1 Since Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the profound transatlantic discord between the United States and most of Europe, it seems popular to predict NATO's demise. It has been written that NATO is now irrelevant; that the foreign policy differences between the United States, France, and Germany renders the alliance useless; or that the increasing military capabilities gap between the United States and Europe is a herald for NATO's collapse. Certainly, a case can be made for each of these assertions. At the same time, Lawrence S. Kaplan's new book provides a challenge to NATO's most recent skeptics, and encourages readers to have historical respect for NATO's longevity, given its record of transatlantic differences that consistently plagued the alliance during the Cold War.

2 As the author of two previous books on NATO and arguably its foremost historian, Kaplan chronicles the history of NATO's internal problems, beginning with the negotiations over Article 5, NATO's collective defense agreement, up to the present differences over Iraq. The majority of the book focuses, however, on Cold War debates. Kaplan is not attempting to unearth new historical data on NATO, but rather is attempting to highlight NATO's complicated history, while implicitly demonstrating its ability to survive.

3 Among the historical clashes that Kaplan addresses are the differences between the United States and Europe over the rearmament of Germany after the Second World War, the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, the United States' decision to cancel its cooperative agreement with the United Kingdom over the Skybolt missile project, the Vietnam War, Europe's distaste for Henry Kissinger and President Jimmy Carter, the Strategic Defense Initiative, among a host of additional political tribulations within the alliance. When faced with Kaplan's long list of transatlantic differences, it is difficult to think of anything but the permanency of "crisis" at NATO.

4 Kaplan is especially instructive on NATO's historical problems between France and the rest of the allies, which produced deep and long-lasting fissures at NATO. Given how willing some modern critics are to predict NATO's demise, it is surprising how few of NATO's skeptics mention the alliance's ability to survive French President Charles de Gaulle and his demands for France's removal from NATO's military wing. Kaplan covers this "Gaullist decade" from 1958 to 1968 exceptionally well.

5 In addition, Kaplan's discussion of Article 5 and its creation is also instructive. Kaplan notes that when the article was under discussion important differences surfaced over how closely the proposed alliance would commit each member-state to mutual defense. Members of the US Congress were also concerned about their constitutional war powers and the potential of losing their own war powers in the North Atlantic Treaty. The eventual agreed-upon language was provided by George Kennan, who ironically was not a supporter of NATO's creation.

6 In recognizing Congress's war powers within the context of an attack upon an ally, Kennan called for the removal of a required "military" response in the treaty. It was replaced with the phrase "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." (p. 4) These changes helped Congress accept the North Atlantic Treaty, but also ostensibly allowed for a degree of individual interpretation regarding a member's own appropriate military response if Article 5 was invoked. Kaplan maintains that the different levels of military support given to the United States after 11 September, in many respects, reflects the actual treaty language agreed to in 1949.

7 The current discussion and American distaste of Europe and Canada's declining defense budgets are also well-placed in historical context. Kaplan addresses the efforts made by Senator Mike Mansfield through much of the 1960s, when he placed considerable diplomatic pressure on the Europeans to increase their defense spending and threatened American ground troop reductions if his conditions were not met. Similarly, Kaplan also discusses the actions taken by Senator Sam Nunn in the 1980s, when Nunn and other congressional supporters called for Europe to invest more in their defenses. In both cases, Europe responded angrily toward congressional demands.

8 Although it is not necessarily Kaplan's main objective, one clear theme that permeates the book is NATO's ability to survive these intense but temporary traumas. Across a host of issues, beginning with its creation, NATO faced internal political disputes, but continues to survive. Kaplan notes that NATO is again at an important crossroads, but given its history of survival and adaptation it remains difficult to discount its future relevance.

9 The book contains perhaps the most exhaustive bibliographic essay on NATO's history published to date. The book's clear strength is its coverage of NATO's Cold War crises. No other work covers this history so succinctly and yet so completely. Kaplan is not as comprehensive in his coverage of NATO's post-Cold War crisis by comparison, yet all of NATO's internal problems, including the allied differences over the first Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, the St. Malo initiatives, up to Iraq, are considered. In sum, Kaplan's historical survey of NATO's dilemmas is outstanding and gives current analysts much to consider about the alliance's ability to adapt internally when the problems in Brussels appear to be insurmountable.

Ryan C. Hendrickson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Eastern Illinois University.