entertainer "Cher," and California Governor George Deukmejian are a few, very well-known examples.

At the present time there are also eighteen Armenian day schools functioning in the United States, 28 different periodicals, ten of which are in English, and four major resource and research centers dealing with Armenians. In California alone there are over 200 separate Armenian organizations including churches, political parties, athletic organizations, cultural associations, social groups, and professional societies which are constantly sponsoring activities. One source estimated that there were "probably 10 different Armenian activities during any one weekend night in Los Angeles."⁴⁵ The vast majority of these Armenian organizations and activities have nothing to do with terrorism. However, a number of them occasionally, and a few of them frequently, pursue the Armenian cause in a manner which overtly supports hatred of Turkey and, at times, even implicitly or explicitly condones violence.

Harry Derderian, a leading official of the Armenian National Committee (the Dashnak's political arm), for instance, was quoted as stating, "If the terrorism is a contributing factor in getting people's attention, I can go along with it."⁴⁶ Commenting about the events of 1915 and the current terrorism, Armand Arabian, a superior court judge in California, reportedly declared, "It is the right of Armenians to seek redress.... Some seek it on street corners."⁴⁷ After Hampig Sassounian was found guilty of murdering the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles in 1982, some Armenians in Boston announced that "What occurred throughout Hampig's trial was a mockery of justice, an attempt to stop the Armenian people from actively pursuing their cause."⁴⁸ Referring to the same case, Bishop Yeprem Tabakian, the prelate of the Western Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, stated, "Hampig's conviction is an indictment directed against all Armenians,"⁴⁹ and Archbishop Vatche Hovsepian, the primate of the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church, added, "I am truly shocked about the verdict."⁵⁰ Larry Cretan, the former director of the Hollywood-based Armenian Assembly, acknowledged that he was "disturbed by those kinds of [terrorist] acts because I feel they're counterproductive," but said he could "understand the motivations behind them."⁵¹

Other Armenians have been more explicit in their comments. Levon

Marashlian, a Glendale College professor Armenian history and culture, said Armenian terrorists are "patriots who have been waiting for 70 years...."⁵² An Armenian student of Dr. Dennis Papazian, a professor of history at the University of Michigan in Dearborn, was quoted as saying: "In a way I'm kind of proud of the terrorists."⁵³ Referring to the trial of two Armenian terrorists who had murdered the Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia in March 1983, the *Dashnak* newspaper in Boston, Massachusetts declared: "To consider it a criminal act distorts the selfless struggles of the Armenian youth, who are pursuing the just cause of their people."⁵⁴ Speaking at a benefit luncheon for the "LA 5," who were arrested in October 1982 for attempting to bomb the Turkish consulate in Philadelphia and later convicted, the mother of one of them was quoted as saying: "We believe in the same things they believe in. If they're criminals, so are we. We raised them."⁵⁵

In 1984, there were several resolutions before the U.S. Congress dealing with the Armenian cause.⁵⁶ House Joint Resolution 247 would have designated April 24, 1984 as a "National Day of Remembrance of Man's Inhumanity to Man." Under its provisions, the people of the United States would have been called upon "to observe such a day as a day of remembrance for all the victims on the genocide, especially the one and one-half million people of Armenian ancestry who were victims of the genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923...."

House Resolution 171 and Senate Resolution 124 were identical. They each would have recognized that "the Armenian genocide was conceived by the Turkish Ottoman Government and implemented from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the extermination of one and a half million Armenian men, women, and children" and would have made it "the policy of the United States" to "embrace these historical events." Finally, Senate Joint Resolution 87 resolved: "That April 24, 1984 be designated as a day of remembrance for all victims of genocide especially those of Armenian ancestry."

Although House Resolution 247 apparently achieved enough promised votes to be passed in the spring of 1984, in the end it and the other three failed to be carried due to the intervention of the U.S. State Department. The Reagan administration felt that passage of the Resolution would "muck up relations with Turkey" and encourage certain Armenians to continue terrorist strikes.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, on September 28, 1984, the U.S. House of Representatives reversed itself and unanimously passed Resolution 247. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee then approved another Resolution (241), "expressing the sense of the Senate that the foreign policy of the United States should take account of the genocide of the Armenian people."

Commenting upon these events in an editorial entitled "ASALA's Day," the *Wall Street Journal* concluded: "In a week when Congress is examining ways to prevent attacks on our embassies, it is particularly ironic to consider resolutions that will be widely interpreted as endorsing terrorism against the diplomats of a democratic ally."⁵⁸ Although the Reagan administration managed to block any further action at this time,

Armenian political power in the United States had been demonstrated once again.

The United States Holocaust Memorial Council provides still another expression of this political power. The Council was established by the U.S. Congress in 1980 as an independent agency to create a memorial museum in Washington, D.C., in remembrance of the victims of the Jewish Holocaust in World War II. The Holocaust Museum was designed to contain approximately 70,000 square feet of floor space divided into exhibit areas, a library, seminar rooms, and offices. Located opposite the Washington Monument, the museum is scheduled to open in 1986. In April 1981, due to heavy Armenian lobbying, the Council unanimously resolved that "the Armenian genocide should be included in the Holocaust Museum Memorial." The negative connotations of such moves for Turkey should be obvious.

