Theories, Practices, and Research in Conflict Resolution and Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey

by
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ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the Kurdish conflict in terms of the theories and practices of conflict resolution. The low-intensity conflict in Turkey is used for the application of conflict resolution theories, namely basic human needs (BHNs), dissonance (relative deprivation), realist, psychodynamic, and chaos theories to explain and understand deep-rooted and protracted intra-state conflicts. Before analyzing the conflict with an interdisciplinary approach and different theories, the historical background is presented. The psychodynamic approach (externalization, projection, chosen traumas, dehumanization, the egoism of victimization, the need for the enemies and allies, and the ethnic identity formation) are necessary to explain the Kurdish question in Turkey in the post-11 September world order. With the help of conflict resolution tools, the author analyzes the use of interactive problem-solving workshop (PSWs) to find a common ground between Turks and Kurds. The article concludes that the conflict should be explained and understood not only within the context of terrorism and economic backwardness, but also identity and basic human security needs of the conflicting parties. It also requires using both military and conflict resolution tools.

INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish question is the main source of political instability in Turkey today and has become the biggest challenge to the existence of the Turkish republic since its creation in 1923. The Kurdish question affects practically all of Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. Its annual expense — estimated at some $6 billion per year (1998) — is one of the main reasons for the weakness of the Turkish economy. It also impacts negatively on the economy by affecting

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tourism, direct foreign investments, and foreign credits. Politically, the Kurdish question hinders the improvement of democracy and human rights, and it helps to strengthen the perception of hard security issues in Turkish politics. Moreover, the more hardliners pursue a military solution, the more Kurdish elements in Turkish society become alienated. Also, the Kurdish question limits Turkish foreign policy. It not only creates tense relations between Turkey and its neighbors, but also impedes Turkish entrance to the European Union. In the end, it threatens Turkey's territorial integrity and creates political instability in the Middle East.

There are many different approaches to defining the Kurdish question. First, the Kurdish question is basically seen as external and internal terrorism that becomes a military and foreign policy issue. Second, it is perceived as an economic inequality, underdevelopment, and unemployment issue that leads to violent, low-intensity conflict. Last, it is, in fact, more an ethnic and identity conflict than terrorism and economic hardship. Turkish policy makers and public opinion at large believe the Turkish state discourse that is based on the homogenous "Turkish" identity and rejects the idea that there is a separate Kurdish identity.[1] In a dynamic process, both the Kurdish and Turkish identity have been changed over time and are likely to change further in the future depending on events.

First, I will highlight the historical factors in the Kurdish question and give an overall explanation of events up until now. In the next section, I will employ three conflict theories to shed light on the Kurdish question. The theories consist of basic human needs (BHNs), dissonance, international/realist theories, and psychodynamic and chaos theories. In the following section, I will focus on the problem-solving workshops that may help to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. In the end, the article will examine the possible solutions for political stability and peaceful coexistence in Turkey.

The Kurdish conflict cannot be explained only with realist theory that presents it as a conflict between the Turkish state and PKK. It is argued here that basic human needs, relative deprivation, psychodynamic, and chaos theories must also receive adequate attention for a multi-level analysis of the conflict and that conflict intervention has to include track-1, track-2, and multi-track approaches.

ORIGINS OF THE KURDISH QUESTION

The majority of Kurds are probably descended from waves of Indo-European tribes and Kurds assume that their ancestors are Medes. The estimated number of the Kurds is probably 20 to 25 million people, living largely in four Middle East countries: Turkey (10-12 million); Iran (5 to 6 million); Iraq (3.5 million), and Syria (1 million).[2] However, this number has varied for Turkey. David McDowall has estimated that 19 percent of the people in Turkey are

Kurds.[3] One of the recent studies based on the 1965 census in which people were asked to identify their mother tongues concluded that the Kurds represent 12.6 percent of the population (that is equal to 7 million in 1990).[4] Because of immigration, only 5 million Kurds live in the southeastern part of Turkey where the violent conflict has been taking place between the Turkish government and Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK (Partiya Karkiya Kurdiya [Kurdish Workers Party]). The others are mainly located in large cities like Istanbul and Izmir and near the region of Mersin and Adana.[5] They speak two dialects: Kurmanji and Surani, which are related to Persian. Approximately 75 percent of Kurds in Turkey follow the Sunni Islamic faith. The others are mostly Alevi and mainly live in Tunceli.[6]

During the period of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds enjoyed a quasi-autonomous status in this region. However, they were never recognized as a minority because of the Ottoman *millet* system.[7] Both Turks and Kurds, together with other Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire, shared the same privilege of belonging to the larger Muslim community (*umma*). Apart from the Christian minority, they formed the Muslim core of the empire. The Kurdish feudal lords and leaders (*aghas* and *sheikhs*)[8] perceived themselves "as Sunni Muslim subjects of a fundamentally Islamic empire."[9] Hence, the Kurdish lords and leaders fought against the French army in Egypt, whom they saw as Christian infidels. Interestingly, Abdulhamid II created the special *Hamidiye* regiments of Kurdish officers and soldiers to use against the Armenians between 1905 and 1908.[10]

Although the primary ethnic distinction between the Kurds and Turks in Turkey is based on language, strong tribal identity among the Kurds is also a significant factor working against ethnic unity. It is crucial to understand that the Kurdish insurrections against the Ottoman state throughout the nineteenth century were the result of tribal rivalry and tribal leaders' aspiration for more freedom and independence in their region. Also, the modernization and centralization of the Ottoman administration, and extension of state rule into the Kurdish inhabited areas triggered a number of revolts in the same period.

After the first and second Constitutional period in the Ottoman Empire (1876-1908), the Kurdish intelligentsia began a cultural movement. The first journal in Kurdish was published and the Kurdish elite organized around societies. After the First World War, the Kurds were invited to the Sèvres Conference where the Allies partitioned the Ottoman Empire. The Sèvres Treaty in 1920 "envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas wanted this."[11] However, Mustafa Kemal led the War of Independence against all these occupants in order to create a new and independent Turkish republic. It is astonishing that the Kurds fought together with the Turks against the Great Powers during this period.

