Islamists, Soldiers, and Conditional Democrats: Comparing the Behaviors of Islamists and the Military in Algeria and Turkey

by

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ABSTRACT
This article compares the responses of the Islamist political forces in Algeria under military pressure to their counterparts in Turkey, under similar duress. While the former rose in a revolt resulting in a violent civil war, the latter chose not to employ violent means and resorted instead to political activism. To understand this discrepancy in the behavior, we propose three independent variables: the ideological and structural differences between two major Islamist groups in Algeria and Turkey, namely the FIS and the RP, and the role of the military in the political-cultural context of both countries. A historical review of Islamic-oriented activism since the nineteenth century is provided in both case studies. This review highlights the empirical factors that shape the contemporary political cultures of Algeria and Turkey, and therefore affect the political attitudes of both the military and the Islamists in their respective countries.

INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, the Middle East has witnessed a revival of Islamist movements aiming to establish “Islamic” states that impose strict interpretations of sharia1 laws. The Islamist political forces succeeded in taking over Iran in 1979 and Sudan in 1989. In Algeria, Le Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won the majority of seats in the first round of the December 1991 parliamentary elections.2 The FIS victory triggered a military coup that aimed to prevent the advance of the Islamist party. The Islamists responded by resorting to violence, leading to an

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eight-year-long civil war. Conservative estimates place the war’s toll at 120,000 fatalities, 3 642 massacres, 4 tens of thousands of detentions, and an unknown number of missing persons. 5 In addition to the humanitarian tragedy, Algeria’s economy was devastated with the loss of billions of dollars in revenue, a dramatic increase in security expenditures by the regime, a ballooning external debt ($30.7 billion in 1997), and rampant unemployment.

Similarly, in Turkey, the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP, or the Welfare Party) 6 won 21.3 percent of the vote in December 1995, thereby securing the largest share of seats compared to other political parties. The Turkish president, Süleyman Demirel, reluctantly invited Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the RP, to form a coalition government with the right-of-center, Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP, or the True Path Party), led by Tansu Çiller. 7 However, after only 18 months in power, the RP was accused of “anti-secular activities” and was shut down by the state prosecutors in May 1997. 8 Erbakan and his ministers were forced to resign from the government, and later, Erbakan was banned from politics for five years. It is generally believed that the decision to disband the RP was taken at the behest of the military establishment, which considers itself the “true guardians of the secular state,” founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 9

Following the fall of the RP government, many observers speculated about the possibility that Turkey would become a new Algeria after the “soft-coup” of February 1997. 10 However, the reactions of Turkish Islamists were relatively more peaceful, than those of their Algerian counterparts. Turkey did not witness any armed confrontation, despite the expectations of several observers. 11

Research Problem

Given the aforementioned developments, we address the following research question, which is often absent from the existing literature on Islamist movements’ behavior: Why did military pressure on the Islamists of Le Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria culminating in 1991-92 result in violent conflict, whereas military pressure on the Islamists of the Welfare Party in Turkey in 1997 resulted in a relatively peaceful resolution? In other words, both the FIS and RP belonged to a category of Islamists that can be called “electoral Islamists,” who accept the Schumpeterian definition of democracy, 12 participate in the electoral process, tend to emphasize majoritarianism, 13 and are reluctant to accept liberal elements of democracy. 14 Yet despite belonging to the same category, the FIS and RP behaved very differently under military pressure. We attempt here to account for the differences in behavior. To answer our research question, we propose three independent variables governing the behaviour of the electoral Islamists under study. First is the ideological variable (ideological differences between the FIS and the RP). Second is the organizational structural variable (difference in the organizational structure between the FIS and RP). And third is the role of the military in the political-cultural context of Algeria and Turkey. We provide an
historical review of Islamic-oriented activism since the nineteenth century in both cases. This review serves to highlight the empirical factors shaping the contemporary political cultures of Algeria and Turkey, which in turn affect the political roles of both the military and the attitudes of Islamists in their respective countries. The research question, the two cases, and the proposed variables offer new insights on understanding the behavior of electoral Islamist movements.

Theoretical Framework

This section will address three theoretical concepts around which our argument is centered: political culture, ideology, and the political role of the military.

The Political Culture

The concept of political culture has a very controversial place in political studies. Bearing in mind the aspects of the concept that might be conducive to culturally essentialist explanations, we can nevertheless argue that the concept still remains important as it addresses “... the need in political analysis to account for values and beliefs.” As noted by Michael Hudson, “the concept of political culture has been widely used by political scientists as a tool for interpreting political behaviour.”

Political culture has been given various definitions. A basic way of defining it would be to note “the embedding of political systems in sets of meanings and purposes, specifically in symbols, myths, beliefs, and values.” According to Lucian Pye, the term “encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. ... A political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system.”

Most important for our purposes, political culture is related to legitimacy. As Hudson states, with reference to Max Weber, “without legitimacy, a ruler, regime, or governmental system is hard-pressed to attain the conflict-management capability essential for long-run stability and good government.” As discussed in this study, the different historical legacies of Algeria and Turkey have contributed to the formation of different political cultures in the two countries. As a result, in the Turkish case, the military has had a certain level of legitimacy in the eyes of the people, whereas in Algeria the same cannot be said.

Ideology

Ideology can be defined as “a set of interconnected beliefs and their associated attitudes, shared and used by members of a group or population that relate to problematic aspects of social and political topics.” Ideologies are not static. They are affected by the political, social, and economic conditions prevalent in a society. Ideologies can be hidden discretely, altered, or dissimulated when such actions seem appropriate or advantageous, depending on the socio-political or socio-economic contexts. There is a dynamic relationship between ideologies
and the concept of political culture. In addition to the definitions provided above, the latter can also be defined as “those values that might support or undermine a particular set of political institutions: the particular distribution of patterns of political orientations, attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” Ideology is one of those values that can either support or undermine a political institution. An ideology pertaining to, and interpreted within, popular and pre-existing sets of beliefs like the Islamic ones in Algeria and Turkey could be one of the major values underpinning or undermining a political regime or institution.

The Political Role of the Military

In discussing military intervention in politics, we refer to “the armed forces’ constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the [elected] . . . civilian authorities.” Two variables affect the military’s intervention in politics: the military’s disposition and the opportunity to intervene. The disposition variable can be divided into two sub-variables: “the motive” and “the mood.” The motive behind intervention could be the “national interest” defined as “the demands that are ascribed to the nation rather than individuals, sub-national groups, or mankind [sic] as a whole”; the “sectional interest” that includes class and regional interests; or the “corporate self-interest” of the armed forces and the individual self-interest of its constituent members. The mood, which is more difficult to define than the motives, is a function of three elements: the military’s self-awareness of its separate identity; “the sense of overwhelming power . . . [and the realization] that there is nothing that can prevent them from having their own way”; and the grievances or grudges that may be caused by “some difference of opinion on political [or ideological] issues.” Finally, “the opportunity” to intervene can be represented by domestic circumstances, such as an internal crisis or by the popularity of the military among the populace. Military intervention in politics is more likely to take place when both the disposition, with its two elements, and the opportunity are present. Intervention could also take place when either the disposition, or the opportunity, is present. The intervention will not take place without these variables.

