

Multinational Land Force Interoperability: Meeting the Challenge of Different Cultural Backgrounds in Chapter VI Peace Support Operations

by
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INTRODUCTION

Multinational military interventions that promote sustainable and enduring peacebuilding measures have become increasingly challenged due to the complex environments and the many different players that are brought into these theatres. The reality of contemporary conflict environments is such that members of the local population, who themselves remain the only agent for a sustainable and peaceful change, are now able to view the behavioral conduct and operational effectiveness of the forces due to the close proximity in which they operate. A common method used by warlords, nonstate actors and paramilitary regimes to garner the support of local communities, is to offer security guarantees in exchange for their support. As a result, the main task for the international community in responding to these conflicts involves determining the basis for local support and seeking to redirect the population's allegiance toward the interventionist forces by demonstrating the provision of credible security. Research has indicated that disparate national approaches observed in recent multinational peace support operations have had an adverse effect on the way in which the international military forces are perceived, due to a failure to build sufficient confidence measures at the grass roots level of society.

These situations test the professionalism of the military ground forces and their application of doctrine. However, troops serving in a multinational theatre of operations are often deployed under the strategic requirements and tactical procedures of regional organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well under the more global auspices of the United Nations (UN) – the world's largest inter-governmental, multilateral organization. The "organizational" approach to pre-deployment planning, therefore, does not always correspond directly with national doctrine. Additionally, where there is a

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direct correlation between the organizational and the national approach, the interpretation of the same set of rules and procedures can be completely different. This results in a disunity of effort on the ground, an increasingly blurred local perception toward the international effort, and a prolonged conflict.

Such factors are now considered of primary importance as calls from Canada and her allies increase for enhanced military interoperability. Much of the discussion on interoperability has focused on Canada-US defence relations. In the past decade, however, Canadian Forces (CF) have operated with a number of other countries in various peace support operations, especially in the former Yugoslavia. Canadian defence policy still maintains that the CF must be prepared for such operations in the future.

This article will discuss the relationship between local populations and multinational military forces and examine the importance of this relationship in, what could be described as, "third generational conflict theatres."¹ It will then discuss some national disparities observed in Bosnia and Haiti and seek explanations behind these differences at the international, national and in-theatre levels. Lastly, the article will discuss recent initiatives aimed at minimizing the differences and the impact this should have on national defence policy and military leadership at all levels.

The Importance of Local Dynamics

Much has been written on the "new" security environment and the growing complexity of conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. Whilst these emergencies are not a new phenomenon, they have become an important subject area for academics and practitioners due to the increased tendency of the international community to respond. Military forces are no longer deployed along borders or demarcation zones that separate antagonistic states. Instead, they are expected to perform activities in the midst of these animosities, such as patrolling dangerous areas, observing human rights violations, protecting military compounds and international headquarters, rebuilding local infrastructures, and assisting in the delivery and administration of humanitarian aid.

In the recent past, international military forces have been labelled as being "passive spectators" and accused of "turning their backs" on the atrocities and human rights violations committed by the warring factions in these environments. The charges have often evolved due, not to the fault of the individual soldier, but to the national and international political forces that control their behavior in the field. In order to deploy troops to these regions, and search for a peaceful settlement to the conflict, the United Nations normally develops a mandate that falls within the UN's "Chapter VI" operations. Chapter VI refers to the section of the UN Charter that endorses military deployments that uphold the principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in the case of self-defence.²

The issue of consent is fairly straightforward. In March 1995, the re-installed Haitian government gave the UN permission to station international military forces in various areas on the Caribbean island to help maintain security and stability. The intervention force, called the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), was authorized by the UN Security Council under a Chapter VI peacekeeping mandate. The troops would be impartial to all individuals and groups and pledged to maintain a stable and secure environment in which the democratic Haitian government could be reinstalled. Lastly, the troops were only permitted to use life-threatening force in self-defence and which was to be executed in a graduated and measured way that ensured minimum collateral damage.

These principles and procedures have applied to many other interventions, as far back as the 1956 UN Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed to the Sinai, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFCYP), which is still stationed there today, the 1992 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, the 1993 UN Preventative Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, and the ongoing UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). These types of operations are most appropriate for the issues discussed in this article due to the restrictions imposed on the troops and the tasks they are expected to perform.

Chapter VI mandates are most common during the earlier and later stages of the conflict. If a conflict or humanitarian emergency deteriorates to the extent that more robust military action is required, a new mandate is often issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force.³ The ratification process behind approving the more robust UN mandate has proven difficult in the past, particularly if it triggers sensitivities for certain UN Security Council members who have the ability to exercise a veto. Such a scenario prevailed during early talks on the deployment of military troops to Kosovo, and the subsequent decision for the OSCE to lead due to the dual veto exercised by both China and Russia.⁴ Alternatively, the entire operation can be taken over by a “coalition of the willing” or a unilateral single-nation intervention. The American and British-led “coalition of the willing” in the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 1994 US-led OPERATION RESTORE DEMOCRACY in Haiti serve as respective examples of these arrangements. Thus, it is possible to categorize contemporary conflict interventions into the following three types: a UN-sanctioned/UN-led operation; a UN-sanctioned operation led by a regional organization; or a UN-sanctioned intervention led by one “executive agent” or a small “coalition of the willing.” The American-led coalition, which launched airstrikes on Taliban military strongholds in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, underlines the more recent utility of “coalition warfare.” This action drew on American-led rules of engagement and would be classified as the employment of air power to deter an aggressive threat under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁵

When security and stability returns and humanitarian activity resumes, a new UN mandate that upholds the same Chapter VI principles underwrites the

new phase of operations. International troops are expected to perform a more integral role within the local society and assist in peace rebuilding programs, security sector reform, and democratic development. The forceful and more robust approaches that feature in the earlier Chapter VII mandates are no longer used, except in the case of self-defence. In some cases, the military forces retreat back to carrying out a support function only, in an effort to give primacy to a newly developed security force and to re-empower local civil authority. Such was the case for the UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which succeeded UNMIH in 1996. A similar “single nation” parallel can be drawn with the British Army’s ongoing intervention in Northern Ireland, where soldiers provide background support to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).

It is during these transitional stages in multinational peacekeeping environments that the local population either redirects its allegiance to the international community (represented by the international military forces and humanitarian groups) or remains loyal to the individuals and groups behind the initial demise of the country. The latter occurs when conflict populations are not convinced that the international forces can provide them with security at the individual level. This insecurity encourages them to turn to their factional group leaders (or their own “stakeholder” group during the conflict) for reassurance. Local warlords, nonstate actors, and paramilitary groups are aware of this phenomenon and have used it to garner support and entice young recruits and child soldiers.

On the other hand, the international forces can work hard to build the trust and confidence necessary for the local residents to believe in their efforts and support their programs. Over time, the loosening of ties with the paramilitaries and factional leaders encourages steps toward reconciliation and helps remove bitterness. Achieving such an environmental transformation and changed mindset is necessary before international funds are spent on infrastructural reconstruction and societal rebuilding. Convincing each individual person that his or her own security is no longer at risk is paramount to a long-term solution.

There are many practical initiatives that can help to foster trust and credibility and remove the deeply rooted fear that helped sustain the *status quo ante*. While it is beyond the scope of this article to acknowledge all possible measures, recommendations that address this problem from a military doctrinal and leadership perspective will be explored. The problem is examined in the context of research carried out in Haiti during the third UN mandate, and during the 1996 Stabilization Force (SFOR) deployment in Bosnia. Both cases involve the participation of the CF, as well as many NATO and UN allies with whom Canada will continue to serve in the future. The choice of cases also reflects the contemporary nature of conflict, which includes a spectrum of activities ranging from low-intensity warfighting to more tranquil peacebuilding tasks.

Research Methodology

The research used to support the arguments in this article formed part of a doctoral dissertation that examined the disparities of multinational land forces in peace support operations. The study covered the multinational interventions in Haiti (1994-96), Bosnia (1996, 1998 and 1999), Somalia (1997) and Northern Ireland (1999), the latter of which was used to explore whether or not parallels existed between the multinational research findings and a single nation intervention. Research was undertaken in each country using rural and urban sample sets to increase the reliability of the data. For example, in Haiti, the urban area of Port-au-Prince and the rural areas in and around Cap Haitien were used. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, the urban area of West Belfast and the rural area of South Armagh were used. The case of Bosnia proved more challenging as, to maintain reliability and achieve accurate analyses, representation from many different rural areas was used to complement the research findings from the multi-ethnic region in and around Sarajevo. The same was true in the urban region of Mogadishu, Somalia, and the various tribal clans represented in the rural districts.

The data gathering, simulation, and interpretation phases of this work employed a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Due to the nature of the problem, and the extreme shortage of statistics in an already underdeveloped area, a qualitative model based on interpretive quality perspectives dominated.⁶ The mainstay of the data gathering involved numerous interviews with local representatives, all of whom were asked the same questions but who were also given room to elaborate on points which they clearly felt strongly about and observations that were directly related to some of the incidents that the author was investigating. Each national sample set was made up of the following proportions of respondents: at least 35 percent from individuals between the ages of 18-35; at least 40 percent from individuals between the ages of 35-50; and at least 20 percent from people in the 50+ age bracket.⁷ These proportions were applied equally to each of the different ethnic factions represented in the areas researched. The total number of people from the different sample sets varied in number, however, they remained consistent in relation to the population density of each area. The author also augmented the research with some quantitative research methods in order to monitor the reliability,⁸ and ward off claims that the research relied too heavily on anecdotal comment.

Following the analysis of the research, the author returned to each region for validation and evaluation purposes. Using smaller, but wholly representative sample sets, a validation questionnaire⁹ was used which summarized the interim research findings. Individuals completing the questionnaires were asked to indicate on a scale of five gradients whether or not they strongly agreed or strongly disagreed with the findings. The questionnaires left room for additional comments, which were also incorporated into the research to enhance clarity.

The research methodology used was effective in penetrating the mindset of the conflict communities and discovering how the behavior and performance of different national militaries affected their overall impression of the multinational force and the role it would play in determining their future. These issues are important within the wider interoperability debate for two reasons. First, interoperability extends beyond weapon procurement programs and defence spending, which looks at interoperability at the strategic level and not at the level of implementation. Second, efforts to achieve interoperability have encouraged a mutual understanding, and the development of, collective defence doctrines; however, controls must also be put in place to monitor the different interpretations of the common doctrine to limit adverse effects on the ground.

