The Post-Cold War Development of the Kurdish Question in Turkey

12 In the 1980s, Kurdish nationalism first found expression within the military realm and then moved into cultural and political fields. Four factors contributed to this resurgence of the Kurdish movement. First, the military regime initiated some of its most regressive and repressive policies toward the Kurds, including a broadening of language restrictions. Second, the PKK emerged as a well-organized force that used violence and led to an insurrection. Third, the Iran-Iraq War caused huge numbers of refugees to move toward Turkey. This attracted media attention and made it difficult to ignore the large Kurdish presence in Turkey. Moreover, structural change within the international system during the post-Cold War era caused the revival of ethnic identities all over the world. Finally, the creation of a quasi-autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq is seen in Turkey as a model its own Kurds may want to imitate and a potential threat to Turkey's territorial sovereignty.18

13 The PKK was formed in 1978 although its origins go back to a faction within the Turkish Marxist-Leninist terrorist group, Dev-Genc (the Turkish Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey). Its first attack took place in 1984 in the towns of Semdinli and Eruh in southeast Turkey, where most of the country's Kurds live. PKK's ideological platform was based largely on separatist nationalism. The leader of PKK, Ocalan, mostly stressed a federalist solution (Turkish-Kurdish, Arab-Kurdish in Iraq, and Persian-Kurdish in Iran) in the Middle East, which necessitated re-structuring in three major states.19 However, in the last resort Kurdish ethnonationalism aimed to create a unified Kurdistan that includes four Middle Eastern countries.

14 Since 1984, Kurdish ethnonationalism has posed a threat to the existence of the Turkish state. Its nationalist demands range from cultural recognition of distinctiveness to outright separation. The Turkish army fought a low-intensity war in the southeast of Turkey against the PKK. In addition to a death toll of 30,00020 people during the conflict, the Kurdish question also posed a great threat to the future stability and territorial integrity of Turkey. Moreover, the Kurdish insurgency has resulted in crippling the economy in Turkey.21 Apart from this political cost, the Kurdish question is the most important impediment to Turkey becoming a full member of the European Union. Moreover, the deadly and violent character of the conflict put Turkey in a difficult human rights position in its relations with its neighbors and the United States.

Post-11 September World and the Kurdish Question

15 In February 1999, a turning point in the Kurdish conflict took place when the PKK leader, Ocalan, was captured and handed over to Turkish authorities. His capture led to internal and external changes in Turkish foreign and internal politics. Internally, the low-intensity conflict had reached its turning point and de-escalation of the conflict began with a de facto ceasefire. Second, Turkey signed a new Accession Partnership Agreement in November 2000 that created a conflict resolution environment, beginning the process of democratization and the development of human rights, such as positive developments on the use of the Kurdish language, TV, and radio broadcasting in the Kurdish language, and freedom to learn the Kurdish language. The Turkish-EU relationship reached a new stage when the EU decided to open accession negotiations on 17 December 2004. Membership negotiations began on 3 October 2005, and the examination of the acquis communautaire was opened on 12 October 2006.22 In July 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan acknowledged past mistakes and the existence of a Kurdish question. These de-escalatory moves by both sides has ceased with the intensification of the conflict in Turkey. All of these new developments have taken place behind the events of 9/11.

Basic Human Needs (BHNs) Theory

20 Basic human needs (BHNs) theory can be applied to this continuing conflict in Turkey. As a founder of BHNs theory, John Burton accepts that there exist "universal needs, cultural values, and transitory interests."29 BHNs theory holds that when individuals' basic human needs are suppressed and deprived, this causes suffering, abnormal, and deviant behaviors. Individuals strive to satisfy needs even at the cost of personal disorientation and social disruption. The satisfaction or deprivation of individual basic human needs is the key source of societal order and change. There is no consensus about what human needs are. On the one hand, Maslow differentiates five basic needs, whereas Burton and Johan Galtung have increased the number of the human needs to nine and twelve, respectively, and emphasize "security" and "identity" needs.30 Individuals may identify themselves with identity groups, such as religious, labor, business, ethnic groups as well as nation states. The need for identity can be satisfied by arrangements, recognizing the political autonomy of national and other cultural identity groups. Galtung defines identity needs as the need for closeness, free from alienation; they include self-expression, roots, belongingness, etc.31 Values are ideas, habits, and customs, and they are linguistic, religious, class, ethnic, or other features that lead to separate cultures and identity groups. The defense of values is important to the needs of personal security and identity. An attack on cultural values, institutions, and norms creates conflict in many instances.