In the Turkish case, the definition of the national security “extends beyond the public order and Turkey’s political and economic interests, to include threats to the country’s Kemalist legacy.” According to the Turkish military’s definition of national security, the motivation of the military intervention in Turkish politics is based on a “perceived national interest” formulated by the Kemalist-style secular ideology. In addition, the “grudge” mentioned above believed to be borne by the military against Islamists is due to the entrenched ideological differences between them. In the Turkish case, there is a strong connection between political culture and history, Kemalist ideological legacy and the political role of the military.
Although this connection is also present in the Algerian context, we argue that the nature of the Algerian military intervention is different. The main motivation of the Algerian military’s intervention was a combination between the self-interest of a faction in the armed forces and the individual self-interests of the leading generals. In the Algerian case, the motivation (self-interest) and the mood (the sense of overwhelming power) were both present, and the opportunity, or the internal and the constitutional crises, was created.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN ALGERIA AND TURKEY

Algeria

The French Colonial Era and the Role of Islam

The initial invasion of Algeria by France in 1830 was challenged by the official ruler, Alday Hussein. The Algerian opposition was soon defeated, and on 5 July 1830 the French entered Algiers. French rule lasted until 1962. An Islamic-inspired resistance commenced following the invasion, led by Abdul Qadr, who was recognized as an Emir of the Jihad (Commander of the Resistance) in 1832. Abdul Qadr vowed to follow the Qur’an and established a shura (consultation) system. He succeeded in opposing the French until 1847 when he was defeated and exiled to France and then to Syria. The Algerian resistance continued under the Sufi leadership of Muhammad Ibn Abdullah and the Rahmaniyun Brotherhood until 1857. With the exception of Bou Amamah’s movement in the south, the year 1871 witnessed the last significant resistance efforts before the ensuing period of uneasy peace from 1871-1931. This period was interrupted by several upheavals such as those of 1907, 1911, and 1914.

In 1931, Abdel Hamid Ben Badis established the Community of Muslim Scholars (CMS) whose slogan was “Islam is our religion; Arabic is our language; Algeria is our homeland.” In April 1956, the leader of the CMS, Sheikh Ahmad Madani, officially declared support for the Algerian revolution of 1 November 1954. There was evidence, however, that members of the CMS had a role in the revolution from the outset. Abbasi Madani, then a young member of the CMS, participated in the assault targeting the official radio headquarters on the very first day of the war of independence. According to some historians and political analysts, the CMS acted as the “peaceful link” between Abdul Qadr’s armed resistance and FLN’s.

Roots of the Conflict: the Post-independence Confrontations Between Islamists and the Military

During the struggle for independence against the French, Islam served to rally Algerians around the effort. The leaders of the independence struggle made references to Islam to gain further support and legitimacy from the populace. For instance, the title of mujahid was given to every fighter of the National
Liberation Front (FLN) and the secret slogan of the revolution was “Allahu-Akbar-Khalid-'Uqba.” Despite that, leftists were the dominant political figures in post-independence Algeria. On 5 June 1962, Algeria officially gained independence and the leader of the FLN and the new president, Ahmad Ben Bella, declared that he would officially adopt a socialist ideology. Under Ben Bella, the CMS was banned in 1963, a few months after independence. The then leader of the CMS and one of its founders, Ahmad Al-Bashir Al-Ibrahimi, was put under house arrest. After Boumedienne’s military coup of 1965, the CMS emerged again under the name of the Community of Values (CV). It was outlawed once again in 1966 and many of its members were detained, including Abbasi Madani.

From 1962 to 1987, Islamists renewed their activities. In 1964, Ahmad Al-Bashir Al-Ibrahimi presented a “Memorandum of Advice” in a meeting of the FLN Party Congress. It was the first declared Islamist protest against the official ideology of the new regime. In his statement, Al-Ibrahimi opposed the leftist orientation of the regime, warned that the situation in the country could deteriorate into a civil war, and mentioned that the only way to avoid this was through guiding the country along “Islamic principles.” A compromise was reached which was reflected by the toned-down leftist rhetoric of the Charter of Algiers and by “re-asserting the country’s Arab and Islamic heritage.”

The opening of the first mosque in the University of Algiers in 1968, which occurred with the help of the Islamist thinker Malik Bennabi, signified an important step taken by Islamists to declare their presence and begin their activities in the university. Since its inauguration, the University of Algiers has witnessed annual national and international conferences, gathering Muslim thinkers who lecture and debate various issues. To a certain extent, such activities have supported the revival of Islamic thought and led to an ideological confrontation with leftist students who were popular at the university at that time.

In November 1982, another “Memorandum of Advice” was signed by Abdul Latif Sultani, Ahmad Sahnon, and Abbasi Madani. The memorandum, whose declaration was accompanied by a large gathering in the University of Algiers, condemned the torture and detention of students, demanded their release, accused some figures in governmental institutions of being “hostile” to “the Islamic culture,” and demanded the reopening of the closed mosques, as well as cultural and social reform. After the memorandum, the government detained Madani and placed Sultani, who was then 80 years old, and Sahnon, who was 73 years old, under house arrest. The crackdown led to a declaration by the Islamists announcing the establishment of the first armed Islamist group since independence: the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA). Led by Mustafa Bouya’li, a former officer in the National Liberation Army (ALN), the MIA’s avowed aim was to subvert the current regime and to replace it with an “Islamic” one. Bouya’li stressed in his speeches that the November 1962 revolution “devi-
ated” from its principles, an argument also made later by Abbasi Madani in his speeches.54

Turkey

The Occupation Period and the Emergence of Kemalist Turkey

After its defeat in the First World War, the Ottoman state’s strongholds in Anatolia and its regions in Europe were divided and occupied by various Western powers. The Greeks occupied Izmir, the British Istanbul, the Italians Antalya, and the French laid claim to Cilicia. Fortunately for Mustafa Kemal, then the military leader of the Turkish resistance, “the victorious Allies could not agree on how to divide the spoils of the war. They were more determined to prevent each other from obtaining territory that would give one a strategic advantage over the rest than on crushing the Turks.55 Kemal was able to invoke Islam to legitimize his leadership and provide a moral ideology for his followers. In the 1920s in Ankara Kemal gave Friday sermons in which he praised the Caliphate and stressed that it should not be separated from political rule.56 By September 1922, the forces under Kemal had liberated most of the country and he was portrayed to the Turks as a national hero.57

On 3 March 1924, the National Assembly “deposed the Caliph, abolished the Caliphate . . . banished all members of the house of Osman” and elected Kemal as the president of the newly formed republic of Turkey.58 From 1924 to 1935, Kemal enforced several social and cultural decrees, including banning the Islamic veil; changing the official holiday from Friday to Sunday; banning the Arabic script and replacing it with a Latin one; issuing a decree making it obligatory that recitation of the ezan59 be in Turkish rather than Arabic; abolishing the seriat and replacing it with a combination of Swiss, Italian, and German codes.60

Roots of the Conflict: the Post-independence Confrontations Between Islamists and the Military

The reactions to the Kemalist-style “secularization” process ranged from violent revolts to non-violent condemnation. The former was represented by Sheikh Said’s revolt.61 Said was a Kurdish Naksibendi62 sheikh (leader) from eastern Turkey who declared Jihad against Kemal and the new National Government on 8 February 1925.63 The rebellion started in Piran, Said’s stronghold, and spread to several areas in southeast Anatolia. Mobilizing more than 15,000 fighters and declaring himself the Emir of the Mujahidiin, Sheikh Said announced that the aim of the rebellion was to restore the Caliphate and re-impose the seriat.64 Outnumbered and outgunned by Kemal’s 52,000 soldiers,65 Said’s troops were defeated by June of the same year and Said himself was captured, court-martialed, and executed by the military.66

The non-violent reactions to Kemal’s new decrees were represented by
movements such as the Nurcu movement, “a modern religious group that takes its name from its founder Said Nursi (1876-1960).” Said Nursi was a Kurdish Muslim scholar from Bitlis who was awarded the Medal of War Heroes in August 1918 and participated in the movement against the British presence in Istanbul. In 1922, he issued a statement demanding that Turkish deputies adhere to Islamic principles and perform the prayers. Consequently, he was accused of “calling for the fragmentation of society” by Kemal. Despite that, Nursi refused to join Sheikh Said’s rebellion and advised the latter to avoid a confrontation with the military. After Said’s defeat, Nursi was detained by the authorities only to be released later on.