The next few sections will explore some of the background detail and research findings from the Haiti and Bosnia case studies. While the involvement of the Canadian Forces will remain the focus of this article, it is important to remember that the broader study encompassed an in-depth view of 12 other nations, both NATO and non-NATO.

Haiti

Haiti has suffered from civil unrest, government corruption, and oppressive leadership for years. The circumstances of its birth as an independent state bestowed four potentially destructive legacies on Haitian society: the passing of power to the local Creole aristocracy; the precipitous and brutal changes of leadership that became a model for future Haitian governments; the violent tactics of Haiti's founding leaders and the use of Voodoo; and, finally, the protracted wars of independence that destroyed the island's flourishing plantation economy.

The oppression of the Creole population by the Mulatto elite was challenged many times by renowned leaders like Toussaint Louverture, Francois Duvalier, and his son who succeeded him, Jean-Claude Duvalier. However, this only created a black elitist regime, which continued to subject the majority of Haitian people to the same oppressive, impoverished, and difficult life to which they had become accustomed. Each regime, along with their "extended" families, controlled the few legitimate and illicit sources of economic wealth, political control, and a powerful security apparatus that shared the riches.¹⁰

This kleptocratic nature of governance survived until the end of the Duvalier legacy in 1986, and a series of similar regimes and bloody coups that lasted for four years.¹¹ In December 1990, the Roman Catholic Priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was sworn in as president by free and fair elections.¹² A coup d'état, led by senior military officials and the capital city's chief of police, removed him from power six months later.¹³ Following US-led efforts to broker an agreement for the return of President Aristide and the military regime's refusal to implement it, a UN-sanctioned/US-led force mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was sent in to restore peace.

The mandate of the operation authorized the US force to use whatever means necessary to return Aristide in accordance with the Governor's Island Agreement.¹⁴ On 31 March 1995, the force was replaced by the UN Mission in Haiti, a multinational peacekeeping force acting under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The force was tasked with maintaining a secure and stable environment, assisting in the training of a new national police force, and facilitating a free and fair electoral process.¹⁵ In 1996, the force was downsized and renamed the UN Support Mission in Haiti Gendarmerie contingent and others participating in a UN Civilian Police Force (UNCIVPOL). A small group of US Army logisticians also provided support and were stationed at an airport compound. Its task was to assist in the professionalization of the national police force and in the maintenance of a secure and stable environment.

Bosnia

The events which preceded the deployment of SFOR in Bosnia had slight similarities to the international arrangements in Haiti, but came with complexities that were reminiscent of a region made up of about seven different ethnic factions, some of whom were fighting against themselves, and with conflict raging throughout the country (for different reasons depending on where one lived). In addition, the ambiguous political system that continued to change as the Yugoslav federation fell apart, posed huge legal challenges to members of the international community who were poised to intervene. Threatened Serb minority populations in Croatia and subsequent fighting along Croatia's border with Bosnia resulted in the deployment of a Chapter VI peacekeeping force tasked with monitoring the designated "UN Protected Areas" containing those populations.¹⁶

The independent recognition of both Croatia and Slovenia encouraged more violence. By this time, similar problems had spread in and around the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo where all three ethnic groups were co-located. In spring 1992, the UN responded to a plea from the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic, and sent in a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to facilitate the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid.¹⁷ Once again, the UN force served under a Chapter VI traditional peacekeeping mandate and was expected to uphold certain rules of engagement and principles associated with the mandate.

As the fighting in the former Yugoslavia spread and the situation deteriorated, combined with several failed attempts at brokering a diplomatic solution, measures were increased to bring in NATO involvement and with it, a more robust mandate.¹⁸ The deployment of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in fall 1995 seriously weakened the position of the factional fighters,¹⁹ which encouraged the factional leaders to seek diplomatic dialogue. They were eventually brought to the negotiating table where they signed up to the US-brokered "Dayton Peace Accords."²⁰

NATO, under IFOR, lasted for one year and was replaced by SFOR, which is still there today. There are three area commands, all of which answer to a central command in Sarajevo.²¹ While SFOR represents a UN-sanctioned/NATO-led force subject to the authority of the NATO commanders, it is still deployed in a peacekeeping/peacebuilding capacity and is therefore expected to carry out the rebuilding and reintegration role inherent in post-conflict operations.

The Local Response in Haiti

Research was carried out during the UNSMIH deployment to examine whether or not different national military conduct and behavior impacted the local population's impression of the UN force. Interviews were conducted on the streets, in residential neighborhoods, restaurants/cafes, prisons, municipal offices at the local police stations, in the more rural areas, and in the aid agency and military compounds. Views were gathered from the local inhabitants and international personnel assisting in all phases of the operation. Although this information was collected during the UNSMIH deployment in spring 1996, feedback on national military troops also included those who participated in earlier phases of the intervention.

