

The Shift in United States-Sudan Relations: A Troubled Relationship and the Need for Mutual Cooperation

by
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Abstract

With the Cold War over and external strategic and ideological considerations removed, African problems now exist mainly in national and regional contexts. However, the devastating situation in Sudan continues to draw global attention and, in particular, the United States that still manifests interest in the Sudan. This article contends that, although US-Sudan relations had been mostly antagonistic and hostile before 2000, cooperation grew, especially after the catastrophic humanitarian disaster of 11 September 2001. However, the need for sustainable, mutual cooperation and interdependence in achieving internal peace in Sudan and ending the war on terrorism cannot be understated.

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War and external strategic and ideological considerations removed, African problems now exist mainly in national and regional contexts. However, the global war on terrorism has replaced the Cold War as the keystone of United States policy in Africa. Sudan's devastating situation, in particular, continues to draw the attention of the US. In addition to the country's cooperation with the US in its war against international terrorism, Sudan also matters to the US because,

It straddles a fault line between Africa and the Middle East that requires the United States to balance delicate, competing foreign policy interests. Depending on how it manages its internal affairs, Sudan can provide either a constructive link between Africa and the Middle East or a point of confrontation that has destabilizing consequences for both regions. Eventually, Sudan might provide to the United States an additional source of energy supply.¹

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This article contends that, although US-Sudan relations had been mostly antagonistic and hostile before 2000, cooperation grew, particularly after the catastrophic terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. However, the need for sustainable, mutual cooperation and interdependence in achieving internal peace in Sudan and ending the war on terrorism cannot be understated. Sudan has ended its 21-year-old civil war that resulted in the deaths of over two million people and the internal displacement of more than 4.5 million. The country wants its name removed from the list of state sponsors of international terrorism. The end of the north-south war enabled Sudan to tap into its vast resources, achieve its national potential, and re-enter the international scene with a renewed sense of legitimacy, at least according to many pundits.² On the other hand, the US needs the ongoing assistance and cooperation of Sudan in its battle on terrorism. The struggle against terrorism makes it impossible for the state to act as “a self-contained and a sealed unit”³ because the US cannot win the war on terrorism unilaterally, therefore, both the US and Sudan must engage in a modicum of cooperation. As well, Sudan has oil, which Hans Morgenthau argues, “is essential to the operation of advanced economies.”⁴ Finally, the US had a national interest in ending the north-south 21-year-old war, and now the crisis in Darfur. Therefore, both nations are largely interdependent because of terrorism, Darfur, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.⁵

This article will analyze Sudan-US relations with a major focus on relations with the Khartoum government of Omar Hassan al-Bashir. It will examine the following components as they are integral to understanding Sudan-US relations: the background to Sudan’s civil war; Hassan al-Turabi and Sudan’s foreign policy; relations between Sudan and the US; the shift in relations following 11 September 2001; the Darfur crises; and the way forward.

Background to the Sudanese Civil War

With an area approximately a third of the size of the US, Sudan is Africa’s largest country. Sudan has Arab and Islamic ties to the Middle East and Africa, and is pulled in various directions: north, toward the Arabs; west, to the Sahel; east, to the Horn; and south, to the Great Lakes.⁶ However, due to its cultural, racial, and religious identity, Islam in the Sudan has become closely associated with Arabism.⁷ Thus, the country is often included in the regional Middle Eastern political geography and its significant role and place in Africa is generally ignored.⁸ With over 36 million people, of whom 70 percent are Muslim and the rest Christian and Traditionalist, and a nation of numerous ethnic groups, Sudan is riven by ethnic loyalties to region and groups. Upon achieving independence in 1956, the Arab-led government reneged on promises to create a federal system, which led to an uprising by southern military officers. This sparked one of the world’s longest-running civil crises, which had disastrous humanitarian consequences.

The origin of the Sudanese crisis goes back to the period of colonization (1898-1956), whereby the north and the south were governed as two separate administrations. The northerners and southerners were kept apart and unintegrated within the border of the new state of Sudan. The seeds of ethnic polarization were further ingrained when the British perpetuated the dualism by encouraging separate identity and development with the educational system Arabized, and Islam as the source of moral code and law. The colonial government focused on developing the economy and infrastructure of the north while ignoring southern development. Although Westernized and exposed to Western pluralism and secularism, the south remains one of the world's most undeveloped places. Since the British departure in 1956, the north and south have been left divided, and thrive on mutual antagonism and struggle for survival. The war went on except for a 10-year pause following the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement, leading to a cessation of the conflict and a degree of self-rule. Prime Minister Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri's (1969-85) attempt to impose the *Sharia* law and turn Sudan's society into a Muslim Arab state led to the resumption of the civil war in 1983. The conflict continued until the ceasefire and Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government and John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Nairobi, Kenya, signed on 9 January 2005. Unfortunately, Vice-President Garang's death on 31 July 2005 endangered the CPA and thereby increased the probability that the genocide in Darfur would accelerate. Central to the CPA are the issues of the relationship between religion and state, the right to self-determination for the south, power and wealth sharing, security agreements, and whether Khartoum, the capital, should be spared the *Sharia* laws.⁹

Hassan al-Turabi, a powerful Sudanese cleric, religious leader, and influential actor in Sudan's foreign policy, made the implementation of a strict form of *Sharia* in Sudan a major priority of his political agenda. His influence dates further back to when he served as Attorney General in the Nimeiri administration where he assisted in the implementation of Nimeiri's declaration of the *Sharia* law as the sole law in Sudan. Turabi has been described as the "de facto ruler of Sudan"¹⁰ following the coup led by Omar Hassan al-Bashir in 1989. At the time of the coup, Bashir's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) had no vision, ideological inclination, and very limited political experience. The RCC was groomed by the National Islamic Front (NIF) founded by Turabi in 1985. The 1989 coup was a personal victory for Turabi as he could finally impose his political vision on the country.¹¹ It is against this background that one can begin to grasp the course of Sudan's foreign policy, through the power behind the throne.¹²

Turabi and Sudan's Radical Foreign Policy: The Sudanese Model

Bashir's radical and militant foreign policy stance against the US could be seen in light of his movement along the path of politicized Islam, and political

backing by his mentor, Muslim Brother leader Turabi.¹³ As such, Sudan's foreign policy approach under Bashir's administration has largely been influenced by Turabi's doctrine and teaching.

Soon after the coup [led by Al-Bashir in 1989] the junta quietly handed power to Turabi and his Islamist Brethren in the National Islamic Front, a political group that had grown out of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was done by turning to Turabi for guidance, and inviting his operatives to infiltrate the civil bureaucracy and the military — creating, in effect, a shadow government. Turabi himself, despite his obvious authority, remains in what might be called the foreground of the background.¹⁴

Turabi has been featured largely as a “cosmopolitan, multilingual, modern, Islamist whose theories about the nature and feature of the Islamist state became highly regarded in Islamist circles and feared by military and monarchical regimes in the Arab-Islamic world and were rejected in the West as undemocratic and not in conformity with the Western notion of ‘civil society’.”¹⁵

As spiritual leader of Sudan's military government, Turabi's major objective was to infuse Islamic principles into the government. Thus, Sudan, under Turabi's influence, wanted a return to pure Islam and to replace secular civil law with Islamic law.¹⁶ Turabi's fundamentalist ideology views modern states in the Islamic world as an illegitimate, immoral division of the *umma* (the community of believers) and the world as two broad but distinct spheres, the non-Islamic world and the community of believers. Borders in the Islamic world are perceived as lacking legitimacy as they are colonial creations. Therefore, as Turabi explained, “The international dimension of the Islamic movement is conditioned by the universality of the *umma* . . . and the artificial irrelevancy of Sudan's borders.”¹⁷ Turabi tried to focus Sudan's foreign policy on the notion that the community of believers is a close knit political unit, not expansionist toward the Western world or non-Muslim world, and stops where Islam stops.

Fundamentalist ideology suggests that terrorism is a last resort rather than the norm, and where terrorism occurs it is perceived as retaliation for “infringement of the territorial integrity of the *umma* by the United States or other Western nations.”¹⁸ It is not violence directed against the non-Islamic world, nor “is the assistance that Iran and Sudan give to fundamentalist insurgencies directed against the West as much as it is directed against governments that Islamic ideologies perceive to be un-Islamic.”¹⁹ In other words, terrorism is directed at a non-Muslim state or entity that is believed to cooperate in the on-going division of the *umma*. As Zachary Karabell argued, the US may attempt to accommodate fundamentalism but to contain it will almost certainly fail.²⁰ In the US, for example, the Clinton administration, like other US governments, claimed that it opposed violence, extremism, and terrorism but not Islam.