Starting in 1926, Nursi authored “several volumes of exegesis on the Qur’an known as the Risale-i Nur Külliyat ([Complete Works of] the Epistles of Light).” These epistles included his teachings and interpretations of Islam, and represented a moral framework and organizational guide for his followers. Subsequently, Nursi was detained once more, put on trial, and ordered into internal exile several times. He died in 1960 just before the military coup in March against the Adnan Menderes government, which was accused of tolerating Islamists’ activities.

The other non-violent reaction to Kemal’s policies is represented by the National Outlook Movement — Milli Görüs Harekatı (MGH). The MGH was founded by the renowned Islamist activist Necmettin Erbakan. It gave birth to several Islamist political parties, including the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi — MNP — established in 1970), the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi — MSP — established in 1972), and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi — RP — established in 1983).

The National Order Party (MNP) called for social reform and the establishment of Islamic schools. The party was banned after the military coup of 1971, and was succeeded by the National Salvation Party (MSP), which was bolder than its predecessor in its religious rhetoric and political demands. The MSP entered the Turkish parliament in 1973 after winning 11.9 percent of the vote. It formed a coalition government with the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi — CHP) led by Bülent Ecevit. In 1980, killings were taking place as a result of daily clashes between right- and left-wing groups. To a large extent, anarchy reigned on the streets. In addition, demonstrations calling for the implementation of the seriat and establishment of an “Islamic” state took place in Konya. As a result of these events, a military coup took place on 12 September and all parties were banned. Politicians, including Erbakan, were prosecuted and banned from engaging in politics for a certain period of time. In 1982, a new Turkish constitution was adopted allowing political parties. As a result, the Welfare Party (RP) was established, which adopted principles similar to those of the MSP. After the ban on political activities was lifted in 1987, Erbakan was elected as the leader of the party. The RP won only 7.1 percent of
The vote in the first general elections, making it unable to pass the threshold for parliamentary representation.78

The Effects of the Political-Cultural Context on Islamists’ Behavior

Both Islamists and the military were two of the principal actors in the political history and culture of Algeria and Turkey. Islamic concepts, such as jihad, and social and economic justice, were continuously invoked by different political groups from various ideological backgrounds (both secularists and Islamists). Islamic concepts were also used to undermine particular political institutions, such as colonial or post-colonial authoritarian “secular” regimes. In other words, Islamic concepts were manipulated by different political actors to mobilize the people and rally them around the religious flag. This pattern of mobilization through the pre-existing sets of Islamic symbols to undermine or underpin a political regime was entrenched in the political cultures of both countries. However, the aims of such mobilization differed. In Turkey, a credible military threat was imposed on the Kemalist regime when Sheikh Said mustered his 15,000 fighters. It was not successful, however, and has not been repeated by any large Islamist group79 since 1925. Arguably, the effective suppression of the opposition during the one-party era left a permanent effect on the psyches of the members of the religious opposition, which discouraged them from engaging in an armed struggle against the regime.80 Therefore, the peaceful coexistence with the “secular” regime proved to be more fecund, and the presence of Turkish Islamists in the legislative and executive branches are not considered an “aberration” in the contemporary political history of Turkey. As a result, the religious-oriented mobilization to undermine the regime was limited to electoral politics and aims — mainly to acquire a parliamentarian majority in order to form a government or lead a coalition.

In Algeria, the historical experience of a credible military threat by Islamists (declaring “jihad”) and its subsequent failure did not occur before Abbasi Madani’s threats to call for “jihad” in July 199181 and the materialization of such calls in 1992.82 In addition, the Algerian political history witnessed neither a two-party nor a multiparty system before 1989, at which point the regime prohibited almost any form of organized opposition. In Turkey, by contrast, the country witnessed a peaceful transformation of power from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) to the Democratic Party (DP) as early as 1950. This climate of political opening allowed for the existence of Islamist-leaning parties like the MNP in 1970 and the MSP in 1972, despite the restraints imposed by the government on their speech and behavior. The presence of these movements within a relatively democratic context contributed to the moderation of their political behavior. In Algeria, the lack of such context/environment and its resulting political culture contributed to the radicalization and capriciousness of their political behavior, at least among the majority of Islamist factions.83
Another issue pertaining to the effect of the historical political context on the responses/behavior of Islamists is the role of the military. The Turkish Islamist movement witnessed several military coups against democratically elected civilian governments (approximately one coup every 10 years). After each coup, the military made several political changes and constitutional amendments, and then re-allowed civilian rule. Under such civilian rule, the Islamists of Turkey re-emerged under a different party title. Their political activity was generally tolerated by the military. This pattern was repeated in 1971, 1980, and 1997, and became a regular phenomenon in the Turkish political context.

In Algeria, before 1992, the only successful military coup was that of Colonel Houari Boumedienne in 1965. It was neither against a democratic regime/process nor Islamists. Military coups were not a regular phenomenon in the Algerian political context. When a successful coup occurred in 1965, there were no significant changes in the political arena until 1989. When the other successful coup occurred in 1992, the leadership of the FIS — emerging as the political winner during the reform period after almost three decades of one-party-dictatorship and lacking the experience provided within the Turkish political context — resorted to violence and collaborated with more radical Islamist factions.

To conclude, within the Turkish political context there were several factors that contributed to the relative moderation of the Turkish Islamists’ responses to military coups/interventions. These factors included the presence of an unsuccessful confrontational precedent with the Kemalist regime (Sheikh Said’s revolt); the presence of an established pattern: a military coup followed by a re-installation of civilian rule; and the military’s relative toleration of newly established Islamist parties, affiliated with the previously “banned” ones. In Algeria, the lack of such historical-contextual factors contributed, together with other variables, to the violent reaction of the Islamists affiliated with the FIS in response to the military coup of 1992.

BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS

Algeria: the Beginnings of the Civil War

In October 1988, riots broke out in Algeria in response to economic scarcity and political destabilization. The riots were probably spontaneous and not organized by any particular political faction. The regime tried to manipulate Islamist figures, such as Ahmad Sahnon, who called on the protestors to abandon a march on 10 October, which was part of the protests. He apparently succeeded. However, on their way back the protestors clashed with army soldiers, who were called out by the Algerian president, Al-Chadli Benjedid, on 4 October. The clash resulted in the deaths of 43 civilians and injury to more than 200. The overall death toll reached 600 over four days of clashes (6-10 October). Sahnon condemned the military’s attitude and sent a message to the president calling for reforms. It was clear that leading Islamists, such as Sahnon and others, played an
important role in controlling the riots. Despite the fact that they did not organize the 1988 riots, the Islamists emerged as the popular leaders of the masses.

In February 1989, Benjedid initiated a package of political reforms, including a referendum on a new constitution that allowed for a multiparty system. As a result, Le Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) was established after a meeting that gathered most of the well-known Algerian Islamist scholars, including Ahmad Sahnon, Abbasi Madani, Ali Belhaj, Hashemi Sahnoni, ‘Azuz Bin Zubda, and others, under one flag. The leadership of the newly-established party decided to enter the municipal elections of June 1990. The FIS won 58 percent of the vote, and two-thirds of the communal and regional assemblies’ seats. The FIS’s next target was the parliamentary elections.

