

## **Facing the Facts: Peacekeeping's Place Within a Broader Approach to Security**

by  
*Ann Fitz-Gerald*

### **ABSTRACT**

*Although the term “peacekeeping” still remains prominent in conceptual and academic circles, its potency as an immediate post-conflict policy instrument has ceased. So too has the effectiveness of a broad multilateral approach to peacekeeping eroded over the years, only to be replaced by more focused efforts to promote regional peacekeeping and bolster the capacity of the regional organizations to undertake peacekeeping operations. While much literature exists on the limitations of conventional UN peacekeeping and the broader operational roles peacekeepers are now expected to take on, far less has been written on the wider security and development policy that operational mechanisms like peacekeeping are now expected to support in most overseas interventions. Understanding the nature of this support is important for appreciating the new time horizons, new partners and new programs to which today’s “peacekeepers” contribute. Key to this understanding is also the way in which bilateral and multilateral institutional structures have adapted to the “security-development” agenda and have responded in a more unified and strategic way. This article examines the persisting challenges that affect the traditional understanding of peacekeeping and the role of today’s international peacekeeping forces. Secondly, it investigates the way in which broader security and development policy has evolved over the past decade, and describes the institutional changes that have emerged within bilateral and multilateral organizations. Lastly, it explores the legal, bureaucratic, and administrative hurdles that continue to challenge the era of “joined-up” government. Conclusions question whether or not, in such a state of organizational incoherence, international peacekeeping can survive as an effective policy instrument.*

---

**Ann Fitz-Gerald** is Director of the Centre for Managing Security in Transitional Societies, at Cranfield University, the UK Defence Academy.

## INTRODUCTION

While the future of UN (United Nations) and multinational peacekeeping approaches has undergone considerable debate during the past decade, there is still a lack of consensus toward an agreed definition of peacekeeping. Failed peacekeeping missions of the past, as well as those that have left less than workable environments even after intervention periods of five and ten years, continue to suggest that peacekeeping as it is currently defined, cannot serve as a reliable mechanism for a country's defence policy without undergoing serious conceptual transformation. Such transformation must extend from the highest strategic interpretations of peacekeeping, through to its operational concepts on the ground.

This article will review how peacekeeping is now viewed, why the term has become "stigmatized" over the years, and what modern peacekeepers should be expected to contribute to multinational interventions in conflict and failed states. It will then assess the culture of the much spoken "International Community," which shapes the conditions and circumstances under which peacekeeping troops deploy. Categories of blame, which summarize the consolidated lessons learned documents, will then be reviewed to illustrate some of the most significant problems that relate firstly to the resourcing of large-scale operations, and secondly, to the appropriateness of the strategy and approach applied to a given region. The article will propose that the Canadian defence and foreign policy community abandon the term "peacekeeping" and focus instead on articulating the role of the Canadian forces in terms of a much wider security service in which military intervention is but one constituent element. Such an approach can be supported more comprehensively by a coherent "joined-up" government strategy, and uphold the principles of Canada's human security paradigm.

## BACKGROUND

As one of the founding countries of "Pearsonian Peacekeeping," the Canadian defence community needs no descriptive overview of the evolution of peacekeeping as an academic term and operational concept. Suffice to say that during the Cold War years "peacekeeping" defined an approach to military operations that more usefully described armed intervention based on an agreed separation that differed from the posture taken to counter larger threats. However, all Cold War missions were based on a single premise: that Canada's vital interest was the prevention of a nuclear war – an occurrence that would destroy Canada. But such a war could also occur as a result of an escalation of a regional conflict that assumed an East-West dimension. Virtually all did, so Canada was the first to offer its involvement – in Canada's own interests.

But peacekeeping also became used quite frequently, and often irresponsibly, as a tool for reactively responding to regional conflicts that had initially

involved full-scale war-fighting, albeit perhaps between two smaller countries or internal regions, but which had been partially solved through diplomatic efforts and which required some external monitoring assistance to ensure the stability and security through the separation of warring factions.

As these interventions entered more complex territory, where heterogeneous populations and unstable state structures or oppressive regimes characterized the regional landscape, peacekeeping, as defined through Pearsonian lenses, no longer provided appropriate short- or long-term solutions. The UN's "tools for peace," as articulated in the UN documents, *Agenda for Peace* and *Supplement to the UN Agenda for Peace*, compartmentalized peace instruments into such terms as peace-making, peace enforcement, and peace-building. Definitions of these concepts became somewhat unclear and remained open to various national interpretations. In many cases, this led to several UN troop contributors taking their own completely different understanding of these terms into the same theatre of operations. One example may be the American understanding of peacemaking, which involves the use of force; quite contrary to the approach of other countries which subscribe to the UN notion of peacemaking, defined as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations."

Indeed, the approach to past classic peacekeeping interventions relied on the UN Charter's Chapter VI principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in the case of self-defense.<sup>2</sup> These principles and procedures have applied to many other interventions, as far back as the 1956 UN Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed to the Sinai, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFCYP - still stationed there today), the 1992 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, the 1993 UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, and the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

Chapter VI mandates are most common during the earlier and latter stages of a conflict. If a conflict or humanitarian emergency deteriorates to the extent that more robust military action is required, new mandates could be issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force by coercive or non-coercive means.<sup>3</sup> The ratification process behind approving these more robust UN mandates has proven difficult in the past, particularly if it triggers sensitivities for the permanent five UN Security Council members who have the right to exercise a veto. Such a scenario prevailed during early talks on the deployment of military troops to Kosovo, during which time China and Russia each exercised its veto power. As a result, a less than adequate decision was made to pledge political support to an interim "monitoring" mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) – an organization even less poised to engage in military activities than the UN.