During the Turabi period Sudan's foreign policy was antagonistic toward the US.²¹ Therefore, as Karabell asserts, the aim of the fundamentalist foreign policy was not to undermine Western nations or destroy them but to attempt to compete globally for prestige, influence, and power.²² Karabell adds that:

The more U.S. foreign policy seeks global power and the greater the demand for an international system of liberal democracies, the greater will be the threat posed by an Islamic fundamentalism that adamantly and violently rejects that hegemony and the norms of Liberalism. If U.S. goals remain relatively limited and the United States attends to issues such as global prosperity and domestic security, then Islamic fundamentalism should not be considered a threat to the United States.²³

In this regard, Sudan opposed the Middle East peace process²⁴ and wished the US presence removed in the region.

When Turabi referred to the Sudanese model, he viewed Islam as a state and a religion where the Islamic movement began as elitist and then developed into a popular movement. Likewise, he viewed the Islamic movement as political and religious as well as revolutionary. The Arab-Islamic Sudanese model condemns Western values and institutions, which promote secularization, including the separation of religion and the state. Turabi blamed the separation of politics and Islam on Western imperialism, which "disestablished Islam, destroyed public institutions and replaced the Sharia with French or British positive law."²⁵

Turabi saw the Islamic movements as threats to Muslim governments and the present world order because Islam purports to safeguard Islamic values and seeks to correct existing inequalities, and because it seeks justice, "Islam will challenge those who enjoy an advantage under the present world order, in economic relations between north and south, in the U.N. structure, in the monopoly of information, technology or armaments."²⁶ As a national doctrine, Islam asserts individual values and independence from the West. Turabi questioned US opposition to radical interpretations of Islam exported to other nations, adding that, if the US should attempt to crush the Sudanese Islamic fundamentalist model, such a move would necessitate strong opposition. The Americans, Turabi asserted, are unlikely to pursue such an enterprise, as this would provoke a great *Jihad* and the Sudanese would turn into terrorists and target Americans.²⁷ From a foreign policy stance, Turabi argued that it appears that the

Islamic movement is a growing force throughout the Middle East, and the Sudanese model enjoys great popularity among the Arab masses for its Islamic stands on foreign-policy issues. The Gulf War was a blessing in disguise because it turned the Islamist movements into mass movements and radicalized Islam in Saudi Arabia. The Islamic masses have taken control and many governments and movements are being undermined. They must go or perish.²⁸

According to Karabell, “Sudan’s al-Turabi has donned the mantle of Islamic revolution, but Sudanese society is not undergoing revolutionary transformation.”²⁹ Ironically, Sudan’s leaders, including Turabi, pursue a radical Muslim dream and see themselves as progressive, but instead of the proposed enlightenment, they have delivered a nightmare, according to William Langewiesche.³⁰ The political sidelining of Turabi,³¹ who had been the international symbol of Islamic extremism and the cause of the regime’s international isolation, affected Sudan-US relations.³² The US, under a new Bush administration, contemplated the re-establishment of relations with Sudan. As a result, a low-level diplomatic presence was established in the fall of 2000 as new sympathies with the Christian and anti-slavery movements in the south emerged.³³ Having thus analyzed the role of Turabi and his Islamic model as a force in Sudan’s foreign policy, the following section will examine US-Sudan’s relations from 1956 to 2006.

Foreign Relations: United States and Sudan

Sudan had been jointly under Anglo-Egyptian administration rule since 1898. In 1956, it achieved independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom. Upon independence, the US was one of the first powers to extend recognition to the new country. US interest in the Sudan rested on ending the country’s war in Darfur, fostering democratic norms, religious and cultural tolerance, and ongoing assistance in the counter-terrorist effort. For the most part, US-Sudan relations have been characterized by ups and downs tainted by the Cold War, Arab-Israeli tensions, the war in southern Sudan, support for international terrorism, human rights abuses, and what US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, termed “genocide” in Darfur.

Upon independence in 1956, relations between the US and Sudan started off well until the country embraced the policy of nonalignment.³⁴ Sudan’s relationship with Egypt was not looked upon favorably by the US as the country turned to the Soviet camp in 1955. The new government in Sudan distrusted and resented US support for Israel and perceived the superpower as the new colonial power following Great Britain. As Donald Petterson explained, “Early on, Khartoum was wary of the United States and of Egypt and the Soviet Union as well. Because Sudan would not take the US side in its Cold War struggle with the USSR, Washington was cool toward Khartoum.”³⁵ However, the US sought to halt Soviet influence in the region and therefore favorably responded to the Khartoum government’s 1957 request for technical and economic assistance. Many in the Sudanese government, particularly the pro-Egyptian and left-wing groups opposed US assistance, and Vice-President Richard Nixon was welcomed with anti-US demonstrations during his March 1957 visit. Nevertheless, total US financial assistance from the late 1950s to 1967 amounted to \$103 million, provided mainly for education, transport, and agriculture.³⁶

In 1958, Sudan experienced a military coup, which led to the overthrow of the country's civilian government of Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil.³⁷ In fact, throughout the country's history, from independence to 1989, Sudan experienced periods of instability with intermittent civilian and military governments. The various administrations faced problems of factionalism, a weak economy, and ethnic dissidence. Following the military takeover by General Ibrahim Abboud in 1958, Sudan did not take the side of the US in its ideological struggle with the Soviet Union but, like its predecessor, established closer links with Abdul Nasser's Egyptian government who had close ties with the Soviet Union. To make matters worse, it expelled 300 foreign missionaries in 1964.³⁸ Abboud stepped down in 1964 following a strike and dissension within the military.

The second civilian government came into existence in 1964, first under Prime Minister al-Sirr al-Khalifa (1964-67), and then under the then-30-year-old Sadiq al-Mahdi (1967-69). Sudan continued to enjoy a cordial and enhanced relationship with the Soviet Union, which provided it with some 2,000 mostly military advisors, accounted for 18 percent of imports, and acquired 25 percent of Sudan's export. In addition, as an Arab League member, relations with other members remained a key feature of Sudan's foreign policy. Thus, siding with the Arab nations and accusing the US of complicity with Israel, Sudan declared war on Israel in June 1967 and broke diplomatic relations with Washington. With this, the US presence in Khartoum was reduced to a few diplomats housed in the Netherland's embassy.

Sudan again experienced political instability when its democratically elected government of the second civilian administration of Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub was toppled in a 1969 military coup led by Colonel Ja'far Nimeiri. Following the coup, there was no change in US-Sudan relations. Nimeiri supported Nasser's pan-Arabism and, like Egypt, established close ties with the Soviet Union, which provided Sudan with arms. However, in 1971, a dramatic shift occurred when Nimeiri suspected Soviet involvement in a 1971 communist attempt against his government. This resulted in a break in Sudanese-Soviet relations, as Nimeiri aligned his country with the US against objections from Egypt and the Arab nations. Moreover, Sudan's new alliance with the US also stemmed from a long-felt threat by the political ambitions of Ethiopia and Libya.³⁹ Nevertheless, Washington welcomed this new gesture as it poured in \$18 million for the resettlement of refugees and rehabilitation of the war-torn south. Unfortunately, in 1973, Palestinian terrorists murdered the new US ambassador to Sudan, Cleo Noel, his deputy, Curtis Moore, and Belgian *Chargé d'Affaires* Guy Eid.⁴⁰ Nimeiri's government sentenced the culprits to life imprisonment in Sudan. However, owing to mounting pressure, Nimeiri commuted the sentences of the assassins in 1974, which to the US was tantamount to freeing the terrorists.⁴¹ Nimeiri's action resulted in strained relations between the two as Washington recalled its ambassador.

Sudan's geopolitical location rendered it the target of revolving-door superpower intervention during much of the Cold War. In the face of Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa in the mid-1970s, and with the incorporation of Ethiopia into the Soviet sphere of influence, the US sought to limit the spread of communism in the Horn. As a result, Washington's relations with Nimeiri began to improve and Sudan became a bastion against communism. Nimeiri's support of the US-sponsored Camp David Peace Accords of 1979 between Israel and Egypt, its cooperation during Operation MOSES, in which thousands of Ethiopian Jews were airlifted via Sudan to Israel, and his hostility toward Libya, earned him generous military and economic assistance. This was evident during the Carter and succeeding Reagan administrations, which provided Sudan with \$100 million in military aid and \$160 million in annual economic assistance, thus making Sudan the top recipient of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa in 1982.⁴² During the Chadian war in the 1980s, Sudan allowed the US to fly weapons from Cairo to Khartoum to El Fasher for onward shipment to Chadian forces fighting Libya and, also, the CIA had a station in El Fasher.