"Genocide studies" represents yet another Armenian attempt to present their case to the American public. In recent years a number of public school systems in the United States have adopted curricula dealing with the horrors of modern genocide. Although the original focus was to be on the Jewish genocide of World War II, Armenians in the United States have been able to incorporate "the Armenian genocide" into a number of these programs. "The result will be ... that this forgotten Genocide of the Armenians will be once again remembered,"⁵⁹ concluded an Armenian sympathizer. Another Armenian observer reported enthusiastically about "genocide studies" which included the Armenian cause in states such as Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Illustrating the hypocritical, political bias of the Armenian position in these studies, this particular observer further claimed that "the primary handicap to this study is the inclusion of Turkish sources."⁶⁰

In other words, Turkey should be accused, tried, and convicted without the benefit of any defense, formed by historical, Turkish sources, all in the supposed cause of scholarly endeavor. "The continued propagation of this distortion of history," concluded Sükrü Elekdag, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, "breeds vengefulness from generation to generation and plays into the hands of Armenian terrorists."⁶¹ Similarly, the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, in surveying the host of Armenian activities, found that it was this propaganda which "gave way to the creation of Armenian terrorism in the years following 1973."⁶²

In pursuing their cause, American Armenians have won over such prominent American politicians as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, William P. "Tip" O'Neill. On October 6, 1983, the Armenian National Committee held a \$150-a-plate dinner in the Los Angeles area home of attorney Walter Karabian. More than 200 people, including a number of elected officials, attended. They heard O'Neill tell them "that during the 40 years he has represented Armenians in his district near Boston, he has been made aware of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and the Armenian people's longing for ... the time when

Armenia would be a free country and they would be able to get back to it."⁶³ More than \$30,000 was raised at the reception by the Dashnak-affiliated organization. Less than two months later, the same group raised close to \$100,000 at a \$250-per-person reception for Walter F. Mondale, the Democratic Party's presidential candidate in 1984. The money was donated to Mondale who told the gathering about the "Genocide in which the Armenian people were literally subjected to mass annihilation."⁶⁴ Numerous other prominent American politicians are strongly identified with the Armenian cause.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the courts of the United States have recently returned some stiff sentences against convicted Armenian terrorists such as Hampig Sassounian. This tough action stands in marked contrast to France where the recent trial of the four ASALA agents who seized the Turkish consulate and killed its guard in September 1981 "emerged [as] a major victory for the Armenian cause."⁶⁵ With good behavior "our boys," as the terrorists were affectionately referred to by French Armenians, may be released within a few years. Despite its strength, the American political sympathy for the Armenian cause also falls far short of the much more blatant support a number of prominent French politicians have given it.

THE FRENCH

The French sympathy for the Armenian cause is largely based on continuing historical affinities dating back almost a thousand years and contemporary political realities involving electoral politics.⁶⁶ Together these two factors have led to a situation where: the President of France, along with several of his highest ranking ministers, has uttered blatantly pro-Armenian statements; French courts have returned amazingly light sentences against Armenian terrorists who openly admitted to murdering Turks; Paris served as the backdrop for a showcase "trial" which convicted Turkey of "genocide" in April 1984; and, the government itself apparently made secret deals with ASALA, probably creating a situation which has permitted France to serve as that organization's headquarters in Western Europe.⁶⁷

At present, the Armenian community in France numbers well over 350,000 and is, by far, the largest in Western Europe. Until the recent rise of Armenian terrorism, this French community was apparently well on its way to being totally assimilated. Now all this has changed dramatically.

The Armenian National Movement (ANM), which is headed by Ara Toranian, has emerged as a dynamic political force, supporting ASALA and advocating terrorism as a method for achieving Armenian goals. The ANM also publishes a highly inflammatory periodical called *Hay Baykar* (Armenian Struggle). Dozens of French Armenian youths donate their time for free to help put it out.

Although there is no estimate of how many members the ANM has, an independent source stated that on April 24, 1983, almost 5000 French Armenians carrying a thousand ASALA flags marched under its

leadership. In contrast, only 300 people participated in a Dashnak demonstration which was staged at the same time. Similarly, the Armenian Apostolic Church in France has also failed to keep up with the changes in the French Armenian community and is clearly not the rallying point it traditionally was in France and still is in most other Armenian communities. The death of Archbishop Serovpe Manoukian in April 1984, however, may effect an alteration in this situation.

An important characteristic of the Armenian community in France is the warm relations it enjoys with a number of leading French politicians, particularly the socialists who came to power under François Mitterrand in 1981. At least three cabinet members in this government are also mayors of cities with large concentrations of Armenians. Some French commentators openly accused Gaston Defferre, Minister of the Interior and mayor of Marseille, of sympathy for the Armenian terrorists when he gave the order to arrest Sonner Nayir, the accused perpetrator of the Orly bombing, before Nayir could lead the police to his contacts in Marseille. An earlier occasion, in April 1982, saw Defferre declare, "France will assist you [the Armenians] to triumph in the pursuit of your just cause."⁶⁸