Alternatively, an entire operation can be taken over by a "coalition of the willing" or a unilateral single-nation intervention. The American and British-led

“coalition of the willing” in the 1990 and 2003 Gulf Wars, as well as the 1994 US-led Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti, all serve as respective examples of these arrangements. Thus, it is possible to categorize contemporary conflict interventions into the following three types: first, a UN-sanctioned/UN-led operation; second, a UN-sanctioned/regional organization-led operation; or third, an operation led by a “coalition of the willing” or “executive agent” (which often deploys at a speed that precludes immediate UN endorsement). It is important to note that rarely would examples grouped in this latter category be characterized by what we have understood as “peacekeeping” missions. Indeed, they have been more akin to warfighting and enforcement by coercive means.

In the early-to-mid 1990s, academics and policy makers began talking about new closely related terms, such as “multi-dimensional peacekeeping,” “crisis prevention,” and “complex humanitarian emergencies.”<sup>4</sup> All gave recognition to the multi-agency context of peacekeeping and the concurrent roles carried out by the military and civilian agencies, and the requirement for careful coordination. This was partially fuelled by the surge of independently funded NGO’s and civilian agencies that had shifted their traditional focus of development work toward riskier humanitarian interventions, which in effect placed them in closer proximity to military activities.

In 1999, the United Kingdom assumed the lead role within NATO as the declared “Custodian”<sup>5</sup> for the development of doctrine for Peace Support Operations (PSO). This concept was much more far-reaching. It included a spectrum of activities ranging from the most tranquil of monitoring and peacebuilding, based on absolute consent of the host nation, to fractious low-intensity warfighting (referred to more commonly as “peace enforcement”) in failed states where consent was non-existent. According to this new PSO doctrine, all of these environmental circumstances and range of activities could mutate up and down the spectrum and national militaries subscribing to the doctrine needed to ensure a significant degree of adaptability and capability. This doctrine has been promoted and adopted within NATO and UN countries, and has served as the most contemporary concept embracing peacekeeping to date.

Meanwhile, NATO’s “peacekeeping” litmus test in the Balkans encouraged NATO countries to speak more in terms of peace support operations – activities that came to be interpreted as more robust intervention postures than those characterised by traditional UN peacekeeping. NATO’s intervention in Bosnia had, for the first time, offered a regional organization, heralded for its integrated military structure, an opportunity to engage operationally in a type of localized or regional conflict for which it was never configured. This reasonably successful intervention, however, underscored the benefits of outsourcing peace operations to organizations better equipped to respond and less politically constrained to those leading the mission.

## **Questioning the Utility of Traditional Peacekeeping**

However, the current mood in most leading NATO and UN countries is that the age of UN-sanctioned frontline military interventions has passed. The lack of capacity for rapid deployability and the dangerous impact of “political assuaging” on the efficacy of the mission has rendered the UN approach virtually ineffectual. Indeed, the significance of non-traditional deployments, such as the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia (and a similar one in Kosovo), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and countless examples of bilateral and coalition-based interventions in Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Iraq, and Haiti, all suggest that in the future the UN will not be the first “port-of-call” for the sanctioning, much less leading, of military operations.

Conceptually, the term “peacekeeping” has also become increasingly discredited because it assumes the existence of a “peace” to keep; something that is never the case in collapsed and failed states. This was demonstrated only too vividly during the successive rebel attacks on Freetown, Sierra Leone, where UN troops had no mandate to respond and whose role became rather futile without the ability and political backing to engage in more robust counter-attacks. Many military and security analysts also remember the tenuous situation in which the then-UN Force Commander in Rwanda, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, found himself in 1994 when he was left without the authority, manpower, and equipment to stop the slaughter of fellow peacekeepers and Rwandan civilians. This incident, which allegedly involved decisions made in UN Headquarters in New York based on third-hand details of the local situation and which led to inadequate political control over the situation, should have justified numerous calls for a serious review of UN peacekeeping as it was understood at that time.

All Canada’s “Cold War” peacekeeping has been, almost exclusively, Chapter VI-based<sup>6</sup> – an armed intervention with an agreement or truce. However, post-1989 peacekeeping has virtually been all Chapter VII. But the lack of differentiation means that the term “peacekeeping” has been seriously abused, largely because those tasking (as opposed to doing) the operations have been civilian politicians/officials who do not know or appreciate the difference.<sup>7</sup> Pearsonian Chapter VI peacekeeping was driven by a calculating self-interest and not altruistic motivations, moreover, it had a high benefit carried out at a very low cost. Conversely, Chapter VII operations provide very low benefit at a very high cost, a reality that many contributors, collectively, were not prepared to accept.

There is now “silent agreement” within the international community that our militaries serve in a much more flexible and credible era of bilateral and coalition engagement. This allows for more timely deployments, fewer political constraints imposed on the engagement, and more collective commitment within the responding community. Whilst these models still accommodate the work of UN agencies and, in later more tranquil stages, the intervention of UN-pooled

regional peacekeeping forces, they are initiated by much clearer and coherent strategies providing for greater damage limitation at earlier stages.

## **The Culture of the International Community**

Numerous studies and reports reviewing lessons learned from various peacekeeping missions have underscored problems relating to resources, mandates, political “buy-in,” and the behavior of troop contributors on the ground.<sup>8</sup> However, because these studies are almost always commissioned by the organizations that committed these errors, recommendations do little more than propose changes within existing institutional frameworks, the magnitude of which falls short of the bold change required. In addition, the reports are often imbalanced and reflect the performance of the external peacekeepers/institutions only, without discussing the difficulties posed by the host population and the roots of these difficulties. Common to all reports is criticism toward the international culture that still hangs behind each engagement. Such culture focuses on short-term agendas and remains largely incompatible with the norms and local approaches found within these largely southern hemispheric problems.

