measure of victory in the future may be the economic and human resources required by the victor to discharge its post-conflict obligations.

After articulating these organizing principles and reviewing US military actions from the Revolutionary War to World War Two and the Cold War, Martel applies this framework to a series of late twentieth-century case studies: the 1986 raid on Libya, 1989 incursion into Panama, the first Persian Gulf War, military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and most interestingly the 2001 war in Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq. Each of the case studies reviews the background and the military campaign waged by US forces and concludes with observations about what these organizing principles tell us about the results achieved. All provide excellent summaries of the conflicts and perceptive analyses of their strategic context.

Martel concludes this excellent book by noting that his intention is to provoke more rigorous thinking, and hence debates, about what victory means. This book clearly will have important practical consequences for the leaders, American public, and scholars who are wrestling with what is the most pressing problem of our time: the nature and meaning of victory. Improving the discourse about what the United States seeks to achieve when it uses military force is, of course, a worthy objective. For these reasons, Martel’s book represents a critical step in the scholarship on the relationship between strategy and victory.

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Peacekeeping has become an important topic for scholars, policy makers, and observers of international events. It has become apparent that peacekeeping deployments are and will continue to be the most common use of force for the West. So, it will be important for those concerned to learn from past operations, both immediate and distant. Enter Kimberly Zisk Marten with just such a work.

Marten has written an ambitious book. She makes the comparison between modern peacekeeping and past “colonial” peacekeeping operations by Great Britain, France, and the United States. Her project is both novel and difficult, yet she achieves her goal in showing that strong similarities exist between modern peacekeeping and the colonial missions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The author makes the argument that these similarities are important and can help policy makers design strategies for the new era of peacekeeping, what
Marten calls “complex peacekeeping operations.” (p. 4) She constructs a series of case studies to determine if these similarities are truly there, and, if so, what we can learn from the successes and failures of the colonial past.

Marten uses the cases of complex peacekeeping operations during the 1990s in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. She also provides brief examinations of the current US military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Her arguments make a strong case that the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s were similar to colonial operations at the end of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. First among these similarities were the motivations for each of these operations. She notes that national interest trumped any humanitarian goals during the colonial period while, during the 1990s, complex peacekeeping gave more consideration to humanitarian goals rather than national interest. However, she is quick to point out that national interest remains a key piece of modern peacekeeping operations.

Another similarity Marten explores is the comparison between the complex peacekeeping operations of today and the colonialism of the past is that both were campaigns to win the native population’s hearts and minds. That is, both sets of missions were undertaken to stabilize and then westernize the target country and population. Further, both peacekeeping operations and colonialism require that the occupying force select the political winners and losers of the new order. They favor those areas and people who are supportive of their efforts and punish those that are not. Such practices occurred in both modern peacekeeping, especially in the Balkans, and in the colonial period she examines.

Marten is able to make a strong argument that these two eras — colonial and modern peacekeeping — are similar in many ways. She, however, is quick to note the differences as well. The brutality with which the colonial powers maintained control was rarely repeated during the modern peacekeeping operations discussed. Also, peacekeeping is generally not done for profit, whereas much of the motivation for colonialism was to maintain control over raw materials in anticipation of the war between the great powers that was anticipated.

The history she tells is extremely interesting, but the more important observations and analysis she provides deal with the failure of complex peacekeeping operations to achieve their stated goals. She argues that these failures are due to a lack of political will on the part of those who engage in such operations. This lack of will builds over time because the goals of complex peacekeeping operations are so ambitious. The goals are not merely to restore order and take care of the immediate humanitarian needs but also to create a pluralistic, Western-style democracy from scratch. This objective, as Marten notes, is difficult, if not impossible. It takes the political will of those engaged to make this happen and that will has rarely been seen in practice.

Marten has written an important book, which is full of ideas for improving the practice of military intervention and peacekeeping. Utilizing a novel way of
looking at modern peacekeeping operations, Marten is able to make the case that the past, at least in some ways, does repeat itself. Furthermore, this work adds to an expanding body of research and scholarship addressing our new, post-Cold War world and asks what the role of the West — the international community — should be in terms of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

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One of the first things one should always try to do when writing a book review is identify a central theme or argument; rather difficult it could be said when reviewing a dictionary. Ludwig Adamec’s update of his 1996 Historical Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions, and Insurgencies does not have, nor does it require, a central theme. Instead, it sets out to provide a quick reference for a variety of terms, events, and people involved in the modern history of this region of South West Asia. For the most part, Adamec succeeds in doing so.

The thirtieth such Historical Dictionary of War, Revolution and Civil Unrest overseen by Jon Woronoff, Adamec’s addition to the series updates his original book to include the American-led invasion following the attacks on Washington and New York in 2001. Rather than trying to tell the story of a particular operation as Sean D. Naylor attempted in Not a Good Day to Die, or offer a detailed description of a societal nuance like Nancy Tapper’s various articles on the Durrani-Pathan tribes of the 1970s and 1980s, Adamec has tried to pull together the major players, events, and places that have characterized Afghanistan over the last 300 years. Adamec does not go into the detail that these authors have done, but what he loses in depth he certainly makes up for in breadth.

Adamec, a professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Near East Centre, has written extensively on Afghanistan, Islam, and their histories. He is, most certainly, an expert on the subject. His book is divided into several sections, beginning with the requisite foreword and acknowledgements. Adamec also provides a list of abbreviations and acronyms along with a detailed, 88-page chronology that is completely cross-referenced with the principle section of the book, the dictionary. The dictionary itself is preceded by a comprehensive introduction and followed by a