Aware of its aims, Benjedid’s regime attempted to contain the FIS politically by two methods. The first was to create several small parties that bore the name “Islamist.” The numbers of the founders of some of these parties were equal to the number of their members. By doing so, Benjedid aimed to split the votes of Islamists’ supporters, by introducing other non-FIS Islamist options. The other method used was to issue the electoral laws of 1 April 1991, which prohibited speaking about politics in mosques and enforced imprisonment penalties on any imam (religious preacher) violating such orders. The new laws divided the electoral circles according to the affiliations of their inhabitants. The wilayat (province) of Tizi Ozo, a stronghold of the Berbers (the majority of whom are not supporters of Islamists) with a population of 1 million, was assigned 21 parliamentary seats. The wilayat of Algiers, the capital and an historical stronghold of Islamists, with a population of 3 million, was assigned 21 seats as well. This made the vote of a citizen living in Tizi Ozo equivalent to three votes of a citizen living in Algiers. A more extreme example of gerrymandering was in the case of Bab Al-Wad area in Algiers. An Islamists’ stronghold with a population of 161,604, Bab Al-Wad was recognized as one electoral circle. On the other hand, Temfosent, a small town near Algiers and a traditional FLN stronghold with a population of 2,550, was also recognized as one electoral circle. This made the votes of 161,604 citizens in Bab Al-Wadi equivalent to 2,550 citizens in Temfosent.

The response of the FIS to these laws was to launch a strike in 1991 from 23 May to 8 June. Clashes during the strike resulted in the deaths of 20 people, resignation of Mouloud Hamrouche’s government, declaration of the emergency laws, and, on 5 June, calling the army into the streets and imposing night curfews. After the strike ended, the government detained the two leaders of the FIS, Ali Belhaj and Abbasi Madani. By then it was clear that Algeria was on the verge of a serious crisis. Trying to postpone the explosion, the new government, led by Sid Ahmad Ghozali, called for a national conference gathering together all Algerian parties. The FIS, under its provisional leader, Abdul Qadir Hachani, refused to participate in the conference, and demanded the release of the FIS
leaders, rehabilitation of the dismissed workers (due to the strike), and suspension of the emergency laws.

After the FIS conference in Batna (July 1991), Hachani decided to participate in the parliamentary elections of December 1991. The electoral laws of April 1991 were replaced by fairer ones, although several inequalities between the regions remained unchanged. The elections took place on 26 December 1991, and the results were a landslide victory for the FIS in the first round. This was followed by a military coup, resignation of the president, and the mass arrest of any supporter or “suspected supporter” of the FIS. Hachani and his entourage were among the detainees.

The military coup triggered the re-emergence of the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Chabouti, a leading member during the time of Bouya’li. “The reconstituted MIA recycled most of the old Bouyalists and the majority of the FIS activists inclined to take up arms, and acted as an umbrella for many local groups.” The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) operated as a sub-group under MIA until the assassination of the former’s founder, Mansori Miliani (another leading member in Bouya’li’s MIA), in September 1993. Since then, the GIA operated separately and pursued a non-compromising policy opposed to “any dialogue or negotiation . . . with the regime.” Later, in 1995, a new organization, the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), was established after the death of Chabouti.

**Turkey: a New Coup, an Old Phenomenon**

Since its establishment in early 1983, the Islamist-oriented Welfare Party (RP) participated in parliamentary elections. The RP garnered 7.1 percent of the vote in 1987 parliamentary elections, 9.8 percent in 1989 local (municipal) elections, 16.2 percent in 1991 parliamentary elections (by making an election alliance with two other nationalist-oriented parties), 19.1 percent in 1994 local elections, and 21.7 percent in 1995 parliamentary elections. In the latter, the RP emerged as the first party in the parliament by gaining 158 seats.

After the RP’s victory of 1995, the Turkish president, Süleyman Demirel, by-passed Erbakan, due to the latter’s Islamist tendencies, and called on the leaders of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi — ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP), Mesut Yylmaz and Tansu Çiller, to form a coalition government. To prevent the accession of the Islamists to power, the military exerted pressure on both Çiller and Yylmaz to forget their historical rivalry. On 3 March 1996, the ANAP and DYP responded to the pressures of the military and the presidency and formed a new coalition government that lasted only three months and three days. When the coalition collapsed on 6 June, Erbakan formed a new governmental coalition with Çiller. “On 28 June 1996, the Turkish Republic for the first time had a Prime Minister whose political philosophy was based on an Islamist ideology. This marked a psychological break in Turkish history.”
Certain actions and statements on the part of Necmettin Erbakan and other members of the RP increased the tension between the Turkish Armed Forces and the RP. The military made their move in February 1997 when the generals of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi — MGK) declared Islamism and Kurdish nationalism threats to the Turkish national security, the former being of a more serious nature and requiring urgent attention. The MGK “recommended” 18 items “to be taken to secure the secular democratic character of the state and its social order.” These “recommendations” were generally aimed at preventing any “anti-secular” acts, broadly defined, and halting the rise of “Islamists,” broadly defined as well, in the military, educational, and official fields. Although Erbakan reluctantly approved the 28 February plan, he was forced to resign by the military in June 1997.

IDEOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

Algeria: The Ideology and Structure of the FIS

The FIS was not a consolidated monolithic group with a long history of political activism like the RP. According to both Al-Hashimi Sahnoni, one of the FIS founders, and Mustafa Kertali, a leading member of the FIS and the Emir of Al-Rahman Brigade, the FIS, which only emerged as an organized political party in September 1989, was a front gathering together several Islamist groups with different ideological orientations. In other words, Ali Belhaj, Abbasi Madani, and the other founders of the FIS succeeded in gathering most of the active Islamist groups under one umbrella. The representation in the 40-members Majlis Al-Shura (the Consultative Council of the FIS) headed by Madani clearly reflected a multi-ideological structure.

Ali Belhaj and Hashimi Sahnoni represented two different factions of the Salafi current which was characterized by extreme conservatism, adherence to a Sunni-based puritanical interpretation of Islam similar to Saudi Wahhabism, and an allegiance to the international Salafi movement. Belhaj represented the relatively hard-line, uncompromising faction, whereas Shanoni stood for the pragmatic one, known for basing its fatwas (religious rulings) on the concept of Maslahit al-Da’wa (interest or welfare of the Islamic call) concept. Based on this concept, Shanoni resigned from the FIS protesting Madani and Belhaj’s decision to carry on the strike of June 1991; called the Batna conference of July 1991 “the conference of death” due to the risky decision of participating in the parliamentary elections of 1991 and its consequences; and condemned the violent response of the FIS militant factions to the coup of 1992.

Muhammad Al-Said represented the Al-Jaz’ara (Algerianization) current or the Islamic Group in Algeria (Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyya Bi Al-Jaza’ir) in Majlis Al-Shura. The ideology of the Al-Jaz’ara current was inspired by the thoughts of Malek Bennabi, a French-educated Algerian intellectual who was the director of Higher Education during Boumedienne’s era. Bennabi’s writings
focused on the reasons behind the decline of predominantly Muslim countries and the ways to progress through the interactions between ideas, cultures, and individuals.\textsuperscript{111} The ideology of Al-Jaz’ara was characterized by its nationalist-Islamist agenda and its rejection of any forms of non-Algerian Islamist interpretations of Islam or influences in Algeria. These rejections included the influences of both the Muslim Brothers, who inspired parties like HAMS, Al-Nahda, and Al-Islah; those of the Saudi-sponsored international Salafī current, which influenced Algerian Salafis; and those of the more extreme, international Jihadi\textsuperscript{112} and Takfiri groups and figures. Al-Jaza’ra current controlled the FIS after Batna’s conference of July 1991, and Abdul Qadr Hachani, who was elected as a provisional leader of the FIS, is considered to be among the leading figures in the Jaz’ara current.\textsuperscript{113}

Abbasi Madani, “the FIS’s primary leader and ideologue,”\textsuperscript{114} represented the Islamist populist current\textsuperscript{115} that was characterized by its evasiveness, pragmatism, and reliance on popular mobilization (street mobilization as opposed to partisan mobilization).\textsuperscript{116} By representing such a pragmatic current, Madani was able to lead the FIS’s fractional coalition.