The first problem cited within critiques of most peacekeeping missions is the lack of political imperative that provides the impetus to engage militarily. Funds to support peace operations and war-fighting are always subject to the political priorities of the day, or the “crisis du jour.” Such has been observed in the United States where the US National Security Strategy of the Clinton administration was simply a consolidation of Presidential Directives on National Security (PDNS), all of which ceased to exist with any change in administration. It is entirely acceptable that strategic government policy will change subject to new governing regimes. However, a reasonable degree of consistency, based on a widely subscribed to idea of “national security interests,” should be employed regarding priorities for engagement.

The political dimension stimulates the need for “quick fixes” to conflicts and failed states – fixes that cannot be sustained because we, as the international community, as well as the recipient country or region, lack the frameworks to transform these quick fixes into longer-term sustainable solutions. This sub-standard commitment only leads to the resurgence of problems in the short-term, similar to those that re-emerged in Haiti after only 10 years had passed since the initial wide-scale international effort.

In failed states and transitional societies, there is no room for the concept of “quick fixes.” Issues, such as factional, ethnic, and religious hatred, internal geographical barriers to reconciliation, gender issues and anti-corruption practices essential for democratic governance, and many other areas for reform, all require *generational* change. These longer-term time horizons must be supported by strategic planning processes as well as separate change management pro-

grams, the operational imperatives for which should impact the job of the peacekeeper on the ground. The Canadian government's commitment in February 2004 to the 90-day deployment of troops to Haiti in response to a massive regime upheaval and civil strife, will add little value to the overall peace-building and reconstruction agenda. More likely, it will fuel more resentment in the longer-term and could compromise any further international responses to the security and development problems.

Many past peacekeeping missions have been criticized for having the wrong mandate. This problem becomes exacerbated for those national military contributors who choose to exercise their own interpretation of what the mandate should be and how the mandate should be protected. Canadian Forces operating in Haiti under the auspices of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) became quite isolated when Canadian troops arrived with a different Rules of Engagement (ROE) card than those of their multinational counterparts.<sup>9</sup> Deployed during the aftermath of a unfortunate debacle in Somalia, Canada's political masters effectively constitutionally "tied" the hands of their soldiers so as to avoid a repeat of the events in East Africa where troops from the Airborne Regiment were found to have behaved inappropriately in their treatment of Somali civilians.

Since the official political handover to Iraqi authorities by the multinational military coalition in June 2004, different national military approaches are beginning to impact on the degree of insurgent activity around key areas, as well as confidence-building measures, which the coalition had sought to build. American-led responses to the insurgent activity around the Iraqi towns of Fallujah and Najaf in the summer and autumn of 2004 have been described as "top heavy" and disproportionate to the threat. In response to the heavy shelling of the town's main mosque and religious center, a former UK Foreign Secretary said of the Americans: "Whenever they fly over these townships and fire missiles into these areas, they are convincing everyone that they are the enemy . . . we need to try to adopt a policy of peacekeeping and minimum force and try to defuse the situation rather than letting the situation spiral out of control."<sup>10</sup>

Meanwhile, in more southern areas, such as Basra and Az-Ubayr Port, the British Army's "soft walk but with a big stick" approach seems to yield more effective results in containing the violence. No doubt, the relevance of principles taken from post-colonial and Northern Ireland "police-keeping" experiences carry great applicability in response to the security vacuum in Iraq. General Sir Michael Jackson, current UK Chief of the General Staff, summarized with the following comment: "We must be able to fight with the Americans. This does not mean that we will fight as the Americans."<sup>11</sup>

These observations suggest that answers to the following questions are desperately required: From where should the most suitable troops contributors within multinational peace operations be drawn, with whom should they be partnered, and to where should they be deployed? In some cases, the American "top

heavy” approach, as well as the approaches of those with more military capability, such as the French Foreign Legion, has been necessary at the front-end of a peacekeeping operation to defuse a significant degree of violence and instil credibility, but completely unnecessary and should be discouraged during the latter stages, when a commitment to local dynamics needs to be evident.

These three areas of “blame” – wrong mandates, wrong troop contributors, and the wrong approach – normally characterized by “short-termism” and “quick fixes,” should not serve as reasons for calling into question the contemporary notion of peacekeeping and why it has failed. But whilst substandard and ill-defined efforts have often characterized the approach of peacekeeping missions in failed and post-conflict states, the resistance shown by some host populations toward the external interventionists almost precludes attaining the most desirable outcomes, even for the most militarily effective multilateral peacekeeping force. In this context, it is important to balance the blame between those providing the assistance and those for whom such assistance is meant.

Clearly, the donor community cannot be all things to all people at all times. Limited resources preclude the indiscriminate and widespread use of national military, development, and diplomatic assets except in regions where national interests are clearly at stake or where surplus capacity exists to assist allies. The resulting compromise often means commitment to only short deployment periods and insufficient thought toward a follow-on capability. The deployment of Canadian Forces for the first phase of the Afghanistan deployment to Kandahar in October 2002, which amounted to a term of six months, serves as an example.<sup>12</sup>

The other side of the argument sympathizes with the host communities who show a degree of resistance to the assistance that, ironically, they so desperately need. However, countries like Ethiopia have repeatedly suffered the effects of external interventions according to Western templates and Western ideals – an approach that made the after-effects of the 1993 drought much more severe. This natural disaster later precluded the Ethiopian government from agreeing to a \$30 million aid “package” offered by the World Bank in 1998. In other cases, such as in Haiti, Bosnia, and elsewhere, Western tools for ending conflict have not always proven to be compatible with requirements for a long-lasting peace. This begs the question “if not the West, or the willing and able donor states, then who?”