After Turkey's independence in 1923, a brief opportunity arose to create a

bi-national or nation-state with a recognized and distinct Kurdish minority. However, the unitary and secularist Kemalist ideology was followed in creating the founding principles of the Republic of Turkey and had an enormous effect on the formation of Turkish nationalism and identity. First, the minorities were defined in religious terms as documented in the Lausanne Treaty. Therefore, only non-Muslim populations – Armenians, Greeks, and Jews – were accorded the special minority and cultural rights. Second, the republic adopted a civic and territorially determined national identity; however, it emphasized the "Turks" as an ethnic category. During this state-building and nation-building period, the fundamental tenet was that Turkish nationalism was based on the Turkish language and "Turkishness." One of Mustafa Kemal's most famous phrases captured Turkish nationalism: "Happy is one who can say one is a Turk." With this emphasis on secularism and Turkish ethnic identity, the Kemalist ideology expected that the Kurds would reject their identity. With the help of modernization and Turkification of the language, the key Turkish elites from the professional intelligentsia to the military officer class sought to create a modern, secular, and united Turkish state. In this new Turkish state, Kurds could qualify as "Turks," only if they denied their own ethnic identity. Since then, there have been two potential threats to the integrity of the modern state: Kurdish separatism and religious fundamentalism.[12]

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed education and secularization reforms imposed by the intellectual and military elites. During this period, 18 revolts occurred in eastern Anatolia and 16 took place in mostly Kurdish populated regions.[13] Among them, three were important: the revolts of *Sheikh* Said in 1925, Agri (Ararat) from 1926-30, and Dersim (Tunceli) in 1937. Even though most scholars believe that the 1925 *Sheikh* Said revolt was caused by a mix of Kurdish nationalist and religious sentiments, the last two revolts were semi-nationalist, but they were all regionally-bound. In addition to the execution of the leaders of the revolts, the Kurdish language and the expression of Kurdish identity were severely banned. Almost all of the Kurdish population of the Dersim area was forcibly deported to the western part of Turkey.[14] Moreover, references to the Kurds were not allowed in the east, and eventually the use of the word "Kurd" disappeared from media, official documentation, and school textbooks. The Kurds were officially declared to be "Mountain Turks."[15]

The rebirth of the Kurdish identity only occurred at the start of the 1950s with the transition to multiparty rule. Migration to the towns, loosening of traditional ties, and increased opportunities for schooling and higher education led to the growth of a new group of Kurdish intelligentsia. Also, the political and economic liberalization and democratization provided a new phase in the cultural and political realm for the Kurdish movement. First, the Kurdish elites started a revival of Kurdish ethnic identity that encompassed both popular forms of expression and intellectual activity that engaged in new publishing activity in a

unified Kurdish language. Second, this new movement allied itself with the left-wing movement in Turkish politics. The new Kurdish leaders joined the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) which became the first party to recognize openly that "there is a Kurdish people living in eastern Turkey."[16] The main emphasis, however, was on the economic identification of the Kurdish question and imperialistic exploitation of "eastern Turkey" in alliance with the collaborating native classes. As Hamit Bozarslan indicated, "the demands were more concerned with integration than separation."[17]

The Post-Cold War Development of the Kurdish Question in Turkey

In the 1980s, Kurdish nationalism first found expression within the military realm and then moved into cultural and political fields. Four factors contributed to this resurgence of the Kurdish movement. First, the military regime initiated some of its most regressive and repressive policies toward the Kurds, including a broadening of language restrictions. Second, the PKK emerged as a well-organized force that used violence and led to an insurrection. Third, the Iran-Iraq War caused huge numbers of refugees to move toward Turkey. This attracted media attention and made it difficult to ignore the large Kurdish presence in Turkey. Moreover, structural change within the international system during the post-Cold War era caused the revival of ethnic identities all over the world. Finally, the creation of a quasi-autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq is seen in Turkey as a model its own Kurds may want to imitate and a potential threat to Turkey's territorial sovereignty.[18]

The PKK was formed in 1978 although its origins go back to a faction within the Turkish Marxist-Leninist terrorist group, *Dev-Genc* (the Turkish Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey). Its first attack took place in 1984 in the towns of Semdinli and Eruh in southeast Turkey, where most of the country's Kurds live. PKK's ideological platform was based largely on separatist nationalism. The leader of PKK, Ocalan, mostly stressed a federalist solution (Turkish-Kurdish, Arab-Kurdish in Iraq, and Persian-Kurdish in Iran) in the Middle East, which necessitated re-structuring in three major states.[19] However, in the last resort Kurdish ethnonationalism aimed to create a unified Kurdistan that includes four Middle Eastern countries.

Since 1984, Kurdish ethnonationalism has posed a threat to the existence of the Turkish state. Its nationalist demands range from cultural recognition of distinctiveness to outright separation. The Turkish army fought a low-intensity war in the southeast of Turkey against the PKK. In addition to a death toll of 30,000[20] people during the conflict, the Kurdish question also posed a great threat to the future stability and territorial integrity of Turkey. Moreover, the Kurdish insurgency has resulted in crippling the economy in Turkey.[21] Apart from this political cost, the Kurdish question is the most important impediment to Turkey becoming a full member of the European Union. Moreover, the dead-

ly and violent character of the conflict put Turkey in a difficult human rights position in its relations with its neighbors and the United States.

Post-11 September World and the Kurdish Question

In February 1999, a turning point in the Kurdish conflict took place when the PKK leader, Ocalan, was captured and handed over to Turkish authorities. His capture led to internal and external changes in Turkish foreign and internal politics. Internally, the low-intensity conflict had reached its turning point and de-escalation of the conflict began with a *de facto* ceasefire. Second, Turkey signed a new Accession Partnership Agreement in November 2000 that created a conflict resolution environment, beginning the process of democratization and the development of human rights, such as positive developments on the use of the Kurdish language, TV, and radio broadcasting in the Kurdish language, and freedom to learn the Kurdish language. The Turkish-EU relationship reached a new stage when the EU decided to open accession negotiations on 17 December 2004. Membership negotiations began on 3 October 2005, and the examination of the *acquis communautaire* was opened on 12 October 2006.[22] In July 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan acknowledged past mistakes and the existence of a Kurdish question. These de-escalatory moves by both sides has ceased with the intensification of the conflict in Turkey. All of these new developments have taken place behind the events of 9/11.