21 The Kurds' identity is based on a number of shared characteristics: a common homeland and culture, a myth of common origins, a shared faith in Islam, similar languages, and a history of bitter conflict with outsiders.32 Although there are some counter arguments about similar language, cultural and language differences are the main factors of Kurdish ethnic identity.33 Denial of Kurdish ethnic identity by the majority – Turks – causes frustration and fear on the part of Kurdish people, while the emphasis on Kurdish identity – defined as autonomy or an independent state – causes "security" problems for the Turkish state. Because of their ontological character, these basic human needs are not open to bargaining. As a result, self-determination is deemed an adequate satisfier of the need for identity. On the other hand, territorial integrity satisfies security needs.

22 It is obvious that the oppression of the Kurdish language and culture is the main reason for conflict in Turkey. For example, Law 2932 declared that the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens was Turkish. Thousands of Kurdish people in southeastern part of Turkey do not speak Turkish. Moreover, the state prohibited giving any names that were not "Turkish." Fortunately, President Ozal pushed the Turkish government and parliament to abolish this law and everyone became free to speak their mother tongues. However, Kurds are still prohibited from using the Kurdish language in public places, schools, and media. In this case, language as a value has become an important tool for expressing and enjoying personal identity.

23 Human needs theory may also explain the reason for conflict from the Turkish perspective. Like the Kurds, Turks have a universal and non-negotiable need: security. Most Turks think that every activity against the territorial integrity of Turkey must be repressed and eliminated. Many military and civilian leaders claim that giving permission to establish a state in its eastern area can jeopardize the survival of the Turkish state. Also, any "political solution" is seen as the revival of Sèvres Treaty that partitioned much of Anatolia itself. This psychological chosen trauma34 can be labeled as the "Sèvres syndrome." Because of this syndrome, most people begin to accept realities and become prepared for a long struggle like the situation the British faced with the IRA and the Israelis with PLO separatists. Moreover, Turkey has many incentives for a united state. First, the Southeastern Anatolia Project, known by its Turkish acronym, GAP, which consists of 22 dams and a variety of irrigation projects, has economic, strategic, and political benefits that would be jeopardized by a Kurdish state. Second, the eastern part of Turkey connects Europe to the Middle East and the Central Asia. Finally, the prospective oil pipeline route of Central Asian oil and gas resources may follow the eastern part of Turkey.

Dissonance Theory

24 Another theory that helps us to understand the dispute between the Kurds and Turks is sociological and psychological theory. Among these dissonance theories, Dennis Sandole lists Galtung's structural violence or rank disequilibrium, and Ted Gurr's relative deprivation (RD) theories.35 According to dissonance theory, "violence is a reaction to felt discrepancies between preferred and actual state of affairs — between our beliefs and values, behavior, and/or environmental as they actually are and as we think or prefer them to be."36 Gurr has conceptualized one variation of the structural violence theme: relative deprivation (RD). This is defined as "a perceived discrepancy between 'value expectations' (VE) (resources to which one feels entitled) and 'value capabilities' (VC) (resources which one feels capable of acquiring and keeping)."37 The primary path to political violence is first, the development of dissatisfaction, second, its becoming politicized, and finally, resorting to violent actions against political objectives and actors. Dissatisfaction and discontent derive from the perception of relative deprivation and is the main factor for collective violence.

25 In the Kurdish case, Turkey's large population (65 million by 1995) and rapid urbanization exceeded its available economic opportunities. As a result, relative deprivation became visible in the gecekondus (shantytowns) where the mostly Kurdish population lives around the western cities of Turkey. Also, the areas traditionally inhabited by the Kurds have been the least developed parts of Turkey. In addition, there were large differences in the distribution of wealth as well as goods and services between the Kurdish and Turkish population. The eastern and southeastern regions where most Kurds currently live have the lowest scores for many socio-economic indicators. For example, in 1985 illiteracy rates of 35.5 and 44.0 percent for these regions were much higher than elsewhere in Turkey. Similarly, the per capita gross national product (GNP) in the two regions is one third of the most two prosperous regions (Aegean and Marmara).38