Thus, there is a convergence of resistance forces from both sides of the intervention spectrum; resistance from Western military contributors who, quite understandably, do not wish to commit forces for long periods of time in areas that are not integral to their national interests, and resistance from the host population, who feel chided and demeaned by imposed foreign solutions which, with more regional knowledge and a longer-term operational commitment, they might be able to do better themselves. Addressing this double-edged problem first requires a firm understanding of what peacekeeping should be and who should do it.

## **What Peacekeepers Should Be Expected to Provide**

Peacekeeping should not be viewed as a concept in itself. It should be seen as an essential element of a much wider security service that seeks to improve the security and safety of people, allowing them the freedom to go about their daily lives. In failed and transitioning states, security in its widest sense must be addressed by anyone seeking to provide assistance to these regions. In this context, two levels of security must be underscored: state security and human security. The state security provisions are protectionist in nature and involve all the uniformed and non-uniformed (statutory and non-statutory) officials authorized to use force, as well as those tasked with overseeing their activities. This would include the relevant ministries and offices within the executive branch charged with managing and monitoring the security forces, such as the ministries of defence, finance, internal and foreign affairs, national security councils, and budget and audit offices, as well as security sectoral representatives within the justice and penal systems.

Thus, any external intervention seeking to improve security and safety must address security at the state level, perhaps in the form of institutional reform, training, or mentoring, as well as at the human security level. As far as the latter is concerned, peacekeepers deployed to certain localities can do just this – instil local populations with the confidence they require to sustain their allegiance to the international effort and not re-align this allegiance with the key perpetrators of the conflict. However, for local populations disillusioned with inappropriate international approaches that do not seek to respond to the immediate security threats, such as the “top-heavy” approaches referred to in previous sections, or the apathy often displayed by other national contributors, support can easily be withdrawn.

No matter where on the peacekeeping spectrum any particular national military is positioned, it must understand peacekeeping as a constituent element of a wider security equation, and the operational and policy implications that flow from this. Firstly, the provision of military assistance to a failed state also requires institutional assistance. Despite the public disdain usually shown toward post-conflict armed groups, particularly those responsible for the country’s security problems, it is still important to remain committed to the development of a local democratic and accountable military during post-conflict peace operations. This not only requires the provision of military training teams to retrain armed forces to be capable of defending a nation’s external security interests, but also a commitment to the institutional reform of a country’s ministry of defence, or whatever institution oversees the conduct of the uniformed officials. As one official who recently facilitated the Ugandan Defence Review said, “You could have the most competent and capable armed forces but what good are they if there is no one to control them?”

Because bloody conflict and fighting is almost always characteristic of a failed state's civil problems, it often precludes unarmed civilian interventionists from entering a theatre of operations. This implies that an external military force assumes overall security responsibilities for a certain period of time. Beyond the military's primary remit lies a host of wider security responsibilities demanding attention at the earliest opportunity. Some of these responsibilities include addressing the immediate security vacuum created by a lack of internal security forces who may have been marginalized and deprived, or even rendered completely futile under the ruling armed forces or powerful rebel groups; creating an interim justice system to hold perpetrators to account, and introducing a disincentive for continued fighting, disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) ex-combatants, their wives, and families, all of whom may wish to renounce their combatant status in exchange for a new life; and creating a civil society that has a voice in security issues.

This broader approach to security – and the acknowledgement of peacekeeping's contribution to it – carries wider implications for national militaries contributing to peace operations. Whilst initial interventions must work to defuse the violence, immediate post-conflict activities that follow must consider these numerous other “strands” of security.<sup>13</sup> This is not to say that the military should be left to “mission creep” that creates new roles that fall outside their core competencies, but that it must recognize the wider security roles necessary for a failed state to function and realize the impact of its contribution to each of these areas. This requires careful and coherent strategic planning that envisions a national security “endstate” in a country – one that will provide the requisite amount of human and state security to allow people to go about their daily lives in a safe and secure way.

Countries partnering to provide external military assistance to another country must consider all consequences of a military intervention that will stop the conflict and bring about an interim peace. From a peace support perspective, this implies that peacekeeping troops work to support provisions of an agreement that has the particular country's (or region's) interests in mind. If, for example, one provision of the peace agreement is to disband external security forces in order to build a new army, peacekeepers should be committed to institutional reform of the entire defence establishment and not just to the reform of the uniformed personnel. This may result in the mentoring of senior staff officers or the training of a senior civil service cadre. In addition, ex-combatants formerly aligned with nonstate actors should, if desired and if in their interests, be considered as potential military recruits in the country's new armed forces. Similarly, some of these disarmed combatants may also be recruited and retrained in a country's new police force, thus implying the need for peacekeepers to cooperate with other security agents. Establishing rule of law on the ground is absolutely essential for confidence-building amongst the local populations.

Later on in the peace operation attention must be channelled toward further developing a country's civilian oversight capacity to ensure democratic approaches to security survive the longer-term. For example, those providing external assistance must demonstrate a commitment toward retraining parliamentarians leading defence and security committees – those who should be responsible for posing well-informed arguments and questions to a country's elected representatives. In addition, a country's media capacity must also be retrained to play more of a role in defence and security affairs, and to carry out "investigative" rather than "sensationalized" media reporting. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local academic think-tanks should be supported to develop the capacity required to influence all areas of security policy and thus feed into a national security strategy reflecting what is best for the nation.