THEORIES, METAPHORS, AND MODELING: THE KURDISH CASE

The Kurdish question in Turkey today is highly complex. Economic, social, and political (domestic as well as international) factors must be taken into account. The Kurdish question is also tied to the transformation of Turkey from a traditional society, where identities were religiously determined at a communal level, to a modern society, where the aim is to define an individual's identity at the state level. In the nation-building and state-building processes, the Kurdish question shows the failure of nation-building process in Turkey. The modernization of society assimilated many Kurds. However, this modernization created a new and growing Kurdish elite that sought recognition of a separate Kurdish identity. Although Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow labeled the Kurdish-Turkish conflict a trans-state ethnic conflict, they still saw that the core of the problem lies with ethnic identity formation:

> By the 1980s this elite was able to generate a sense of Kurdish identity among other Kurds. The divisions of the traditional Kurdish society of the pre-Second World War period were to an extent transcended. This growing awareness of Kurdish identity and the difficulty of the Turkish political system in accommodating it lie at the heart of the Kurdish question.[23]

Similarly, in his article, Mesut Yegen explained how the Kurdish question is reconstituted within the "Turkish State Discourse (TSD) as an issue of either

political reaction, tribal resistance, or regional backwardness, but never as an ethno-political question. In TSD, the Kurdish resisters were not Kurds with an ethno-political cause, but simply Kurdish tribes, Kurdish bandits, Kurdish sheikhs — all evils of Turkey's pre-modern past."[24]

In order to generate a generic conflict theory, Dennis Sandole proposed to combine and integrate a "two-culture problem": "conflict-as-startup conditions and conflict-as-process."[25] "Conflict-as-startup conditions" generate "conflict-as-process,"[26] and "self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes" come to characterize the conflict. In conflict resolution theory, the concept of *equifinality* or *multicasuality* is an operative concept: "different startup conditions can lead to the same process."[27]

In the following paragraphs, I will draw on five conflict theories for "explanation and understanding"[28] of the Kurdish question in Turkey: basic human needs, dissonance, realist theory, and psychodynamic and chaos theories. It is argued here that these three "paradigmatic" approaches help us to explain the conflict-as-startup conditions and equifinality (multicasuality) in the Kurdish question.

CONFLICT-AS-STARTUP CONDITIONS

Basic Human Needs (BHNs) Theory

Basic human needs (BHNs) theory can be applied to this continuing conflict in Turkey. As a founder of BHNs theory, John Burton accepts that there exist "universal needs, cultural values, and transitory interests."[29] BHNs theory holds that when individuals' basic human needs are suppressed and deprived, this causes suffering, abnormal, and deviant behaviors. Individuals strive to satisfy needs even at the cost of personal disorientation and social disruption. The satisfaction or deprivation of individual basic human needs is the key source of societal order and change. There is no consensus about what human needs are. On the one hand, Maslow differentiates five basic needs, whereas Burton and Johan Galtung have increased the number of the human needs to nine and twelve, respectively, and emphasize "security" and "identity" needs.[30] Individuals may identify themselves with identity groups, such as religious, labor, business, ethnic groups as well as nation states. The need for identity can be satisfied by arrangements, recognizing the political autonomy of national and other cultural identity groups. Galtung defines identity needs as the need for closeness, free from alienation; they include self-expression, roots, belongingness, etc.[31] Values are ideas, habits, and customs, and they are linguistic, religious, class, ethnic, or other features that lead to separate cultures and identity groups. The defense of values is important to the needs of personal security and identity. An attack on cultural values, institutions, and norms creates conflict in many instances.

The Kurds' identity is based on a number of shared characteristics: a common homeland and culture, a myth of common origins, a shared faith in Islam,

similar languages, and a history of bitter conflict with outsiders.[32] Although there are some counter arguments about similar language, cultural and language differences are the main factors of Kurdish ethnic identity.[33] Denial of Kurdish ethnic identity by the majority – Turks – causes frustration and fear on the part of Kurdish people, while the emphasis on Kurdish identity – defined as autonomy or an independent state – causes "security" problems for the Turkish state. Because of their ontological character, these basic human needs are not open to bargaining. As a result, self-determination is deemed an adequate satisfier of the need for identity. On the other hand, territorial integrity satisfies security needs.

It is obvious that the oppression of the Kurdish language and culture is the main reason for conflict in Turkey. For example, Law 2932 declared that the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens was Turkish. Thousands of Kurdish people in southeastern part of Turkey do not speak Turkish. Moreover, the state prohibited giving any names that were not "Turkish." Fortunately, President Ozal pushed the Turkish government and parliament to abolish this law and everyone became free to speak their mother tongues. However, Kurds are still prohibited from using the Kurdish language in public places, schools, and media. In this case, language as a value has become an important tool for expressing and enjoying personal identity.

Human needs theory may also explain the reason for conflict from the Turkish perspective. Like the Kurds, Turks have a universal and non-negotiable need: security. Most Turks think that every activity against the territorial integrity of Turkey must be repressed and eliminated. Many military and civilian leaders claim that giving permission to establish a state in its eastern area can jeopardize the survival of the Turkish state. Also, any "political solution" is seen as the revival of Sèvres Treaty that partitioned much of Anatolia itself. This psychological *chosen trauma*[34] can be labeled as the "Sèvres syndrome." Because of this syndrome, most people begin to accept realities and become prepared for a long struggle like the situation the British faced with the IRA and the Israelis with PLO separatists. Moreover, Turkey has many incentives for a united state. First, the Southeastern Anatolia Project, known by its Turkish acronym, GAP, which consists of 22 dams and a variety of irrigation projects, has economic, strategic, and political benefits that would be jeopardized by a Kurdish state. Second, the eastern part of Turkey connects Europe to the Middle East and the Central Asia. Finally, the prospective oil pipeline route of Central Asian oil and gas resources may follow the eastern part of Turkey.