26 Living conditions are very poor and unbearable. For example, 2,500 villages and 8000 hamlets have been displaced because of security and terrorism. Moreover, 700 schools in Diyarbakir were closed because of terror and the lack of will to work in the southeast. Overall, 3,600 schools accommodating nearly 100000 children have been closed in the region. In 1996, 1.3 million students competed in entrance exams to universities for 100000 places. This leaves more than one million candidates as minor employees and unemployed. The rate of university entrance in southeastern Anatolia is very low. Both Turkish and Kurdish youth are frustrated by their future, and extremist messages among these youths find more acceptance among both Kurdish extremism and Turkish ultra-nationalism as fundamentalist sentiments become the center of Turkish politics.39

27 With the help of globalization, mass communication, and transportation, the Kurds' relative and absolute deprivation has increased without economic development in comparison with the Turkish west. As a result, the Kurdish intellectuals have voiced new demands, such as broadcasting in Kurdish, which have led to the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement.

Realist and International Relations Theory

28 Because traditional Kurdish territories are dispersed among at least four states – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria – the Kurdish question cannot always be contained within the territorial limits of one state. Also, the emergence of an active Kurdish diaspora, especially in Western Europe, contributes to the internationalization of the Kurdish question.

29 During and after the Cold War, Turkey and Syria had a "strained relationship" because of disputes over Hatay province, water, and terrorism. Water is a continuing source of conflict for Turkish-Syrian relations and is likely to lead to serious confrontation in the future when Turkey completes construction of the GAP project. Syria also has claims on the bordering Turkish province of Hatay. Syria supported political groups and terrorist organizations in order to use them against Turkey to balance the water and border issues. Syria allowed PKK bases in the Bekkaa valley in Lebanon and housed the PKK leader, Ocalan, in Damascus until Turkish pressure forced Syria to expel Ocalan. Since then, relations between the two countries have become friendlier. Syria recognizes that the PKK is a terrorist organization and agrees not to permit any activities that jeopardize the security and stability of Turkey.

30 Concerning Kurdish separatism, Iran and Turkey had somewhat converging interests in preventing an independent Kurdish state. However, Iran has been seen to be behind Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, and it sometimes supported PKK activities in Turkey. On the opposite side, Iran was worried that Turkey and Azerbaijan may be developing a separatist sentiment in Iranian Azerbaijan. Also, it claims that Turkey supports political and terrorist groups that oppose the Iranian Revolution. In time, the decline of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism (political Islam) in Turkey, and moderate and open reformist sentiment in Iran may create more peaceful and cooperative relations between Iran and Turkey. But the Axis of Evil discourse has created anxiety in Iran and the nuclear crisis with the West may have negative spill-over effects onto Turkish-Iran relations and the Kurdish question in both countries.

31 Saddam's threat to the region was well-known, and Iraq threatened to attack Turkey if Allied planes continued to use bases in Turkey. During the 1980s, Iraq also supported the PKK. But, despite these conflictual relations, Iraq shared Turkish and Iranian interests in preventing an independent Kurdish state. After the Gulf War, Kurdish groups in Iraq took advantage of the Northern Iraqi power vacuum and established an autonomous Kurdish region.40 During the post-Saddam period the Kurds in Iraq possessed de facto and de jure autonomy and federal status in Iraq that may lead to more gains for them, and uncertainty and unstability for the region.

32 Similarly, Greek-Turkish relations have been conflicted with little hope for normalization. The Cyprus problem and disagreements over the Aegean Sea have been the traditional points of contention, but the PKK was added as a major issue of conflict between the two neighbors. Greek sympathy for Kurdish nationalism had long been known, but PKK leader Ocalan's statements about Greek military and political support created a new crisis between these two neighbors and allies. However, we have witnessed a new rapprochement and détente between Greece and Turkey after the 1999 Earthquake.

33 European governments have accepted that the PKK was a terrorist group that seriously threatened Turkey's stability and security. From their point of view, a destabilized Turkey could expose extremists politics that could endanger Western interests regarding their politics against Iraq and Iran, as well as the future of the Middle East peace process. On the other hand, they have pressured Turkey about its human rights record and a policy change toward the Kurds. In a similar vein, the United States has been the most supportive Western country for Turkey's right to combat PKK terrorism. Decision makers in the United States still regard Turkey as a country of considerable strategic importance, viewing Turkey as a relatively stable, pro-Western state that could offer itself as a useful model for others to imitate, particularly the Turkic states of the former Soviet Union.41

34 The perception of dangerous neighbors feeds Turkish paranoia and distrust about the foreign forces that want to divide Turkey. This Sèvres Syndrome not only divides people's attention from the identity-based character of the conflict but also strengthens the perception of the necessity of a military solution to the Kurdish question. In short, Ankara blamed external powers – friends and foes alike – for the emergence of the Kurdish problem. Despite the fact that Turkey has succeeded in equating the PKK with terrorism in the minds of Americans and most Europeans, Turkish leaders have refused to engage in a dialogue with moderate Kurdish groups.

