

tional wisdom, and work by Robert Pape on air power, suggests that barbarism will almost always fail. It would be interesting to know if Toft's data supports this expectation. Second, it would be telling to know why some but not all weak states change to a winning strategy. One might conjecture that strong states have less freedom to shift strategies owing to institutional inertia and size. These factors should be less relevant in weak actors, yet not all of them adopt strategies that maximize their chances of winning.

Notwithstanding the importance of these questions, they also speak to the clarity and quality of Toft's writing. These questions come to mind because the writing is exceptionally clear and the thesis is interesting. The bottom line is that Toft's book is worth reading. It makes an important contribution to our understanding of asymmetric conflict and contributes to a growing literature on the importance of military strategy.

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Weinstein, Jeremy M. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

In *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Jeremy Weinstein provides a detailed empirical investigation into the "micropolitics of rebellion" (p. 38), explicating the link between rebel behavior and rebel leaders' management of both external resources and internal pressures. Although many studies of rebel violence in civil wars focus on the role of opposing state forces in explaining variation in group behaviors, Weinstein argues instead that the use of rebel violence can be explained, in part, by the internal dynamics of such organizations. A key theme underpinning the analyses presented in this book is that insurgent groups are little different from other political organizations and, as such are constrained in their operations from within and without. (p. 51)

The main finding of this book is that rebel organizations that emerge in resource-rich environments tend to commit higher levels of indiscriminate violence, while initially resource-poor organizations are more likely to be selective in their employ of violent behavior against civilians. (p. 7) For Weinstein, the group's initial resource endowment constitutes a significant external constraint on rebel behavior through shaping its membership profile. Internally, the management of the organization's membership is a critical concern. Weinstein classifies rebel organizations into two groups whose constitutions are based upon incentives for individual participation. (pp. 9-11, 204-08) He argues that "activist rebellions" emerge largely in resource-poor environments and so attract

high-commitment individuals who are motivated primarily by ideology. Prone to self-policing through the development of effective norms and stable control structures, these organizations are less likely to engage in wanton violence against civilians. (pp. 204-06) In contrast, “opportunistic rebellions” emerge in resource-rich environments, having attracted low-commitment individuals with the short-term material benefits from participation, rather than social solidarity. Weinstein argues that unchecked individualism plagues these organizations’ ability to develop meaningful control structures to constrain members and contributes to unpunished violence against non-combatants. (pp. 204-05)

Weinstein combines the comparative method with large-N analysis in this book. He first employs process tracing to connect the use of violence against civilians by the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, RENAMO in Mozambique, Peru’s Central Committee of Shining Path, and its offshoot, the Shining Path Regional Committee of Alto Huallaga (Shining Path-CRH). In relating each group’s initial resource endowment to their levels of violence against civilians, Weinstein’s theory is borne out through the case studies. He shows how the Shining Path and NRA, which began as resource-poor movements that recruited members motivated by long-term gains, became activist rebellions that cultivated respect among civilians, while the resource-rich Shining Path-CRH and RENAMO developed into opportunistic movements comprised of myopic, undisciplined members who engaged in heavy violence against non-combatants (pp. 299-300). These findings are augmented by a quantitative analysis of civil wars since 1945, in which the author finds increases in combat-related deaths to be associated with the presence of rebel financing through contraband and external intervention on the rebels’ behalf. (Table 8.1, p. 307)

While Weinstein should be commended for his efforts to provide multi-method support for his arguments, the quantitative analysis is not particularly compelling. First, while Weinstein is interested in the level of civilian deaths attributable to rebel violence, he is confined by data availability to using (admittedly imprecise) measures of aggregate combat-related deaths (pp. 306-07). Additionally, Weinstein only includes variables for a group’s initial economic endowment in his statistical model, although rebel strength was argued to have both a social and an economic component. By omitting a measure of social endowment from the model, the reader is precluded from evaluating previous arguments about the relationship between the social and economic endowments. Finally, while the external intervention variable should speak only to changes in initial strength, it is unclear whether the variable indicates outside sponsorship present only at a group’s inception or if it includes sponsorship offered during the course of conflict. In order to ensure that this variable reflects *initial* capabilities, it would be useful to have controlled for the timing of the intervention.

Nonetheless, the difficulties in empirically testing Weinstein’s arguments are not confined to this study; a scarcity of micro-level quantitative data on the

behavior of rebel organizations during civil wars makes precise statistical testing of such arguments challenging. However, the author deftly leverages the comparative method to describe a logic of rebel violence in civil war that is predicated upon the management of both human and material resources. In doing so, Weinstein provides an excellent contribution to the development of the study of violent rebellion and insurgency.

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Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

In my view, *Understanding Terror Networks* by Marc Sageman is one of the best books on terrorism published in the last 20 years. It offers everything one looks for in a serious academic work: important topic, interesting theory, high quality data, rigorous research design, insightful analysis, non-obvious findings, and significant policy implications. Best of all, *Understanding Terror Networks* is written in clear, accessible prose that ensures its message will be heard by students, scholars, and policy makers alike.

Understanding Terror Networks focuses on the development of the global (*Salafi*) Islamic *jihad*, a movement of fanatical Muslims who use violence to establish a worldwide Islamic state. It includes *al-Qaeda*, which has been at the forefront of the movement, alongside less well-known organizations, such as *Jemaah Islamiya*, which operates in Indonesia and Malaysia, and the *Groupe Islamique Armé* based in Algeria. The movement also includes individuals, like Ramzi Yousef (the 1993 World Trade Center bomber), who are not directly connected to particular organizations. The puzzle is how such a wide-ranging network of individuals and groups all committed to the violent overthrow of the international *status quo* came into existence — a significant question not just for those interested in *al-Qaeda* and its related organizations, but also for those generally interested in the origins of terrorist networks.

Sageman's thesis is that ordinary people, many of whom are not especially fervent Muslims, at least initially, are drawn into the global Islamic *jihad* through connections to others who are themselves linked to people in the larger terror network. (The *jihad*'s core emerged from the cauldron of the Afghan-Soviet war during the late 1980s.) The *jihad*'s attraction is that it provides a sense of belonging and purpose to individuals who are alienated and disconnected from their societies of origin and frustrated by continual underemployment. However, the *jihad* is not open to everyone. Only those that through luck, asso-