Feedback on the American troops was divided according to time periods: during the earlier Chapter VII operation that authorized the use of force and the later support role the forces contributed to the UN Force. People generally felt that the American military was the right force to bring in during the earlier days of the conflict as a lightly-armed peacekeeping force would not have deterred the violence, crime, and political unrest. This was particularly the case for the people interviewed in Port-au-Prince where the worst violence was erupting.

In the northern city of Cap Haitian, the American response to a particularly violent firefight with the paramilitary group *Force Armee d'Haiti* (FAD'H), resulted in increased support for the international force. The incident saw American warning shots to deter a gang member from shooting a pro-Aristide demonstrator outside the Cap-Haitian police station, answered with direct fire toward the American troops. In response, the Americans shot and killed 10 of the paramilitaries. The response to the incident strengthened support for the Americans in particular for at least two reasons. First, it demonstrated to young potential paramilitary recruits that similar behavior would not be tolerated and showed the disincentives of subscribing to the cause.

Second, residents of Cap Haitian commented on the renewed confidence instilled by the American action, which led to the reopening of local businesses that had been continually looted and robbed by the paramilitaries. For the majority of people in Haiti, any extra income besides state allowances was usually made from market stalls in the city and town centres, thus, the American performance had brought hope that the markets could function once again. One former mayor even suggested that the robust, resolute approach proved to many

people that the American's current involvement in Haiti was different from the nation-building tactics used between 1915-34 that had generated so much resentment toward the US.²²

After the arrival of other national troops contributors and the official hand-over of command from the United States to the UN, local groups were able to observe the behavior of several different military forces and remark on the way they were managing the transformed peacekeeping/peacebuilding environment. Local Haitians living around Port-au-Prince grew to resent the American military forces for their insistence on using dedicated military vehicles (and not the open-sided UN trucks used by the other national battalions). Moreover, the locals questioned the need for the tall heavily-manned guard towers that the American forces had constructed at each of their sites, and the requirement to travel in groups of no less than eight with heavy military vehicles wherever they went. This approach during a more peaceful environment had a compelling psychological impact on the Haitian population and enhanced the understanding of the UN presence.

The Pakistani battalion, which had been deployed since the transition to the UN force in 1994, had seemingly developed a good rapport with the local groups. Many of those interviewed commented on the Pakistanis' determined look, the positioning of their guns and their attentiveness during patrolling activities, which made the Haitians believe that the Pakistanis were very much aware and in control of the situation. Their ability to combine this structured approach with constant interaction with people, whether it was helping someone push a wheel barrow down the street or building a soccer field for the children in a bad neighborhood, built tremendous support for the Pakistani battalion in Haiti. People acknowledged that this more than made up for their inability to communicate in the local language. If any violence broke out, the large majority of people interviewed were convinced that the Pakistanis would resist any aggression and protect the population.

At a conference held in 1996, one British academic and former war defence correspondent described the Canadian approach to peace support operations as "enormously generous but relying more on the use of 'soft tactics'" shaped by peacekeeping policy approaches similar to that of the Dutch and Scandinavian countries.²³ Recent debacles in Rwanda, Somalia and internal problems within the Canadian National Defence Headquarters have, in the recent past, put enormous pressure on the individual serving soldiers and have subjected them to rigid procedures that have, according to Canadian soldiers and their allied partners, restricted their operational freedom. The continuous need for the Canadian armed forces to be seen as militarily "clean" and "politically correct" due to these past experiences has caused the average soldier to feel more limited in using traditional robust approaches. Thus, for the sake of satisfying a public and government back home that seem ill-informed with regards to current oper-

ational requirements, the reputation of the Canadian land forces as credible security providers has been compromised. The point here is that this is not due to the individual level of competence or professionalism brought into theatre by each soldier, but to the discouraging ethos that has been built by Canadian politicians who repeatedly fail to see the role these individual men and women play in defending Canadian national interests – at home and abroad – and support them appropriately.

In Haiti, shortly after the transition to the UN-led operation in 1995, Canada was forced to modify its interpretation of the UN rules of engagement (ROE) in order to protect a group of Canadian hydro workers who had been commercially contracted to restore electricity to the capital city of Port-au-Prince.²⁴ When a warehouse they were working in came under paramilitary fire, Canadian troops had to request permission from the highest authorities to use force to deter the attack. The existing Canadian ROEs only permitted the troops to use force “in the case of self defence” due to Canada’s insistence on the removal of “. . . and in defence of property” from the same clause prior to deployment of troops. Had Canada agreed to the original UN text, the ROEs during this incident would have been clear and the Canadian troops would have had the freedom to deter the attack from wherever they stood. The only counterattack that their initial ROEs would have permitted would have been for the troops to position themselves in between the paramilitaries and the hydro compound in order to use force “in the case of self defence” – clearly not an option in these violent circumstances. The ROEs were later modified to include the use of force in the case of self defence “and also in defence of the mandate,” which could justify the protection of the Canadian civilians. Most countries already use this text despite the Canadian belief that ambiguity in determining what would and would not threaten the mandate may result in unnecessary violence.²⁵

The restrictions on the Canadians were obvious even to the local inhabitants. When people described the Canadian’s approach to patrolling and escorting they remarked that they did not appear to be in control as much as the Pakistani troops. In addition, feedback also suggested that the troops tended not to hold their weapons at the ready position like their Pakistani colleagues. There was also a perception that the Canadian soldiers tended to avoid the more turbulent areas of the city where needy reconstruction projects required their assistance. Reports on their failure to defuse and control several street-riots and student protests, also highlighted the constraints under which they had to operate.