In the past, responsibility for this broader security role has been left to the development community. As a result, dangerous temporal and spatial disconnects emerged between those tasked with carrying out "defence" and street-level security functions, and those coming into theatre to support wider development programs. However, there is now widespread recognition that security is necessary for development and vice versa. This realization has fuelled the impetus behind more comprehensive "joined-up" government approaches in many Western donor countries well accustomed to providing overseas assistance. Such an approach has involved the merger of all security-related departments (defence, development, and foreign affairs functions) under the broader remit of conflict prevention to provide more holistic approaches to overseas assistance, and the relationship between security and development.

The rise of development policy and the exertion of its power in parallel with traditional approaches to security has further underscored the need for local ownership, regional solutions to regional problems, and other variables contributing to a longer-term and sustainable peace and security agenda. Thus, "joined-up" government has encouraged a stronger commitment toward local capacity-building amongst all those departments with an interest in security, albeit not without some institutional problems. This has encouraged donor funding during post-conflict and development phases to shift into the hands of indigenous organizations, drawing on international groups only for facilitation and training purposes.

This capacity-centred approach must also influence the immediate post-conflict agenda and the role of indigenous security forces for confidence-building purposes. Such a process should be influenced by national coalitions who have a genuine interest in a long-term peace and the local knowledge to influence the process, including an approach compatible with the existing cultural foundations and state infrastructure.

## **Regional Solutions to Regional Problems**

Regional problems should be responded to with regional solutions, even if regional assets do not lead in the provision of resources required for more regionally-tailored solutions. However, what should drive an intervention is the regional knowledge and the regional commitment to a sustainable solution to a sub-regional or perhaps to a country's internal problems. During recent discussions with representatives from the South African Ministry of Defence,<sup>14</sup> it was revealed to the author that, whilst the UK and other Commonwealth partners providing assistance to defence reform programs had felt very strongly about the South Africans adopting UK-based models and military doctrine, the South Africans uncovered great dangers in this idea. One such example included the fact that torrential rainfalls in the sub-Sahara region were an environmental reality for national militaries, an environmental reality that is not even mentioned in the doctrinal manuals of those countries offering assistance but something that greatly affected the South African Defence Force's military tactics.

There are currently a number of regional and sub-regional organizations that serve as the key mechanisms to support the peace and security agenda in different parts of the world. The regional and sub-regional organizations located in the southern hemisphere, such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have not, until recently, been equipped with adequate resources and decision-making frameworks to sanction and deploy regional peacekeeping missions. However, an organization like the Organization of American States (OAS), whose membership straddles both the northern and southern hemispheres, has proven reasonably useful for peace-building purposes in Haiti where it was able to draw on the riches of the north and the knowledge of the south. Had the joint UN-OAS mission in Haiti not been plagued by such a dominant UN political influence, an abundance of short-term expectations, and, as a result, a less than adequate outcome, an acceptable regional solution to a regional problem may have developed.

These organizations tend to form due to their members' mutual interests in regional security and development. All possess protocols and declarations committing their respective memberships to regional peace and security agenda, and citing the means through which this will be achieved. The AU's Peace and Security Council, ECOWAS's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping and Security, and CARICOM's Crime and Security Committee all serve as examples. Whilst these organizational mechanisms have come under severe criticism for not developing better operational means to respond to regional conflicts, this is primarily due to a lack of resources. In addition, a regional organization such as the AU, that spans the membership of almost the entire African continent, suffers from similar political setbacks as the UN due to the disparate interests of its members. For example, recent discussions and decisions concerning the foreseen

African Standby Force will continue to be stymied by the need to carefully manage Libya's position in these negotiations, particularly Libyan President Mu'ammarr Ghadaffi's vision of serving as commander-in-chief of the force; clearly something that the majority of the African countries are firmly against.

The May 1997 deployment of the Nigerian-dominated ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Sierra Leone was mandated to use whatever force was necessary to implement the provisions of the Abidjan Peace Agreement. This served as one of the first examples of a regional solution to a regional problem. ECOMOG engaged with the *de facto* leadership, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (responsible for launching the May 1997 military coup), in negotiations in providing assistance to a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program and continued monitoring. Whilst not ideal, this interim solution provisionally made up for the UN Security Council's failure to support an appeal to provide a security presence to support the implementation of the peace agreement. Moreover, after sending an unarmed observer mission into Freetown in February 1998, the UN demonstrated its lack of utility when it was evacuated during the rebel alliance attempts to take back Freetown, an effort that was eventually countered by ECOMOG forces. Still grappling with inadequate solutions and following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the UN deployed the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), from which 500 peacekeepers were soon lost to hostage-takers.

Although many elements of the military intervention in Sierra Leone did not go well and a number of lessons can be learned from this intervention, other "good practices" must also be identified. "Regionalizing" the intervention in Sierra Leone prior to "internationalizing" the assistance proved enormously helpful in promoting security and stability throughout the West African region, and had a significant impact on the containment of the problems. Besides the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force in 1998 and the subsequent contribution the Nigerian government made to the UNAMSIL force, other bilateral efforts in the area reinforced this approach. For example, discussions with the government of Guinea prepared Guinean forces to meet rebel groups attempting to penetrate the shared border, which sent a powerful message to the RUF concerning the support to the international community offered by Sierra Leone's neighbors. In addition, efforts to implement UN sanctions on Liberia reinforced ongoing attempts to break ties between Liberian leader Charles Taylor and the RUF. This was supported by the creation of an International Contact Group (ICG) on Liberia, including France, Monrovia, Senegal, Britain, Nigeria, the UN, and ECOWAS, which also sought to create stability in the sub-region and find a resolution between Liberia's government forces and the rebel groups. Reinforcing this work at the international level were efforts to keep the conflict in Sierra Leone high on the agenda of the UN Security Council. Lastly, the US government-led Kimberly Process, which sought to combat the conflict diamond trade through the implementation of a global rough diamond certification system, mitigated the problem of diamonds providing an incentive for violence.