The Jihadi current, characterized by its animosity to and rejection of democracy, exclusion of non-violent methods to change “non-Islamic” regimes, intolerance with political rivals, especially secularists, and by frequently resorting to dramatic terrorist methods to achieve its goals, was not represented at the Consultative Council level of the FIS.\textsuperscript{117} At the middle-leadership and grassroots levels, however, some protagonists of the Jihadi current joined the FIS. Most notable among these was Charif Qouasmi (alias Abu Abdullah Ahmad), who was the local representative of the FIS in the Bi’r Khadim suburb of Algiers in 1990,\textsuperscript{118} Qouasmi became the national Emir of the Jihadi GIA between March and September 1994.\textsuperscript{119}

A similar conclusion can be drawn about the representation of the Takfiri current, which is also characterized by its horrendously violent methods, as well as by the excommunication of any person who does not join their group(s).\textsuperscript{120} Building on such excommunication and considering the rest of Algerian population apostates, Takfiri factions allowed the murder and looting of anyone who is not among their rank. One of these factions took over the GIA’s leadership in 1995 and their leader in 1996, Antar Zawabri, issued a statement in which he declared the rest of the Algerian population as infidels.\textsuperscript{121}

It is clear that the FIS factions did not adhere to any one ideology and its organizational structure was fragmented from the beginning. In time of crises, such a motley coalition was not able to hold fast. The continuous splits that occurred since the controversial decision to strike in May 1991 attested to the organizational volatility of the FIS coalition and the military coup of 1992 detonated what was left of the FIS’s internal cohesion.\textsuperscript{122} After 1992, each faction practiced its own ideological preferences. “The majority of the FIS activists
inclined to take up arms” joined the recycled [Armed Islamic Group] MIA under “general” Chabouti. In addition, a group of the Al-Jaz’ara faction led by Muhammad Said and Abdul Razzaq Rajjam formed an alliance with the GIA under Qouasmi in 1994. Abdul Qadar Hachani “urged FIS’s followers to remain calm, exercise caution and not to respond to any provocation from whatever sources,” while Belhaj urged his Salafi followers to join the ranks of Chabouti’s MIA. At best, the leadership of FIS could not take a unified stance. At worst, the leaders were giving their followers conflicting decisions.

TURKEY: THE IDEOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THE RP

In the Turkish case, the structure of the RP and conditions relating to its emergence were different from those of the FIS. Despite the presence of different views regarding its strategy for dealing with the military, public rhetoric, and popular mobilization aims, the RP did not include factions with major ideological differences. Under the historical leadership of Erbakan (since 1970), the RP had enough time to consolidate its official ideology, structure, and leadership.

While the FIS leadership gave conflicting statements about their position regarding democracy, the question of accepting or rejecting democracy was firmly decided by the RP leadership in favor of acceptance. In a certain sense, one could say that the Turkish context ‘forced’ the Islamists — the RP, in this case — into democratic accommodation. As Gilles Kepel states, “whatever the role played by the military in the fate of Turkish Islamism, the movement had been compelled to function according to the rules of a pluralist, relatively democratic system, which for over twenty-five years had incorporated the Islamist movement as one of the main components of the nation’s parliamentary life.”

The history of the RP’s democratic participation, not to mention its predecessors’, was more than 14 years (1983-97); long enough to entrench democratic practices in the ideology of the group. This is one of the key factors that “...set Turkish Islamism apart from that of other countries” and enabled the RP to avoid “...the drift toward violence that took a toll elsewhere in the final decades of the century.”

In the aftermath of the 28 February intervention, a split occurred between the factions of the RP’s successor, the FP, giving birth to the AKP and the SP; this division was less as a result of ideological differences and more as a consequence of the new circumstances created primarily by the military during the 28 February process. We can also add to this the personal rivalries between the historical leadership represented by Erbakan and his allies, and the younger generation represented by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. Although in one sense, the older and younger generations represented the ‘conservatives’ and the more moderate ‘reformists’ respectively, the split within the FP occurred directly as a result of the military intervention. As Çakyr states, “with the...
February 28 process, the National Vision Movement [MGH] was pushed into a change and a transformation out of its will.”\textsuperscript{133}

The “post-modern” coup of February 1997 forced both the SP (RP’s and FP’s successor) and the AKP to adopt similar rhetoric in the political arena with regard to the issues that were considered particularly sensitive after the coup. The statements and positions of the SP and AKP are almost identical in this regard. They both vowed to adhere to democracy, support joining the EU, and follow the Kemalist political traditions.\textsuperscript{134} When asked if he still had the same political thoughts he did when he was a member of the RP, Erdogan replied, “I think the same way,”\textsuperscript{135} an answer that supports the view that the split was not ideological in nature. On the other hand, the FIS had less than two years experience with democratic participation (from 8 March 1989 to 11 January 1991) and the leaders of its factions never agreed about the Islamic “legitimacy” of secular democracy.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Turkey

\textit{Historical and Cultural Legitimacy}

A main difference between the Algerian and Turkish armies is that the latter was the main actor in the creation of modern Turkey.\textsuperscript{136} The army in Turkey changed the Sèvres boundaries and “enforced,” at least according to the national perception, new ones in the Lausanne Treaty. Due to its national armed struggle, Turkish army enjoys a historical legitimacy in Turkish political culture and the “military and military values still lie at the heart of any definition of what it means to be Turkish.”\textsuperscript{137} As Yavuz states, “the military remains a very popular and trusted organization, even among those who don’t seem to share its radical secularist agenda.”\textsuperscript{138} Through the educational system, the Turkish military establishment has been able to inculcate certain values; according to a former Turkish minister of culture, İstemihan Talay, “the Turkish military is synonymous with the Turkish nation, the institution and embodiment of the most important values what make us [Turks] what we are.” Schoolchildren are taught that the “army is the symbol of [their] . . . national unity and the guarantee of [their] . . . future, which fulfills its duty to the letter.”\textsuperscript{139}

Opinion polls reflect the results of the military’s strategy: popular trust and a positive image. In December 1996, in the middle of the RP-DYP government term in office, only “16.6% of those questioned said that they trusted politicians” compared to 81.3 percent trusting the military. In 1999, after the soft-coup against the RP-DYP coalition, 78.9 percent of those questioned said that they trusted the armed forces compared to 21.6 percent trusting the politicians.\textsuperscript{140}
The Military’s Perception of its Role

The leadership of the Turkish military establishment perceives itself as the vanguard and protector of the national security of the state. The latter is defined by the military itself and that provides the armed forces with the power to shape and determine basic state policies. As Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar state, “... the realm of influence of TAF [Turkish Armed Forces] goes significantly beyond its counterparts in other democratic societies. It is not only a professional military organization but a core element of Turkey’s political system, enjoying a high degree of political and institutional autonomy.” According to the military leadership, the national security would be endangered if the Kemalist-style secularism was threatened, undermined, or altered by an Islamist-oriented party. Based on this perception, in addition to popular support, the military’s leadership is able to mobilize its soldiers, rallying them around their “moral and legal obligation to protect the Turkish republic against any kind of threat” including those posed by Islamist parties.

In addition, like all other actors on the political scene, the military also has economic interests that influence its attitude toward various governments, in particular, that of the RP. The direct involvement of the military in the economic realm through the OYAK Corporation, as well as boycotting and the elimination of pro-Islamist business establishments (the so-called Green Capital) during the 28 February Process, all point to the important economic dimensions of military intervention.

A Culture of Acceptance?: the Legality and Constitutionality of Intervening in Politics

In addition to its historical legitimacy and relative popularity, the Turkish military was granted “legal” rights to intervene in politics whenever the Kemalist-style secularism was endangered, in perception or in reality. According to the preamble of 1982 Constitution (amended in 1995), “no protection shall be given to thoughts or opinions that run counter to the Turkish national interest . . . or the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Ataturk,” and Article 35 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Law of January 1961 “specifically charges the military with the responsibility for protecting the nature of the Turkish regime including the Kemalist principles of territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism.” Moreover, according to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, five of the ten members of the MGK were supplied by the Turkish armed forces, and they could issue “legally binding resolutions which the government had to accept and parliament could not veto.” That was the ruling of the Constitutional Court in February 1997, legally clarifying that MGK resolutions were not recommendations and “the government had no choice but to implement them without question or delay.”