Other leading governmental figures have also openly sympathized with the Armenian cause. In June 1982, Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson rejected a Turkish offer proposing coordinated anti-terrorist campaigns between the two countries. Minister of Defense Hernu, who resigned in September 1985 over the bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior* by the French Secret Service, told a large Armenian rally in his home city of Villeurbanne on October 10, 1982: "Whenever there are aggressions, we must raise the question as to who the real aggressor is. Are the aggressors the people that survived a genocide committed by the Turks or the Turks themselves?"⁶⁹ The President of France himself, François Mitterrand, appeared on January 7, 1984, at an Armenian Christmas celebration in a suburb of Lyon. There he told the gathering: "It is not possible to erase the genocide which has struck you. This genocide must be inscribed in the memories of everyone, and the tragic fate of the Armenian people must serve as a lesson for the youth."⁷⁰

The encouragement such statements from French officials give to Armenian terrorists and their sympathizers in France is obvious. As one Armenian observer concluded: "Such support for the Armenians is seen nowhere else in the world."⁷¹ "We condemn you ... the past President of France, Giscard d'Estaing. If you hadn't tolerated the actions of them [the Armenian terrorists and their sympathizers] in return for their votes, those murderers would not have lost their self-control, and acted like this today,"⁷² wrote Artin Penik, a Turkish citizen of Armenian descent, who committed suicide by setting himself on fire to protest against ASALA.

Three weeks after President Mitterrand's remarks cited above, the trial of four ASALA agents began. In 1981 they had seized the Turkish Consulate in Paris, murdered its guard, seriously wounded the Consul himself, and held 56 people hostage for sixteen hours under the threat of death. As partially described above, the entire affair became largely a

platform for the Armenians to denounce the Turkish "genocide" and to claim a "victory for the Armenian cause." The President of the Court ruled that the defendants could not be referred to as "terrorists," the defendants were allowed to make long speeches denouncing Turkey, irrelevant anti-Turkish letters from singer Charles Aznavour and the movie director Henri Verneuil were admitted as evidence, and the defendants finally were given such light sentences that good behavior might lead to their early release. The entire affair contrasted strongly with the trials of Armenian terrorists being held at the same time in the United States and Yugoslavia where maximum sentences were returned. It is no wonder the Turkish government and people feel bitterly toward France.⁷³

Less than three months later, the "Permanent Tribunal of Peoples" opened in Paris.⁷⁴ Organized by the French Armenian academician, Gerard Chaliand, this "tribunal" heard statements from a number of prominent Armenian scholars. It then pronounced Turkey guilty of genocide and condemned the international community for its indifference. Although some attempts at independence and objectivity were obviously made — three Nobel Prize recipients were part of the jury — its decision was a foregone conclusion. Objectivity might have been better served had this tribunal been combined with the "International Symposium on Terrorism," being held concurrently in Ankara, Turkey. To this latter session, a number of foreign and Turkish scholars supportive of the Turkish position were invited.⁷⁵

Reports that the present French government struck a deal with ASALA in 1981⁷⁶ further reveal the French position concerning Armenian terrorism. Prime Minister Mauroy reportedly agreed with ASALA that in return for French recognition of "the 1915 genocide," there would be no further terrorist attacks on French soil. Further terrorist demands, which, to some extent, were apparently met, included leniency for Armenian terrorists held in French prisons, unrestricted use of French airports by ASALA members, and even permission to store arms and equipment on French soil.

That there was some truth to this alleged deal is indicated by the fact that Hagop Hagopian was not arrested, but merely followed and photographed when he was in Paris as recently as April 1983. The ease with which the French police rounded up so many Armenian terrorists immediately after the Orly bombing is also revealing. Indeed, it is arguable that if the French authorities had taken a stronger stance against terrorist activities the Orly bombing might well have been prevented. Its perpetration, however, demonstrated the bankruptcy of the French policy. As the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ilter Turkmen, pointedly observed, "Those who support or tolerate terrorism should now realize ... terrorist acts can also cause serious damage for themselves."⁷⁷

CYPRUS

Sporadic intercommunal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, punctuated by much heavier outbursts in 1964, 1967, and again

in 1974, led in 1974 to a Turkish invasion of the island and the establishment of a *de facto* Turkish Cypriot state in the north to balance the continuing *de jure* Greek Cypriot state in the south.

Many Turks feel that the Greek Cypriots support the Armenian terrorists in revenge for this Turkish invasion.⁷⁸ The largely circumstantial argument has been offered by a respected leftist university professor and columnist, Mumtaz Soysal. "Why has this [Armenian] violence been revived suddenly after a pause of half a century[?] ... The re-starting date of this organized violence coincides with the date of the 1974 Turkish landing in Cyprus.... To be more specific, the Armenian cause has been included in the 'long-term struggle policy' of the Greek Cypriots, to 'save Cyprus'."⁷⁹

Turkish officials have compiled a large file concerning this alleged Greek Cypriot connection. Leaflets and press clippings with statements made by Armenians and Greek Cypriots supposedly verify the accusation. Archbishop Makarios, for example, promised the Armenian Patriarch Koren in August 1977 that "we will give every material and moral support to the Armenians in a bid to internationalise the Armenian question." The new Greek Cypriot President Spyros Kyrianiou "has been the recipient of the biggest Armenian award by the hand of Koren for his 'services to the Armenian cause'." Kyrianiou also received an award from the Armenian National Council in New York "for the continued support of the Armenian cause."⁸⁰