Psychodynamic and Chaos Theories

35 The ongoing Kurdish question may also be analyzed with the help of psychological approaches as well as complexity and chaos theories and the butterfly effect, all of which offer novel and interesting ways to analyze the behaviors of low-intensity conflict systems. In James Gleick's book, Chaos, he stated that "Simple systems give rise to complex behavior. Complex systems give rise to simple behavior."42 The butterfly effect, extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, indicates that insignificant variations in the initial starting conditions in the system, such as a storm system, have enormous effects on the outcome — the path and intensity of the storm. Conflict systems have two varieties of chaos: weak chaos (simple systems with one variable change) and strong chaos (more complex systems with many variable changes over time). When a conflict moves from latent to manifest conflict processes, weak, uni-dimensional chaos leads to strong, multi-dimensional chaos making prediction and control difficult, and uncertainty and instability widespread. In a chaotic conflict system, conflict residuals (feedbacks) cause persistent instability where an individual, or group's basic human needs, such as ethno-national identity, security, development, and recognition, are not satisfied and/or the presence of structural violence and relative deprivation are common phenomenon. Different forces or variables, such as historic enmity, suitable targets of externalization, projection, displacement, chosen traumas and glories, dehumanization, the egoism of victimization, the need for enemies and allies, and ethnic identity formation, enters into a simple chaotic system that results in very complex and high-dimensional chaos. Many observers claim that "significant cultural-political and regional differences exist between Turkish and Iraq Kurds,"43 and more commonalities between Turks and Kurds in Turkey. The Kurds in the region have "geographical, political, linguistic, tribal and ideological divisions."44 But the narcissism of minor differences and shifting of ethnic identities created more Kurdishness among Kurds in the region and more minor differences among Turks and Kurds in Turkey. Murat Somer argues that "Kurdish identity is probably still in the making . . .. Turks are seen as the primary other are still evolving."45 Despite the fluidity and uncertainty of identities, BHNs theory suggests the importance of satisfaction of identity and security needs of the conflicting parties.

36 Every unstable environment eventually reaches stability. William Zartman's "hurting stalemate"46 indicates that conflict may reach a solution where all the parties (domestic sources of conflict) as well as the international system (international sources of conflict) come together in a point where all the conflict and third parties exhaust all the energy, time, and resources, realize the failure of contentious tactics, lose social support, and expose unacceptable costs.47 Following the "hurting stalemate" in 2000, the next step was to move from conflict settlement ("put the fire out") to conflict resolution (deal with the deep-rooted and underlying causes of conflict) and conflict transformation (deal with long-term relationships among the parties) approaches.48

37 According to Vamik Volkan, the border between two ethnic groups reveals rituals that occur between their members. Erecting a psychological border between the two ethnic groups that prevents each group's externalizations and projections from back to the in-group is one ritual.49 When neighbor groups are not in conflict, physical borders are flexible and large groups reduce their investment in them. For example, crossing the border between Canada and the United States is little more than a formality since no threat is involved in moving from one large group's territory to the other's. Under conflict situations, however, physical borders serve a double duty: they provide practical physical protection, and they are "psychologized" to represent a symbolic thick skin that protects large groups from being contaminated.50 When members of large groups feel that their psychological borders are threatened, they may consider killing out-group members rather than continue to live under the anxiety. Some mental borders take the form of a shared mythical belief in a fantasized physical structure that protects the group, like an invisible wall that keeps dangerous elements out. In such a climate, chosen traumas and glories, mourning difficulties, and feelings of entitlement to revenge are reactivated.51

38 Volkan52 maintains that human needs determine the group's friends (allies) and enemies between in-group/out-group. Thus, human beings possess, an inherent need to have both enemies and allies. Similarly, there is a need to maintain a border and preserve identity from contamination with enemy images. This psychological mechanism helps us to maintain our separate group identities. We can see this in any problem-solving workshop. Volkan calls this an "accordion phenomenon." At first, the group experiences a period of closeness and aligns themselves physically and emotionally with the other group (out-group). This illusionary sense of brotherhood breaks down because of the mechanism called "reaction formation" (unconsciously doing something contrary to one's true but hidden wish) and produces a defensive move in which the distance is reestablished. The togetherness becomes too much to tolerate. The extension and contraction of the accordion gradually becomes less pronounced and the accordion keeps playing in lesser degree. The accordion ritual also reflects a need to have and maintain a border between the antagonists.53 The Kurds and Turks have lived together and the narcissism of minor differences has worked little in the Kurdish conflict. Both groups may feel they are different. At the same time, they feel the same and together. To live in Turkey where territorial integrity and respect for human rights have been observed has become the common aspirations of both groups.