In the early 1980s, Nimeiri's government faced growing internal unrest as it failed to ameliorate the severe economic hardship intensified by drought, famine, fuel, and food shortages. In addition to his arbitrary rule, including the implementation of strict *Sharia* laws in 1983, advocating such punishments as the amputation of limbs for stealing⁴³ and public flogging for alcohol consumption, inept management of the economy and the famine caused by the 1984 drought led to mass discontent and crystallized opposition, which led to his downfall. Moreover, the hanging of Mahmoud Taha, the Republican Brother's Reformist Movement leader who was condemned for apostasy, also triggered Nimeiri's downfall. Furthermore, the situation was worsened by Nimeiri's imposition of austerity measures advocated by the US and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ironically, as Washington's relations with Nimeiri's Sudan peaked, his popularity at home fell precipitously. Finally, following a mass riot, Nimeiri, while in Washington seeking more economic assistance, was toppled by a military coup in April 1985. Nevertheless, under Nimeiri, the US and Sudan experienced, for the most part, closer relations during the Reagan administration. Vice-President George Bush, Sr., had visited Sudan in March 1985, just before Nimeiri's ouster.

Nimeiri's overthrow was a setback for US-Sudanese relations. Sudan's new military leader, General Suwar al-Dhahab, and his Transitional Military Council (TMC), viewed past American support for Nimeiri suspiciously, particularly his support for the Camp David Accords, hostility toward Libya, introduction of the joint military exercise Operation BRIGHT STAR, and his sanction and facilitating of the America-supported airlift of some 7,000 Ethiopian Jews via Sudan to Egypt. Therefore, Dhahab moved away from his predecessor's close relationship with the US, embraced the policy of neutrality, and developed closer ties with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Dhahab alienated the US by dis-

carding Nimeiri's anti-Libyan policies and improving relations with Ethiopia. Libya and Sudan signed a military agreement in 1985.⁴⁴ The Reagan administration displayed increasing irritation and grew worried about the presence of Libyan and "other known terrorists" in Sudan.⁴⁵ As a result, US-Sudanese relations reached a low point in November 1985, when the State Department urged Americans not to travel to Sudan, as the country had become a base for Libyan and other terrorists.⁴⁶ The State Department reassigned 45 American embassy officials and dependents (about 10 percent of the mission staff were sent to other US embassies), as well as planned future cuts in the diplomatic corps in Khartoum. US concern over the growing presence of Libyan and other terrorists, along with the dismantling of Nimeiri's dreaded security apparatus (expert surveillance), signaled to Washington that Sudan might be veering away from its traditional Western and Egyptian supporters. Relations further deteriorated following the US bombing of Libya on 15 April 1986.⁴⁷ A day later, William J. Calkins, a US embassy communications officer in Sudan, was shot in the head.⁴⁸ Subsequently, the US ambassador to Sudan ordered the evacuation of all non-essential American Embassy employees and their families out of Sudan.

Following the April 1986 elections, the Dhahab government relinquished power to the new civilian leadership of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. US ambassador to Sudan, G. Norman Anderson (1986-89), visited Mahdi to express Reagan's support for Sudan's democratic process and his readiness to assist the country. The Ambassador also warned Sudan that improved relations with Libya, Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union would not be at America's expense.⁴⁹ Washington also expressed security concerns over Americans in Sudan and the continued presence of Libyan "terrorists." On the other hand, Mahdi acknowledged the need for cordial relations with Washington but, at the same time, expressed his country's interest in maintaining non-alignment. On October 1986, he visited Washington but was disappointed when he could not meet President Reagan. To maintain Sudan's independence and non-alignment stance, Mahdi requested the removal of US equipment (light transport vehicles, hospital supplies, and equipment) from Port Sudan.⁵⁰ He hoped that eliminating America's presence in Port Sudan would improve relations with the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, and Libya. Even though Mahdi's government pursued a non-alignment policy during much of his tenure, relations with the US remained important, as Washington continued to be a major donor of humanitarian assistance.

However, in June 1989, a group of army officers, labeled the "Revolution of National Salvation," led by Umar Hasan al-Bashir, and backed by the Muslim Brother leader Turabi, ousted the country's third democratically elected government. Bashir's National Islamic Front (NIF)-backed government became a target of global criticism and increasing American opposition.⁵¹ US-Sudan relations reached their lowest point during Bashir's regime. Under pressure from Turabi, he instituted a radical, extremist, and ideological government based on the

Sharia law. As was stated earlier, Bashir was a disciple of Turabi, the power behind the revolution.

The US was disturbed by the Bashir government's policy with regards to human rights violations in the southern war, its association with Iran, and its assistance to various terrorist networks, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.⁵² Bashir's Islamist regime faced the challenge of reconciling "their religious legitimacy and basis of power with diversity and conflicting value systems within the nation-state and the still interdependent world."⁵³ However, following the toppling of the elected civilian government of Mahdi in 1989, the US terminated all military and economic assistance programs to Sudan but continued to provide humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons through its Agency for International Development. Bashir perceived this as unfriendly and accused the US of interference in the country's internal affairs. The US responded by accusing Khartoum of hindering foreign aid distribution and seizing relief supplies. Consequently, given the existing political environment and tension between Khartoum and Washington, the Bashir government mistrusted US motives when the US proposed a peace initiative to end the north-south civil war. In May 1990, Bashir rejected US proposals for a ceasefire. His anti-Western stance, support for Iraq during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf war, and criticism of the presence of Western forces on Islamic holy lands further strained relations between the two nations. In February 1991, the US withdrew its embassy personnel and closed its embassy in Khartoum.

US frustration with Sudan further grew when it falsely alleged that Sudan was involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. During the Clinton administration, the US believed Sudan supported international terrorism and declared it a "rogue state" along with Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya, placing Sudan on the state sponsors of terror list on 12 August 1993.⁵⁴ This was done because of the presence of foreign terrorists in Sudan.

Following Sudan's classification as a state sponsor of terrorism, Washington froze Sudanese assets in US banks, imposed comprehensive economic and financial sanctions that restricted exports and imports from the Sudan (with the glaring exception of gum Arabic), and banned US investments and financial transactions in the country. In calling for the sanctions, the Clinton administration stated that "the policies and actions of the government of Sudan, including continued support for international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constitute an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."⁵⁵ Early in 1996, the US withdrew its diplomatic and intelligence personnel and moved its embassy "offshore" to Nairobi for security concerns.⁵⁶ Marilyn Albright, then US ambassador to the United Nations, called Sudan a "viper's nest of terrorism."⁵⁷ At US insistence and pressure, Khartoum asked Osama bin Laden and

his terrorist network *al-Qaeda* to leave Sudan.⁵⁸ The US upheld the UN Security Council resolution banning senior Sudanese government officials from entering the US. Washington also provided some \$20 million in surplus military equipment (“non-lethal”) to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea, all affected by the destabilizing campaign of the Bashir government.⁵⁹

In turn, Sudan viewed America’s support of regional actors in the Horn of Africa as an attempt to punish, destabilize, and facilitate the downfall of the Bashir government.⁶⁰ Some Sudanese citizens’ perception of the US assertion of Khartoum’s involvement in a genocidal war in Darfur, coupled with the statement that Sudan posed a threat to its neighbors, and its classification as a sponsor of international terrorism, stemmed from the fear of Sudan’s Islamist political agenda or more likely Islamophobia. As William Langewiesche remarked, “Scorned as fundamentalists by their opponents, the Sudanese leaders prefer a less loaded label — they call themselves Islamists. Since coming to power in 1989, they have turned their nation into the second radical Islamic state, after Iran. Their success in attaining power has had compelling effects on all of North Africa and much of the Middle East, where many countries teeter on the brink of their own Islamic revolutions. This has disturbed the West.”⁶¹

Nevertheless, in response to the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, on 20 August 1998, believed to be orchestrated by bin Laden, the US launched a Tomahawk cruise missile strike against suspected bases in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan that the US claimed was making chemical weapons. In defending US action, President Clinton contended:

. . . I ordered our armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security. Our target was terror. Our mission was clear: to strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama bin Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier of international terrorism in the world today.⁶²

The US claimed to have concrete evidence that the al-Shifa factory was being used in connection with the production of chemical weapons and that bin Laden’s terrorist network used it for the production of the deadly nerve agent, VX. The US further claimed that financial transactions linked bin Laden to the plant and that soil samples secretly collected outside the plant contained traces of EMPTA (a precursor chemical for VX).⁶³ However, the Sudanese government denied that al-Shifa or any other facility had been used to produce chemical weapons.⁶⁴ It claimed that the factory was a pharmaceutical plant producing malaria medicine for many African nations and that it was not connected to or financed by bin Laden. Furthermore, the Sudanese contended that the bombing of al-Shifa was based on false accusations and poor intelligence. Independent tests conducted by the Chair of the Chemistry Department at Boston University, who headed a team to Sudan to investigate the plant, gave it a clean bill of health.