More to the point, the Turks have charged that "the Armenian Institute, founded by the Melkonian Brothers in Nicosia under the name 'Melkonian Institute,' is training elements for the Armenian terrorist organisation." More general claims are made that "there is concrete evidence in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot administration that supporters of the 'Armenian cause' and the members of the Armenian organisation" are being sheltered in the Greek Cypriot sector.⁸¹ "Armenian terrorists are known to have already gathered in the Greek part of Cyprus where they have been engaged in certain activities for some time,"⁸² added another Turkish report. Rauf Dentas, Turkish Cypriot leader, brought up the subject of Armenian terrorist camps when he met with the commander of the UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus.⁸³ *Hürriyet*, the largest selling daily in Turkey, even gave a detailed report on what it claimed was a camp near Nicosia of "Armenian murder gangs" training and planning sabotage.⁸⁴

The Turkish belief in the reputed connection was given new possible substance when PLO evacuees from Beirut passed through Cyprus in August 1982. At that time Turkish newspapers claimed that between 250 and 1,200 Armenian guerrillas had surreptitiously entered Cyprus along with the PLO allies evacuating Beirut.⁸⁵

In the summer of 1983, further reports again indicated that after the fall of Beirut some Armenian terrorists escaped to Cyprus,⁸⁶ as well as several other locations. A detailed report in the Turkish press told how on "July 24, [1983] the Greek Cypriot administration gave permission to

Armenian terrorists to establish a 'training camp' at the 'Cacopetria' region of the Troodos mountains.'"⁸⁷ An accompanying map even pinpointed the location in the center of Cyprus. It was claimed that approximately 160-170 Armenian terrorists were being trained at the camp and that two more such camps were also operating. Greek officers from "motherland Greece" supposedly were training the terrorists at all three locations.

Such reports are, nonetheless, suspect. Although there undoubtedly is sympathy among Greek Cypriots for the Armenian terrorists and a small Armenian community has long existed in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot government has denied it supports the terrorists and independent investigations in Cyprus have yielded no evidence to substantiate claims of assistance.⁸⁸ Indeed, Greek Cypriot support for the Armenian terrorists probably would be insanely suicidal given the present political, geographical, and military facts of life. It is doubtful, therefore, that the Greek Cypriots have knowingly given substantial material aid to any Armenian terrorists.

OTHERS

There are a number of other states which have demonstrated a certain amount of support for the Armenian cause, probably as an indirect way to pressure their historical enemy, Turkey. Chief among them appear to be Greece, Syria, and Iran. Indeed, for Greece this hostility is also very current given the disputes with Turkey over the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.

A small, but active Armenian community exists in Greece. It often has manifested overt sympathies for terrorist acts against Turkey and has been active in raising funds to defend JCAG terrorists such as Harutiun Levonian and Raffi Elbekian, who assassinated the Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia in March 1983. Papandreou's socialist (PASOK) government has relaxed the entry procedures and security checks for those seeking to enter Greece. In addition, the country possesses excellent air connections to Europe, the Middle East, and the Soviet bloc. All of this obviously would facilitate terrorist activities and it seems likely that elements of both ASALA and JCAG fled to Greece, as well as to Syria or Iran, after the fall of Beirut in 1982.⁸⁹ Recently, Panos Kondogiorgia, a representative of PASOK, told a gathering of Greek Armenians that in their struggle, "waged on all fronts by every method, PASOK is on your side."⁹⁰ Occasionally, however, PASOK did not fulfil that promise. Joseph Kasesyan, an ASALA spokesman in Athens, noted his organization had participated in a youth festival organized by PASOK in 1981 but was refused entry in 1982.⁹¹

MIDDLE EAST

More substantial evidence exists regarding a Syrian-Armenian connection. A number of sources have indicated that some of ASALA's leaders fled to Syria after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.⁹² Certainly the Turkish government of General Kenan Evren was convinced of

such "possible links to Syria ... [and] the remarkably close tie-up between Asala, the Russians, and extremist factions of the ... PLO."⁹² On the very day of the bloody Ankara airport attack in August 1982, a Syrian diplomatic courier was detained at the Istanbul airport. His diplomatic pouch contained an assortment of weapons and explosives destined for the Syrian consulate in that city. Since the two ASALA agents who attacked the Ankara airport had travelled in Syria or possessed Syrian passports, the Turks speculated that there was a link.⁹⁴ *Ter-cuman*, a Turkish daily, recently printed the names, addresses, and photographs of high-ranking ASALA leaders. All were living in Syria or Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon. This information was supposedly verified by experts.⁹⁵

In the summer of 1983, it was reported that Syria had "apparently succeeded in coopting the pro-Soviet middle eastern section [Hagopian's grouping] of ... ASALA Syria now cooperates with ASALA in training, the planning of operations and the supplying of arms and forged documents." Specific training sites for the terrorists on Syrian soil included Kamishli on the Turkish border, a location near the ancient city of Homs and Camp Tadmur As-Sahra near Damascus. In Syrian-controlled Lebanon, ASALA bases were located in the Bekaa Valley village of Anjar and in the northern city of Tripoli. In this latter site, ASALA operated under the pink-uniformed militia "al Fursan-al Arab" (the Arab Horsemen), the organization established by Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Syria's president. Further, the report declared, "The entire ASALA setup in Syria falls under the patronage of the elite Defence Brigades commanded by Rifaat al-Assad."⁹⁶ The younger Assad is believed, in some circles, to do his brother's 'dirty work' and has been mentioned as a possible successor to the Syrian leadership.