39 Another psychodynamic process that affects the formation of psychological borders between two groups is the concept of chosen traumas and glories. It refers to an event that invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group.54 The 11 September events can be labeled as "chosen traumas" for the American public and policy makers. They have caused traumatic responses and become a part of collective memory and a syndrome for American people and the world. In the same way, the Sèvres Syndrome is a chosen trauma for Turks where any radical and unexpected changes in Turkish internal and foreign policy produce reflexive reactions and create a static response to the changing world system.

40 The Kurdish conflict is psychologically contaminated with shared perceptions, thoughts, fantasies, and emotions (both conscious and unconscious) related to past historical traumas and glories. It is clear that the psychological processes live on powerfully in the Kurdish conflict. The Kurds, as a group, psychologically reach back to the Sheikh Said Rebellion as their prime chosen trauma. Every suffering since then is associated with this event in 1925 and its mental representation. Also, the Sèvres Agreement is a chosen trauma for Turks in which they fear that the survival of Turkey and existence of the Turkish nation has been threatened by inside and outside enemies. The chosen traumas affect their international relationships, especially their relationship with the region's other countries and the world. Since both groups historically have forged their national identities by defining themselves against other groups and not each other, there is still a possibility that they could learn to live in harmony and peace. Further hope is offered by the fact that Turkey has not seen a civil war or outbreak of violence like Iraq's. The enemy images of Kurds and Turks are not fresh enough to create an extensive in-state conflict in Turkey. But the psychological borders have become more real. The changing regional power structure and the emergence of an autonomous state in northern Iraq may increase the possibility of perceived borders between the two groups.

41 In 2003, the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown in Iraq. The 1 March decision by the Turkish parliament that rejected the deployment of US troops in Turkey and the involvement of Turkish troops in Iraq created a ripple effect on US-Turkish-EU relations. Apart from other explanations, the article suggests that the post-11 September world created an in-group/out-group or "us versus them" dichotomy. For Turks, they rejected being seen as a "Western" ally state and may have felt more Muslimness/Turkishness than Western. Despite cooperation between Turks and Kurds, the Kurdish identity viewed Turks as "the primary and the enemy other."55 It is obvious that the changes around Turkey's neighbors, especially in Iraq, may have positive or negative spill-over effects on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. If Turkey moves toward more democracy, human and ethnic rights, and conflict resolution, and succeeds with the European Union process, Turkey and Turkish Kurds could voice the positive changes in northern Iraq and regional politics, and "become the leader and partner of all regional Kurds on many issues."56 Second, resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and stabilization of Iraq may open new opportunities for trade, communication, education, service sector, cultural, economic, and social development. Third, a non-chaotic, stable Iraq and the comprehensive Middle East peace initiative could have positive-sum (win-win, non-zero-sum) effects on Turkish-Kurdish relations, regional cooperation, and new discourses on the Turkish and Kurdish identity and security needs.

42 The negative spill-over effects depend on the escalation of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and the repression and enforcement of assimilation of the Kurdish population. A "tit-for-tat" approach suggests that the more Kurds employ violent strategies and tactics, the more Turkey uses "military solution" methods and vice versa. In this case, the complex and chaotic character of the conflict will increase with the establishment of Kurdish statehood in Iraq and polarization among Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and others. Despite the mutual interdependence of the Turkish state and the Kurdish entity in Iraq, the lack of trust based on the divide-and-rule policies of Turks, Persians, Arabs, the British, and Americans may re-kindle pan-Turkish, pan-Kurdish, and pan-Arab nationalists, and eliminate the moderates in favor of security and economic survival. The extreme positions of all sides may jeopardize Turkey's democratization and EU integration. The removal of stable psychological borders and the construction of new identities could intensify the negative spill-over effects of the new Kurdish entities in the region.