His report concluded that based on the soil samples taken around the factory, and “To the practical limits of scientific detection, there was no EMPTA.”⁶⁵

Following the cruise missile attack, relations between the two countries were close to the breaking point as Sudan withdrew many of its diplomats from Washington. Khartoum called several times for a UN investigation into the bombing and argued that, rather than the US becoming the world police, it was in favor of a multilateral approach to global problem-solving through the offices of the UN. Some Wilsonian idealists would agree with this view: “That peace depends on the expansion of democracy, not on a balance of power, that adherence to international law rather than the accumulation of power is a nation’s most vital interest, and that national security is best guaranteed, not by alliance systems, but by a universal world organization committed to the defense of every nation-state through collective security.”⁶⁶

Although the Clinton administration succeeded in isolating and containing Sudan with financial and economic sanctions, the US made little headway in ending the country’s civil war and did not significantly weaken Bashir’s Khartoum government or improve Sudan’s humanitarian crisis. Along these lines, the Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, J. Stephen Morrison, argued that the US policy of unilateral isolation and containment of the Khartoum government failed to achieve desired results. Morrison noted that:

Throughout the Clinton era, U.S. policy did not match means to ends. Ambiguities persisted over true U.S. intentions: whether the preeminent U.S. aim was to force a regime change, to press for reform of Khartoum, or to achieve a sustainable end to Sudan’s war. The United States pursued these multiple ambitions simultaneously, with little attention paid to whether regime change was achievable or how these diverse and seemingly contradictory policies would be reconciled. These ambiguities encouraged the mistaken belief in Khartoum that the United States was engaged in a covert war to overthrow the Sudanese government.⁶⁷

In 1999, Sudan’s ambassador to Washington, Mahdi Ibrahim, noted his country’s new posture of a strong stand against US intervention in Sudan’s internal affairs. The ambassador indicated that Sudan would mobilize the Arab, Islamic, and African nations against America’s trend of intervening in the domestic affairs of Islamic and Arab nations. He insisted that America’s persistence in intervening in Sudan’s internal affairs was disguised under the umbrella of human rights.⁶⁸ What Ibrahim alluded to as intervention was US humanitarian assistance. During the periods of the hostile relationship between the two nations, the US, through its Agency for International Development, provided millions of dollars for humanitarian relief efforts.⁶⁹ Furthermore, in late 1999, the Clinton administration, aside from the provision of food aid, reportedly supplied weapons to the

southern rebel movement, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang. Thus, through the 1990s, Sudan-US relations grew increasingly hostile as many American officials perceived Khartoum as the principal threat to US interests in East Africa. In 2000, the US prevented Sudan from succeeding Namibia as the African member of the ten non-permanent Security Council members, and defeated efforts to lift UN sanctions against Sudan, which had been imposed following the June 1995 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. The culprits had fled to Sudan.⁷⁰

However, since the September 2001 attack, relations have improved between the two nations as will be discussed in the section on 9/11. As a signal that the US appeared ready to improve relations, the US abstained from the lifting of UN sanctions against Khartoum because it was cooperating in counterterrorist efforts, including the provision of intelligence. In that same year, 2001, President Bush appointed Senator John Danforth, first as his Special Envoy to the Sudan, and later as US Special Envoy to the UN to facilitate the southern peace process. Khartoum reacted unfavorably following the passage of the Sudan Peace Act insisting that the US had passed one resolution after another to punish the government of Sudan. On 13 June 2001, the House of Representatives passed the Sudan Peace Act intended to speed up the relief effort and achieve a comprehensive solution to the war in the south. The act forbade foreign oil companies with oil operations in Sudan from selling stock or other securities in the US.⁷¹ The Sudan Act, enacted on 21 October 2002, stipulated that if Khartoum failed to engage in good faith negotiation with the SPLA and did not refrain from unreasonable interference with relief efforts, the president upon consulting with Congress should take the following measures:

- Seek a UN Security Council resolution for an arms embargo on the Sudanese government;
- Instruct US executive directors to vote against and actively oppose loans, credits, and guarantees by international financial institutions;
- Take all necessary and appropriate steps to deny Sudan government access to oil revenues in order to ensure that the funds are not used for military purposes;
- Consider downgrading or suspending diplomatic relations.⁷²

However, the Sudanese peace process in Kenya, held under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),⁷³ was sustained by high-level US engagement, heightened diplomacy, and senior leadership. This led to six major accords between the north and the south, including the Machakos agreement (separating church from state and granting the south the right to a referendum on independence after six years), resolution of the Abyei conflict, security arrangements, protocol on the resolution in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, power sharing, and wealth-sharing agreement.⁷⁴ If all went well with the

peace talks that began in 2003, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, had pledged to lift sanctions against Sudan, provide financial assistance to the war-torn country, and remove Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Following a reassessment and a move to further strengthen the Sudan Act on 23 December 2004, the Bush administration signed into law the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act. Besides ending the conflict and reducing human suffering, the 2004 Act was to stimulate freedom and democracy.⁷⁵ The act also authorized \$100 million to the warring parties to achieve a comprehensive peace accord.

International and regional efforts by the US, Britain, Norway, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea resulted in the signing of the historic Comprehensive Peace Agreement (the Naivasha Agreement) on 9 January 2005 by Khartoum and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement, thus, marking a formal end to more than four decades of civil war in Sudan as well as a shift toward cooperation in the war on terror that began with the horrifying experience of 9/11.

Shift in United States-Sudan Relations: 9/11

On 20 September 2001, President Bush told Congress and the nation that:

The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it and destroy it where it grows . . . Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime . . . We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.⁷⁶

Bush called on every nation to join the US on the war on terrorism by offering a choice of "either you are with the U.S. or with the terrorists." This marked a significant radical stance that altered America's foreign policy and national strategy. Along the same lines, then Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated: "This has become a new benchmark," and cooperation on terrorism is "a new way of measuring a nation's relationship with the US."⁷⁷ Consequently, in the wake of 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington DC, US foreign policy fundamentally shifted, as nations like Sudan, became of great interest to the Bush administration mainly because it believed Khartoum had intelligence vital to the war on terror. Classified as a "state supporter of terrorism," Sudan came to the support of the US by offering to clean out terrorist networks off its soil. In 1996, Sudan also claimed it repeatedly offered to turn bin Laden over to the US but Washington refused. However, such a claim was denied by former CIA director, George Tenet.⁷⁸ As Khidir Haroun Ahmed, Sudan's senior diplomat in Washington remarked, "If the United States had only listened to Sudan back in

the mid-1990s, the tragedy of 11 September might have been avoided.”⁷⁹ Sudan’s *mukhabarat* (secret police) in the 1990s had collected intelligence on bin Laden’s *al-Qaeda* network, including information on terrorists involved in the attacks of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, as well as information on suspected *al-Qaeda* operatives linked to the 11 September bombings. Instead, as Ahmed explained:

Yet from 1996 through 2000, Madeleine Albright and her Assistant Secretary for Africa, Susan Rice, apparently preferred to trust their instincts that Sudan was America’s enemy, and so refused to countenance its assistance against the deepest threat to US security since 1945.⁸⁰

The preceding statement is in line with former US Ambassador Timothy M. Carney’s contention. For five years during the Clinton and Bush administrations, right up to the 9/11 attack, *mukhabarat* offered to provide vital information about bin Laden’s *al-Qaeda* network but, according to Carney, the US rejected Sudan’s readiness to engage America on terrorism. Carney noted that American inability to seize this opportunity had serious implications for US national interest. A case in point was the US embassies bombings in 1998. Furthermore, Carney added, the US lost access to a treasure of material on Saudi-born bin Laden and his network. It appeared the US was in an awkward position with its Sudanese policy as it sought to include a repressive radical, militant Islamic Sudan classified as a “rogue state” and a “state sponsor of terrorism” in an anti-terrorist effort.