In March 1983, the Turkish foreign minister conferred with President Assad in Damascus, but apparently failed to convince him to end his support for ASALA. In fact, after the Kurdish Workers Party, a reputed ally of ASALA, fled from Turkey, it was granted refuge in Syria. In June 1983 and again in October 1984, Turkish military forces entered northern Iraq with Iraqi permission, routing Kurdish and Armenian units which had been raiding across the border into eastern Turkey. With the Iraqi base thus threatened, Syria may become an even more important haven for Turkish enemies in the future.

Over the past several years a number of Armenian terrorist attacks against Turks have occurred in Iran. Several more during the spring of 1984 culminated in the murder of the Turkish Embassy's Military Attache and of a Turkish businessman. At least in this way Iran too has provided a base for the Armenian terrorists. However, historically, the Armenians and the Iranians are enemies, warring against each other some 1500 years before the Turks entered Anatolia and it is not clear to what extent the present government of Iran condones Armenian actions.

Ancient Armenia constituted a satrapy in the Persian Empire of Darius the Great. In 484 A.D., one of the frequent unequal wars between the two was concluded by the Treaty of Nuvarsag. To the Armenians,

this event still symbolizes national and religious freedom against tremendous odds. Most Armenians throughout the world celebrated its 1500th anniversary in 1984. Past Iranian conquests of former Armenian lands and forced migrations of Armenians to Iran, as well as more voluntary movements, have led to a situation in which Iran today hosts what may be the largest concentration of Armenians in the Middle East, ranging from 200,000 to, perhaps, 500,000 people. Recently, Armenian sources have begun to complain about Iranian persecution.⁹⁷

The Ottoman and Persian Empires were also historic enemies. In the late nineteenth century, "Persia ... became the launching ground for [Armenian] operations in nearby Turkish Armenia."⁹⁸ Thus, no dramatic reorientation of policy was necessary for either Turkey or Iran to view the other in a hostile light. Even before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Iranian authorities apparently had encouraged ASALA to relocate in their country, giving them "bases and barracks on the Turkish borders and [providing them] with instructors in the use of various weapons."⁹⁹ The Israeli invasion caused additional elements of ASALA to move to Iran. In July and August 1983, ASALA issued its first communiqués from Tehran.

Recently, however, Turkey and Iran apparently have shown a greater willingness to control the situation. In April 1984, ignoring death threats from ASALA, the Turkish Prime Minister successfully visited Tehran. Yet, by the fall of 1984, Turkish businessmen again were complaining that Iranian security officials were paying little attention to their appeals for protection from Armenian terrorists.¹⁰⁰

There is some evidence that Iran recently supported ASALA assaults on France because France supports Iraq in its war against Iran and also provides a refuge for Iranian foes of Khomeini. One Armenian leader who met an Iranian foe of Khomeini in Paris was quoted as declaring: "Khomeini may be a Judas to you, but he is the spirit of holiness to us, for he gives us money and arms."¹⁰¹ In fundamentalist Iran, politics is apparently making for strange bedfellows. The ambiguous situation of the Armenians is only one example.

CONCLUSION

Armenian terrorism, similar to Irish terrorism, has international connections wherever an Armenian population resides. Historical events serve both as a stimulus to overt terrorism by a few members of the Armenian community and to sympathy with the causes advocated, by a larger number. As a result, the quarrel between Armenia and Turkey currently has global ramifications and policies set by one country regarding terrorists and terrorist actions frequently have a world-wide effect.

Footnotes

1. For analyses, see two other articles by the author, "Contemporary Aspects of Armenian Terrorism," in *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984), pp. 103-144; and "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey," *Orbis*, 27 (Summer 1983), pp. 447-477.

The declared rationale for this terrorism is to gain revenge for Turkish massacres of Armenians during World War I and to achieve what a number of Armenian publications have summed up as the "3 R's": (1) recognition of what happened; (2) reparations; and (3) restoration of the ancestral homeland.

The number of Armenians killed and the circumstances involved therein, however, are disputed. The Armenians claim that what occurred was genocide wilfully perpetrated by the Turkish government. The Turks, on the other hand, claim that a far smaller number of Armenians died as an unfortunate result of general wartime conditions, and that, in addition, hundreds of thousands of Turks also were killed at that time.

Out of a plethora of pro-Armenian sources, two in particular are most frequently cited to back the Armenian claim: (1) the massive compilation by the senior British statesman, Lord James Bryce, and the then young, but later world-renowned historian, Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-16*, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous no. 31 (London: Joseph Cavston, 1916); and, (2) the memoirs of the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at that time, Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, 1919). In addition, see, Gerard Chaliand and Yves Ternon, *The Armenians: From Genocide to Resistance* (London: Zed Press, 1983).

For a recent presentation of the Turkish position, see, *Documents on Ottoman Armenians*, Vols. I and II (Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, 1982 and 1983). Further, see, Kamuran Gurun, *Ermeni Dosyasi* [The Armenian Files] (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1984).