The fact that the Turkish military establishment enjoyed a popular image...
supported by an historical legitimacy, entrenched role in Turkish political culture, and embedded concept (Kemalism as equitable to “modernity” and “progress”) to rally their people around it, in addition to the relative “legality” of their intervention in politics, made a decision to take up arms against such an establishment by an opposition party a potentially suicidal one. Moreover, neither the historical political experience of the RP nor its ideological orientation did or could have encouraged countering the February 1997 military coup by force, especially in light of the fact that the RP was only supported by 21.7 percent of the voters, an insignificant percentage compared to the 81 percent support attained by the FIS.  

Algeria

The Military’s Legitimacy

The situation is different when it comes to the Algerian military. After 34 years (1965-89) of a military-backed, one-party-dictatorship that was perceived by the demonstrators of October 1988 as being primarily responsible for “the failure of a state-run economy, a growing national debt [in addition to a 30 percent inflation rate and 25 percent unemployment rate] and of imposing austerity measures on the majority of the population but not on the elite [mainly the army generals and their entourages],” the Algerian military could hardly enjoy “historical legitimacy” compared to its Turkish counterpart. In addition, despite the ALN role in the decolonization struggle, by 1991 several controversial figures, who had been fighting on the French army side as late as 1960, reached the upper echelons and senior ranking positions within the Algerian military establishment. These figures included Khalid Nazar, the incumbent defence minister at the time of the coup; Arabi Belkhair, the incumbent interior minister; Muhammad La’mari, the incumbent commander of the Land Forces; and Isma’il La’mari, the deputy director of military intelligence. The appointment of Khalid Nazar triggered the resignation of General Muhammad Atayliyah, the chief inspector of the Algerian Armed Forces and commander of the First Region, protesting the appointment of a member of the so-called “officers of France” clique in top-ranking positions rather than the “officers of the ALN.” The background of the coup leaders encouraged the FIS and other militant Islamist groups to take up arms. The title “Lacoste’s corporals,” widely used to refer to Nazar and his entourage, even by military figures, was a successful manipulation of the generals’ background by Madani Mezraq, the Emir of the AIS, in his communiqué dated April 1995.

Having such backgrounds and leading a coup against a popular front with an “Islamic” agenda, the plotters could not find much popular support. The timing of the coup was also problematic. It occurred in January 1992, when the memories of the October 1988 events were still fresh. Given this fact, even leading secular politicians, who had been staunchly opposed to the FIS, avoided supporting the coup.
A Culture of Fear and Suspicion?: The Legality of the Military Intervention

Unlike the Turkish Constitution of 1982, which grants the military the right to intervene in politics to preserve the Kemalist regime and the official ideology of the state, the primary mission of the Algerian National People’s Army (ANP) was limited to “safeguarding the independence of the state and the defence of national sovereignty,” as outlined in Article 24 of the Constitution of 23 February 1989. In other words, the new constitution did not assign the mission of safeguarding the state’s official ideology to the army. Nor did the Algerian Constitution specify how the military could “legally” intervene in politics. Since Benjedid dissolved the parliament in January 1992, creating a constitutional vacuum, the coup plotters established the High Security Council (HCS) dominated by military generals and, then later, the High Council of State, an unconstitutional entity that was to take presidential powers in Algeria until December 1993. The first statement of the self-declared High Council of State stated that the aim of the coup was to prevent the FIS from taking political power in Algeria by “force.” Within such a political context and due to the violations of the democratic political process by the military, it was easy for the FIS and their allies to mobilize support and spread their message of armed resistance against the military regime.

CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, we can tentatively conclude that the three independent variables – ideological and structure differences as well as the nature of the political role of the military – affected the responses of the FIS and RP to the military coups against them. We are not arguing that these variables represent an exclusive explanation. We argue, however, that they are significant enough to affect the responses of Islamists to military interventions. Further research is needed to compare these variables to other potential explanations, most notably socioeconomic and resource mobilization.

The first and the second variables are the ideology and the structure of the group. Umbrella groups, unlike relatively monolithic ones, tend to fragment during crises with each sub-group following its own ideological and policy preferences. This is clearly exemplified by the fracturing of the FIS and its leadership after the 1992 coup. The third variable is the nature of the political role of the military and whether or not that role is legitimized and popularly supported by the political culture within which the military operates. The “degree of tolerance” of the military toward their opponents can be considered as a sub-variable within this third variable. Regularly permitting Islamist-oriented parties to re-emerge under different titles and with a more moderate agenda was an incentive to the overwhelming majority of Turkish Islamists to shun the armed path. The lack of such a “degree of tolerance” in the Algerian military’s political role gave credibility to the radical extremist factions who argued from the beginning that
democracy is pragmatically a “blocked road” as well as “illegitimate” for Islamists.

The period from the 28 February military intervention until the present has also witnessed interesting developments with regard to Turkish military-Islamists relations. The AKP’s coming to power in the November 2002 elections was certainly the most important part of these developments. The party has been actively engaged in efforts to join the European Union and the democratization process. The AKP’s actions and rhetoric in this regard have been taken by some to be genuine and by others not so. If we were to speculate, the military can be included among the former.

The developments in the recent past, however, indicate that the AKP has lost its willingness and ability to realize some of the key reforms for democratization. These include curbing the political power of the military, as well as the decriminalization of expression of thought. The current states of affairs do not augur well for proper democratization in Turkey.

The differences in the military’s political role and the “degrees of tolerance” in Algeria and Turkey created the following patterns: in Turkey, if the Islamists crossed the red-lines set by the military, a coup would take place. The Islamists will not violently respond since both the political context and historical experience almost guarantee a future chance to resurface under a different title with a relatively moderate agenda and less extreme rhetoric. In Algeria, the pattern was as follows: after each military-backed crackdown on Islamist activists, radical factions would take up arms against the ruling regime. This pattern is clearly demonstrated by Mustafa Buya’li’s group in 1982, when he declared Jihad after the crackdown on the Islamist-oriented university students and detention of Islamic scholars. Ten years later, the MIA, GIA, and AIS re-declared Jihad after the 1992 coup and crackdown on Islamist activists. The chance of resurfacing in the future under a different title is out of the question in Algeria. Algerian President Abdul Aziz Bouteflika declared in September 2005 that he could not punish the ones who perpetrated the coup and cancelled the 1991 democratic process. He also declared that there would be neither rehabilitation nor recognition for the FIS as a political party, even under a different title. It is unclear whether these circumstances will lead to the continuation of the violent pattern, even after the 2000 conditional amnesty that was granted to the AIS guerrillas and their affiliated groups. In an interview, Ali Ben Hajar, the Emir of the Islamic League for Call and Jihad (ILCJ) was asked whether or not he has considered pursuing the armed path in the future. He replied that he personally does not think about it. However, he mentioned that he would put down arms only when his “freedom” (as opposed to detention/incarceration) was guaranteed by the military, implying that if that “freedom” was threatened again, the disastrous pattern might be reinitiated for a third time.
Endnotes

The authors would like to thank Ms. Maya Ollek for her insightful comments and contribution to this article.