Almost all of the respondents appreciated the kindness showed by the Canadian military forces and the ease of communication through French cultural and linguistic affinities. Many respondents also commented on the friendliness of the Canadians and their consistency in smiling and waving to the local inhabitants. Nevertheless, in the case of heightened security measures, only 12 percent of the 147 local respondents interviewed in the city of Port-au-Prince

stated that the confidence they had in the Canadians as credible security providers was quite low.²⁶

The Local Response in Bosnia

Similar themes were noted from the research findings in Bosnia. Local Muslim, Serb, and Croat residents were interviewed in and around Sarajevo, in the Bihac region of southwest Bosnia, Mostar, Banja Luka, Prijedor and in the Central Bosnian corridor of Drvar, Jajce, Gornji Vakuf, and Bogojno. Canadians had served in many of these regions during different phases of the UN and NATO intervention in the former Yugoslav Republic.

Several Canadian soldiers recalled a well-known incident that occurred on April 1998 in the central Bosnian town of Drvar. During the repatriation of Serb groups back to the now Croat-dominated town, the Croat residents of the area rebelled and ignited riots on the streets. The reactions of many Canadians were described as being “confused” and “fearful.” This apparently became more evident when many of the troops jumped back into their SFOR trucks in the hope that the problems would die down. Perhaps these reactions also reflected the fact that, at that time, Canadian land force doctrine did not include crowd or riot control. British troops arrived shortly after in armored vehicles and secured the area. Many Croats and a significant number of the repatriated Serbs said that, at the time, they were very happy to see the arrival of the British troops.

A number of Canadians interviewed concluded, fairly or otherwise, that, although it would have been in the ROEs to shoot, the political ramifications back home in Canada made them resist.²⁷ Other more senior onlookers also acknowledged that the ROEs were such that the troops could have fired, but that the response would not have reflected the Canadian approach to these incidents.²⁸ The recommendations of a more senior officer were to always threaten areas with future military presence as opposed to immediate robust reactions. As such, immediately following that incident, local authorities were instructed that any further incidents would result in an indefinite deployment of SFOR troops in the town. Apparently, since that statement was issued no further problems in the area were reported. However, feedback from the local residents indicated that the belated but robust intervention of the British soldiers had served to deter any further incidents.

Serbs in most areas did not warm to American ground troops due to several reasons. When diplomatic efforts reached an impasse during the UN deployment in 1993, the American support for the “lift and strike” option caused some degree of resentment. Moreover, in various press releases and official statements, visiting US officials rarely acknowledged the problems caused by the Muslim and Croat populations in Bosnia. This was particularly the case when the Serbs received strong condemnation by the US in the February 1994 mortar incident in the Sarajevo market despite the fact that incident reports analyzing

the projection and impact of the firing weakened the argument that the Serbs bore any responsibility.²⁹

Most military personnel living and serving in Bosnia were aware of the “heavy” approach used by the Americans when serving on the ground. In the context of the more recent American intervention in Kosovo, Lawrence Freedman offers the following observations on the American obsession with force protection.

As a US Army brigade moved into Kosovo as part of the force that intended to bring calm into the country after the war, its mission statement listed as its first priority ‘self-protection’ with the ‘peace-keeping tasks’ secondary. While the troops of US allies intermingled with the local population, US troops stayed in a guarded and well appointed compound, separated from the society that they were supposed to help calm.³⁰

In Bosnia, inquiries into the travel plans of American troops at checkpoint stops were often met with soldiers jumping out of heavily armed military vehicles in order to guard the delegated spokesperson while he or she dealt with the factional representatives. This top-heavy approach, particularly during the SFOR mandate that focused on peacebuilding and reconciliation, was viewed as unnecessary and only served to raise anxieties among the ill-informed, and aggravated others. As in Haiti, the troops never travelled in groups of less than eight people with a minimum of two armored personnel carriers.

Local residents believed that the Americans had little interest in speaking and interacting with them. They believed that the troops felt indifferent toward understanding the local situation and lacked the capacity to think laterally and beyond their own cultural beliefs. Following the August 1997 shooting of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary Simo Drljacha by British Special Forces,³¹ demonstrations were mounted in front of the SFOR Civil-Military Centre (CIMIC) in Prijedor which, at that time, was being manned by American officers. The CIMIC had been set up earlier that year to serve as an information centre for locals and a place where they could speak to ground troops about various SFOR programs and initiatives. After this incident, the Americans on duty at the CIMIC refused to speak to the locals or make efforts to defuse the situation, which generated even more hostility. Soon after the incident, they were replaced by a group of Czech officers.

Bosnian Muslims living in the Bihac region recalled an incident that further underscored the Americans’ reluctance toward understanding local dynamics. A number of American soldiers had been tasked with distributing IFOR newsletters (a peacebuilding tool used to improve communications and understanding) in the area of Bos Krupa. The newsletters were translated in slightly different dialects and emphasized slightly different issues, depending on whether the target audience was Serb, Muslim, or Croat. Both the interpreters and a sub-

stantial number of local residents realized that little care was being taken toward the distribution of the material. This indifferent and detached attitude, which was exhibited on many occasions, undermined ethnic sensitivities and did not help the Americans gain respect and credibility in a very ethnically mixed region.

Another incident in 1995 in the Bosnian town of Dobož also illustrates the same “top heavy” American approach that tainted the Bosnians’ view of the American forces during the peacekeeping and peacebuilding stages of that conflict. A group of Muslims had been given permission by Danish and British troops to cross a bridge to visit a cemetery (in the newly proclaimed “Serb” side of town) where relatives had been buried. Riots broke out and Serbs began chasing Muslims, throwing stones and physically beating them. As the British and Danish troops fired warning shots into the air, their efforts were overshadowed by the sudden appearance of American gunships, with blades tilted downwards in order to spray stones and objects into the air in an “overkill” effort to move back the crowd. Several Danish and British officers who witnessed the incident suggested that alternative, more graduated levels of force could have been used to prevent further threats and violence.³² Many of the local residents who were interviewed felt that the use of gunships had sent a very powerful message to the factional militant groups in terms of consolidating more resources and heavier equipment. Other individuals felt that the Americans were trying to use “scare tactics” to increase compliance in the area.

Due to the broad range of national troop contributors that served in Bosnia between 1995-99, the local populations identified several other national tendencies, which affected their perception of the international effort. The behavior of the Bangladeshi and Malaysian soldiers toward the Bosnian women and the significant time they spent in local bars and restaurants had affected IFOR’s reputation in both Sarajevo and Bihac. In the more southern area of Mostar, while the locals warmed to the Italian and Spanish troops, they worried about their ability to offer sufficient protection in the case where fighting re-ignited between the Croat and Muslim factions in the area. Residents in and around Sarajevo and Mount Igman felt very strongly toward the French Foreign Legion’s “over the top” approach to “spraying bullets in response to a tree branch breaking in the wind.”³³

The results proved that certain categories of military “professionalism,” perceived from the local perspective, were observed in Bosnia. On one end of the scale were troops described as “net users” as opposed to “net contributors” of security. These included the Malaysians, Jordanians, Bangladeshis, and Ukrainian troops. To a certain extent, the Russians were also grouped in this category, despite their potential to take strategic advantage of their historical alliance with the Serb factions. The national contingents described above were considered a liability to the multinational effort, particularly in many instances where impartiality, credibility, and professionalism were often compromised.

This suggests that differences in approaches to ROE and thus, effectiveness, are more the result of which forces the countries come from rather than a lack of common training. While common training programs would, without question, help bridge the gaps, the cultural ethos that shapes a national military's interpretation and leadership approaches toward a common doctrine and ROE are central to achieving a more unified response.

Grouped in the next category were troops like the Spanish, the Dutch and the Canadians. These groups were known to practice softer and less robust soldiering, which, to the locals, would not be effective during periods of heavy violence. In addition, the local perception was that these troops lacked the operational freedom necessary to offer adequate protection if tensions between the ethnic factions resurfaced. On a more socio-behavioral point, the locals generally felt that these troops kept a certain "distance" from the local groups and did not engage themselves in the local environment as much as they could have. Adjectives such as "withdrawn" and "detached" were used several times to describe the approach of these groups to patrolling. (However, it should be noted that recent discussions with personnel from the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)³⁴ suggested that the Canadian contribution in the "canton 10" region of central Bosnia has made notable progress in the past few years in terms of interfacing with the local community, coordinating with other civilian agencies, and assisting in the peacebuilding strategies. Admittedly, the threat in Bosnia has diminished and social and economic rebuilding in multiethnic areas is now the priority – perhaps a move away from the ambiguity inherent in volatile "Chapter VI 1/2" theatres has instilled the confidence required for the CF to have a more magnified presence.

The French and Czech forces generated fairly positive feedback on their military conduct and professionalism. Locals from all ethnic backgrounds felt safe in the company of Czech troops and applauded their way of handling tense situations. These observations were quite complementary to the Czech battalions considering the fact that they were still adjusting to Western military practices and were only just being folded into the NATO Alliance's integrated military structure.³⁵

The Americans were criticized for their "top heavy" approach, particularly during times when it was not necessary. They were also described as being insular and non-committal toward understanding and interacting at the local level. Generally speaking, local residents from all sides felt that the Americans should not be used in such sensitive environments where relationship building and positive encouragement were considered priorities. This has implications for a country whose technological superiority and projection of military power excels at the highest of diplomatic and operational levels. Perhaps there is significant merit in John Hillen's argument that "superpowers don't do windows," which recognizes that NATO best serves its many different security roles by

playing to the core competencies of its members³⁶ – which, for the United States, should perhaps not include Chapter VI peacekeeping in complex environments.

The response to the British presence was more encouraging. Local residents applauded their firm approach and impatience toward obstructionism. However, they also felt that the British troops demonstrated a firm commitment to understanding local circumstances in each community and made efforts to remain informed at all times. Individuals and groups seemed very aware of the help that the British troops provided to other forces and were cognizant of the leadership roles they assumed in different multinational situations. The one criticism that surfaced in Bosnia was the tendency for the British troops to refrain from concealing their weapons, or carrying them into public places during sensitive events aimed at rebuilding the social fabric of country, such as local elections and multiethnic council meetings, even during the post-Dayton phase when peacebuilding strategies were progressing quite well.

These disparities in national approaches have also been observed in multinational interventions elsewhere. The 1993 slaughter of 25 Somali civilians carried out by the Pakistani military contingent, in response to the shooting of two Pakistani soldiers, and the subsequent exoneration of those who orchestrated the slaughter, had significant ramifications.³⁷ Not only did it upset any hope for an interim peace agreement to be followed but also illustrated the differences between how these incidents are handled by national governments and, therefore, what does and does not serve as a deterrent for such actions.

Of recent interest has been the overwhelming support for British intervention in Sierra Leone and the criticism expressed toward the multinational UNAMSIL force led by a Nigerian General, who allegedly answered to Lagos rather than New York.³⁸ The strategy of the British troops to offer better protection for residents of Freetown, to take control of several northern paramilitary strongholds and to return refugees fleeing for Guinea, while incurring only one fatality, represented a remarkably positive turn of events in a country controlled by rebel forces.

There are obviously many other incidents that may be investigated to assess the collective impact of different national military approaches on a conflict population. However, such preliminary observations recognize that inconsistent and incongruent national interpretations of multinational military procedures, conduct, and leadership required to fulfil a mandate can have a negative impact on the overall effort. For example, the current “war on terrorism” will carry interesting implications for the recently debated Turkish-led UN peacekeeping force proposed by Algerian Ambassador Lakdar Brahimi to succeed the interim British-led force in Kabul.

Nor can different national contributors be heavily faulted for fine-tuning rules of engagement according to their own national law. Notwithstanding the fact that multinational forces often operate under the operational control of a

regional organization or the UN, donor nations will never be willing to have their forces governed (and held legally accountable) to a standard that is not in accordance with the donating country's domestic law.³⁹ But when it is known that national legal constraints and political pressure will disturb the multinational unity to the extent where it has a negative impact on the peace process, restrictions should be communicated and core competencies should be more clearly defined. Arguably, the reality of coalition warfare has already advanced to the point where national exceptions to the force ROEs are accommodated – however, it is questionable whether or not the UN's very political and ad hoc approach to organizing Chapter VI (and Chapter VI 1/2) peacekeeping forces is familiar with this template.

Implications for Interoperability and Multinational Training

Current multinational training programs neither address this gap in developing standard approaches and uniform interpretation, nor do they provide adequate resources to tackle the problem in the near future. The UN has recently been stripped of its “gratis programme” under the aegis of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) whereby an increasing number of military staff officers from the armies of the member states were assigned on loan, or “gratis,” to UNDPKO. While nearly one quarter of the department's 400-plus staff was in fact made up of national armed forces personnel, being “gratis” meant that they worked for the UN and not their home country. These “gratis” officers contributed invaluable to contingency planning and operational training prior to multinational deployments to areas such as Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.⁴⁰

Due to internal bureaucratic problems and discontent fuelled by the financial limitations imposed on the less industrialized nations to fund officers employed in New York City, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in September 1997 that called for an expeditious phasing out of all “gratis” personnel. This left UNDPKO's Training Unit with a staff complement that had been reduced from 27 to four. UNDPKO's Training Unit had previously used the input of the “gratis” officers to develop the curricula for all UN military training programs and to represent the department as course trainers. The diversity of backgrounds and military experience added value to the training programs and ensured that training was “multinational” in nature.

However, even with this program in place, most of the “gratis” officers came from NATO countries or US allies, which did not accurately represent national contributions in the most recent peacekeeping operations (i.e. Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nigeria). As a result, there was a tendency to duplicate NATO procedures and other templates that had been offered in the past by leading NATO contributors. The lack of proportional representation in peacekeeping training forums, compounded by the phased out “gratis” program, poses major challenges to multinational military training for future UN deployments.

At the moment, the very small staff complement in the UNDPKO Training Unit continues to run their bi-annual program called “Train the Trainers,” whereby those responsible for peacekeeping training at the national level gather in Turin, Italy for courses in Multinational Peacekeeping Training. They are then expected to return to their national training centres and incorporate the instruction and content into courses run at national training centres.

Discussions with many leading military nations indicated that only a limited number of member states sent designated “trainers” on these courses. Certain national representatives felt that their own training modules were more up-to-date and reflected current operational requirements for multinational interventions much better than the UN-sponsored course. Some commented that the research behind most of the UN course content was very outmoded and reflected the old Sinai-based peacekeeping principles that lacked a great deal of contemporary relevance.⁴¹ Others did not send any of their officers because it did not consider the training to be “half as advanced” as their own national training programs.⁴²

Another problem, and perhaps something that could be developed and facilitated much easier than an expanded training program, was a lack of quality control mechanisms in place to ensure that the national interpretation of UN ROEs and operating procedures was reunited under the multinational mandate once troops arrived in theatre. After the UN mandate and ROEs are agreed at the highest levels and further endorsed by the UN Security Council (UNSC), contributing nations send these UN templates back to their own national authorities for further analysis. The documents are sent to national legal experts who ensure that the UN’s legal interpretation of the mandate is compatible with the contributing nation’s own legal interpretation. In addition, the Ministry of Defence assesses the procedures and requirements according to its own national doctrine and codes of conduct to ensure compatibility at the military level. After any requested changes or modifications are dealt with, final directives are issued and operational planning for the multinational deployment begins.