Nevertheless, the Sudanese were sympathetic to the US following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, as Sudan’s Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail spoke by telephone to Colin Powell. This was the first high-level contact between the two countries in years. Khartoum condemned the attacks and said it would cooperate on the war on terrorism. Relations between the two appeared to have improved as the US encouraged the cooperation of Sudan in its fight against international terrorism. Following the 9/11 attacks Sudan, behind the scenes, had become a cooperating partner and valuable ally of the CIA. In fact, it has so far shared its files on suspected terrorists with the US and restricted their financial transactions. For example, it has disclosed the following:

- Sudan’s *mukhabarat*, its version of the CIA, has detained *al-Qaeda* suspects for interrogation by US agents;
- The Sudanese intelligence agency has seized and turned over to the FBI evidence recovered in raids on suspected terrorists’ homes, including fake passports;
- Sudan has expelled extremists, putting them into the hands of Arab intelligence agencies working closely with the CIA;

- The regime is credited with foiling attacks against American targets by, among other things, detaining foreign militants moving through Sudan on their way to join forces with Iraqi insurgents.⁸¹

Sudan has also issued an open invitation for the US to come in, investigate, and follow-up on any information in connection with Sudan's involvement with terrorism. As a result, the US has sent security and anti-terrorism experts to Sudan.

Consequently, it appeared that the terrorists' attacks of 11 September had altered US global priorities, and dialogue and collaboration with the Sudanese government had become vital. Sudan's cooperation on the war on terrorism signaled a new turn in US-Sudanese relations, which have led to the softening of the prevailing tension between the two nations. This policy was further enhanced as the US supported the UN's lifting of the travel ban from the country. Likewise, Sudan seized the opportunity to possibly be removed from the blacklist of sponsors of terrorism. Yet, this great achievement was marred by the ongoing Darfur conflict and growing instability in north east Sudan.

The Darfur Crises

The Darfur conflict, which began in February 2003, complicated international attempts to end the country's instability and kept US-Sudan relations tense. Since the fighting began, hundreds of thousands (at least 200,000) have been killed and more than 2.5 million displaced in the region. Darfurians blamed Khartoum for the region's underdevelopment and neglect. The accumulation of grievances led to the formation of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)⁸² and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLA). The government reacted to the rebellion ferociously, using Sudanese Air Force helicopters and planes to attack villages suspected of supporting the rebellion. The US declared that the Sudanese government's military forces and the government-backed militias, the *Janjaweed*, bore the responsibility for the Darfur atrocities, where a consistent and widespread pattern of violence had been directed against non-Arab individuals and villages.

As a result of Sudan's latest crisis, in June 2004 the Bush administration made the normalization of diplomatic relations with Sudan conditional upon ending the Darfur crisis. This greatly angered the Sudanese who saw this as "moving the goalposts" with regard to removing Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Besides, Colin Powell, then US Secretary of State, condemned what he classified as "genocide" in Darfur. Meanwhile, humanitarian conditions steadily declined and the security situation worsened. Currently, funds are urgently needed in Darfur to maintain the 7,000 African Union (AU) force in the region mandated by the Security Council, to provide equipment and logistics, as well as sufficient humanitarian aid.

The AU mission was to observe and report violations of the April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Despite the ceasefire, *Janjaweed* and rebel

attacks continued. The AU endeavored to bring about African solutions to African problems (the move resulted in failure and absolved the West from interfering) but the international community failed to support the AU by providing adequate resources as the AU was near bankruptcy. A UN plan to send a 12,000 man peacekeeping force into the region in December 2006 was rejected by the Sudanese government. Meanwhile, the new UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, awaits the go-ahead from Khartoum to plan for a hybrid UN-AU force in Darfur of approximately 17,000 peacekeepers and 3,000 police. The idea was to replace the exhausted African Union force which is small, ill-equipped, and poorly funded. However, Khartoum continues to oppose international demands for a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur. Bashir fears that the deployment of a UN force will be likened as Western invasion and that UN forces might arrest government officials implicated in the Darfur crisis. Khartoum insists on no blue helmeted peacekeeping mission in Darfur but would welcome technical support staff by the UN that would not engage in peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, the ongoing opposition resulted in delays in the deployment of a UN force mandated to protect civilians under the UN charter.

On 5 May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), mediated by the African Union and US was signed by Khartoum and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLA). The DPA was the first step toward ending the violence in the region. However, the SLA faction led by Minni Arkou Minnawi (SLA/MM) was the only one of three negotiating factions to sign the peace accord. The agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria was rejected and not signed by two other smaller factions, the Justice and Equality Movement and the SLA faction of Abdel Wahid Mohamed Nur (SLA/AW). SLA/AW, a smaller and a rival faction of the SLA, was concerned with such unresolved matters as compensation for war victims, proportionate political representation,⁸³ and participation in implementation of security arrangements.⁸⁴ On the other hand, JEM contended that the power and wealth-sharing protocols failed to adequately address structural inequality between Sudan's centre and its periphery. Consequentially, the fragile DPA fell apart, and failed to end the fighting but accelerated the violence. In addition, Kenneth H. Bacon, president of the advocacy group Refugees International informed President Bush: "That agreement is not working, and one of the many reasons is Minni Minnawi."⁸⁵ Despite the DPA, Minnawi's forces conducted a reign of terror, killed young men, abducted children, and raped women in northern Darfur.⁸⁶ The unpopular agreement facilitated the break-up of the rebellion into smaller groups. On 30 June 2006, some of the leaders who did not sign formed a new group, the National Redemption Front (NRF).⁸⁷ Despite the 12 May 2006 ceasefire fighting renewed in July 2006 between the NRF and Minnawi's SLA faction. This had the effect of further alienating many Darfurians from Khartoum. As one Fur ethnic leader stated, "The DPA is only words on paper, it means nothing to us. Our lives have only gotten worse since it was signed."⁸⁸ Nevertheless, President Bush urged Minnawi to build support for

peace and work with other factions to achieve support for the DPA. Bush also cautioned Minnawi that his force “must refrain from instigating violence.”⁸⁹ Overall, the Bush administration favors a policy of engaging the Khartoum government in a dialogue to end the crisis in Darfur.

CONCLUSION

As Western European nations and Sudan’s neighboring states normalized diplomatic relations with Khartoum in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration found itself increasingly isolated as it became the lone holdout among major nations in renewing dialogue with Khartoum. US inability to garner a concerted multilateral effort with key European partners to move toward its position and apply pressure upon Khartoum greatly hampered America in achieving its foreign policy objectives.⁹⁰ Although it is unclear what leverage the US had over Khartoum during the Clinton era, the administration’s Sudan policy created considerable leverage in that it maintained unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and limited the full involvement of world financial institutions in aiding Sudan.⁹¹

With the sidelining of Turabi, Bashir appeared to be moving away from a confrontation with the US, to a more moderate stance, although that was beginning to change with the emergence of the alliance of conservatives in Sudan as a potent political force. Along similar lines, the Bush administration sought a diplomatic resolution of the north-south war rather than containment and isolationism. As the parties in the southern Sudanese conflict stumbled toward peace, US diplomacy and leadership kept the negotiations moving ahead and uninterrupted. Working with Norway, the United Kingdom, Kenya, and African actors, the US laid the ground work for ending the southern civil war and for putting in place the foundations for a just and lasting peace. Finally, it seems that American policy toward Sudan has been successful as both warring parties in the Sudanese conflict signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005, ending 21 years of Africa’s longest-running, brutal civil war that claimed the lives of more than 2 million people and left millions of dislocated Sudanese as well as widespread devastation. At first, this historical moment no doubt greatly contributed to promoting Sudan’s better image before the global community. However, the atrocities and genocide in Darfur tarnished Khartoum’s accomplishment. Besides, the CPA signed in 2005 is now showing signs of strain and the current equation for peace in Sudan is a disturbing one.

Nevertheless, the improved relations between the two countries were largely attributable to Bush’s engagement, along with former Secretary of State Colin Powell (who made it clear to the House International Relations Committee that Sudan was a priority to him and the Bush administration),⁹² as well as a very committed interagency team led by Acting Assistant Secretary Charles Snyder and Special Envoy Senator Danforth. Earlier, the success of its constructive engagement policy toward Sudan with regards to the CPA no doubt amounted to

the Bush administration's signature diplomatic achievement in Africa and for American diplomacy. However, the ongoing conflict in Darfur still casts a long shadow, and US inability to achieve sustained action to quell the violence and end the genocide and crisis in Darfur has tainted the Bush administration's record in Sudan, reducing it to a chronology of failures.