1. In Turkish, the Arabic word *sharia* is rendered as *seriat*, hence the latter will be used in the Turkish context.

2. The FIS won 188 out of the 231 seats of the first round (81 percent of the seats).


5. Muhammad Abdul ‘ati, “Muhasilat Al-Sira’.”

6. In this article, we will be using the Turkish acronym “RP” and “the Welfare Party” interchangeably.


10. It is also referred to as the ‘post-modern’ coup.

11. Samir Najm, “Muqadimat Al-Infijar Al-Kabir Bayna Al-Jaysh Wa Al-Usuliyn (The Beginning of the Big Explosion between the Army and the Fundamentalists),” *Al-Hawadith*, 1 May 1998, p. 30. The violent acts of the “Turkish Hizbullah” — not to be confused with its Lebanese counterpart — constitute a partial exception to the general absence of violent tactics used by the Islamists. Notwithstanding the gruesome acts of violence allegedly committed by the group, we still contend that the group was a relatively insignificant force, certainly paling in comparison to the violent groups in Algeria. For a more detailed investigation of the “Turkish Hizbullah,” see Asll Aydlntasbas, “Muder on the Bosphorus,” *The Middle East Quarterly* 7 no. 2 (June 2000).


13. Most of the time they emphasize it to the point of ochlocracy and tyranny of the majority.


15. Since the February 1997 soft-coup was against the RP, the first Islamist political party to attain a significant electoral victory that admitted its leader to premiership, we chose it as the main Turkish case study.


25. Ibid., p. 61.

26. Ibid., p. 83.


30. Before his resignation, Benjedid dissolved the Algerian parliament headed by Abdul Aziz Belkhadim, thereby creating a “constitutional vacuum” regarding his successor, the incumbent head of the parliament. Since that position was “vacant,” the opportunity was set for an overt military take over, especially after the refusal of the head of the Constitutional Council, Abdul Malik Binhiblyes, to take the presidential position in protest to the military’s action. See Emad Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa (Oxford: Westview, 1997), p. 149; Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York: Colombia University Press, 1997), p. 102.


32. Ibid., p. 72.


34. Muru, Al-Jaza’r Ta’ud Li Muhammad, p. 76

35. One of its nearest translations-by-meaning can be “Muslim struggler.”

36. Khalid Ibn Al-Walid was one of the most prominent military commanders in the history of Islam, whereas ‘Ukba Ibn Nafi’ was the Muslim leader who brought Islam to Algeria. The two names are culturally and historically significant.
39. He was the father of Ahmad Talib Al-Ibrahimi, one of the presidential candidates of the 1998 elections who was accused of being the FIS candidate. See Ashraf Khalil, “General Fi Al-sulta: 90% Min Al-anasir Al-Musalaha Istajabat Lil Al-’afow (A General in Authority: 90% of the Armed Elements Positively-Responded to the Amnesty),” *Al-Sha’b* 7 (March 2000), p. 7.
45. Bennabi is considered to be the father of the Al-Jaz’ara Islamist current (the Algerianization current), which presents a national-Islamist ideology. Its main figures are Muhammad Said and Abdul Razzaq Rajjam, both of whom were assassinated by the GIA in 1995. See Ricardo Laremont, *Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria, 1783-1992* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000), p. 186.
48. Sultani was the second man in the CMS after Al-Ibrahimi.
49. The uncontested “godfather” of the post-1980 Islamist movement in Algeria. Sahnon was also the third man in the CMS.
52. MIA might have been secretly established after 1979; however, its first public declaration was in December 1982 after the November crackdown. See Abu Zakaria, *Al-Haraka Al-Islamiya Al-Musalaha Fi Al-Jaza’ir*, 1993, p. 17; Stone, *The Agony of Algeria*, p. 181.
57. Ahmad, “Al-Zikra Al-Arba’un Li Istiqal Al-Jaza’ir,” p. 50.
58. Ibid., p. 55.
59. The call for prayer.
61. Some view the Sheikh Said uprising more as a manifestation of Kurdish nationalism rather than Islamic opposition to a self-avowedly secular regime. See Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion* (Austin, TX: University of Texas, 1989). One could certainly argue that to a certain degree, the uprising was a manifestation of Kurdish reactions to the loss of autonomy and centralization of power under the new Republican regime. See Mesut Yen, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,” *Journal of Winter 2006*
Contemporary History 34, no 4 (1999), p. 563. Be that as it may, the occurrence of the uprising shortly after the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 also attests to the religious character of the rebellion. This view is reinforced by the fact that “Islam has... deeply affected Kurdish society; even ostensibly non-religious aspects of social and political life are moulded by it... The first Kurdish uprisings with a nationalist aspect were almost without exception led by shaykhs of sufi orders.” Martin van Bruinessen, The Kurds and Islam, Islamic Area Studies Working Paper Series, No.13. (Tokyo, 1999). Therefore, it is possible to see both religious and nationalistic elements in the uprising. The role of Islam in it is undeniable.

62. The Naksibendi order is one of the various Sufi orders popular in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

63. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p. 93.

64. Ibid., p. 108

65. Ibid., p. 107.


67. The name “Nurcu” was neither used by Nursi nor his contemporary followers. The official media and government used it to refer to them (Nursi and his followers) as the “Nurcu movement.”


70. Yavuz, “Search for a New Social Contract in Turkey,” p. 120.


73. Rusen Çakır, “Milli Görüs Harekat (The National Outlook Movement),” in Yasin Aktay, ed., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt 6: İslamiçlık (Political Thought in Modern Turkey, Vol.6: Islamism) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 544. In the words of Çakır, “without doubt, the most important independent Islamic movement of the history of the Republic of Turkey is the National Outlook. And the leader of the National Outlook deserves — inevitably — to be defined as the most influential Turkish Islamist politician of the 20th century.” After the demise of the Welfare Party, the MGH manifested itself on the political scene through the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi or FP). The FP transformed into the present-day Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi or SP). According to Akdogan, it is also possible to call the National Outlook Movement as the ‘Erbakan Movement.’ See Yalçın Akdogan, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party),” in Aktay, ed., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt 6: İslamiçlık, p. 622.


75. Shakir, Al-Tarikh Al-Mu’asir, p. 128.


77. Çakır, “Milli Görüs Harekatı,” p. 548. Although the RP was established in 1983, because of being vetoed by the junta, it could not participate in the general elections.


79. By “large Islamist group,” we mean those movements whose supporters exceed 5,000 people. Again, the phenomenon of “Turkish Hizbullah” is a partial exception to this rule.

81. Mostafa Bouya’li’s calls for Jihad in 1982 “found little echo” and did not present a credible military threat to the regime. Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, p. 49.

82. Shahin, Political Ascent, p. 143; Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, p. 57.

83. The Movement for the Islamic Society (MSI or HAMS; not to be confused with the Palestinian radical group HAMAS) and Al-Nahda can be excluded since they adhered to democratic participation even after the 1992 coup. They were both losers in 1991 elections, however.


85. Unsuccessful coup attempts took place in Algeria in 1964 (Colonel Chabani’s attempt) and 1967 (Colonel Zubairi’s attempt).

86. The ideological and structural variables, and the role of the military shall be discussed later.


88. Al-Sheikh, Ajnihat Al-Inqaz, p. 45.

89. Muhammad Muqqadim, “Mustafa Kertali Lil AlHayat: Musibat Qouasmi Fi Hashitih Zaytoni Wa Zawabri (Mustafa Kertali to Al-Hayat: The Disaster of Qouasmi was in His Retinue Zaytoni and Zawabri)” AlHayat 8 (February 2000), p. 14. Ali Belhaj and Hashemi Sahnoni, two leading Islamists and later among the founders of the FIS, met on 7 October 1988 with several military generals to coordinate the containment of the riots.


93. Ibid.

94. Roberts, “The Search for a Political Solution in Algeria,” p. 239

95. Ibid., pp. 240 and 241.

96. Yavuz “Milli Görüş Hareketi,” p. 596. We can argue that the increase of support given to the RP in the elections during the aforementioned years is a manifestation of the general strengthening of Islamism in the 1980s, following the 12 September coup. Nuh Yılmaz notes that “the Islamist movement reached its zenith at the level of the masses at the end of the 1980s.” See Nuh Yılmaz, “İslâmçılık, AKP, Siyaset (Islamism, AKP, Politics),” in Aktay, ed., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt 6: İslâmçılık, p. 615. In his view, this situation became even more pronounced in the post-11 September period: “By showing a rapid progress in such diverse domains as those of the local capitalist classes, Islamist intellectuals, the media and educational institutions, Islamism reinforced its place in the political arena as a popular alternative and an original movement.”


