Stylistically, this book has been written exceptionally well. Central themes are woven throughout the book, often in ways that show various angles of a crucial issue. For example, by the end the reader cannot help but have a very good grasp not only of how the military has and has not been used in peacekeeping, but also of how it could and should be used. *Enforcing the Peace* is also quite concise, delving into greater detail only when necessary. The language is neither so technical as to be inaccessible, nor so general as to be vague. There are great little passages at the beginning of each chapter to refocus the reader’s attention and set the tone. The data behind *Enforcing the Peace* is also substantial. Marten’s research took her around the world, from the Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Nova Scotia to NATO headquarters in Belgium. She collected information in Australia, India, and Japan, and she was briefed at both Fort Bragg and US Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo.

Kimberly Zisk Marten has two previous books to her credit, one of which won the Marshall Shulman Prize. Now she has another outstanding piece of work. Insightful, relevant, and succinct, *Enforcing the Peace* is certainly an excellent contribution to peacekeeping studies and deserves unqualified recommendation.

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Bob Cassidy’s book is a must read for all security professionals, including serious thinkers in academe. It is particularly relevant as the US military, specifically the army, is searching for self-identification in the midst of addressing complex security challenges across a wide spectrum. Cassidy lucidly traces the lost opportunity of the 1990s to grapple with post-Cold War challenges including situations that at one time or another were described as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace-making, stability and security operations, low-intensity conflict, etc. Why did the army struggle so with understanding and preparing for its role in myriad contexts and operations?

Cassidy sheds light on this struggle in two ways: first, his book is a comparative look at the British and American experience with what he calls, Armed Humanitarian Operations. Second, he tackles head-on, the military strategic cul-
tures of both the US and British forces manifested in their doctrinal documents over the years. Scholars will find Cassidy’s literature review of strategic and organizational culture useful for surveying a broad scope of knowledge and definitions, but more importantly, it demonstrates the salience of the concept of strategic and organizational culture as a causal variable. By linking it to observable doctrinal pieces, it becomes clear how culture, though hard to quantify or grab hold of, is indeed central to security studies. Cassidy distills the literature review to a digestible, cogent definition of strategic culture: “a set of preferences, values, and beliefs that bounds the rational choices of the acculturated.” (p. 27)

What accounts for the relative success of the British in low-intensity conflicts, such as counterinsurgencies, as compared to the Americans’ rather unsuccessful experience in these types of operations? Cassidy traces the British military experience to its core aim: imperial policing, which “made internal security the norm and conventional war the exception.” (p. 59) This long-term experience provided the British with “experience, appropriate military skill, and flexibility.” (p. 58) This comparative advantage did not come without risks, and those risks centered on the British performance on the continent. However, the British view of war saw counterinsurgency and other internal security operations as the norm and valued minimal force, patience, and perseverance as important qualities for success. In contrast, the American way of war valued big wars. In fact, it is enlightening to revisit the US military’s perspective of Vietnam as an anomaly: the sooner we forget the sooner we can move on to more important matters, such as readying the force for the big one. As a result, the US military lost a huge opportunity for lessons learned from Vietnam.

Using two cases of armed humanitarian operations – of US involvement in Somalia and the British involvement in Bosnia – Cassidy demonstrates how each military’s culture influenced the process and outcome in each situation. For the Americans, Somalia came right after the Persian Gulf War validated the big war syndrome. Somalia cannot be ignored; there are too many lessons learned that must enter US institutional memory: the importance of a Civil Operations Military Center (CMOC), the importance of matching mandate and resources; civil-military relations, etc. For Bosnia, the British emphasis on restraint, impartiality, and consent came naturally. However, the efficacy of this new type of operation came into question: to paraphrase, the urge to do something is not a substitute for policy.

Cassidy’s research is impeccable. His study provides a concise and clearly written source on the roots and thinkers of military strategy, doctrine, and organization. How does an organization change its culture? How does an organization recognize its own biases? A first step is drawing upon the experiences of others. But as Cassidy rightly argues, culture change can only come from the top. How does an organization produce senior leaders who have succeeded in that organization to change? Only a learning organization, one that embraces innovation and creative thinking will adapt and survive. We need generals who listen to
the mavericks, who truly have courage, not just on the battlefield but in the halls of the Pentagon, who value education, who reach out to the other relevant players in the security environment (non-governmental organizations, UN, elements of the interagency, sister services, etc), and who clearly articulate the military’s role in the myriad complex challenges that we face now and in the future.

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Anthony James Joes’ most recent book on guerrilla warfare is written to teach the important elements of counterinsurgency to a primarily American audience. Joes feels counterinsurgency has been ignored by historians who write mainly of great battles and who romanticize the exploits of guerrilla leaders while ignoring the famous commanders of counterinsurgency. Joes also is concerned that although America’s military is likely to be involved in future guerrilla style conflicts, possibly with increasing frequency, American strategists continue to concentrate on the blitzkrieg-style speed and violence that has come to be known as the American way of war. In order to remedy the situation, Joes has written a well-researched guide to counterinsurgency to show that with an intelligent strategy based on historical lessons America can fight and win asymmetrical conflicts.

As Joes admits, no two conflicts are exactly alike, and he pokes fun at those Americans who regularly protest “No More Vietnams.” However, a serious look at history’s many insurgencies, small wars, and asymmetrical conflicts does reveal certain truths about the nature of this type of conflict. The episodes in history covered by Joes begin with the American War of Independence and end with a brief epilogue on the current war in Iraq. Occasionally, Joes travels even farther into the past when he briefly mentions Roman operations in Spain, and “the brilliant exploits” of Judas Maccabeus against the Syrians. The most important truth revealed from history, the one most often forgotten by Americans dazzled by firepower and speed, is that insurgency and counterinsurgency are political phenomena, that victory comes through the restoration of peace, and peace comes from what can best be described as good government. In order to achieve peace one must, Joes says, reintegrate into society its disaffected elements through conservative military tactics, redressing grievances, making amnesty attractive, and erecting a legitimate government. “Its essence is maximum force with minimum