The response to the resurgence of conflict in Haiti should also have provided a clear case for regional organizations, like CARICOM or the OAS, to be engaged as the lead agent but with assistance from others. Like Africa, many Latin American and Caribbean countries cannot, even collectively, fund a large-scale military deployment much less the work of indigenous civilian agencies. However, as these groups do bring the local knowledge that garners trust, more effort must be made toward developing regional and sub-regional capacity for groups of states with direct national security interests in these conflict regions. In this case, and so long as funding allowed, interest would not wane as quickly as the impetus driving an international intervention, particularly in the most remote areas in Africa, which become quickly forgotten about.

### **Implications for Canada and the Canadian Forces**

Canada's Human Security Programme provides an excellent foundation that recognizes the critical link between security and development. It identifies the five pillars upholding this paradigm as the protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety – all of which feed into a much wider notion of democratic security. Operationalizing a holistic approach to these pillars will be the main challenge for Canada, and will require a fully functional joined-up government approach at the strategic and operational levels.

The constituent elements of Canada's "3D" model composed of defence, development and diplomacy also serve as the country's three main instruments of foreign policy. Such a policy implies the cross-departmental cooperation between National Defence, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The "3-D" concept is modelled on similar national efforts to establish more "whole of government" or "joined-up government" approaches to address a wider spectrum of security policy issues that are closely linked to development priorities. During the May 2004 opening of the Diplomatic Forum in Toronto, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peter Harder, described the model as a "second priority in the current transition [of government] that places greater emphasis on horizontal thinking."

However, many have questioned whether or not the much-needed 3-D approach stops at that "thinking." In practice, there is no joined-up pool of resources from which to manage joined-up planning. Such an incomplete strategy precludes strategic thinking at the highest levels, which, ironically, should be the primary aim of such an exercise. Without any resources, Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC) can exert minimal influence on CIDA. Similarly, while posing at the robust end of the foreign policy spectrum, the lack of resources within the Department of National Defence (DND) limits meaningful and long-term operational impact. This point became only too evident with the February 2004 commitment of Canadian troops to Haiti for an initial period of only 90 days.<sup>15</sup> The

pledge was issued at the same time as reports suggesting that all branches of the Canadian military say they lack the resources for major international expeditions.<sup>16</sup>

Clearly, joined-up resources necessary to enact a joined-up government strategy are still an issue. At present, CIDA manages a multi-billion dollar discretionary fund, which is restricted by two things. First of all, Canada's membership in the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) implies a commitment to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) criteria.<sup>17</sup> These criteria include a remit to deliver development aid in a secure and safe environment and, arguably, are in need of serious revision that reflects the realities of failed and post-conflict states, as well as the debate surrounding the security-development nexus.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, the strategic mantra governing CIDA speaks laudably about enhancing aid effectiveness through poverty reduction and by contributing to a more secure environment. However, Canada's involvement assumes some degree of absorptive capacity within the recipient country and a reasonable degree of stability and security in order for it to carry out its programs. This precludes involvement in anything but secure and stable theatres of operations, and poses significant limitations on the use of the discretionary fund for the defence and diplomacy pillars of 3-D. Thus, investing in vulnerable countries seems counter to CIDA's strategic agenda, which, again, is underscored by Canada's recent decision to intervene in Haiti.<sup>19</sup>

However, all is not lost within the 3-D approach. The idea itself is encouraging shared discussions and analysis. This has emerged not only from a recent "joint" scoping mission by all three departments in Haiti but also by a similar approach taken toward Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the picture is still incomplete without the joint planning, joint policy, joint implementation, and joint endstate.

For an effective, joined-up government approach to prevail, a country must first evaluate its foreign policy and determine what joined-up mechanisms are required to achieve foreign policy goals or elements thereof. Former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin's recent announcement of a foreign policy review has no doubt come at a critical time. However, even before foreign policy goals are established, national interests must be clearly articulated to determine the foreign and domestic policy means by which these national interests must be protected, pursued, and projected, at home and abroad.

The articulation of national interests will also strike at the heart of Canadian defence policy. Serving as the key instrument of foreign policy, DND must carry out horizon forecasting to identify areas where national security interests are at stake and how the Canadian Forces can be deployed to defend these interests. Strategic defence analysts should also identify potential partners with similar national security interests for the sake of joint planning, forecasting, and risk management. In areas where collective interests are at stake, the government must be very clear on its goals and aspirations for that particular region, as well

as the mechanisms it may draw on to achieve these goals. As these mechanisms will no doubt include the services of regional and sub-regional organizations, Canada's defence policy will have to commit to strengthening the capacity of these organisations so that they may respond to these requirements.

Under the "peace support operations" pillar of Canada's Human Security Program, a commitment is made to support capacity-building initiatives at the UN.<sup>20</sup> However, arguments drawn from earlier sections of this article support the need for strengthening regional and sub-regional organizations, whose capacity will drive future peace operations. The same implication can be drawn from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's (ICISS) report entitled, *The Responsibility to Protect*. The report recognizes that, while sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from unavoidable catastrophe, when they are unable or unwilling to do so the responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.<sup>21</sup> It also asserts that "regional and sub-regional organizations should also contribute their experiences and plans to this global effort [of conflict prevention]" and suggests that the UN be used as a repository of best practice tools and strategies.<sup>22</sup>

Also at the strategic level is the issue of addressing the contribution defence makes to, and derives from, a "joined-up" government structure. Under a wider security remit, which responds to the strategic mandates and concerns of each department, the defence community must ensure that policy and programs facilitated by such a joined-up structure will enable it to meet its more specific objectives. At the moment, overseas military assistance would support two of the three primary roles for the Canadian Forces:

- The protection of Canadian sovereignty and territorial integrity in the context of cooperative security within North America;
- Aid to the civil authority in Canada; and
- Contributing to international peace and security.

As far as the first (and to a lesser degree, the third) priority is concerned, Canada is currently cooperating with the UK and the US in facilitating the development of Jamaica's first comprehensive national security strategy. This serves as a more recent example of an institutional commitment to providing overseas military assistance that simultaneously enhances defence relations and encourages interoperability with partners. As one of the expected priorities arising from the Jamaican national security development process will be Jamaica's role as a military leader among CARICOM member states, the process will stimulate the regional capacity-building process. Whilst hindsight is always a brilliant concept, had this process been undertaken within a few key Caribbean states as a security-development exercise to bolster the Caribbean's regional security capacity following the 1994 conflict in Haiti, the response there today may have been different. Sadly, a lack of strategic foresight within the wider donor community did not render this as an option.

The third priority area for the Canadian Forces – contributing to international peace and security – is where a defence contribution under a wider security remit can help encourage more sustainable solutions. Ensuring an appropriate security landscape to deal with issues, such as disarmament, human rights, democracy, and development, requires joint planning and programming among those departments dealing with the security-development nexus. Similarly, national and regional partners must also be engaged at all levels that feed into a broader concept of security. Such an approach can help contribute to international peace and security in a way that best suits the area in question.

Thus, joined-up government mechanisms addressing wider approaches to security, as well as a more coordinated and well-developed commitment to national and regional partners based on a clear articulation of Canada's national interests, and how these should be defended abroad, must influence the way in which Canada approaches a broader subject in which peace support operations (as opposed to peacekeeping) form one constituent element. Approaching peace support operations in this way enables one to identify areas of potential engagement leading to longer-term solutions.

At the operational level of engagement, the Canadian Forces must export their rich experiences and peacekeeping pedigree in the form of training and capacity-building, in addition to providing uniformed soldiers in areas where little or no capacity exists. Through its commitment to initial officer training programs, and higher command and staff college courses, run from military training institutions in Kingston and Toronto respectively, Canada can continue to help educate global partners whose knowledge will be subsequently promoted back home. Similarly, DND could sponsor export courses that preserve Canada's brand name as a leading peace support nation, and offer opportunities to promote these values and conceptual approaches to relevant regional partners. Alumni-tracking mechanisms could help measure the impact and evaluate the effectiveness of the training, which would be much more cost effective than running a dedicated college or peacekeeping centre. Arguably, a "virtual" or "modular" export approach taken by the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre may serve as an appropriate vehicle in implementing this concept. Such types of initiatives would warrant funding under a joined-up pool of government funds, as contributing to the professionalization of security forces within partner countries and regions, only supports the diplomatic and development agendas. Moreover, such coordination ties peacekeeping in with other relevant and parallel issues that characterize the relationship between security and development.

The Canadian Forces must also build on their current doctrine and concepts so that peace support operations, in the context of a much wider security "service," are reflected in all aspects of professional development. Campaign planning tools, such as lines of activity and decision points, must appreciate wider security governance issues, such as rule of law and democratic governance of the security sector. Presenting these concepts within a new doctrinal frame-

work will encourage soldiers working toward a defined end state to appreciate the national security end state their efforts are seeking to support. In addition, it will educate them on the roles and responsibilities of other actors contributing to wider security issues who may act as intermediaries along various lines of activity but beyond where a military lead may cease.<sup>23</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the need for the conceptual transformation of peacekeeping as it is currently defined, Canada's rich experience as a leading contributor to peace support operations and the academic debate, must continue to benefit global thinking on the subject, as well as the future operational effectiveness of Canada's national and regional partners. This will require a strategic approach that includes the following imperatives:

- Gaining agreement at the Privy Council level of the government on how Canada's national interests should be defined;
- Identifying priority partner countries and regional/sub-regional organizations that have similar national interests and who may choose to defend these interests through the use of similar mechanisms, and setting up working committees responsible for capacity-building in different regions and sub-regions;
- Assessing the implications of the above for the Canadian Forces and determining how security issues requiring military responses to overseas priorities may benefit from a "joined-up" government approach for more sustainable solutions;
- Bringing together all relevant departments with an interest in security (under the existing "3-D" concept), agreeing on wider strategic objectives that tie in with Canada's overseas priorities, as well as a centrally controlled budget to support this work from which all departments can draw funds;
- Creating a unit within DND that would serve as the key interlocutor with the other security relevant departments and fall under a guise of "Defence Relations" or "Defence Diplomacy" – a term which defines the role of defence within a wider security remit;
- Within the strategic objectives of the joined-up government structure, identify contributions to the security-development nexus that would fall under the remit of peacekeeping (newly conceptualized);
- Abandoning the term "peacekeeping" within all Canadian government policy organs and developing a new Canadian policy/concept paper on peace support operations (or a similar term of choice) – this paper

should clearly articulate how Canada's approach to peace support operations supports Canada's Human Security Programme and the objectives of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; and

- Outlining operational imperatives necessary to reach these strategic objectives (officer training, doctrine development, export courses, mentoring with national and regional partners, capacity-building with regional/sub-regional organizations and civil society).

## Endnotes

1. Pearsonian peacekeeping characterizes the approach Lester B. Pearson, former Canadian prime minister, supported toward multinational military interventions and originated with his contribution to resolving the Suez Crisis in the autumn of 1956. For a more comprehensive account of the background to Pearsonian peacekeeping and the principles that underpinned the concept, see Alex Morrison "Pearsonian Peacekeeping: Does it have a future or only a past," in *Journal of Conflict Studies* 23, no. 13 (2003).
2. See *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: United Nations, 1994), p. 19.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
4. See John Mackinlay, ed., *A Guide to Peace Support Operations* (Providence, RI: Brown University, 1996). See also John Mackinlay and Randolph Kent, "Complex Emergencies Doctrine: The British are still the Best," *RUSI Journal* (April 1997).
5. It is customary for NATO to create Working Parties/Groups, Panels, or Custodians to lead on certain areas of policy development.
6. With the exception of Korea, which would have been described as Chapter VII peacekeeping.
7. For instance, the idea to initially issue UNPROFOR forces deploying to Bosnia in 1992 with a Chapter VII mandate was driven purely by the lack of consent required to deploy Chapter VI peacekeeping troops and not by the threat on the ground (i.e., Bosnia was not yet recognized as an independent country, thus consent had to be given by "Yugoslavia," whose central government was still controlled by Serbia). As a result, the decision to deploy was made using a Chapter VII argument but troops were only equipped with Chapter VI "tools" to stop the fighting.
8. See J. Borton, E. Brusset, and A. Hallam, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, Study 3. (Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. 87-105, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1996). *A Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned on the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)*, found at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/UNOSOM.pdf>; *The Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping Reform*, found at [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/report.htm](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm). One government-sponsored report that did go farther in recommending greater institutional change required for peacekeeping reform was Nicola Dahrendorf, ed., *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change* (London: King's College, London University, 2003).
9. In Haiti, shortly after the transition to the UN-led operation in 1995, Canada was forced to modify its interpretation of the UN rules of engagement (ROE) in order to protect a group of Canadian hydro workers who had been commercially contracted to restore electricity to the capital city of Port-au-Prince. When a warehouse they were working in came under paramilitary

fire, Canadian troops had to request permission from the highest authorities to use force to deter the attack. The existing Canadian ROEs only permitted the troops to use force “in the case of self-defence” due to Canada’s insistence on the removal of “. . . and in defence of property” from the same clause prior to deployment of troops. The ROEs were later modified to include the use of force in the case of self defence “and also in defence of the mandate,” which could justify the protection of the Canadian civilians.

10. “Cook: Iraq Strategy is Failing,” *Guardian*, 8 April 2004, p. 2.
11. Richard Norton-Taylor, “General Hits out at US tactics,” *The Daily Telegraph*, 26 April 2004, p. 2.
12. As part of Operation APOLLO, in January 2002 Canada also sent a battle group of about 750 soldiers to Kandahar in Afghanistan to assist US troops in roles ranging from reconnaissance to combat. The reconnaissance troops were equipped with Coyote vehicles specifically requested by US forces. During the six months of the battle group’s operations in Afghanistan, four Canadian soldiers on training exercises were killed by US “friendly fire” when fighter pilots dropped bombs during an active patrol. See Ken Epps, “Canadian troops in Afghanistan,” *Ploughshares Monitor* (Winter 2003).
13. General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, UK Armed Forces, used this term at a conference on the military intervention in Kosovo where he likened all aspects of a broader peace support mission to strands of a rope, which in the end must be woven together harmoniously for a stronger, more comprehensive end state. The term is now widely used in the military doctrine community. General Sir Mike Jackson, speaking at Eynsham Hall, Oxford, 21 September 1999. See also Stephanie A. Blair, *Weaving the Strands of the Rope: A Comprehensive Approach to Building Peace in Kosovo* (Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, September 2002).
14. Based on discussions at the African Security Networking meeting, held in Maputo, Mozambique, June 2004.
15. However, this deployment was later extended under a new UN-led six-month plan for Haiti. For more information, see “UN to take over Haiti peacekeeping mission,” *Toronto Star*, 2 June 2004.
16. Kevin Cox and Tu Tanha ha, “Canada Commits to Haiti,” *Globe and Mail*, 6 March 2004.
17. See <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf>.
18. For more information, see a range of publications housed within the International Peace Academy’s (IPA) Security and Development Nexus Programme, found at [http://www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseSecDev\\_body.htm](http://www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseSecDev_body.htm).
19. These thoughts on joined-up government have also been argued by the author in an unpublished Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) paper entitled “The Nexus between Security and Development: Implications for Joined-Up Government.”
20. See Canada’s Human Security Programme, found at <http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/pso-en.asp>.
21. See ICISS’s report entitled “The Responsibility to Protect,” found at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp>.
22. *Ibid.*
23. The issue of police reform in Sierra Leone serves as an excellent example of where a number of other intermediaries cooperated with the international peacekeeping forces during the drawdown of military responsibilities. Following the initial military lead in this area, a Commonwealth Police Task Force was formed to lead on police reform, an arrangement that was later augmented by the contribution of the UN Civilian Police Force (UNCIVPOL). Due to a lack of capacity, the contribution of each intermediary was necessary before power could be handed over to the indigenous police force.