

particularly among university students, by being published in a paperback edition in addition to the hardback version.

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Brzoska, Michael, and Frederic S. Pearson. *Arms and Warfare: Escalation, De-escalation and Negotiation*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.

Arms and Warfare endeavors to assess the effects of arms shipments to war zones on the course and outcome of the conflicts concerned. It does this principally through an extensive set of case studies drawn from wars fought during the past 30 years. In doing so it draws a number of significant and, in some respects, unexpected conclusions.

Most studies of the effects of arms transfers on conflicts are concerned with the build-up of armaments before the conflicts break out, and there is often an assumption that these processes are instrumental in creating the conditions for war. This book, by contrast, is concerned with the impact of arms transfers *after* the outbreak of war. Furthermore, the conflicts selected are among those which are less clearly affected by the East-West divide, though in almost all cases there is some impact.

Eleven wars are examined, ranging from the Indo-Pakistan conflicts of 1965 and 1971 through to the major Middle East wars of the 1970s and 1980s. The Falklands War is treated in some depth, as is the earlier Ogaden War, and there is a brief but informative section on the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978-79. One of the most significant conflicts covered is perhaps the least-well-known, the bitter war for the control of Western Sahara, starting in 1976 and still not properly resolved.

The book is impressive in content and effectively analytical. The authors' knowledge and understanding of the role of arms transfers in the development and conclusion of wars stems partly from an almost encyclopedic coverage of the process of arms transfers and a series of detailed analyses of their purpose.

In the case of the Falklands War, the Argentine re-armament program, ironically relying partly on British supplies, was still in its early stages when the conflict developed. Yet the process of the arms build-up, even if incomplete, seems to have given the junta an added belief in its chances of success. As the war progressed, the coalition developed by Britain to block further transfers had, at the very least, a psychological impact on the junta, though no substantial military effect.

While little publicity was given at the time to US aid to Britain, this, in contrast, was militarily significant in several respects, not least in the air war.

A detailed examination of the relationship between arms transfers and diplomatic bargaining in the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War of 1973 is not fully conclusive, but it illuminates the complexities of the four-way relationship involving the US, Soviet Union, Egypt and Israel. Here, certainly, both Henry Kissinger and the Soviets saw the crucial value of manipulating arms transfers in pursuit of diplomatic objectives.

As to the Iran-Iraq War, here too, the complexities almost defy analysis, with the major players such as the Soviet Union, France and the United States all altering their objectives, and thus their arms transfers policies during the long years of destruction. The book pays too little attention to the hidden role of Western states in supporting Iraq during the mid-1980s, but this is hardly the fault of the authors as much of the evidence has begun to come to light since the book went to press.

In one sense, there is a lesson here, in that the authors have made an important but, to an extent, preliminary analysis of a topic which requires far more work. Their main conclusion, too, is preliminary. Arms transfers within conflicts may in some circumstances intensify a conflict, and in others ease it, but their main importance lies in their political significance, namely in indicating the extent and nature of the support available to belligerents from external actors.

Arms and Warfare is a thorough, detailed and impressive piece of analysis, combining the systematic use of case studies with an ability to draw out careful and often modest conclusions. Its results may be tentative, and much more work may be required, but it is an important contribution to an under-researched subject.

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Haydon, Peter T. *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993.

Until now there had never been a definitive study of Canada's role in the Cuban missile crisis. There is at last. Peter Haydon's *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered* is an exhaustive and detailed analysis of cabinet politics, US-Canadian relations, the activities of the Canadian armed forces, and Canadian civil-military relations in the most dangerous episode of the Cold War. Making extensive use of both open and previously classified materials (as well as his own recollections and contacts from his service in the Royal Canadian Navy), Haydon has produced the first truly comprehensive study of the event. As an historical narrative, it supersedes all previous works on the subject.