Dissonance Theory

Another theory that helps us to understand the dispute between the Kurds and Turks is sociological and psychological theory. Among these dissonance theories, Dennis Sandole lists Galtung's structural violence or rank disequilibrium, and Ted Gurr's relative deprivation (RD) theories.[35] According to dissonance

theory, "violence is a reaction to felt discrepancies between preferred and actual state of affairs — between our beliefs and values, behavior, and/or environmental as they actually are and as we think or prefer them to be."[36] Gurr has conceptualized one variation of the structural violence theme: relative deprivation (RD). This is defined as "a perceived discrepancy between 'value expectations' (VE) (resources to which one feels entitled) and 'value capabilities' (VC) (resources which one feels capable of acquiring and keeping)."[37] The primary path to political violence is first, the development of dissatisfaction, second, its becoming politicized, and finally, resorting to violent actions against political objectives and actors. Dissatisfaction and discontent derive from the perception of relative deprivation and is the main factor for collective violence.

In the Kurdish case, Turkey's large population (65 million by 1995) and rapid urbanization exceeded its available economic opportunities. As a result, relative deprivation became visible in the *gecekondus* (shantytowns) where the mostly Kurdish population lives around the western cities of Turkey. Also, the areas traditionally inhabited by the Kurds have been the least developed parts of Turkey. In addition, there were large differences in the distribution of wealth as well as goods and services between the Kurdish and Turkish population. The eastern and southeastern regions where most Kurds currently live have the lowest scores for many socio-economic indicators. For example, in 1985 illiteracy rates of 35.5 and 44.0 percent for these regions were much higher than elsewhere in Turkey. Similarly, the per capita gross national product (GNP) in the two regions is one third of the most two prosperous regions (Aegean and Marmara).[38]

Living conditions are very poor and unbearable. For example, 2,500 villages and 8,000 hamlets have been displaced because of security and terrorism. Moreover, 700 schools in Diyarbakir were closed because of terror and the lack of will to work in the southeast. Overall, 3,600 schools accommodating nearly 100,000 children have been closed in the region. In 1996, 1.3 million students competed in entrance exams to universities for 100,000 places. This leaves more than one million candidates as minor employees and unemployed. The rate of university entrance in southeastern Anatolia is very low. Both Turkish and Kurdish youth are frustrated by their future, and extremist messages among these youths find more acceptance among both Kurdish extremism and Turkish ultranationalism as fundamentalist sentiments become the center of Turkish politics.[39]

With the help of globalization, mass communication, and transportation, the Kurds' relative and absolute deprivation has increased without economic development in comparison with the Turkish west. As a result, the Kurdish intellectuals have voiced new demands, such as broadcasting in Kurdish, which have led to the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement.

Realist and International Relations Theory

Because traditional Kurdish territories are dispersed among at least four states – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria – the Kurdish question cannot always be contained within the territorial limits of one state. Also, the emergence of an active Kurdish diaspora, especially in Western Europe, contributes to the internationalization of the Kurdish question.

During and after the Cold War, Turkey and Syria had a "strained relationship" because of disputes over Hatay province, water, and terrorism. Water is a continuing source of conflict for Turkish-Syrian relations and is likely to lead to serious confrontation in the future when Turkey completes construction of the GAP project. Syria also has claims on the bordering Turkish province of Hatay. Syria supported political groups and terrorist organizations in order to use them against Turkey to balance the water and border issues. Syria allowed PKK bases in the Bekkaa valley in Lebanon and housed the PKK leader, Ocalan, in Damascus until Turkish pressure forced Syria to expel Ocalan. Since then, relations between the two countries have become friendlier. Syria recognizes that the PKK is a terrorist organization and agrees not to permit any activities that jeopardize the security and stability of Turkey.

Concerning Kurdish separatism, Iran and Turkey had somewhat converging interests in preventing an independent Kurdish state. However, Iran has been seen to be behind Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, and it sometimes supported PKK activities in Turkey. On the opposite side, Iran was worried that Turkey and Azerbaijan may be developing a separatist sentiment in Iranian Azerbaijan. Also, it claims that Turkey supports political and terrorist groups that oppose the Iranian Revolution. In time, the decline of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism (political Islam) in Turkey, and moderate and open reformist sentiment in Iran may create more peaceful and cooperative relations between Iran and Turkey. But the Axis of Evil discourse has created anxiety in Iran and the nuclear crisis with the West may have negative spill-over effects onto Turkish-Iran relations and the Kurdish question in both countries.

Saddam's threat to the region was well-known, and Iraq threatened to attack Turkey if Allied planes continued to use bases in Turkey. During the 1980s, Iraq also supported the PKK. But, despite these conflictual relations, Iraq shared Turkish and Iranian interests in preventing an independent Kurdish state. After the Gulf War, Kurdish groups in Iraq took advantage of the Northern Iraqi power vacuum and established an autonomous Kurdish region.[40] During the post-Saddam period the Kurds in Iraq possessed *de facto* and *de jure* autonomy and federal status in Iraq that may lead to more gains for them, and uncertainty and unstability for the region.

Similarly, Greek-Turkish relations have been conflicted with little hope for normalization. The Cyprus problem and disagreements over the Aegean Sea have been the traditional points of contention, but the PKK was added as a major issue

of conflict between the two neighbors. Greek sympathy for Kurdish nationalism had long been known, but PKK leader Ocalan's statements about Greek military and political support created a new crisis between these two neighbors and allies. However, we have witnessed a new rapprochement and détente between Greece and Turkey after the 1999 Earthquake.

European governments have accepted that the PKK was a terrorist group that seriously threatened Turkey's stability and security. From their point of view, a destabilized Turkey could expose extremists politics that could endanger Western interests regarding their politics against Iraq and Iran, as well as the future of the Middle East peace process. On the other hand, they have pressured Turkey about its human rights record and a policy change toward the Kurds. In a similar vein, the United States has been the most supportive Western country for Turkey's right to combat PKK terrorism. Decision makers in the United States still regard Turkey as a country of considerable strategic importance, viewing Turkey as a relatively stable, pro-Western state that could offer itself as a useful model for others to imitate, particularly the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union.[41]

The perception of dangerous neighbors feeds Turkish paranoia and distrust about the foreign forces that want to divide Turkey. This Sèvres Syndrome not only divides people's attention from the identity-based character of the conflict but also strengthens the perception of the necessity of a military solution to the Kurdish question. In short, Ankara blamed external powers – friends and foes alike – for the emergence of the Kurdish problem. Despite the fact that Turkey has succeeded in equating the PKK with terrorism in the minds of Americans and most Europeans, Turkish leaders have refused to engage in a dialogue with moderate Kurdish groups.

