1 Bob Cassidy's book is a must read for all security professionals, including serious thinkers in academe. It is particularly relevant as the US military, specifically the army, is searching for self-identification in the midst of addressing complex security challenges across a wide spectrum. Cassidy lucidly traces the lost opportunity of the 1990s to grapple with post-Cold War challenges including situations that at one time or another were described as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace-making, stability and security operations, low-intensity conflict, etc. Why did the army struggle so with understanding and preparing for its role in myriad contexts and operations?

2 Cassidy sheds light on this struggle in two ways: first, his book is a comparative look at the British and American experience with what he calls, Armed Humanitarian Operations. Second, he tackles head-on, the military strategic cultures of both the US and British forces manifested in their doctrinal documents over the years. Scholars will find Cassidy's literature review of strategic and organizational culture useful for surveying a broad scope of knowledge and definitions, but more importantly, it demonstrates the salience of the concept of strategic and organizational culture as a causal variable. By linking it to observable doctrinal pieces, it becomes clear how culture, though hard to quantify or grab hold of, is indeed central to security studies. Cassidy distills the literature review to a digestible, cogent definition of strategic culture: "a set of preferences, values, and beliefs that bounds the rational choices of the acculturated." (p. 27)

3 What accounts for the relative success of the British in low-intensity conflicts, such as counterinsurgencies, as compared to the Americans' rather unsuccessful experience in these types of operations? Cassidy traces the British military experience to its core aim: imperial policing, which "made internal security the norm and conventional war the exception." (p. 59) This long-term experience provided the British with "experience, appropriate military skill, and flexibility." (p. 58) This comparative advantage did not come without risks, and those risks centered on the British performance on the continent. However, the British view of war saw counterinsurgency and other internal security operations as the norm and valued minimal force, patience, and perseverance as important qualities for success. In contrast, the American way of war valued big wars. In fact, it is enlightening to revisit the US military's perspective of Vietnam as an anomaly: the sooner we forget the sooner we can move on to more important matters, such as readying the force for the big one. As a result, the US military lost a huge opportunity for lessons learned from Vietnam.

4 Using two cases of armed humanitarian operations – of US involvement in Somalia and the British involvement in Bosnia – Cassidy demonstrates how each military's culture influenced the process and outcome in each situation. For the Americans, Somalia came right after the Persian Gulf War validated the big war syndrome. Somalia cannot be ignored; there are too many lessons learned that must enter US institutional memory: the importance of a Civil Operations Military Center (CMOC), the importance of matching mandate and resources; civil-military relations, etc. For Bosnia, the British emphasis on restraint, impartiality, and consent came naturally. However, the efficacy of this new type of operation came into question: to paraphrase, the urge to do something is not a substitute for policy.

5 Cassidy's research is impeccable. His study provides a concise and clearly written source on the roots and thinkers of military strategy, doctrine, and organization. How does an organization change its culture? How does an organization recognize its own biases? A first step is drawing upon the experiences of others. But as Cassidy rightly argues, culture change can only come from the top. How does an organization produce senior leaders who have succeeded in that organization to change? Only a learning organization, one that embraces innovation and creative thinking will adapt and survive. We need generals who listen to the mavericks, who truly have courage, not just on the battlefield but in the halls of the Pentagon, who value education, who reach out to the other relevant players in the security environment (non-governmental organizations, UN, elements of the interagency, sister services, etc), and who clearly articulate the military's role in the myriad complex challenges that we face now and in the future.

Colonel Cindy R. Jebb is Professor and Deputy Head in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy.