

Rethinking Conflict Resolution: The Linkage Problematic Between "Track I" and "Track II"

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INTRODUCTION

Conflict resolution approaches developed out of a need to find a process which could facilitate the “resolution,” rather than management of intractable ethnic conflicts. They are predicated on the belief that the roots of conflict can be resolved, as opposed to management approaches which argue that conflict is so fundamental to society and the international system that it can at best be “managed.” Conflict resolution approaches were derived from a grass-roots movement that decried the state-centric and power-political leanings of high politics as described by dominant theories of the international system and approaches to conflict. Conflict resolution was so-called because traditional forms of conflict management failed to prevent or satisfactorily resolve many conflicts. According to Realpolitik approaches, conflict is ameliorated at the state level by mediation, negotiation and tactical bargaining or coercive third party intervention, and kept in stasis by peacekeeping forces. Therefore it depends on the state-centric framework of international relations which is subject to a security dilemma, managed through the balance-of-power mechanism, or in its more liberal form, pacified by the spread of free-market democracy. Thus, the individual, the sub-national or sub-state group has little input into such processes, except through the democratic process if it exists. Conflict resolution approaches have attempted to bring the individual, assuming that participatory political structures exist, back into the realm of the significant when it came to understanding and ending conflict and made a case that conflict could be resolved at the diplomatic level only with the consent of the individual citizen.¹ It is well-known that conflict management and resolution approaches have differing views of what is constituted by the word “peace.” Conflict management approaches assume peace to be no more than status-quo management, while conflict resolution approaches are premised more optimistically on a natural harmony of interests. Yet it has recently become commonly accepted that the two approaches are complementary.

The notion that so-called Track I and Track II approaches (by which I mean conflict management approaches such as military forms of intervention, mediation and negotiation in a state-centric environment, and conflict resolution unofficial approaches to diplomacy, respectively) are complementary implies that there are two distinct levels in the international system: that of the state and the society of states, and that of the individual/civil society. It assumes that one may not operate in harmony without the other. While this is an improvement on the view that states are all that matter, the following article is predicated upon the view that there is developing - however fragile - a normative framework of politics at the citizen level, at the global and regional levels,² and to a certain extent at the state level of international society.³ Abstracting from this, the dynamics of a clash between state security and human security emerge. This casts doubt upon the proposition that Track I and Track II are complementary, as both approaches aspire to different objectives, different versions of order, different

epistemologies and methodologies, operating at different levels and involving different types of actors and interests. Consequently, this article examines how conflict resolution approaches, including the problem-solving workshop, contingency and conflict transformation approaches, have evolved as a response to the failure of conflict management approaches, and assesses the potential of their most recent reinventions, which have sought to create a more multidimensional approach to resolve the sorts of conflicts currently ongoing. It illustrates the fact that the separation of Track II from Track I is a fiction, as in practice it is actually embedded within the state-system and conflict management approaches. The effort to de-link conflict resolution from state security creates a problematic distance of participants and processes from the society they are trying to change. Embedding it within the state-system reduces its normative aim of attaining human security, as this becomes compromised by the traditional state security debates which characterize management approaches.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACHES

. . . the resolution of any conflict, whether it be intercommunal or international conflict, must be analysed as a situated process located within the structural properties of patterned social systems. The role of conflict resolution or mediation may thus reproduce such continuities or contribute to their problem.⁴

The field of conflict resolution was initially drawn from several strands, including David Mitrany's ideas on functional integration among countries to create a common interest in peace, and Ernst Haas' empirical analysis of how this had occurred in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951.⁵ It was also apparent that unofficial diplomacy was becoming increasingly important in international affairs, as illustrated by the example of the nuclear physicists from the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union who began to meet to exchange ideas about reducing the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used.⁶ The use of conflict management approaches had thrown up several crucial dilemmas, one related to the fact that traditional practice often allowed settlements based on "peace without justice" and the application of coercion (even if of a persuasive nature). Another key dilemma was related to a shift in issues and the emergence of new types of actors with competing agendas. The elevation of ethnopolitics, and the inclusive and exclusive politics of group representation as a competitor of the state-centric system, created areas which traditional diplomacy could not address. Conflicts over ethnicity, language, religion, or culture, tend to resist efforts toward compromise. The growth of interdependence, the subsequent erosion of sovereignty, claims for self-determination, legal asymmetry between disputants and the growing legitimacy of the concept of human security, as opposed to state security offered further opportunities for development.

Conflict resolution approaches thus developed partly in reaction to the "balance of power" conflict management techniques associated with positivist Realpolitik approaches. That said, they are based on the same realist dichotomy of state and non-state, but place more emphasis on the non-state level. Edward Azar argued that conflict outcomes were determined by human needs, which are inexhaustible, but often are not

allocated correctly. As these needs are not negotiable and are distinct from interests, their suppression can lead to conflict because their pursuit is said to be an ontological drive common to all.⁷ While interests are subject to negotiation, cultural values and universal needs are not. While they may be suppressed, they will always reappear. The suppression of these needs tends to lead to protracted conflicts:

The human framework shifts definitions of justice from a normative base to one that reflects behavioural considerations . . . the definition of justice posits as a basic norm or rule the principle that inherent human needs must be satisfied if law and order is to be sustained and societies are to be stable and non-violent.⁸

Accordingly, at the conceptual level the root cause of conflict is deemed to be the suppression of human needs. Therefore, individuals must have opportunities at all levels to communicate with each other in the context of a supportive framework. This type of contact through workshops and Track II approaches is supposed to increase confidence and trust, leading to a better common understanding.

It is readily apparent that most conflicts have been caused or exacerbated by the failure of political, economic and social institutions to pay sufficient attention to the perceived needs of communities or minorities. The question of whether these needs are “. . . universal or relative in a specific context or cultural setting, whether they are different from simple wants or demands, whether they can be hierarchically ranked, whether they are mutable, and whether they are absolute or negotiable . . .” has not adequately been addressed.⁹ As Johan Galtung has pointed out, human needs theory can be used to build a priority of issues which should be addressed.¹⁰

Conflict resolution approaches were “to explain conflict, its origins, and its escalation sometimes by reference to other conflicts, sometimes by analytical means, but within the context of a continuing discussion between the parties.”¹¹ Conflict is approached as a socio-biological problem to be solved, where the third party must establish conditions in which the disputants attempt first to define and identify their conflict, before solving it. This process endeavors to establish the conditions necessary to de-escalate the conflict, presenting it as a “problem to be solved rather than a contest to be won . . .,”¹² and examines the relationship between the parties and the broader goals that they want to achieve. In essence, this approach tries to prevent the occurrences in the past relationship between the disputants from dictating their future relationship.¹³ A de-escalatory mechanism is therefore introduced by focusing on a super-ordinate goal,¹⁴ encouraging the two sides to look at each others’ needs in an objective fashion.

During the 1970s, interactive problem-solving workshops aimed at protracted internal and international conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland, Cyprus and the Middle East, increasingly came into use. Such workshops involved a convenor (often an academic) who facilitated discussions between the disputants who typically were linked to their leadership or might be leading future members of their community. Problem-solving workshops move through several distinct stages and their participants may become quasi-mediators upon returning to their community.¹⁵ John Burton first applied such techniques

in meetings which contributed to the 1966 Manila Peace Agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, before turning his attention to the Cyprus problem in 1966. This did not lead to the restart of UN mediation (which had reached an impasse in 1965), but to the start of intercommunal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's mission of good offices. Though this was deemed by the parties to be less interventionist than UN mediation had been during 1964-65, it nevertheless failed to produce concrete results. Burton's objective was to create a non-threatening atmosphere in which the disputants could mutually analyze their misperceptions about the conflict and each other with the aid of a third party, and then jointly explore functional avenues toward resolution. He argued that the basis of "deep-rooted conflict" lay in the pursuit of fundamental human needs for identity, security and justice, which are irrepressible and non-negotiable. Burton later explored the idea that problem solving techniques can be applied not just for conflict resolution but also for conflict prevention, providing a human needs approach to political decision-making, which in turn may create long-term stability in political environments.¹⁶

Leonard Doob also applied conflict resolution techniques in the Horn of Africa, Northern Ireland and later in Cyprus.¹⁷ Herbert Kelman, who worked with Burton on the Cyprus Workshops, also ran a series of workshops with Israeli and Palestinians representatives.¹⁸ Kelman, in his work on the social-psychological dimensions of conflict, explored another dimension of intractable conflict. He argued that "[i]nternational or ethnic conflict must be conceived as a process in which collective human needs and fears are acted out in powerful ways. Such conflict is typically driven by non-fulfilment or threats to the fulfilment of basic needs."¹⁹ According to Kelman, these needs are articulated through identity groups and provide imperatives in international and inter-group conflict. Kelman defines the social-psychological process that promotes conflict as being both normative and perceptual, based on the conflict norms and images rooted in the collective needs and fears that drive the conflict. This occurs among the leadership and the general public and creates "... the escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic that characterizes conflict interaction."²⁰ Clearly, Kelman is right to point out that historical traumas, as occurred in Kosovo, Cyprus, the former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland and the Middle East, provide reference for the development of ethno-nationalist and hard-line negotiating positions and attitudes vis-a-vis each other (particularly among political entrepreneurs). He made the case that discussions should be facilitated by social scientists acting as third parties, whose goal is to improve communication and understanding as well as problem-solving. Kelman argued that the social-psychological nature of this process emphasized social interaction and the dynamics provided by individual and institutional factors in inter-group conflict.²¹ Edward Azar and Stephen Cohen also used these techniques in the Middle East between Israel and Egyptian intellectuals.²² Azar developed a "problem-solving forum model" for addressing identity-related needs in protracted conflicts, and applied the model to the Falklands conflict, Lebanon and in Sri Lanka.²³


C.R. Mitchell has called for the development of "third-party consultancy" as a means of providing professional services to disputants in a non-directive manner, in an effort to avoid the rigid "objectivity" of traditional third party approaches. He argued that strenuous efforts are required to convince decision makers and policy specialists of the

new methodology's potential, and that this will provide innovative solutions to conflicts which will not respond to traditional methods.²⁴ Louise Diamond and John McDonald added the concept of multi-track diplomacy in which Track I describes official government-to-government interaction, whereas Tracks II through IX represent various unofficial peace-making activities.²⁵ Recent work carried out by psychologists and sociologists has focused on reconciliation and the role of third parties in facilitating intercommunal reconciliation processes. According to this literature, reconciliation attempts must first come to grips with the perceptions of victimization prevalent among those involved in intractable conflict, and the process of mourning is viewed as being absolutely essential to the healing process.

Perhaps most importantly, the relationship between traditional high level approaches to ending conflict and conflict resolution approaches has been the subject of much analysis. For some, unofficial or Track II methods that precede the more traditional diplomatic approaches may prepare the ground for official negotiations. Negotiations initiated at the Track II level or channel may then be passed to an official negotiating forum. Sometimes, the two work side by side in a related or a non-related manner. Perhaps the traditional diplomatic channel reaches an impasse which conflict resolution can help overcome. Yet, often there has been no clear relationship between the two processes, raising the possibility that there may be no basis for a connection. This has occurred in the case of Cyprus, where conflict resolution and official processes have been disconnected and have had relatively little impact upon each other. In the case of the 1993 negotiations between the Israelis and the PLO representatives conducted in Oslo, conflict resolution approaches and traditional forms of negotiation were interchanged at different stages of the negotiations, though as Deinol Jones has argued, facilitation has served to reaffirm the Palestinians' status as non-state rather than sovereign.²⁶ The argument that Track I and II are complementary has been based upon the assumption that the lines between official and unofficial mediation processes have become increasingly blurred and that conflict resolution methodologies can be applied to official processes.²⁷ However, this assumes that official process have not colonized the unofficial level.

The following diagram outlines the overall framework of conflict resolution approaches in the context of the full spectrum of levels that the conflict may affect.

Figure 1 Conflict Resolution



The attempt to develop linkages between high level and grassroots level has opened the way for the multidimensional approaches of conflict transformation and peace-building to develop this further. As Hugh Miall, et al. have noted, conflict resolution approaches aim to transform conflict “. . . into peaceful non-violent process of social and political change. . .” rather than attempt to eliminate conflict.²⁸ This means that conflict resolution is a never-ending task. It represents a forceful critique of the neatly packaged conflict endings presented by conflict management approaches and explains its fall-back position of conflict management in perpetuity.

Terrell Northrup’s work on conflict transformation develops this approach, critiquing some of the flawed norms of traditional diplomacy. Northrup argues that conflict transformation has been based upon four assumptions found in conflict resolution, which themselves indicate a slightly different conceptualization of conflict. These assumptions suggest that parties to conflict are rational; that misperception constitutes a central cause of conflict; conflict resolution principles can be applied across social settings, including labour, international and interpersonal conflict; and a high value is placed on peaceful resolution. Northrup argues that parties to a conflict may be rational, but only in their own cultural context. In effect, this means that misperception fails as an explanatory tool and this constitutes a crucial critique of approaches to conflict which do not acknowledge the tension between the universal and the particular.²⁹

Raimo Vayrynen has argued that conflict transformation operates at the actor, issue, rule and structural levels. Actor transformation brings about internal or external changes,

including the recognition of new parties to the conflict. Issue transformation operates at the level of political agendas and tries to emphasize issues upon which commonality exists. Rule transformation tries to redefine the relationship of the actors according to mutual norms, while structural transformation operates at the level of the structural relationship between the actors.³⁰

The work of Elise Boulding, Adam Curle and John-Paul Lederach,³¹ has examined the possibility of transforming the relationships among actors and disputants and has utilized conflict resolution approaches as a method of bringing third parties into the conflict environment who can act as agents of personal and social change. This development in the field has been described by Miall et al. as constituting a further track below the Burtonian Track II level. Their suggestion is that this addition to the field should be described as Track III, as it has laid increased emphasis on the importance of indigenous actors and resources in the peace process.³² Lederach has indicated, through his model on the three levels of leadership in a conflict, the importance of building upwards from the grass roots. At the level of diplomacy, top-level leaders operate in the Westphalian context, while at the mid-level leaders engage in problem-solving workshops, while at the grassroots, local leaders engage in peace commissions.³³

Lederach's work on conflict transformation has indicated the need for establishing an infrastructure for a peace constituency. He argues that a comprehensive approach to peace-building should integrate top-level leaders, community leaders and grassroots actors. In Lederach's model the problem-solving approach to conflict resolution and a public, process-oriented approach are combined in order to address the multi-dimensional nature of protracted social conflicts in the context of a non-linear peace-building process. This emphasizes the need for a multi-sectoral approach to conflict transformation which brings in grass roots, local and NGO actors in order to create a sustainable process.³⁴

Lederach has created a three-level system for peace-building, including, at the top level, a "top-down" approach. This includes intermediaries or mediators backed by a supporting government or international organization and whose goal is to achieve a negotiated settlement. The second level includes the problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution training and the development of peace commissions. The third level includes grassroots, bottom-up approaches.³⁵ Lederach argues that peace-building needs to take into consideration:

. . . the legitimacy, uniqueness, and interdependency of the needs and resources of the grassroots, middle range, and top level.' The same is true when dealing with specific issues and broader systemic concerns in a conflict. More specifically, an integrative, comprehensive approach points toward the functional need for recognition, inclusion, and coordination across all levels and activities . . . in both of these conceptual approaches, the level with the greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain the peacebuilding process over the long term appears to be the middle range. The very nature of contemporary, internal, protracted conflicts suggests the need for theories and approaches keyed to the middle range.

He continues:

Although such approaches are informed by deeper systemic analysis, they also provide practical initiatives for addressing immediate issues, and, are able to draw on valuable human resources, tap into and take maximum benefit from institutional, cultural, and informal networks that cut across the lines of conflict, and connect the levels of peace activity within the population. These qualities give middle-range actors and subsystem and relationship foci the greatest potential to serve as sources of practical, immediate action and to sustain long-term transformation in the setting.³⁶

Lederach suggests that there is an overlap between structural and procedural aspects of peace-building in which there is a need to understand systemic issues, the progression of conflict and the ability to sustain its transformation. Conflict transformation operates in four interdependent dimensions, including the individual dimension of emotional, perceptual and spiritual aspects of conflict; the relational dimension to maximize communication and mutual understanding; the structural, dimension which highlights the underlying causes of conflict and its effects and derivation on and from, social structures; and the cultural dimension, which refers to the consequences of conflict for the culture patterns of a group, and how culture affects approaches to ending conflict.³⁷ Thus, Lederach has developed conflict resolution approaches by emphasizing the role of middle-range actors whom, he argues, have the greatest potential for constructing an infrastructure for peace through their impact at both the top and the grassroots levels in long-term reconciliation processes. Such conflict transformation and peace-building must be coordinated for effective implementation of a comprehensive peace-building strategy to occur.

Kumar Rupesinghe argues that:

central to any effective approach is the concept of strategic planning for the elaboration and design of a sustainable peace process and, ultimately, sustainable peace. Designing peace processes involves bringing together a variety of conceptual and organizational elements to help ensure long-term success in peacebuilding.³⁸

He argues that this means there is also the possibility that making peace can occur simultaneously at several levels. Rupesinghe also calls for “two-track diplomacy,” which combines high level mediation and facilitation approaches, and which also focuses on developing a peace constituency for peace “. . . that spans all communities through community-based development, citizen-based peace groups, the media, business leaders, and others.” He argues that these processes should be,

complementary, consistent and sustained, with the linkages between them understood. Another necessary element is a wider political framework and relationship of power, which can be used to persuade parties to conflict to enter into ceasefires or negotiations. The US umbrella in the Middle East is one example of this; NATO’s involvement in Bosnia is another. Involving outside actors and placing a local conflict in a wider context can decrease the salience of that conflict.

He continues:

For the international community what has emerged most clearly from the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Liberia, Somalia and elsewhere is that in each case a strategic concept is needed that unites local peacemakers, inter-national organizations, the international non-governmental community and scholars in cooperation towards conflict transformation and war prevention. The scale and complexity of the problems faced are such that the only realistic approach is concerted action involving all levels of the international community, as well as cooperation within the components of that community to maximize the impact of their respective strengths.³⁹

Thus, what transpires from this discussion is the development of conflict resolution approaches into a comprehensive and multidimensional approach to ending conflict, hinging on a linkage between the different types of actors and issues in multidimensional conflicts. This has emerged from the assumption of linkages between Track I and II. However, approaches at both levels still tend to focus on moderating the secessionist or ethno-national challenge to the state by reconstructing states. Despite this anomaly, Lederach, for example, is clear that statist methods of addressing conflict tend to be unworkable.⁴⁰ What this appears to show is that conflict resolution/transformation approaches as a methodology lend themselves, at the very least, to the identification of the core roots of conflict, though the more ambitious claim to aid in their “resolution” is more suspect. However, such approaches are able to address aspects of such disputes that conflict management approaches tend to exacerbate (as has clearly been attempted in the cases of Cyprus, the Middle East and Sri Lanka, where status and legitimacy has been an all-consuming mantra for many years among the disputants.) Yet, this assumes that such approaches do not tend to support the most powerful party.⁴¹ As Christopher Mitchell has argued, it may be that conflict resolution approaches deny the reality that conflict is an inevitable part of the human condition;⁴² the problem with this, however, relates to those who are not directly involved in a conflict, but are affected by it.

More recent theoretical developments within the field of conflict resolution/transformation and peace research have thus seen an attempt to move beyond the binary of subjectivist and objectivist, which reflects the exclusions produced by the state in the Westphalian system, and has concentrated on the intersubjective nature of conflict within a framework in which the role of discourse vis-a-vis culture plays a crucial role. As Miall, et al. has pointed out, this has linked the cultural context of conflict with human needs in order to develop approaches to address conflict, its resolution and its transformation.⁴³ Vivienne Jabri has developed conflict resolution theory in the context of social theory, and views conflict as being reinforced at a social level by dominant discourses and institutions, which cannot be addressed via rational negotiations of the more subjective conflict resolution approaches.⁴⁴ This illustrates the failings of conflict management approaches and the tendency for conflict resolution approaches to fall victim to the “trickle down effect” in which the dominant and hegemonic discourse of state-centricity emphasizes strategic concerns related to the internal (rather than external in the case of civil conflicts) integrity of the state. This is as opposed to a “trickle up

effect” in which conflict resolution aids more formal attempts to manage conflict. Indeed, such approaches tend to offer the possibility of legitimizing the disunity of the state in a complex federal solution in the minds of officials representing the existing state’s interests. Jabri turns to structuration theory to address this problem, which views structure and agency to be mutually dependent and argues that conflict generates hegemonic discourses which clash. Such discourses may be reproduced by third parties, thus perpetuating conflict.⁴⁵ This implies that a further step needs to be taken before conflict resolution approaches can avoid reproducing the binaries and the discourses that give rise to conflict in the first place. As Miall, et al. has pointed out, this has significant repercussions for the whole debate about third party intervention, including the assumptions normally made about its necessity - often in the guise of the UN - in order to address, manage or resolve conflict.⁴⁶ Jabri argues, on the basis of Habermas’ concept of communicative action, for an approach which leads to political participation without the threat of dominance.

THE IMPACT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACHES

Conflict resolution approaches have provided an important impetus for change in the field of diplomacy, in that where management approaches have failed, individuals, social movements, NGOs and, as Cameron Hume has pointed out, diplomats and officials often now use conflict resolution approaches.⁴⁷ The main thrust of this development has been the highlighting of the inadequacies of making peace in the Westphalian system. However, such approaches take place within which the dynamics provided by that system. The state and the official level often creates the limits within such activities operate. It is also apparent that conflict resolution activities also often take place in environments in which traditional forms of peacekeeping are managing a status quo, and in which outside forces are manipulating a “hurting stalemate” in order to produce a “ripe moment.” This means that such activities provide a conceptual glimpse of what lies beyond Westphalia in terms of human rather than state security, but in practice can contribute only in a limited manner. Claims to the “scientific” nature of such approaches and their human needs basis, as well as to their neutrality, are also conceptually suspect.

However, the institutionalization of conflict resolution practices is extremely important in developing awareness at the civil and semi-official level, and does contribute in a variety of ways to the unofficial level. As Louis Kriesburg has argued, “. . . in large-scale conflicts various intermediaries and approaches generally need to be combined to be effective. If they are well coordinated, their effectiveness enhances the efforts of any one approach.”⁴⁸ This also applies to forms of conflict which might not qualify as “large-scale” in the sense that Kriesburg implies, as they raise local, regional and global issues. Kriesburg gives the example of the coordinated approaches used to end the Mozambique civil war (which involved a government and rebel party, and was therefore clearly intractable in the context of traditional diplomacy) during the peace process of 1989-92. A Catholic missionary order, the Community of Sant’ Egidio, used its links derived from its humanitarian work with both the government and the insurgent Resistencia Nacional Mocambicano (RENAMO) group, to facilitate negotiations without raising the issue of the status and legitimacy of the disputants. The negotiations were also assisted by an

archbishop, a member of the Italian parliament and representatives of many governments, including the Italian, French, Portuguese, UK and US governments, and representatives of the United Nations. Neighbouring governments also indicated a regional consensus for a settlement by contributing to the process. Humanitarian NGOs were also actively involved and consulted during the negotiations, which increasingly became coordinated at different levels and led to an agreement in Rome on 4 October 1992.⁴⁹

The Tajikistan Dialogue provides another example in which a wide range of Tajik actors were brought together in 1993, after a vicious civil war had erupted on independence from the Soviet Union.⁵⁰ A series of meetings resulted which entailed five separate stages,

(a) deciding to engage in dialogue to resolve mutually intolerable problems; (b) coming together to map the elements of the problems and the relationships that perpetuate the problems; (c) uncovering the underlying dynamic of the relationships and beginning to see ways to change them; (d) planning steps together to change the relationships; and (e) devising ways to implement their plan.⁵¹

As during the Oslo Accords, some of the Tajiks from different factions also participated in the official negotiations. Both examples also illustrate the fact that problem-solving workshops tend to extend themselves into a series of meetings involving similar participants over several months or years. This has occurred with the emergence of conflict resolution groups in Cyprus and the Middle East as well; sometimes the groups are organized by the same convenors and involve the same participants, while it is also common for participants to go on to join other workshops and groups. One general omission in this kind of activity has been that while work focuses on the relationship between opposing groups, there has been very little in the way of exploring the stereotyping that occurs within the group - particularly in terms of patriarchy and other forms of internal power structures which may then spill over into inter-group dynamics.⁵²

It may well be mistaken to argue that intergroup conflict stems from intergroup dynamics, rather than from intra-groups dynamics.

The Centre for Conflict Analysis (CCA) has continued its work based upon the methodology of problem solving workshops. One of its latest efforts has centered on the Moldovan conflict, and has brought together delegates in workshops aimed at identifying their key concerns, and whether they are compatible. It has cooperated with the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in providing a forum for a settlement of the conflict, including representatives of the Russian and Ukrainian presidents. As Andrew Williams has explained,

No issue, be it small or large, is allowed to be excluded if the parties think it important. A confidential and non-adversarial atmosphere is created. The process seems to work because everything is deniable (there being no publicity); and because there is no pressure from normal political organs or individuals. In short everyone is able to think the unthinkable and create alternatives.⁵³

This example is important in that it was made clear to the CCA that its presence was welcomed by the OSCE, and it also appears that, as with the Oslo process, the interaction of first and second track processes has been beneficial, though not necessarily decisive. As Williams has argued, in the Moldovan conflict the official Russian and Ukrainian mediators are relatively partial, but “. . . they and the OSCE representatives who chair the talks between the two sides feel a clear commitment to resolving the conflict as it destabilizes the region and contributes a continuing volatile aspect to their domestic politics.”⁵⁴

Conflict resolution approaches, impact on high-level diplomacy has partly resulted in the UN Secretary-General being able to play an enhanced role, based upon his mission of good offices and facilitation. For example, Boutros Boutros Ghali introduced Special Representatives in crisis areas, and developed the use of small groups called Friends of the Secretary-General to provide advice and enhance the linkages between the Secretary-General and interested parties in conflicts. The linkages with regional organizations have been enhanced, as have linkages to NGOs involved with humanitarian and conflict resolution projects. It has also provided increasing levels of peace-building assistance for civilian authorities in conflicts, as in Namibia in 1989, and, through conducting and monitoring elections, in Haiti, El Salvador, South Africa, Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola. In the light of an increasing range of Security Council activity, as in the several fact-finding missions sent to crisis areas in Angola, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and Western Sahara, arms and trade embargoes and international tribunals, the UN has played an increasingly dynamic role. Regional groups have also played an active role in resolving conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Nine OSCE members constituted the “Minsk Group” which facilitated negotiations over the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which the Secretary-General’s mediation was supported by Britain, France, Russia, Germany and the United States (who constitute the “Friends of Georgia” and the “Friends of Tajikistan”). Success has been limited, though the intention is clear. Moscow desires a prominent role in dealing with conflicts in the former Soviet republics, and the UN or OSCE has played a role in directing or monitoring Russian peacekeepers. At the same time an ad hoc group of governments has supported negotiation. It is clear that the end of the Cold War has led to an important increase in the application of conflict resolution techniques, mainly because of the intra-state and intractable nature of many of the emergent disputes, and the clear inadequacy of conflict management approaches.

The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the agreement in principle between Israel and the Palestinians was developed through the use of a few low-key and secret, exploratory meetings by officials without formal negotiations; there was, however, a growing development of a conflict resolution culture through non-governmental organizations. As official negotiations began, additional mediation and facilitation efforts by third parties and conflict resolution activity by non-governmental groups gained impetus. In the Egypt-Israel case this led to Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, and the subsequent Camp David Accords, which in turn led to Israel’s final withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. There is little doubt that the Middle East peace process between Israel and the Palestinians benefited from Track II diplomacy and its contribution to the middle level official and the high level official interactions between the Palestinians and the Israelis is

significant, as has been the long development of grass roots peace movements and NGOs in the area. The international conference that convened in Madrid in October 1991 indicated that there was a regional and global desire for a meaningful peace process, with the Palestinian and Israeli delegations interacting with Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, as well as representatives of the United Nations and the European Community. The subsequent “Oslo track” soon became an official, albeit secret, diplomatic effort, based on the methodologies that conflict resolution approaches offered, though also susceptible to, the foibles of conflict management approaches in which states jealously preserve their sovereignty, as can be observed in the subsequent and recent behavior of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The lack of implementation because of Israel’s concerns about this has led to a collapse of the process.

In Cyprus, workshops bringing together both communities have taken place since the late 1960s with negligible effects upon the two communities’ ethno-national stereotyping or official negotiating positions. Indeed, many participants have found that the workshops confirmed their stereotypes, as well as made them the target of structural violence (such as being passed over for promotion) or intracommunal abuse.⁵⁵ Indeed, when official political tensions increase, as occurred several times in the 1990s, conflict resolution activities were physically blocked or attendance dropped. However, they have introduced a more diverse discourse into the conflict environment, though nationalists often dismiss them as being a product of US or European (being the principle organizers and funders)⁵⁶ attempts to persuade one or other side to compromise. Suspicion of Track II processes even among moderates runs very high. The Greek Cypriot side tends to view anything which promotes friendships between the two communities as desirable if it contradicts the hard-line thesis of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The latter assert that the two communities cannot live together by virtue of their ethnicity, historical and cultural consciousness, which has been tainted by the communities’ imbalance of numbers. For this reason, the Turkish Cypriot leadership frowns on bicomunal events, as these may undermine its hard-line position of complete separation. The Greek Cypriot leadership does not like the fact that conflict resolution workshops base their understanding on the perceptual level of conflict, rather than on international norms of justice and international law. Obviously, conflict resolution processes impact upon very sensitive areas; yet their practice in Cyprus has shown a certain insensitivity to such complex issues. Greek Cypriot participants have often become isolated from their own community and have therefore found it difficult to make the necessary contributions to effect changes. They have been identified as traitors, or are seen as being misled by third parties (who are often perceived as state-backed - in this case, by the US). The Turkish Cypriots actually have been prevented by their administrations on numerous occasions from taking part in conflict resolution workshops. The net result has been that in certain circumstances such workshops have been the source of tensions and have become heavily politicized. One solution put forward to resolve this has been to provide such processes with the official stamps of approval of both administrations. However, this has proven impracticable both because of the all-pervasiveness of the sovereignty and recognition issues, and also because this would locate such workshops in the mainstream political debates (which would, of course, be counterproductive).⁵⁷ So, little has been achieved in concrete terms as both sides, though particularly the Turkish Cypriot leadership, have been wary of

unofficial processes impinging upon their territory, though a forum has been provided upon occasions for like-minded individuals to engage to a limited degree with the other.

PROBLEMS WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACHES

Much of the literature on conflict resolution concentrates on the internal dynamics of conflict resolution, rather than its external dynamics.⁵⁸ Because of this emphasis, it often becomes apparent that practitioners and participants alike have not examined how this framework envisages the international system. This is a result of the tendency in the literature to endorse the theoretical de-linking of Track II from the international conflict environment, and also from the inter-disciplinary debates on which it is based. This tends to further isolate participants and practitioners from the very environment that they are attempting to affect. What makes the practice of conflict resolution even more tenuous is the occasional tendency of practitioners to treat participants as if they were guinea pigs in “conflict resolution experimentation” believed to be of such limited scope for academic, rather than practical, ends.⁵⁹ Conflict resolution approaches are again detached from the wider conflict environment in an attempt to prevent citizen diplomacy from succumbing to the standard politicization which tends to take place in ethno-political, sub-state or intractable conflicts. The conflict resolutionists would tend to argue that this separation is necessary if citizen diplomacy is to reduce stereotyping and contribute to an overall settlement. Yet how can such approaches contribute to an overall settlement if they are indeed de-linked from the socio-political environment at all the levels at which protracted conflict is extant? It seems somewhat contradictory to argue that linkages only operate in certain directions. If the effects of conflict resolution are expected to trickle up, then high-level, hard-line discourses must be expected to trickle down. Given the fact that political, administrative and bureaucratic reward structures are often decisive in forming views and practices, the trickle down effect may far outweigh this. Ultimately, this effect may reinforce the hard-line views harbored by participants in workshops rather than weaken them.

This somewhat contradictory perspective on conflict, and the methodology which is derived from it, is thought to remove the critical difficulties inherent in earlier approaches where the common argument is made that mediation is crippled by the intensity of the dispute, the resources or lack of that which the mediator has access to and the type of issues at stake for the disputants.⁶⁰ It is in this context that the international system dictates that conflict management approaches aim at bringing about compromise based on the zero-sum logic of the international system. As Mitchell has pointed out, this means that conflict management approaches are often crippled by their own logic. According to the conflict resolution perspective, this Gordian knot can be untied by a bottom up approach. In this way, individuals who have certain influential positions in the conflict environment are provided with an alternative and positive-sum understanding of their conflict, which through a trickle-up effect, will eventually play a role in the international politics related to the conflict environment. However, it appears that conflict resolution techniques are crippled by the same logic that provides a barrier for conflict management approaches. This relates to the third parties’ resources, the level of which relates to how dynamic its role is as opposed “status quo mediation,” the perceptions of the parties, their

devious objectives and the impact of the interests inherent in the wider global and regional environment.⁶¹

Though the problem-solving workshop is based on the assumption that conflict is a subjective, social process,⁶² little has been said of their indirect results other than in terms of success or failure at the citizen level and in the realms of diplomacy. It is precisely because of the argument that conflict is essentially a matter of perception, attitudes and values, that this oversight constitutes a significant flaw in the whole conflict resolution package as it is currently practiced, both by scholars, and by external, possibly state-backed, institutions, or at the official, semi-official and professional levels. The indirect effects of the alternative understandings of conflict fostered by conflict resolution approaches lie in the participants' perceived understanding of their role and the role of facilitators, but also in the changing relationship between participants and their own community. This is also affected by the level of politicization which workshops are subject to from the political establishment and constituencies of both communities about their own intentions and perceptions vis-à-vis workshops, and also their perceptions of the other communities' exploitation of such workshops at both the unit and system level.

There is indeed an observable linkage between conflict resolution practices and high diplomacy, as most practitioners hope. However, this seems to be verifiable in terms of the negative perceptions that official hard-liners hold about problem-solving workshops, for example, and the rhetoric of treachery they often apply to participants. As a consequence, participants may become separated and victimized, in some cases by their own communities. This can extend to verbal and even physical violence, but participants are not prepared or equipped to deal with such contradictions produced by the workshops. They tend to assume that because they do not perceive themselves to be directly linked with mainstream political debates within a conflict environment there will be no reaction and they will not be perceived as a threat. Yet it must not be forgotten that in intractable conflict, ethno-politics or hard-line rhetoric and emotion flourishes and this is often utilized by political elites to mass support behind their hard-line policies. These include militarization, and the search for legitimization through political and military alliances in the region and in the context of the international system and traditional diplomacy. State actors tend to hope that conflict resolution activities will bring "rebels" into line; non-state actors hope it will aid them to accrue legitimacy. Any semblance of a crack in subgroup unity and the homogeneity of ideas tends to be dealt with ruthlessly.

Much local and regional conflict tends to be predicated on the imperfections and anomalies thrown up by the state system itself, on which their perceptions and understanding are based. Much of the theorizing which takes place in IR tends either to use a power-politics framework in which it is the pursuit of power that creates conflict and its method of management, or tends to criticize the role of the state in de-emphasizing the potential role of other actors at other levels. However, this seems to ignore the fact that disputants' perceptions of their situation are often framed with respect to their ethnicity and the ethno-political dialogues within their groups, but also with respect to their understanding of the international system as they perceive it. This appears to be something which conflict resolution approaches overlook. This, in turn, often leads

to participants' dislocation in their own communities, either through a growing alienation between participants and non-participants, or through actual victimization on the part of ruling elites. The other possibility also ignored by the literature on workshops is that they may actually result in confirming the stereotypes or nationalist images held by disputants, either through experiencing hard-line others, or simply by creating a greater awareness of structural or political intolerance in the context of a wider discourse about human security and human rights.

An essential point here is that the common perception of actors who are involved in conflict resolution workshops, or in mainstream political debates is that legitimacy lies in "official" political activities. There is a great reluctance to question this. Conflict resolution activities do accrue a certain legitimacy based on their emphasis of the needs and will of individuals, but their legitimacy is also very dependent on the levels of "official" recognition that they have acquired. This issue is very complex, mainly because as with traditional approaches to IR, the individual is regarded as separate from, but - somewhat confusingly - dependent on, high-level political actors; yet an examination of conflict environments tends to illustrate how far the two are interlinked. This is a critical point in that what is at stake is not just the fate of communities or identity groups, but the whole notion of the Westphalian international system. For Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the Palestinians and Israelis, and the different factions in Northern Ireland, for example, the dialogue which takes place at the domestic level, both official and non-official, is tainted by the systemic competition that the notion of the "Westphalian imaginary" has produced. As a consequence, participants and facilitators involved in Track II dialogues cannot but take account of this.

Yet, practitioners and subjects alike tend to become engaged in their search for an understanding which may become divorced from the overall political conflict environment and may tend to ignore the effects of such workshops in terms of the individual and sub-group polarization that they may cause. Conflict resolution workshops do not avoid the intense politicization inherent in intractable conflict; external sponsors of such processes, as well as practitioners and subjects/participants tend to be swept along by such undercurrents. The general focus on the local conflict environment and the perceptions of citizens implies that they are agents in the conflict environment. Yet, often the result of conflict resolution approaches is a narrow definition of the conflict itself which ignores the very levels it seeks to have an impact upon - the official level, who may feel threatened by such workshops and endeavor to suppress them. What is clear here is that participants are powerless when official diplomacy intervenes at their level - short of resorting to subgroup conflict.⁶³ Finally, there is also the problem of psychological disjuncture brought about by the objectives of external patrons and states in sponsoring such activities, because of the tendency of academics and practitioners who conduct workshops to view them as "laboratories," and because of the shifting perceptions that participants experience.

CONCLUSION

One of the most significant insights that the examination of conflict resolution activities in protracted conflict illustrates is the inadequacy of state-oriented methods of conflict management and settlement.⁶⁴ Further, the tendency for outsiders to impose their own definitions of justice⁶⁵ and to protect what they identify to be weaker parties also leads to disillusionment within the participant groups, or justifies those who may be uncertain about the official negotiating positions of both sides. The actual conduct of conflict resolution itself is potentially divisive within communities involved in external conflicts, leading to a division between moderates and hard-liners in which moderates are seen to be betraying the morality and norms of each community. What tends to occur in practice is that citizens' discussions of their needs and their views of the conflict become ensnared by the traditional political discourse, which is characterized as intractable because of its concentration on legalistic approaches, strategic security and resources. The motives, understanding and misperceptions of organizers, funders and facilitators all become subject to a wider speculation among participants and their communities alike. Here, traditional international perspectives dominate.

What this demonstrates is that Track II diplomacy is actually much more closely inter-linked with what its own practitioners perceive to be separate - Track I diplomacy - and consequently that forces are at play which are akin to the more pernicious forces characterized by political realism in a conflict environment. Conflict resolution proponents hope that at some point Tracks I and II will merge, though others have argued that there is a real possibility that the two tracks will just continue into the distance unconnected.⁶⁶ Yet, it is a mistake to assume that conflict resolution practitioners and participants are separate from and therefore are immune to so-called high politics. Roughly speaking, Track I and II exist in the same environment and are therefore victims of the same shortcomings and as Vivienne Jabri has pointed out, it may be that “. . . conflict resolution as a response to conflict is influenced by and reproduces the social continuities which constitute social and political systems.”⁶⁷

Conflict resolution approaches have attempted to provide the analyst with another perspective through which to view conflict and through which to resolve it. Indeed, it has provided a whole school of academics with an alternative epistemology, despite the fact that there are as yet some notably flimsy assumptions made. For example, the definition of human needs, the assumption that suppression of such needs leads to an inevitable backlash and the argument that such needs are actually inexhaustible, tends to de-link aspects of conflict from the environment in which actors are located and underestimates the reach of non-ethical states and actors. The argument that human needs are ontological tends to imply that individuals have certainly a greater level of agency in international structures than many would find to be acceptable. In other words, it seems to be a mistake to regard the perceptions and potential effectiveness of participants on their conflict environment as a one-way street in which spill-over effects impinge positively on the conflict itself. This seems merely to be repeating the somewhat facile argument that the international/national divide is clear-cut and watertight. Thus, while the theoretical basis behind conflict resolution approaches tends to argue against the overall importance of the state as the sole actor in conflict, the practice of conflict resolution at least illustrates the overwhelming weight of “official” diplomacy as compared to citizen diplomacy. Official

negotiations between the state and non-state representatives remain relatively unaffected by Track II processes, although Track II processes operate only on the approval of the Track I process or official actors. Otherwise, participants run the risk of being alienated from their local communities. What this illustrates is that participants in Track I diplomacy perceive a much greater linkage between Track I and Track II, to the possible detriment to the hard-line negotiating positions adopted at the official level, than participants in Track II process themselves perceive. This point is extremely important as it underlines the fact that the holy grail of conflict resolution might not be as unlikely as it has come to be seen by many commentators; in other words, that Track II does have a direct effect on Track I. The negative side to this is of course that the opposite also holds true - those involved in Track II immediately become much more susceptible to the vagaries of official approaches, and the associated dangers which may go with becoming so directly involved in sensitive political debates in societies which are split and are not beyond envisioning the use of force both on internal “dissenters” and external opposition.⁶⁸

It may also be that the assumption that conflict resolution approaches reduce ethno-nationalism and stereotyping, and that blurring the lines between unofficial and official diplomacy will not merely reproduce hegemonic discourses, is also incorrect. The elevation of human security issues through conflict resolution approaches may exacerbate polarization in civil society because its dominant groups may still focus on state security. This implies that the ontology, epistemology and methodology of conflict resolution and management approaches are juxtaposed, and that contingency approaches, parallel track processes and wider conflict transformation approaches result in the replication of zero-sum discourses revolving around state security.⁶⁹ It could well be that the linkages between Track I and Track II merely mean that conflict resolution approaches become slaves to state interests, with all of their inherent legal and structural asymmetries; they may reinforce stereotyping and nationalism; and make actors more aware of the structural and political oppression they face in the context of the revelations of a human security discourse.⁷⁰ Yet, it is undeniable that this framework and the empowerment of individuals within conflict environments to move beyond ethno-national stereotyping via conflict resolution approaches, if this can be achieved on a wide scale, is important and therefore that these problems need to be recognized and addressed.

Endnotes

1. It must be pointed out that the term “citizen” tends to be used in its state context by conflict resolutionists. However, as the context of citizenship is under attack, as is its Westphalian backdrop, I assume that citizen refers to an individual residing in a state, but who has needs and rights which transcend the state. It must also be pointed out that conflict resolution approaches assume that the individual is able to participate in political decision-making and that participatory processes exist in the society in question.
2. Here I concur with Clark’s recent argument that the state occupies a middle ground between the internal and the external, and is moulded by as well as shaping, the process

of globalization. See Ian Clark, "Beyond the Great Divide: Globalization and the theory of international relations," *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998), p. 479.

3. This point draws on Hedley Bull's argument about discussion of the existence of an international society, despite the tendencies of states to follow their own national interests. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchic Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

4. Vivienne Jabri, "Agency, Structure, and the Question of Power in Conflict Resolution," *Paradigms* 9, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 51.

5. See David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).

6. Louis Kreisburg, "The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field," in William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 56.

7. E.A. Azar, "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions," in J. Burton & E.A. Azar, *Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), p. 29.

8. J. Burton and F. Dukes, *Conflict: Practices in Management and Settlement* (Macmillan and George Mason University, VA: Centre for Conflict Management and Resolution), p. 85.

9. J. Lewis Rasmussen, "Peacemaking in the Twenty-First century: New Rules, New Roles, New Actors" in Zartman and Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict*, p. 33.

10. Johan Galtung, "International Development in Human Perspective," in John Burton, ed., *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (New York: St Martin's, 1990), p. 311. Burton has defined these needs as physical and psychological security; basic survival needs; identity needs; economic needs; political participation; and freedom (freedom of speech, movement, religious preference and association).

11. John Burton, *Conflict and Communication* (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 61-62.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

13. A.J.R. Groom, "Problem Solving in International Relations," in R. Thakur, ed., *International Conflict Resolution* (Boulder, CO: Westview; Dunedin, New Zealand: University of Otago Press, 1988), p. 88.

14. David Mitrany's work on conflict provides an important contribution to the critique of traditional diplomacy, as does Groom and Taylor's development of his work on functional institutions, which seem to point to an opening for the development of a new form of multidimensional peacemaking, as outlined below. See D.A. Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: Martin Robertson, 1975); A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., *Frameworks for International Co-operation* (London: Pinter, 1990).
15. They may even become participants in negotiations later on, as was the case in the Israeli- Palestinian negotiations following the Kelman's workshops.
16. See J. Burton, *Conflict Resolution and Prevention* (London: Macmillan, 1992).
17. Leonard W. Doob, ed., *Resolving Conflict in Africa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970).
18. Herbert Kelman, "Contributions of an Unofficial Conflict Resolution Effort to the Israeli Palestinian Breakthrough," *Negotiation Journal* 11, no.1, pp. 19-27.
19. Herbert Kelman, "Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict," in Zartman and Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict*, p. 195.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
21. Herbert C. Kelman, "An Interactional Approach to Conflict Resolution and its Applications to Israeli-Palestinian Relations," in *International Interactions* 6, no. 2 (1979); "Informal Mediation by the Scholar-Practitioner" in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).
22. Stephen P. Cohen and Edward E. Azar, "From War to Peace: The Transition between Egypt and Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, no. 1, pp. 87-114.
23. Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict* (Hampshire, UK: Dartmouth Publishing, 1990).
24. C. R. Mitchell, *Peacemaking and the Consultant's Role* (Westmead, UK: Gower, 1981).
25. Louise Diamond and John McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy* (Grinnell, IA: Iowa Peace Institute, 1991). Track II involves nongovernmental conflict resolution activities; Tracks three to nine involve various unofficial actors' interactions in the areas of business, research, education, peace and environmental activism, religion and the media.
26. D. Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation* (Manchester, UK: University of Manchester Press, 1999), p. 160.

27. See, for example, Louis Kriesburg, "Varieties of Mediating Activities and Mediators in International Relations," in Jacob Bercovitch, ed., *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 226.
28. Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Oxford, UK: Polity Press, 1999).
29. Louis Kriesberg, Terrell A. Northrup and Stuart J. Thorson, eds., *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1989), p. 51. See also Alan Tidwell, *Conflict Resolved* (London: Pinter, 1998), p. 73.
30. R. Vayrynen, *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation* (London: Sage, 1991), pp. 4-6.
31. See E. Boulding, *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990); A. Curle, *Another Way; Positive Response to Contemporary Conflict* (Oxford: John Carpenter, 1994); J. Lederach, *Building Peace- Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997).
32. Miall, et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 19.
33. Lederach, *Building Peace*, p. 39.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-54.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-84.
38. Kumar Rupesinghe, ed., *Conflict Transformation* (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 79-80.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.
40. Lederach, *Building Peace*, p. 16.
41. Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (London: Pinter, 1996), p. x.
42. *Ibid.*, p. x.
43. Miall, et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 218.

44. V. Jabri, *Discourses on Violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered* (Manchester, UK and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996).
45. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
46. Miall, et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, p. 59.
47. Cameron R. Hume, "A Diplomat's View," in Zartman and Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict*, p. 320.
48. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 69.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
50. Harold H. Saunders, "Sustained Dialogue on Tajikistan," *Mind and Human Interaction* 6, pp. 123-35.
51. Kriesburg, "Development of the Conflict Resolution Field," p. 67.
52. See Myria Vassiliadou, "The European Accession and Bicomunal Work on Cyprus," Presentation at Ohio State University, Columbus, 28 June 2000.
53. Andrew Williams, "Conflict Resolution after the Cold War: The case of Moldova," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999), p. 72.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
55. Often the lure of attendance is because of the opportunity to attend workshops located abroad, attendance which tends to be dominated by "old hands" who jealously guard their privileges.
56. For example, in the Cyprus case, the US funds a large amount of Track II work through the Fulbright commission. US facilitators are often approached by unofficial and official members of each community in order to make an impression on the US government. It appears that there is less suspicion of the role of smaller countries and organizations that fund conflict resolution in Cyprus, for example, Norway.
57. This proposal was put forward by a senior official in the Turkish Cypriot administration at a conference held at the London School of Economics by the Association for Greek, Cypriot and Turkish Affairs in 1997.
58. See, for example, Zartman and Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict*, especially pp. 23-80.
59. This has been a common complaint from facilitators in some workshops that have taken place on the Cyprus conflict. See Meron Benvenisti for an anecdote about a similar

experience quoted by Tarja Vayrynen, "Going Beyond Similarity: The Role of the Facilitator in Problem Solving Workshop Conflict Resolution," *Paradigms* 9, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 71.

60. For example, see Mareike Kleibor, "Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 2 (June 1996), p. 362.

61. See Oliver Richmond, "Devious Objectives and the Disputants' Views of International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo) 35, no. 6 (1998).

62. See, for example, Herbert C. Kelman, "Informal Mediation," pp. 64-96.

63. This is generally regarded as not being a plausible option as all resources are geared to the communal, ethnic or inter-state conflict and subgroup disunity is regarded as being suicidal.

64. In Sri Lanka, for example, where there is a clear need for a new approach, traditional mediation has been attempted on many occasions since 1957, including the extended mediation of India, which has failed because it was unable to reconcile the conflicting conceptualizations of the conflict by the disputants as well as the third party. See Kumar Rupesinghe, "Mediation in Internal Conflicts: Lessons from Sri Lanka," in Bercovitch, ed., *Resolving International Conflicts*, pp. 161-64.

65. These are normally based on international law and liberal democratic norms, which are essentially Western and may not be held by local disputants.

66. Stephen Ryan, *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990), p. 89.

67. Jabri, "Agency, Structure, and the Question of Power," p. 54.

68. This could involve imprisonment, harassment, phone-taps, the denial of jobs and opportunities and the general apparatus of oppression applied against political dissenters by authoritarian political organizations and processes (which groups under threat are likely to develop in order to sustain unity and cohesion in the face of the enemy).

69. It is possible that a "global civil society" based conflict resolution process may be less open to becoming part of a traditional management process because it is more firmly rooted and supported.

70. This has certainly been the case in many such efforts in Cyprus. Genuine progress has been made with respect to a small number of participants, but this has not changed general perceptions or official negotiating positions at all since workshops began in the late 1960s.