The task left is for the US to intensely pressure the government and rebels in Darfur to seek a political solution and strive to achieve sustainable peace as it did to end the north-south civil war. The presence of African Union troops and the signing of the peace agreement between the Khartoum government and the late Garang's SPLM in Kenya have yet to have a positive effect in respect to Darfur. Regardless of its shortcomings, the US has been (to no avail) in the forefront and the strongest proponent of ending atrocities committed in Darfur: Powell's conclusion that genocide and brutal human rights crimes have been committed in Darfur, its numerous attempts to secure actions and sanctions at the Security Council, and its proposal for the appointment of an independent UN Commission of Inquiry have all helped to galvanize attention and reduce the violence and calamities on the civilian population. However, the US opposes a Security Council referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate and prosecute those most responsible for the violation of international humanitarian law and human rights in Darfur.⁹³ The search for workable formulas in the Sudan requires that the US remain neutral, and bringing peace to Sudan must be defended on universal principles and not in respect to limited US national strategic objections.⁹⁴

While history was made with the signing of the CPA, the rest of the global community scrambled for a piece of Sudan's wealth. The international community should be reminded of the immediate task of reconstructing southern Sudan and the urgency of supporting Sudan's CPA. Besides, the marginalized south will be a major development challenge for the US as well as for the global community. However, since signing the CPA, Khartoum has yet to live up to its commitments under the north-south agreement. All that have been achieved has been bringing in Salva Kiir Mayardit as vice-president, as well as a handful of other southerners into the government. A major component of the CPA centred on the sharing of revenue from Sudan's oil fields, with the south receiving half of the country's oil revenue. Kiir complained that "southerners have not been shown production or revenue figures, so they can't determine whether they've received their fair share or not."⁹⁵ While Khartoum lacks the political will to implement the CPA, the SPLM after Garang's death remains weak and disorganized. It is imperative the Bush administration appoint a special envoy to the region to monitor the implementation of the CPA, as well as achieve an acceptable Darfur Peace Agreement, as the current DPA has failed to improve anything for Darfur's vulnerable people. Moreover, with the ongoing massive atrocities and genocide, US efforts continue to lack urgency and focus, and its leadership has failed to stop Khartoum's perpetual stalling and lack of effective

action. US desires to ensure its cooperation with Sudan in the war on terrorism may have dampened and compromised its ability to pressure Khartoum. As Eric Reeves, an independent Sudan analyst, noted there had been signs of a slight thaw toward Khartoum despite the State Department's official stance.⁹⁶ Equally, the religious right argued that the Bush administration in its fight against terrorism had cooperated with Sudan. The movement was concerned with such cooperative efforts because they believed that such a move would compromise the administration's ability to confront Khartoum on human rights abuses.⁹⁷ In light of this, Khartoum has been largely successful in keeping the international community at bay over Darfur "by facilitating increased chaos on the ground and promoting divisions among the rebels."⁹⁸ While the Darfur conflict remains one of the worst humanitarian crises in Africa, the lone superpower must end the sufferings and genocide of the marginalized people of Darfur, otherwise peace will continue to elude the continent's largest nation.

Nevertheless, the severe threat posed by terrorism presents enormously complex challenges to the Bush administration and has become among the greatest post-Cold War foreign policy dilemmas facing US administrations. And it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, raising profound implications for US foreign policy. In his article on "Chasing Terrorists," James Wall notes that terrorism involves a battle against shadowy figures that don't fight with conventional methods. As the administration combats terrorism in the millennium, Wall warns that, "Terrorism may not be defeated until we begin eliminating the factors that contribute to the anti-Americanism that generates so much anger. A major step in addressing the root causes of terrorism would be a more even-handed approach to the Middle East."⁹⁹ The same might be said about Africa.

Endnotes

1. Frances M. Deng and Stephen J. Morrison, *U.S. Policy to End Sudan's War: Report on the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2001).
2. However, more than a year after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed little has been done.
3. See Jennifer Sterling-Folker, *Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U.S. International Monetary Policy Making After Bretton Woods* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), p. 20.
4. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," *Encounter* 3 (August 1974), p. 56.
5. With both nations having mutual interest on certain national and international issues or concerns (terrorism and war in Sudan), and somewhat interdependent, it follows that each government would likely choose cooperation over other policy options. James Rosenau argues that:

The fact that interdependence issues cannot be handled unilaterally, that foreign policy officials must engage in a modicum of cooperation with counterparts abroad in order to ameliorate the situations on which such issues thrive, means that the rhetoric, as well as the substance, of control techniques must shift toward highlighting the common values that are at stake.

James N. Rosenau, "Capabilities and Control in an Interdependent World," *International Security* (Fall 1976), p. 44. Cited in Sterling-Folker, *Theories of International Cooperation*, p. 20.

It is debatable whether relations between the United States, a superpower, and Sudan, a developing country, could be considered interdependent. Many authors, like Jones (1984), Baldwin (1980), Little (1996), Milner (1991), and McMillan (1997) have written on and examined the concept of interdependence. The most suitable definition, as it pertains to emerging new US-Sudan relations, is provided by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. According to these authors, interdependence in simple terms means, "mutual dependence," and in international politics, it refers to "situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries." Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977), p. 8. In this instance, the newly developed relationship between the US and Sudan were mutually beneficial and the necessity for interdependence and cooperation possibly paved the way for the change to more friendly relations. However, it is noteworthy that the term interdependence is not only limited to situations of mutual benefit, but interdependent relations also involves cost. In this regard, Nye and Keohane contend, "Our perspective implies that interdependent relationships will always involve costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is impossible to specify *a priori* whether the benefits of a relationship exceed the costs. This will depend on the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the relationship." *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10).

6. Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International Systems: The Politics of State Survival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 118. Cited in Gary Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 258-59.
7. The word "Arabism" is used here to indicate that Islam in the Sudan has become closely associated with Arab cultural identity and support for Arab political position.
8. However, for the US, Sudan is considered part of Sub-Saharan African.
9. Speaking about the *Sharia* laws, Numeira accepted many of Hassan al-Turabi's recommendations in the September Laws, which was the first attempt to establish full *Sharia* law in the country. For Turabi, the implementation of strict *Sharia* law was a priority.
10. Afraid of Turabi's growing influence, he was dismissed from Numeiri's government. He then infiltrated state instruments of power by establishing links with the army. His NIF devoted funds to sponsoring the careers of young and ambitious officers in the military. Bashir received such financial support throughout his military career. Lorenzo Vidino, "The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan," *al-Nakhlah: The Fletcher School* (Fall 2006), pp. 1-3, at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/archives/fall2006/vidino.pdf (Retrieved on 20 January 2007).
11. Vidino, "The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan," p. 3.
12. In fact, in 1992 US authorities spoke of a "Tehran-Khartoum axis" as Department of State analysts warned that the NIF, "under the leadership of Hassan al-Turabi, has intensified its domination of the government of Sudanese President General Bashir and has been the main advocate of closer relations with radical groups and their sponsors." See Vidino, "The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan," p. 4.
13. Cooperation between Bashir and Turabi existed also because of Turabi's growing influence in Khartoum. As such, at the beginning of his rule Bashir relied on the Islamists for support, thus forming an alliance with Turabi's fundamentalist National Islamic Front.
14. William Langewiesche, "Turabi's Law," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 274 (August 1994), p. 29. In the quote, "... Remains in what might be called the foreground of the background," meant that Turabi was the power behind the throne.
15. Carolina Fluehr-Lobban and Richard Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989: National Islamic Front Rule," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 23 (2001), p. 2.

16. Sudan's alleged involvement in the World Trade Center bombing, its support of terrorist organizations, including the hosting of Osama bin Laden, collaboration in the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, and the cultivation of ties with US foes, particularly Iran and Iraq, demonstrates the country's pursuit of a fundamentalist foreign policy path under the influential leadership of Turabi.
17. Zachary Karabell, "Fundamental Misconceptions: Islamic Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy* 105 (Winter 1996), p. 81.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-90.
21. The Khartoum government provided safe havens for radical groups and terrorist organizations, including bin Laden's *al-Qaeda*, whose base in the Sudan was fundamental in laying the foundations of a world terrorist movement. Bin Laden told CNN in 1997, that "one of his proudest achievements while in Sudan was the role his Afghan Arabs played in the 1993 killings of more than a dozen American soldiers during the famous Black Hawk Down incident." See Vidino, "The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan," p. 8. Five Sudanese nationals were arrested in June 1993 on suspicion of plotting to bomb the UN, New York FBI headquarters, and the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels. See *ibid.*, pp. 1-13; and Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989," pp. 1-9.
22. Karabell, "Fundamental Misconceptions," pp. 84-85.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
24. The Middle East peace process has been on-going since 1967. However, the article refers to the peace process that took place in the 1990s during the Clinton administration. Various meetings were held with the Israeli prime minister and Palestinian leader with the US mediating. The meetings focused on various issues, including the West Bank and Gaza, Jerusalem, and the future of the Palestinian people.
25. Louis Cantori and Arthur Lowrie, "Islam, Democracy, the State and the West," *Middle East Policy* 1 (1992), pp. 49-50.
26. Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989," pp. 2-8.
27. Cantori and Lowrie, "Islam," pp. 54-55.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Karabell, "Fundamental Misconceptions," pp. 86-87.
30. Langewieshe, "Turabi's Law," p. 29.
31. Turabi had a profound influence over many aspects of Sudanese state policy. However, in the late 1990s and 2000s, many, including Bashir, turned against him. The political rift between Turabi and Bashir during 2000 and 2001 culminated in Bashir sacking Turabi as head of the Sudanese parliament as well as stripping him of his political power. When Turabi signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" with his erstwhile archenemy, the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SPLM), he was considered a security risk and foe of the government. He was imprisoned by his one-time ally Bashir in March 2004 and freed in June 2005.
32. As a result of Khartoum's support for international terrorism, particularly when a number of Sudanese with ties to the Sudan mission were implicated and indicted on charges of involvement in the World Trade Center bombing, its harboring of Osama bin Laden, and cultivation of ties with American enemies Iran and Iraq, the US severed all ties with Khartoum, recalled its ambassador, Donald Peterson, and imposed a ban on trade in 1995. In addition, following the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak in 1996, the US and Egypt mounted a campaign to isolate Sudan. In addition to sanctions, the Clinton administration isolated Sudan as a "rogue" state. Sudan's relations with most Arab and African countries deteriorated because of terrorism, and by 1996 Sudan was virtually isolated within the international community. See

- Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989," pp. 1-8. See also Dan Connell, "Sudan: Recasting U.S. Policy," *Foreign Policy in Focus* 5 (November 2000); and Vidino, "The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan," pp. 4-11.
33. Mobilizing thousands of American churches, the ranks of the religious freedom movement ignited a growing campaign against Sudan, accusing it of slavery, man-made famine, and forced conversions against its Christian and traditionalist population. When the US Commission on International Religious Freedom issued a report calling Sudan the world's abuser of religious freedom and belief, the religious right wing called on the Bush administration to step in. As Joshua Green remarked, "Rather than let him repeat his father's mistakes, Karl Rove listened and the Administration grudgingly made concessions. It helped that the Christian Right had supporters in key positions within the Administration, including Elliot Adams, Human Rights Director of the National Security Council, and John Bolton, Under Secretary of State." See Joshua Green, "God's Foreign Policy: Why the biggest threat to Bush's war strategy isn't coming from Muslims, but from Christians," *Washington Monthly* 33 (November 2001), pp. 30-33; and Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, "The Sudan Since 1989," pp. 7-8.
 34. Sudan embraced non-alignment before the 1958 coup of Abboud. Writing on the failure of democracy, G. Norman Anderson explained that the civilian democratic governments in Sudan before the 1989 coup pursued a policy of nonalignment marked by anti-Western sentiments, with close association and over reliance on radical foreign nations like that of Abdul Nasser's Egypt. See G. Norman Anderson, *Sudan in Crisis: Failure of Democracy* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida: 1999), pp. 6-8, 23.
 35. Donald Petterson, *Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), p. 9.
 36. Anderson, *Sudan in Crisis*, pp. 16-17.
 37. The government of Abdallah Khalil faced several issues, including stabilizing the south, disagreement on a permanent constitution, strains within the coalition government, economic hardships as a result of poor cotton harvest, and unrest caused by government-imposed economic restrictions.
 38. Petterson, *Inside Sudan*, p. 9.
 39. In 1981, Sudan relations with Libya worsened when Libya engaged in cross border raids into western Sudan. The government of Nimeiri harbored members of the Libyan National Salvation Front and permitted them to broadcast anti-Qaddafi diatribes from radio transmitters in the Sudan. Libya responded by providing financial and material support to the SPLM. Sudan viewed the 1981 tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen, as undermining relations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum. Sudan alleged that Ethiopia was cooperating with Libya in the effort to overthrow the Khartoum government. On the other hand, Sudan's neighbors, including Libya and Ethiopia, were concerned with the destabilization of the region brought on by Sudan's action of harboring and supporting regional insurgents, such as the Ethiopian, Egyptian, and Eritrean Islamic Jihads. These groups were considered threats as they attempted to destabilize neighboring governments.
 40. The US diplomats were murdered by members of the Black September Organization. The group demanded the release of Sirhan Sirhan (held in a US prison for the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy) and other Arab militants and army officers held in Jordan. They threatened to murder the hostages if their demands were not met within a 24-hour deadline. When the US and Sudan turned down their request for a plane to leave Sudan and upon the expiration of the deadline, Cleo Noel Jr., Curtis Moore, and Guy Eid were murdered.
 41. Nimeira, because of various circumstances in the case, commuted the sentences to seven years beginning from the date of arrest and would release the convicted assassins to the PLO. In response, on 25 June 1974 President Nixon sent a communiqué to Nimeira stating that such a measure was not adequate punishment and may have a negative impact on American congressional and public opinion. See Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Documents on Africa, E-6 (1973-76).

42. Peterson, *Inside Sudan*, pp. 9-10.
43. On 24 April 1984, Nimeiri declared a state of emergency, in part to ensure the broad implementation of the *Sharia* throughout the nation and suspended most constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals. "Amputations for theft and public lashings for alcohol possession were common during the state of emergency. Southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north were also subjected to these punishments." See "Sudan," US State Department Background Notes, 1995, at http://www/worldrover.com/history/sudan_history.html (Retrieved 15 December 2006).
44. In the agreement, Libya was to supply trailers, trucks, and spare parts for Sudan's Soviet-made equipment. Libya, on the other hand, was permitted to set up a base in the Darfur area to allow its troops to join Chadian insurgents fighting to overthrow the Chadian government.
45. Jonathan C. Randal, *Washington Post*, 7 January 1986, p. A10.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Following the 1969 Moammar Qadhafi coup, relations between the two countries were strained. Libya's foreign policy was directed toward supporting international terrorism. The US broke relations with Libya and closed its embassies in the early 1980s. Libya also closed its US embassy. In 1988, Libyan terrorists bombed Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland killing 270 people. The US bombings of Libya were an act of self-defense against terrorist targets in Libya. The military action was taken against five targets connected with terrorism. Unfortunately, the action resulted in a number of civilian casualties, including children. Libya was a major foe of the US for a quarter of a century. However, in 2003, Libya assumed responsibility of the Pan Am bombing and agreed to pay relatives of victims \$2.7 billion. Moreover, it denounced terrorism and abandoned its weapons of mass destruction programs. In 2004, both nations began normalizing relations and in May 2006 the US removed Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
48. Blaine Harden, "The People are Hospitable, Despite Anti-U.S. Incident," *Washington Post*, 27 April 1986, p. A19. Libyan terrorists in Khartoum were believed to be hunting Americans following the execution style shooting of Calkins.
49. Anderson, *Sudan in Crisis*, pp. 55-56.
50. The United States signed an agreement with Nimeiri in 1981 for warehousing in Port Sudan on the Red Sea. Items involved included light transport vehicles, hospital supplies, and equipment, and there were no lethal weapons. The US was already nervous about the equipment in Port Sudan, and complied. As such, the modest American presence in Sudan was dismantled.
51. NIF is the political organization that governs Sudan under the leadership of Bashir. First created in the 1960s as an Islamist student group, it was then known as the Islamic Charter Front. Turabi became a notable leader of the organization which later changed to become the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1989, with the assistance of the military, the organization toppled the civilian government of Mahdi, and upon gaining power, Turabi renamed it the National Islamic Front. Under the NIF, the *sharia* remains the basis for administering justice.
52. Langewiesche, "Turabi's Law," p. 8. Although a domestic issue, the US was concerned with Khartoum's human right abuses.
53. Francis M. Deng, "Africa and the New World Disorder: Rethinking Colonial Borders," *Brookings Review* 11 (Spring 1993), p. 34.
54. Ted Dagne et al, "Religion and Peacemaking: Meeting on Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan," *United States Institute of Peace*, 16 September 1997, p. 6, at <http://www.usip.org/religionpeace/rehr/sudanconf/panel6.html> (Retrieved 25 September 2004).
55. See US State Department, (2003), at <http://www.UStreas.gov/ofac/legal/sudan.html>.
56. The Clinton's administration withdrawal of full-time diplomatic presence in Sudan in February 1996 hampered its ability to maintain and sustain information flow, thereby leaving Washington with no platform or voice for exerting influence.