Psychodynamic and Chaos Theories

The ongoing Kurdish question may also be analyzed with the help of psychological approaches as well as complexity and chaos theories and the butterfly effect, all of which offer novel and interesting ways to analyze the behaviors of low-intensity conflict systems. In James Gleick's book, *Chaos*, he stated that "Simple systems give rise to complex behavior. Complex systems give rise to simple behavior."[42] The butterfly effect, extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, indicates that insignificant variations in the initial starting conditions in the system, such as a storm system, have enormous effects on the outcome — the path and intensity of the storm. Conflict systems have two varieties of chaos: weak chaos (simple systems with one variable change) and strong chaos (more complex systems with many variable changes over time). When a conflict moves from latent to manifest conflict processes, weak, uni-dimensional chaos leads to strong, multi-dimensional chaos making prediction and control difficult, and uncertainty and instability widespread. In a chaotic conflict system, conflict

residuals (feedbacks) cause persistent instability where an individual, or group's basic human needs, such as ethno-national identity, security, development, and recognition, are not satisfied and/or the presence of structural violence and relative deprivation are common phenomenon. Different forces or variables, such as historic enmity, suitable targets of externalization, projection, displacement, chosen traumas and glories, dehumanization, the egoism of victimization, the need for enemies and allies, and ethnic identity formation, enters into a simple chaotic system that results in very complex and high-dimensional chaos. Many observers claim that "significant cultural-political and regional differences exist between Turkish and Iraq Kurds,"[43] and more commonalities between Turks and Kurds in Turkey. The Kurds in the region have "geographical, political, linguistic, tribal and ideological divisions."[44] But the narcissism of minor differences and shifting of ethnic identities created more Kurdishness among Kurds in the region and more minor differences among Turks and Kurds in Turkey. Murat Somer argues that "Kurdish identity is probably still in the making . . .. Turks are seen as the primary other are still evolving."[45] Despite the fluidity and uncertainty of identities, BHNs theory suggests the importance of satisfaction of identity and security needs of the conflicting parties.

Every unstable environment eventually reaches stability. William Zartman's "hurting stalemate"[46] indicates that conflict may reach a solution where all the parties (domestic sources of conflict) as well as the international system (international sources of conflict) come together in a point where all the conflict and third parties exhaust all the energy, time, and resources, realize the failure of contentious tactics, lose social support, and expose unacceptable costs.[47] Following the "hurting stalemate" in 2000, the next step was to move from conflict settlement ("put the fire out") to conflict resolution (deal with the deep-rooted and underlying causes of conflict) and conflict transformation (deal with long-term relationships among the parties) approaches.[48]

According to Vamik Volkan, the border between two ethnic groups reveals rituals that occur between their members. Erecting a psychological border between the two ethnic groups that prevents each group's externalizations and projections from back to the in-group is one ritual.[49] When neighbor groups are not in conflict, physical borders are flexible and large groups reduce their investment in them. For example, crossing the border between Canada and the United States is little more than a formality since no threat is involved in moving from one large group's territory to the other's. Under conflict situations, however, physical borders serve a double duty: they provide practical physical protection, and they are "psychologized" to represent a symbolic thick skin that protects large groups from being contaminated.[50] When members of large groups feel that their psychological borders are threatened, they may consider killing out-group members rather than continue to live under the anxiety. Some mental borders take the form of a shared mythical belief in a fantasized physical structure that protects the group, like an invisible wall that keeps dangerous elements

out. In such a climate, chosen traumas and glories, mourning difficulties, and feelings of entitlement to revenge are reactivated.[51]

Volkan[52] maintains that human needs determine the group's friends (allies) and enemies between in-group/out-group. Thus, human beings possess, an inherent need to have both enemies and allies. Similarly, there is a need to maintain a border and preserve identity from contamination with enemy images. This psychological mechanism helps us to maintain our separate group identities. We can see this in any problem-solving workshop. Volkan calls this an "accordion phenomenon." At first, the group experiences a period of closeness and aligns themselves physically and emotionally with the other group (out-group). This illusionary sense of brotherhood breaks down because of the mechanism called "reaction formation" (unconsciously doing something contrary to one's true but hidden wish) and produces a defensive move in which the distance is reestablished. The togetherness becomes too much to tolerate. The extension and contraction of the accordion gradually becomes less pronounced and the accordion keeps playing in lesser degree. The accordion ritual also reflects a need to have and maintain a border between the antagonists.[53] The Kurds and Turks have lived together and the narcissism of minor differences has worked little in the Kurdish conflict. Both groups may feel they are different. At the same time, they feel the same and together. To live in Turkey where territorial integrity and respect for human rights have been observed has become the common aspirations of both groups.

Another psychodynamic process that affects the formation of psychological borders between two groups is the concept of chosen traumas and glories. It refers to an event that invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group.[54] The 11 September events can be labeled as "chosen traumas" for the American public and policy makers. They have caused traumatic responses and become a part of collective memory and a syndrome for American people and the world. In the same way, the Sèvres Syndrome is a chosen trauma for Turks where any radical and unexpected changes in Turkish internal and foreign policy produce reflexive reactions and create a static response to the changing world system.

The Kurdish conflict is psychologically contaminated with shared perceptions, thoughts, fantasies, and emotions (both conscious and unconscious) related to past historical traumas and glories. It is clear that the psychological processes live on powerfully in the Kurdish conflict. The Kurds, as a group, psychologically reach back to the *Sheikh* Said Rebellion as their prime chosen trauma. Every suffering since then is associated with this event in 1925 and its mental representation. Also, the Sèvres Agreement is a chosen trauma for Turks in which they fear that the survival of Turkey and existence of the Turkish nation has been threatened by inside and outside enemies. The chosen traumas affect their international relationships, especially their relationship with the region's other countries and the world. Since both groups historically have forged their

national identities by defining themselves against other groups and not each other, there is still a possibility that they could learn to live in harmony and peace. Further hope is offered by the fact that Turkey has not seen a civil war or outbreak of violence like Iraq's. The enemy images of Kurds and Turks are not fresh enough to create an extensive in-state conflict in Turkey. But the psychological borders have become more real. The changing regional power structure and the emergence of an autonomous state in northern Iraq may increase the possibility of perceived borders between the two groups.