2. For the Turkish position here, see, Bilal N. Simsir, ed., *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians*, Vols. I and II (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1982 and 1983). For the Armenian position, see, Richard G. Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), and Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963).
3. Cited in *The Armenian Weekly*, July 2, 1983, p. 2. *The Armenian Weekly*, published in Boston, Massachusetts, is an official organ of the Dashnaks (see below).
4. The reports in *The California [Armenian] Courier*, September 22, 1983, p. 2; and, *ibid.*, December 8, 1983, p. 9. For numerous other egregious examples of such tacit support of terrorism, see the articles in *ibid.*, September 13, 1983, p. 3; October 13, 1983, pp. 8, 12; October 20, 1983, p. 3; December 1, 1983, p. 11; January 12, 1984, p. 8; March 8, 1984, p. 9; and, August 23, 1984, p. 8; *The Armenian Weekly*, September 3, 1983, p. 6; October 21, 1983, p. 1; November 26, 1983; p. 2; December 24, 1983, p. 1; February 11, 1984, pp. 6-7; June 9, 1984, pp. 2, 15; August 11, 1984, p. 2; and, August 18, 1984, p. 8; *The Armenian Reporter*, June 2, 1983, p. 10; June 23, 1983, p. 10; August 4, 1983, p. 2; September 1, 1983, p. 3; September 15, 1983, p. 11; April 12, 1984, p. 3; July 5, 1984, p. 1; and, below. (*The Armenian Reporter* is an independent Armenian American weekly.)
5. "Contemporary Aspects of Armenian Terrorism," pp. 121 ff.; and the following issues of *The Armenian Reporter*, August 18, 1983, p. 10; September 29, 1983, p. 1; November 10, 1983, pp. 1, 8; November 24, 1983, p. 12; December 22, 1983, p. 4; January 5, 1984, p. 1; and, September 13, 1984, p. 1.

The Dashnaks recently changed the name of their terrorist organization to the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA). Numerous issues of the Dashnak organ, *The Armenian Weekly*, contain eulogies and panegyrics to JCAJ (now ARA) members. For example, see, the issues of August 20, 1983, p. 1; September 17, 1983, p. 3; December 10, 1983, p. 1; December 24, 1983, p. 1; January 14, 1984, p. 1; January 21, 1984, pp. 2, 4; January 28, 1984, p. 1; July 28, 1984, p. 8; August 18, 1984, pp. 2, 3;

- and, September 29, 1984, p. 15. The Dashnak weekly virtually ignores the other main Armenian terrorist group, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). In contrast to the more nationalist and right-wing Dashnaks, ASALA has strong Marxist sympathies.
6. The following discussion is based on Christopher Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 363 ff.; Andrew Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* (August 1982), pp. 32 ff.; Sato Papazin, "Sept années de lutte armée," *Hay Baykar* [Armenian Struggle] (Paris: Mouvement National Arménien Pour L'ASALA), December 22, 1982, pp. 8-9; and, Pierre Terzian, "La Question Arménienne Aujourd'hui," in the special issue of *Critique Socialiste*, 55, No. 4 (1982), entitled "Arménie du Genocide à L'explosion," pp. 51-58 and 62-65.
 7. "Armenian Terrorist Leader Hagopian Interviewed: *Milan Panorama* in Italian, 1 Sept. 1980, pp. 62-65," in *Joint Publications Research Service: Western Europe*, No. 1628, September 24, 1980, hereafter cited as "Panorama Interview."
 8. Cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, May 6, 1982, p. 5.
 9. "Nadim Nasir Report: *Al-Majallah* Visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon," in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (FBIS), Daily Report (Middle East and Africa), September 1, 1982, p. G8, hereafter cited as "*Al Majallah* Interviews ASALA."
 10. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), p. 244.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
 12. *The Economist*, October 3, 1981, p. 51. Also see the lengthy report in *The Armenian Reporter*, February 9, 1984, p. 2.
 13. "Behind the Armenian Terrorists," *Foreign Report* (England) August 19, 1982, p. 1.
 14. See Z. Michael Szaz, "Armenian Terrorist Ironies," *Washington Times*, September 2, 1982, p. 8A. Also see *New York Times*, August 1, 1983, p. A6.
 15. James Ring Adams, "Lessons and Links of Anti-Turk Terrorism," *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1983, p. 32.
 16. Claire Sterling, *The Time of the Assassins: Anatomy of an Investigation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983), p. 73.
 17. "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA."
 18. *New York Times*, April 17, 1983, p. 8.
 19. James Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1896), p. 425.
 20. Walker, *Survival of a Nation*, p. 371. See also, in general, Mary Matossian, *The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962). One might also note the "Committee for Cultural Relations with Armenians Abroad" has been "developing a closer link between the Armenian motherland and the Armenians dispersed to the four corners of the world. Formed in 1964, the Committee has won the confidence of Diaspora Armenians...." See "20th Anniv. of Spiruk Committee Marked," *The Armenian Reporter*, November 15, 1984, p. 3.
 21. For details, see Walker, *Survival of a Nation*, pp. 360 ff.
 22. See the statement of Professor Aydin Yalcin in "Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate on Turkish Experience with Terrorism" (Serial No. J-97-43), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981, p. 5; hereafter cited as "US Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism."
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. "*Al-Majallah* Interviews ASALA."
 25. Paul Henze, "Coping with Terrorism: What Do We Know? What Can Be Done?" (discussion paper presented at the "Conference of the Political and Social Studies Foundation" held at Istanbul, Turkey, October 3-6, 1982), p. 16.
 26. "Testimony by the Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee," (Washington: mimeographed, March 11, 1982), p. 6.