99. Ibid., p. 34.

100. Among these we can mention the fact that Erbakan made his first official visits as prime minister to Muslim countries like Libya, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as that certain RP mayors engaged in activities that drew the ire of the secularist segments, including the armed forces. See Özgür Gökmên, “28 Subat: Bir Batılılaşma Restorasyonu Mu? (The February 28: Is it a Restoration of Westernization?)” in Yasin Aktay, ed., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Cilt 3: Modernlesme ve Batılıcılık (Political Thought in Modern Turkey: Modernization and Westernism), (İstanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 348-49. As Gökmên notes, “in this period, Sincan together with Sultanbeyli were the municipalities which faced most of the reaction. The
thing that accelerated the process [of military intervention] was the ‘Evening Commemoration for Jerusalem’ in which the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran also participated.”

101. Gökmen “28 Subat,” p. 348. At the time, one of the top generals of the armed forces, Çevik Bir, made the following statement: “As the Armed Forces, we are giving priority to eliminating the anti-secularist trends. These trends are even trying to infiltrate the army. Now the threat against secularism has become more serious than the PKK threat that has been going on for 12 years.”


104. Muqqadim, “Mustafa Kertali Lil Al-Hayat,” p. 8. Kertali was the municipal deputy of Al-Arba’a region after the 1990 municipal elections. He was the head of the FIS branch in Al-Arba’a.

105. The Al-Rahman Brigade under Kertali operated militarily from 1992 to 2000. It joined the GIA in 1994, severed relations with and declared war against it (GIA) in 1995 after the GIA’s internal coup against the FIS *Sheikhs* of the Al-Jaz’ara current (Muhammad Said and Abd Al-Razzaq Rajjam) and then joined the AIS in 1997.


107. Shahin, *Political Ascent*, p. 133. Excluding Mahfuz Nahnah’s movement (HAMAS in 1991 and now HAMS) and Abdullah Djaballah’s group (Al-Nahda in 1991 and now Al-Islah), who are more loyal to the Muslim Brothers’ traditional ideology, *Jihadi* groups, like the remnants of Bouya’li’s Islamic Armed Movement (MIA), refused to participate in elections on religio-ideological grounds and therefore can be also excluded as groups. Individuals from this current joined the FIS, however.


110. Shahin, *Political Ascent*, 120; François Burgat and William Dowell, *The Islamic Movement* (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1997), p. 317. The name Al-Jaza’ra was given to the current by Mahfouz Nahnah, the leader of HAMS representing a faction of the Algerian Muslim Brothers, to distinguish them from other Islamist movements with international connections.


112. Like bin Laden and his associates.


116. The best example of such a current is Ayatollah Khomeini’s movement in Iran.


118. Muhammad Muqqadim, “Ali Bin Hajar Yarwi Lil Al-Hayat Tajribatoh Dakhil Al-Jama’a Al-


120. Shahin, Political Ascent, p. 133.


123. Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, p. 198. Established by Mustafa Bouya’li and recycled by Abdul Qadir Chabouti, a leading member during the time of Bouya’li, the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) vowed to overthrow the military regime through a guerrilla warfare strategies. Chabouti was an officer in the Algerian army and he was given the title Liwa’ or general by his militant followers for his military skills.


125. Shahin, Political Ascent, pp. 151 and 156.


127. Özipek, “28 Subat ve İslamcılar,” p. 644. However, this is not to say that the RP, the most important party of the National Outlook Movement, was a total monolith. As Özipek avers, “the political support that was given to the RP did not signify total identification with the leadership of the party” and that “its rhetoric of justice and liberty against repression brought together various groups on the [same] political line.” Be that as it may, one can say that the RP was quite homogenous with regard to its ideology and there were not really any factions to speak of as was the case of the FIS in Algeria.

128. Esposito and Voll, Islam and Democracy, p. 165; Shahin, Political Ascent, p. 138; Muqqadim, “Mustafa Kertali Lil AlHayat”, p. 14. While Al-Jaz’ara (Said and Hachani) and the Populist (Madani) factions declared that they would accept and abide by democracy, the Salafi factions (Belhaj and Sahnoni) were more inclined toward rejecting it. Needless to say the position of the jihadi faction was categorical rejection while the Takfiri faction both categorically rejected it plus excommunicated any group or individual who accepted democracy.


131. Ibid., pp. 346-47. Kepel mentions that radicalism did exist: “A radical faction did appear in Turkey at the turn of the 1980s, chiefly among militants fascinated by the Iranian revolution and by extremist Arab groups … these militants mostly concentrated their efforts in the universities … But this radical student Islamism never took hold in Turkish society, nor did it strike a chord with the impoverished youth of Turkey’s cities, in contrast to the Egyptian and Algerian experience.”


133. Çakır, “Milli Görüş Harekatı,” p. 552; Özipek, “28 Subat ve İslamiyalar,” p. 644. However, some contend that the separation of the AKP from the MGH represented a larger philosophical change and transformation. As Özipek notes, “this philosophical transformation had started long before the political separation that took place in the aftermath of the February 28.”

134. Louis Meixler, “Turkish Leader, Promising More Democratic Freedoms and Crackdown on Torture, Lobbies Italy for Help in Pushing EU Bid,” Associated Press Newswires, 13 November 2003; Howe, Turkey Today, p. 183. However, after the AKP’s coming to power and the SP entering into opposition, one witnessed a differentiation of political rhetoric between the two parties with regard to certain issues. In spite of this, on other issues, particularly the most sensitive one — secularism — they towed a similar line.


143. Ismet Açka, “Kollektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (The Turkish Armed Forces as a Collective Capitalist).” *Birikim Dergisi* 160/161 (August-September 2002), pp. 80-101; Özipek, “28 Subat ve İslâmcılar,” p. 641. According to Özipek, as far as economic relations are concerned, it is possible to see the 28 February intervention as an elimination operation against the newly growing social forces, including the Islamist-oriented capitalist class.


146. They include the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the land, naval, air and gendarme forces, and the secretary of the council (a military officer).


148. Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, p. 358. Kepel argues that the RP would not have been able to engage in a forceful resistance to the process “…without unleashing a revolutionary process that it did not have the means to control — and one in which the devout middle class and the small businessmen of the MUSIAD [Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen] would never have participated in any case.”


151. Algerian army officers who fought on the French side during the colonization period and then later joined the ALN and/or the FLN guerrillas.


153. Robert Lacoste was the French governor-general of Algeria from 1956 to 1958. He “promoted” a group of Algerian petty-officers who were fighting on the French side to the rank of officers. Some of these officers joined the FLN and ALN in 1960 and 1961, allegedly to infiltrate the organizations at the orders of Lacoste. These “promoted” officers were later accused by some Algerian politicians of being loyal to France. Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War*, p. 165; Burgat and Dowell, *The Islamic Movement of North Africa*, p. 234; Ben Bella, “An Interview with the Ahmad Ben Bella”; and Samrawy, “Tafasil Al-Inqilab ‘ala Al-Dimuqratiya Fi Al-Jaza’ir: Huwar Ma’ Al-‘akid Muhammad Al-Samarwy.”


157. A group affiliated with the AIS and representing the Algerianization current (*Al-Jaz’ara*). Members of this group assassinated the notorious leader of the GIA, Jamal Zaytoni, in 1996 avenging the assassination of Muhammad Said, a leading figure in the Algerianization current, as well as responding to the massacres adopted by the post-Qouasmi GIA.