In 2003, the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown in Iraq. The 1 March decision by the Turkish parliament that rejected the deployment of US troops in Turkey and the involvement of Turkish troops in Iraq created a ripple effect on US-Turkish-EU relations. Apart from other explanations, the article suggests that the post-11 September world created an in-group/out-group or "us versus them" dichotomy. For Turks, they rejected being seen as a "Western" ally state and may have felt more Muslimness/Turkishness than Western. Despite cooperation between Turks and Kurds, the Kurdish identity viewed Turks as "the primary and the enemy other."[55] It is obvious that the changes around Turkey's neighbors, especially in Iraq, may have positive or negative spill-over effects on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. If Turkey moves toward more democracy, human and ethnic rights, and conflict resolution, and succeeds with the European Union process, Turkey and Turkish Kurds could voice the positive changes in northern Iraq and regional politics, and "become the leader and partner of all regional Kurds on many issues."[56] Second, resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and stabilization of Iraq may open new opportunities for trade, communication, education, service sector, cultural, economic, and social development. Third, a non-chaotic, stable Iraq and the comprehensive Middle East peace initiative could have positive-sum (win-win, non-zero-sum) effects on Turkish-Kurdish relations, regional cooperation, and new discourses on the Turkish and Kurdish identity and security needs.

The negative spill-over effects depend on the escalation of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and the repression and enforcement of assimilation of the Kurdish population. A "tit-for-tat" approach suggests that the more Kurds employ violent strategies and tactics, the more Turkey uses "military solution" methods and vice versa. In this case, the complex and chaotic character of the conflict will increase with the establishment of Kurdish statehood in Iraq and polarization among Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and others. Despite the mutual interdependence of the Turkish state and the Kurdish entity in Iraq, the lack of trust based on the divide-and-rule policies of Turks, Persians, Arabs, the British, and Americans may re-kindle pan-Turkish, pan-Kurdish, and pan-Arab nationalists, and eliminate the moderates in favor of security and economic survival. The extreme positions of all sides may jeopardize Turkey's democratization and EU integration. The removal of stable psychological borders and the construction of

new identities could intensify the negative spill-over effects of the new Kurdish entities in the region.

COMMON GROUND BETWEEN TURKS AND KURDS: THE INTERACTIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH

Many methods, techniques, and practical initiatives for the de-escalation, transformation, and resolution of intergroup conflict exist within the conflict resolution field. Among these methods are informal, non-directive workshops that bring members of conflicting parties together in face-to-face, small group, problem-solving discussions moderated or facilitated by informal panels of outside consultants to help participants understand and resolve their conflicts. One of the intervention techniques used for the Kurdish question was "interactive problem-solving workshops (PSWs)."[57] This approach was first introduced by John Burton in 1969. Since then, conflict resolution practitioners have held many PSWs between Israelis-Palestinians, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Russians and Baltic republics' participants.

The main focus in PSWs is to change the perception between the conflicting parties so that these interactions transform the political debate and decision-making processes in the two communities. These workshops may foster a better understanding of the other's perspective and change the image of the other side. Another result is that participants may understand there is someone to talk to and something to talk about.

In order to find a lasting and peaceful solution of the Kurdish question, a group of Turkish and Kurdish citizens decided to organize confidential problem-solving workshops under the auspices of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) and European Center for Common Ground (ECCG) in 1996. The meetings were facilitated by William Ury and were held in three neutral international locations: France, Switzerland, and Belgium. The participants consisted of 14 prominent Kurds and Turks,[58] who engaged in intensive, informal, and interactive discussions. They also agreed to three basic premises:

- first, that democracy is desirable;
- second, violence is counterproductive; and,
- third, any solution must safeguard the territorial integrity of Turkey.[59]

During the PSWs, Kurdish and Turkish participants engaged in the process of a "walk through history."[60] At the end of this process, the participants agreed on "a set of principles for peaceful co-existence as the citizens of the same country and polity."[61] Also, they launched a "peace partnership project" which sought to facilitate public debate and generate support for the non-violent resolution of the Kurdish question. As a result of these activities, they established a new non-governmental organization (NGO) in Ankara, the Foundation for the Research of Social Problems (TOSAV).[62] During the last couple of years, TOSAV's main

objectives have been highlighted in "the Document of Mutual Understanding."[63] In this document, they proposed a new constitutional framework and order for the resolution of the Kurdish question, and the democratization of Turkey. It suggested reforms in political and institutional, cultural and educational, legislative and judicial, and security and economic areas.

Apart from the existent deadlocked initiative, the PSWs and conflict resolution technique aimed to change attitudes, perceptions, and ideas for resolving the conflict among the individual participants in the workshop, and transfer these changes into the political arena, i.e. political debate and the decision-making process within each community. This conflict resolution technique made great contributions to peace making and resolution of the Kurdish question.

CONCLUSION

The Kurdish question in Turkey is a highly complex, controversial, and extremely politically sensitive issue. And because of its inter-state nature developments in northern Iraq are also causing additional complications for Turkish decision makers. Moreover, the international community's reaction has been perceived as interference in Turkey's internal affairs. Within the psychological realm Turkish policy makers still live in the state of the "Sèvres Syndrome." As President Demirel publicly announced, Western appeals for Turkey to grant minority rights and open up a dialogue with the Kurds could lead to a situation worse than that envisaged by the Treaty of Sèvres. He warned of the danger of Turkey slipping toward a situation resembling that of a bloodbath in Bosnia and former Yugoslavia.[64] The stress on linkage between Sèvres, "concessions" to the Kurds and the views of the West may create polarization within Turkish society.

Also, it is a complex issue to define who the Kurds are. M. Van Bruissen argued that the Kurds within Turkey might feel that they have multiple identities. For example, a Sunni Zaza speaker may be a Zaza, a Kurd, a Sunni Muslim, a citizen of Turkey (or a Turk), the member of a certain social class, tribe, or village, depending on the particular context.[65]

What makes everything more complicated is that the religious and fundamental movements and ethnic Islam have become more influential in the areas where the Kurdish majority live.[66] In her analysis, Lale Yalcin-Heckermann concluded that the Kurdish question in Turkey will depend on these two fundamental forces: nationalism and Islam.[67] Because of the need to preserve differences and describe one group's members from another, it is more effective to make borders flexible, accessible, and negotiable than to remove them. The late Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, saw the psychological barrier between Egyptians and Israelis as a problem that needed to be removed. Although the barrier certainly was an obstacle on the path to peace, removing it entirely would have caused further complications because a sense of shared identity without a border induces aggression, as each group tries to recover its individual identity. The resolution

of the Kurdish conflict may require the creation of a new shared identity (European) and/or the re-definition of a common identity (Turkishness) for the maintenance of healthy psychological borders.

There is no easy answer or panacea for the Kurdish question in Turkey. In 1993, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller briefly referred to a possible Basque model of regional autonomy in the case of the Kurds in Turkey.[68] In early 1995, she made a speech that energized some debates about the Kurdish issue. She declared that "Happy is one who can say one is a citizen of Turkey."[69] Unfortunately, there has been more violence and bloodshed in Turkey because of the complex nature of the Kurdish question. Kirisci and Winrow saw the possible solution if Turkey moves toward further "democratization and devolution of decision-making powers, the development of a dialogue, and the possible emergence of multiculturalism based on a real and genuine civic nationalism."[70] Similarly, Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller offered more improvement, reform, and modernization in democratic structures. If there is no urgent solution to the Kurdish problem, Turkey could be "dragg[ed] into a broadened civil war, economic weakness, domestic terror, polarization, chauvinism, and curtailment of democratic liberties."[71] In a similar vein, TOSAV's document of mutual understanding suggested that economic development, multi-culturalism, and democratic pluralism may ease ethnic and religious tensions.[72] In his article, Hakan Yavuz argued that common identities, such as Islam and citizenship within a democratic environment, can help to manage ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic states. He stated that "Turkey's Kurdish problem can be addressed only if Turkey creates a civil society that functions as a repository of multiple identities and builds necessary political institutions to negotiate and navigate the interaction among these identities."[73]

After recent developments, there may be hope for a possible peaceful solution of the Kurdish question. The capture of PKK's leader may eliminate the monopoly of hardliners and radicals on the Kurdish side. On the other hand, the domestic and international pressure on Turkey for more democratization, peaceful coexistence, and respect of human rights may create positive effects not only with the Kurdish question but also for Turkish society. In this new environment, both side's moves toward a solution ebbs and flows. For example, the HADEP, the succeeding party acting in the name of Kurdish ethnic and democratic claims, won many municipalities in the 1999 election and has moved toward a greater role for democratic political participation and representation. However, many people still suffer because of the infamous article 312 in the Turkish penal code when they voice their concerns about the Kurdish question and political Islam in Turkey.

Like many low-intensity conflicts, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is dynamic, chaotic, complex, and unstable, as well as having escalatory and de-escalatory phases. Conflict intervention has so far employed realpolitik tools,

such as army and police actions. However, the chaotic and complex conflict systems require multi-dimensional and multi-track conflict intervention methods that include all major stakeholders and focus on underlying basic human needs and structural violence. It is vital to address the security issue of all parties that is necessary to build trust with the other side. The goal of terrorism is not to defeat the other party but to destabilize the region and bring about the loss of governmental control. Intervention must provide prediction and control in the conflict system, and move from manifest conflict to negative peace, and from negative peace to positive peace. Also, conflict resolution has to begin with the neighborhood level (*mahalle*) and extend to the local community (*semt*), city, province, southeastern region, Turkey, and the Middle East. Also, perpetual peace requires a "paradigm shift" to move people away from the attractors of violence toward the attractors of peaceful solutions.

In my opinion, there is still hope for a solution to the Kurdish question within Turkish democratic institutions, the preservation of the territorial integrity of Turkey, and the recognition of the Kurdish identity.

Endnotes

1. Mesut Yegen, "The Kurdish question in Turkish state discourse," *Journal of Contemporary History* 34, no. 4 (October 1999), pp. 555-68.
2. Robert Olson, "The Kurdish question and Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq since the Gulf War," in Robert Olson, ed., *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its impact on Turkey and the Middle East* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), p. 84.
3. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996), p. 32.
4. Server Mutlu, "Population of Turkey by ethnic groups and provinces," *New Perspectives on Turkey* no. 12 (Spring 1995), pp. 517-41.
5. As a matter of fact, the largest Kurdish-populated city in the world is Istanbul, which exceeds the number of Kurds in Diyarbakir.
6. McDowall, *A Modern History*, pp. 2-13.
7. The millet system was a form of communal self-government. In the Ottoman Empire, one's identity derived from one's religion. Non-Muslim communities were institutionalized in accordance with religion and allowed to govern themselves, although they were responsible to the Ottoman government.
8. An *Agha* means feudal lords, and a *Sheikh* refers to religious leader.
9. McDowall, *A Modern History*, p. 17.
10. Some authors found some overlaps between the Ottoman *Hamidiye* regiments and the village-guard system in 1980s. For him, both of them have a role to discipline the nomadic people of the region and maintain the loyalty of Kurdish tribes to the central authority. Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 129.
11. McDowall, *A Modern History*, p. 17.
12. See Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990); and Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997).

13. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, p. 101.
14. During the PSWs between Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals, one of the Kurdish participants told a very sad and emotional story about the Dersim revolt and its results. Afterwards, one of the Turkish participants told the group that he did not know this side of history. Interview with Dr. Dogu Ergil, 1 March 2000, Washington, DC, at http://www.sfcg.org/tosavm.htm.
15. Gulistan Gurbey, "The development of the Kurdish Nationalism movement in Turkey since the 1980s," in Olson, ed., *The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s*, p.13. Michael Gunter explained the origin of word "Mountain Turks" in a sarcastic manner: "Indeed, the very word 'Kurd' was said to be nothing more than a corruption of the crunching sound (kirt, kart, or kurt) one made while walking through the snow-covered mountains in the southeast. The much abused and criticized appellation 'Mountain Kurd' when referring to the Turkish Kurds served as a code term for these actions." Gunter, *The Kurds*, p. 6.
16. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, 1997, p. 108.
17. Hamit Bozarslan, "Political aspects of the Kurdish problem in contemporary Turkey," in Philip G. Kreyenbroek, ed., *The Kurds: Contemporary Overview* (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 99-100.
18. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish question: Critical turning points and missed opportunities," *Middle East Journal* 51, no.1 (Winter 1997), pp. 66-67.
19. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), p. 25.
20. For comprehensive information about civilian, PKK, and security force casualties between 1984 and 1995, see Table 5.6 in Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, p. 126.
21. Most analysts believe that 70 percent inflation and 20 percent unemployment rates in Turkey are the result of the huge military spending during the Kurdish insurgence. Olson estimated that Turkey's war against the Kurds cost them $6 billion. Olson, "The Kurdish question and Turkey's foreign policy toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq since the Gulf War," p. 101. The total deployment of Turkish troops and security forces reached 300,000; that includes regular troops, police, special forces, village guards, and gendarme. Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, p. 152. Apparently, approximately one-quarter of the total manpower of NATO's second-largest army was deployed in the area against the PKK.
22. At http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678.
23. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, p. 89.
24. Yegen, "The Kurdish question in Turkish state discourse," p. 555.
25. Dennis J.D. Sandole, *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic Conflicts of the post-Cold War Era* (New York: Cassell Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 109.
26. In this book, Sandole defines conflict-as-process as negative self-fulfilling prophecies (NSFPs). NSFPs are both self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes (initiating, escalation, controlled maintenance, etc.) as well as action-reaction processes. In CR, conflict-as-process is where third parties enter the scene.
27. Ibid., p. 129.
28. Martin Hollis, *The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1994.
29. John Burton, "Human needs theory," in John Burton, ed., *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), pp. 36-37.
30. Ibid.; Johan Galtung "International development in human perspective," in John Burton, ed., *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (London: MacMillan, 1990).
31. Johan Galtung, "International development," p. 309.
32. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), p. 30.

33. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, claim that there is no unified language and religion among the Kurds. Similarly, Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, emphasize the Kirmanji and Zaza as two different Kurdish dialects, and Sunni and Alevi as two different Islamic faiths.
34. Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (New York: Westview, 1998).
35. Dennis J.D. Sandole, "Paradigms, theories, metaphors in conflict and conflict resolution: Coherence or confusion?" in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, eds., *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 11-12.
36. Ibid., p. 11.
37. Ibid., p. 12. See Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
38. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, pp. 122-23.
39. Interestingly, PKK terrorists are mostly recruited from teenagers. Also, the rise of ultra-nationalist and religious parties is the result of this vicious cycle of terrorism and economic deprivation. The Nationalist People's Party (NPP) became the second party in the 1999 election. One of its slogans was "Hang Ocalan."
40. Nur Bilge Criss, "The nature of PKK terrorism in Turkey," *Studies of Conflict and Terrorism* 18 (1995), pp. 17-37.
41. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, p. 177.
42. James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), p. 304.
43. Murat Somer, "Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity: Turkey, the Kurds, and the Emerging Iraq," *Security Dialogue* 36, no.1 (March 2005), p. 114.
44. Ibid., p. 116.
45. Ibid., p. 117.
46. William I. Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman, eds., *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, September 2000).
47. J.Z. Rubin, D.G. Pruitt, and S.H. Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994).
48. Sandole, *Capturing the Complexity of Conflict.*
49. Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships* (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1988); Marc H. Ross, "Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts," *Political Psychology* 16, no. 3 (1995), pp. 523-44; Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
50. Volkan, *Bloodlines*, p. 105.
51. Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*; Vamik D. Volkan "Psychoanalytic Aspects of Ethnic Conflict," in Joseph V. Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,1990), pp. 81-93.
52. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies.*
53. Volkan, *Bloodlines*, p. 102; Fisher, *Interactive Conflict*, p. 111.
54. Vamik D. Volkan and Norton Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict* (Cambridgeshire, UK: Eothen Press, 1994), p. 7.
55. Somer, "Failures," p. 114.
56. Ibid., p. 182.

57. Herbert C. Kelman, "The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach," in Chester A. Crocker, et al., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, DC: USIP, 1996).
58. The participants are selected from different background and professions. They are from the military, political, cultural, and media realms of the decision-making apparatus. PSWs had seven Turk and seven Kurd participants. There were also seven domestic PSWs in Turkish cities. They were held in Van, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul with 100-200 participants.
59. Interview with Dr. Dogu Ergil.
60. Joseph Montville, "The psychological burdens of history," unpublished material (1999), p. 3.
61. At http://www.tosav.org.tr/common.htm or http://www.tosam.org/english.html.
62. TOSAV are the Turkish initials for the new NGOs. TOSAV was established in April 1997 and received a great attention from both Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals, artists, public opinion leaders, as well as the diplomatic corps.
63. For an English version of the document, see http://www.tosav.org.tr/common.htm.
64. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, p. 210.
65. M. Van Bruinessen, "Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism, and the refugee problem," in P.G. Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl, eds., *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992), p. 47.
66. Burhanettin Duran, "Approaching the Kurdish question via Adil Duzen: An Islamist formula of the Welfare Party for ethnic coexistence," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no.1 (April 1998), pp. 111-28.
67. Lale Yalcin-Heckermann, "Ethnic Islam and nationalism among the Kurds in Turkey," in Richard Tapper, ed., *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 102.
68. *Turkish Daily News* [TDN], 13 October 1993.
69. TDN, 4 January 1995.
70. Kirisci and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question*, p. 214.
71. Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, p. 223.
72. For the entire text, see http://www.tosav.org.tr/common.htm.
73. Hakan M. Yavuz, "A preamble to the Kurdish question: The politics of Kurdish Identity," *Journal of Muslim Affairs* 18 (April 1998), p. 17.