27. Sterling, *Terror Network*, pp. 228-246.
28. On the Soviet connection in the plot to kill the Pope, see Claire Sterling, *The Time of the Assassins: Anatomy of an Investigation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983); and Paul Henze, *The Plot to Kill the Pope* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983).
29. Henze, "Coping with Terrorism," pp. 16-17.
30. Paul Henze, letter to the author dated March 14, 1983.
31. *Ibid.* For analysis of Katyn Forest, see Z.K. Zawodny, *Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962).
32. "US Senate Hearings on Turkish Terrorism." On this point, see especially, Turkish General Staff, *Anarchy and Terror in Turkey*; as well as Paul Henze, *Goal: Destablization — Soviet Agitational Propaganda, Instability and Terrorism in NATO South* (European American Institute for Security Research Reprint Series, 1981), pp. 43-44; and "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey, *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, 19 (1981/1982), pp. 472-473.
33. "Behind the Armenian Terrorists," p. 1.
34. Cited in *Wall Street Journal*, August 9, 1983, p. 32.
35. *The Armenian Reporter*, March 1, 1984, p. 2.
36. Gwynne Dyer, "Correspondence," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 9 (1973), p. 382.
37. Yonah Alexander, comments made during news conference concerning his new book to be published with Ray S. Cline, *Terrorism: The Soviet Connection* (New York: Crane Rusak, 1984), Washington, D.C., January 23, 1984.
38. Cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, December 28, 1982, p. 13.
39. Cited in *New York Times*, August 1, 1983, p. A6.
40. Ronald Grigor Suny, *Armenia in the Twentieth Century* (Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1983), p. 81.
41. "Al-Majallah Interviews ASALA."
42. "Panorama Interview."
43. The 1980 U.S. census reported only 212,621 Americans of Armenian heritage. The figure is so low because the census probably counted many Armenians as Lebanese, Iranians, Syrians, etc. There are probably some 200,000 Armenians in the Los Angeles area alone and perhaps as many as 400,000 in California, which, since 1982, has had a governor of Armenian descent, George Deukmejian. The number of Armenians should not be exaggerated, however, because at the most they constitute no more than 1.5 percent of the population of California and barely .2 percent of the overall population of the United States. Nevertheless, the point is there are many more Americans of Armenian descent than Turkish.
44. The following discussion is based on Vahe Oshagan, "The Armenian-American Contribution," *The Armenian Weekly*, January 21, 1984, p. 3; as well as various issues of *The [Armenian] California Courier*. Also see the lengthy account about Armenians in the Los Angeles area by Michael Leahy in the August 1983 issue of the *Los Angeles* magazine, reprinted in four separate parts by *The [Armenian] California Courier* beginning with the issue of August 25, 1983.
45. *The [Armenian] California Courier*, December 1, 1983, p. 4.
46. Cited in Russell Warren Howe, "Unraveling the Motivations for Armenian Terror," *Washington Times*, August 3, 1983, p. 7A.
47. Cited in Michael Leahy, "LA Armenian Community Grows Fastest in State," *The California [Armenian] Courier*, August 25, 1983, p. 7.
48. Cited in *The Armenian Weekly*, January 14, 1984, p. 7.
49. Cited in *The California [Armenian] Courier*, January 12, 1984, p. 2.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*, August 4, 1983, p. 2.
52. *Ibid.*
53. Cited in *The Armenian Reporter*, September 8, 1983, p. 8.