57. Ted Dagne, "Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 11 December 2002), CRS-14.
58. Undoubtedly, the Bashir regime was under pressure from both the US and Saudi Arabia to expel bin Ladin from the Sudan, and as Turabi's son explained, "there were parties in the government that arranged his [bin Laden's] departure with the United States. These parties are against my father's trends." See Vidino, "The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan," p. 11.
59. The money was given to those states that supported the SPLA in its effort to overthrow the Khartoum government and install in its place Sudanese opposition groups under the coalition known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). Dan Connell, "Today's Costliest Civil War," *The Progressive* 64 (June 2000), p. 24.
60. Ted Dagne, et al, "Meeting on Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan," p. 6.
61. Cited in Veronica Nmoma, "Sudan" to be published in the *Encyclopedia of Global Perspectives*, 2006, originally in Langewiesche, "Turabi's Law," p. 28.
62. Cited in Michael Barletta, "Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence," *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall 1998), p. 116.
63. Bruce D. Berkowitz, "Facing the Consequences, As El Shifa Shows. It Takes More than Intelligence to make Smart Decisions," *Washington Post*, 5 September 1999, p. B1.
64. Barletta, "Chemical Weapons in the Sudan," p. 115.
65. Gene Healy, "Arrogance of Power Reborn: the Imperial Presidency and Foreign Policy in the Clinton Years," *Policy Analysis: The Cato Institute* 389 (13 December 2000).
66. Lewis Fretz, "Bill Clinton's New World Order Takes Shape," *New Zealand International Review* 22 (1997), pp. 16-19.
67. J. Stephen Morrison, "Sudan: Peace Agreement around the Corner?" Testimony before the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11 March 2004).
68. See "Sudan Ambassador to Washington Calls for Serious Stand Against American Interventions in Sudan Affairs," *Sudan News Agency*, 1 July 1999, at <http://www.vitrade.com/news/990701U-suna.htm> (Retrieved 25 September 2004).
69. From 1989, the United States through USAID has provided over one billion dollars in humanitarian assistance. For more on US contributions, see "Darfur Humanitarian Emergency," US Department of State, 11 August 2004.
70. Five assailants were killed and three escaped to Sudan. High-ranking governmental officials were suspected of having planned the abortive assassination attempt. Three Egyptians (members of the assassination team) escaped and with the aid of the Sudanese embassy in Addis Ababa returned to Sudan. Khartoum's failure to cooperate with the Ethiopian request for extradition led to the US attempt at imposing Security Council sanctions on Sudan. Although minor sanctions went into effect, Sudan ignored the extradition. The incident led to strained relations between the two countries. However, relations between the two improved and Mubarak attended an Arab Summit in Khartoum in 2003.
71. The companies include China National Petroleum Company, Talisman Energy Inc. of Canada, Lundin Oil Corporation of Sweden, Malaysian State oil producer Petronas, and Totafina of France. For more on these, see Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Will Bush Stop Sudan Genocide," *Insight on the News* 17 (16 July 2000), pp. 20-21.
72. "Sudan Peace Act," *Fact Sheet*, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 21 October 2007.
73. IGAD is a sub-regional organization formed by and consisting of seven countries in the Horn of Africa: Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya. Besides IGAD countries and the United States, Norway and the United Kingdom have been instrumental in the Sudan peace process in Kenya.

74. For a detailed discussion of the agreements, see J. Stephen Morrison, Frederick Barton, and Bathsheba Croker, "The CSIS Post Reconstruction Project and Africa Program," Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 3 (January 2005), at <http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr> (Retrieved 25 September 2006).
75. The act requires the president to determine and certify to Congress on a semi-annual basis that Khartoum and the SPLA are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations would continue. The act as originally enacted also requires the president to regularly make a positive determination, most recently in 2004.
76. Ted G. Carpenter and Frank J. Gaffney Jr., "Symposium: Military Policy and Regimes that Support Terrorism," *Insight On The News* 17 (12 November 2001), pp. 40-41.
77. Michael Waller, "Who Is With Us — and Against Us," *Insight On The News* 17 (29 October 2001), pp. 14-15.
78. Vidino, "The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Sudan," pp. 9-11.
79. Larry Luxner, "Healing the breach? After several years of severely strained relations and, in some instances, open hostility between the US and Sudan, an exchange of diplomats could herald a new era of cooperation," *The Middle East* (July 2003), p. 20.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.
81. Ken Silverstein, "Official Pariah, Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism," *The Los Angeles Times*, 29 April, 2005.
82. The JEM is said to be an instrument of Turabi. The JEM has a different agenda, one of derailing the present government of Bashir and replacing it with a more radically inclined body. See Charles Snyder, "A Step Toward Peace: The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Accord," Press Conference, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, 12 January 2005, at <http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200501130822.html> (Retrieved 18 January 2005).
83. The DPA stipulated for a popular referendum to be held in 2010 resolving whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single government. Three years prior to the elections the accord would grant the rebel movements 12 seats in the National Assembly in Khartoum, 21 seats in each of Darfur's state legislatures, one state governor, two deputy state governors, and some key positions in local and state governments.
84. Security arrangements include effective monitoring of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, refraining from conducting attacks in and over the Darfur region, neutralizing and disarming the armed militias, including the *Janjaweds*, refraining from all attacks against civilians, violations of human rights, and ensuring the security of commercial activities.
85. "Bush Meets Rebel Leader to Discuss Darfur Accord," *Washington Post*, 26 July 2006, p. A13.
86. *Ibid.*
87. NRF members include the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Sudan Liberation Movement/Army faction of Khamis Abdallah Abakar (SLM/A), and Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA). The NRF intended to incorporate all the holdout groups but two factions of the SLM led by Abdelwahil al-Nur and Ahmed Abdelshafi declined to join.
88. See "Sudan: Can the Darfur — Darfur Dialogue and Consultation Help Bring Peace to Darfur?," The Initiative for Inclusive Security, Refugees International, 23 August 2006, at <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/9390/?PHPSESSID=0a7f6091ed0e4ecf3d> (Retrieved 10 January 2007).
89. *Ibid.*, p. A13. See also, "Bush Presses Rebel Leader to Help on Darfur Peace," *Reuters*, 25 July 2006.
90. When President Bush renewed the economic sanctions in October 2002, he stated his reason for extending sanctions, explaining that "Because the actions and policies of the Government of Sudan continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, the national emergency declared on November 3, 1997, and the

measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond November 3, 2002.” See Ted Dagne, “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy,” Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 11 December 2002. US foreign policy objectives in the Sudan during the Clinton administration included ending Sudan’s support of international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize surrounding countries, atrocities and human rights abuses, denial of religious freedom, human trafficking (slavery), and ethnic cleansing. See John Prendergast, et al., “Meeting on Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan,” *United States Institute of Peace*, 16 September, 1997.

91. According to Congressional Research Service report, “In 1977, President Clinton invoked the most powerful economic authority available to his office to prohibit nearly all trade and transactions between the United States and Sudan.” See Dianne Rennack, “Sudan Economic Sanctions,” CRS Report for Congress, CRS, 11 October 2005, CRS page 11. Equally, on 3 November 1997, President Clinton invoked authority under the National Emergencies Act and the International Economic Powers Act to declare that an emergency existed as a result of flagrant violation of human rights, support for terrorism, destabilization of neighboring countries, and slavery. In light of these circumstances, the Clinton administration suspended bilateral preferential trade treatment, prohibited the import and export of goods and services, including defense articles and defense services, grants, credits or loans to Khartoum, performance of contract for commercial, industrial or governmental projects, and transactions dealing with transportation of cargo to and from Sudan. See CRS, pp. 11-12. The Clinton administration upheld sanctions imposed by the UN, including the arms embargo, implemented travel restrictions, and blocked property and assets held by Khartoum in the US. His administration also declined a request from Khartoum for funding or program support in the IMF and World Bank. See Rennack, “Sudan Economic Sanctions,” p. 1.
92. Dagne, “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy.”
93. This is largely because US politicians fear being called before the ICC for their military activities around the world.
94. The US never has been neutral. However, the author advocates that the US remain neutral in the interest of achieving sustainable peace in the Sudan.
95. “Sudan’s Long Slide: A Peace Agreement’s Unmet Promises Need a U.S. Response,” *Washington Post*, 22 July 2006, p. A16.
96. Suzanne Goldenburg, “Sudan Becomes US Ally in ‘War on Terror’,” *Guardian*, 30 April, 2005.
97. As Joshua Green noted, following the 11 September attack, “The Administration quickly allied itself with some of the world’s most dangerous regimes, including Sudan and Syria, which the State Department classified as ‘state sponsors of terrorism’.” See Green, “God’s Foreign Policy,” pp. 26-27. Also, the Christian activists were angry because of the policy change, which embraced Sudan, but neglected human rights considerations.
98. See “Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead,” *Working Paper*, International Crisis Group, 31 March 2006.
99. James M. Wall, “Chasing Terrorists: Misguided Missiles,” *The Christian Century* 115 (9 September 1998), pp. 811-13.