54. *The Armenian Weekly*, January 14, 1984, p. 1.
55. Cited in "LA Five Draw Zealous Support from Community," *The California [Armenian] Courier*, November 10, 1983, p. 2.
56. For text of resolutions, see United States. Library of Congress. *Digest of public general bills and resolutions*, prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
57. *The Armenian Weekly*, June 2, 1984, p. 1.
58. "ASALA's Day," *Wall Street Journal*, October 2, 1984, p. 30.
59. "NAASR Marks 25th Anniversary," *The Armenian Mirror-Spectator*, April 7, 1979.
60. Gary A. Kulhanjian, "Genocide Studies: A Benefit to All," *The Armenian Weekly*, January 7, 1984, p. 2.
61. "Elekdag Eulogizes Arikah; Condemns Terrorism," *Turkey Today* (published by the Turkish Embassy in the U.S.), February 1982, p. 3.
62. *The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1982), foreward.
63. "O'Neill Guest at ANC Reception: Reaffirms Support for Armenian Cause," *The Armenian Weekly*, October 15, 1983, p. 1.
64. "Mondale Backs Armenian Cause: \$100,000 Raised," *The [Armenian] California Courier*, December 15, 1983, p. 1.
65. *The Armenian Reporter*, February 16, 1984, p. 11.
66. For background on the historical relationship between France and Armenia, see David M. Lang, *The Armenians: A People in Exile* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 27, 37, and 59-69; Nalbandian, *Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, pp. 37-38, 71, and 96; and Edward Boghosian, "The Armenian Community of France — A Potential Force," *The Armenian Reporter*, February 23, 1984, pp. 1-2.
67. See "Background, Activities of Armenian Organizations Explored: Cairo *Al-Musawwar* in Arabic, 12 August 1983, pp. 20-21," in *Joint Publications Research Service: Armenian Affairs*, No. 2838, October 17, 1983, p. 10. A purported picture of Hagop Hagopian, incidentally, appears in *ibid.*, p. 11.
68. Cited in *The Armenian Reporter*, July 28, 1983, p. 7.
69. *Ibid.*
70. *The Armenian Weekly*, January 21, 1984, p. 1.
71. Boghosian, "Armenian Community of France," p. 2.
72. Cited in *NewSpot: Turkish Digest*, Supplement to issue of August 13, 1982, p. 1.
73. See, for example, "Armenian Terrorism and the Paris Trial: Views and Evaluation of Ankara University," 1984; and, *Turkish Daily News*, February 3-9, 1984, p. 1.
74. See the lengthy analyses of its proceedings in *The Armenian Reporter*, April 19, 1984, p. 1; and, *ibid.*, April 26, 1984, pp. 1, 14.
75. The disinterested scholar who seeks the truth in this ancient Armenian-Turkish feud would do well to start his research by studying the proceedings of *both* these two gatherings.
76. William Echikson, "Armenian Bombing at Orly Ends Pact Between Socialists and Terrorists," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 1983, p. 4; *The Armenian Weekly*, July 23, 1983, p. 1; and, *The Armenian Reporter*, November 15, 1984, p. 12.
77. Cited in *New York Times*, July 16, 1983, p. 1.
78. Marvin Howe, "Turks Blame Cypriots for Attacks in Name of Armenians," in *ibid.*, February 28, 1980, p. 3; in addition see, *ibid.*, March 1, 1980, p. 4; *ibid.*, March 13, 1980, p. 2; and, "The 'Armenian Connection' in Bombings," *The Guardian*, December 19, 1979, p. 2.
79. Mumtaz Soysal, "The Trigger and the Finger," (translated and reprinted from the Turkish daily, *Milliyet*), *Turkish News*, April 1980, pp. 20-21.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
81. *Ibid.*
82. *NewSpot: Turkish Digest*, September 3, 1982, p. 2.
83. "Dentas Asks about the Armenian Plots," in *ibid.*, September 10, 1982, p. 6.

84. See the accounts in *New York Times*, February 28, 1980, p. 3; and, David Barchard, "Greek-Armenian," *Special News Bulletin*, August 23, 1980, p. 2.
85. See the press accounts in *New York Times*, August 29, 1982, p. E2; and, *NewSpot: Turkish Digest*, September 10, 1982, p. 2.
86. "Syria, Greece Reportedly Support Armenian Terrorist Groups: Tehran *Alik* in Armenian, 27 August 1983, pp. 2, 7; in *Joint Publications Research Service: Armenian Affairs (JPRS: AR)*, No. 2839, October 20, 1983, p. 3; "Report on Armenian Conference in Lausanne: London *Al-Dustur* in Arabic, August 8, 1983, p. 35," in *ibid.*, No. 2831, October 3, 1983, p. 3; and, *The Armenian Reporter*, September 15, 1983, p. 13.
More recently, see, *The Armenian Reporter*, October 4, 1984, p. 1; and, *ibid.*, November 15, 1984, p. 12.
87. Yusuf Kanli, "Armenian Terrorists Reported Training in Troodos Mountains," *Turkish Daily News*, September 12-18, 1983, p. 15; and, *ibid.*, October 3-9, 1983, p. 3.
88. *Cyprus Bulletin* (issued by the Press and Information Office, Cyprus), April 2, 1983, p. 4; *New York Times*, February 28, 1980, p. 3; and, *ibid.*, March 1, 1980, p. 4.
89. Robert Kaplan, "Armenian Terrorists Find New Bases from Which to Wage Their Battle for a Homeland," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1983, p. 12; *The Armenian Reporter*, March 1, 1984, p. 1; and, *JPRS: AR*, No. 2839.
90. Cited in *JPRS: AR*, No. 2839.
91. *Turkish Daily News*, January 20-26, 1984, p. 1.
92. In addition to the sources cited above, see, *The Armenian Reporter*, September 15, 1983, p. 13; *ibid.*, December 29, 1983, p. 2; *ibid.*, October 4, 1984, p. 1; and, *The Armenian Weekly*, July 30, 1983, p. 8.
93. "Behind the Armenian Terrorists," p. 1.
94. "Briefing" (Ankara), March 28, 1983, p. 8.
95. See *JPRS: AR*, No. 2839.
96. See "The Terrorists," *Wall Street Journal*, September 19, 1983, p. 32.
97. See, for example, the reports in *The Armenian Reporter*, January 5, 1984, p. 1; *ibid.*, May 31, 1984, p. 1; *ibid.*, September 27, 1984, p. 1; and *The California [Armenian] Courier*, October 6, 1983, p. 8.
98. Nalbandian, *Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, p. 173.
99. This and the following are based on "Armenian Groups Reportedly Move Headquarters to Tehran: London *Al-Dustur* in Arabic, September 5, 1983, pp. 19-20," in *JPRS: AR*, No. 2856, November 25, 1983, pp. 27-29.
100. *The Armenian Reporter*, October 4, 1984, p. 15.
101. Cited in *JPRS: AR*, No. 2856.