Depending on whether time permits, pre-deployment training may take place at national training centres. However, the speed at which troops deploy, particularly during the first rotation into theatre, becomes critical and therefore minimizes the chances of providing training tailored to the specific mandate and geographic region. Therefore, the responsibility for ensuring uniformity of response ultimately falls into the hands of the UN Force Commander once all troops are deployed into theatre. Faced with a multitude of other more demanding responsibilities, such as holding meetings with political factions, negotiating peace agreements and liaising with Heads of State, the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, the Force Commander cannot be expected to monitor how different nations interpret the same mandate.

Concepts and doctrine that embrace the more contemporary principles of

peacekeeping are articulated in the NATO doctrine for peace support operations. The growing pre-eminence of this doctrine, and its influence in Europe and the US, is also encouraging a degree of apathy toward UN peacekeeping concepts and training. As the declared “custodian” for NATO doctrine for peace support operations, the UK has been hugely influential in shaping recent military training programs in all of the NATO and associate member states. It recognizes the complex evolution of peace support operations and how different contingencies affect the response requirements. The doctrine also acknowledges the vast number of civilian agents and the continuum along which transitional management and lead-agent responsibilities become exceptionally important.

There is now a significant divide between countries that subscribe to the NATO doctrine and those who remain loyal to the UN’s outdated approach. Defence analysts might argue that NATO’s lead on military training is more appropriate, considering its recent involvement as lead agency in peace support operations in the Balkans. Nonetheless, it is imperative that the international community decides which organization should take the lead in training future multinational forces and recognizes that softer, more traditional peacekeeping principles cannot be definitely separated from more robust postures.

A few recent initiatives have attempted to bridge the gulf between UN and NATO approaches toward the development of contemporary peacekeeping practices. NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADR-CC) at NATO Headquarters in Brussels is now reviewing the “Oslo Guidelines,” first drafted by the UN’s Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The guidelines advise UN and NATO members on how their assets can become immediately deployable to help respond to natural disasters within NATO’s area of operations. More recent discussions have advanced the debate to also include out-of-area “complex humanitarian emergencies” in light of NATO’s precedent-setting “non-article V” interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. This process has called for the inclusion of UN OCHA staff within the EADR-CC, which may drive a more prosperous and transparent relationship between the two organizations.

Other initiatives have arisen from ambitious recommendations published in the *Brahimi Report*, the most important of which include the development of meaningful criteria and techniques to identify and respond to conflicts in a more robust fashion; an increased role for regional organizations in peacekeeping; and greater coherence and coordination among security, trade, and development institutions in conflict prevention. However, these efforts are being stymied by the insistence of developing countries that equal organizational focus and resources be directed towards development issues, such as the elimination of poverty and HIV/AIDS.⁴³ The Office of the UN Secretary-General has acknowledged these concerns and, as a result, has requested that priority be placed on developing strategies for conflict prevention, something that each side of the

debate regards as a half-way house between sustainable development and conflict intervention.⁴⁴ The change of focus has also posed difficulties in generating consensus among member states to endorse further job appointments in the DPKO necessary for the full implementation of many of Brahimi's recommendations.

National Solutions

The results of the research hardly seem encouraging in the wake of increased calls for better multinational interoperability. From a Canadian perspective, phrases such as "achieving close strategic partnerships" and "interoperability with Canada's principal ally" feature significantly in the Canadian Chief of Defence's *Strategy 2020* paper, as well as in the most current literature on Canada's strategic defence priorities. These statements were not only in reference to the United States, but also to "other like-minded states" with which the Canadian forces would find themselves deployed in the future.⁴⁵ This type of interoperable co-operation requires clearly defined, commonly accepted and attainable objectives, all of which should create the conditions to achieve a unity of effort in theatre.

This is particularly the case when peace support operations and humanitarian missions still remain high on Canada's agenda and reflect a closer cooperation with other government departments, such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in keeping with "joined-up" government.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on the mammoth subject of inter-operability with the United States – a relationship which former Canadian Defence Minister Art Eggleton described as the "closest defence relationship in the world"⁴⁶ – it is important to delineate between levels of interoperability and what Canada should be moving to achieve. The technological advancements and defence trade and partnering at the strategic level must be complemented with the correct training and knowledge-sharing at the operational and tactical levels. What good is the most advanced shared weapons system if it is not operated in harmony and cohesion with like-minded allies? The same argument holds true for the need to unite a headquarters vision with the same vision of the soldiers representing that headquarters on the ground. If multinational interoperability is to be achieved and progressed, it must be taken right down to the unit level. The coalition and allied warfare of the future will see armored infantry companies of one nation serving under the battalion leadership of another. Such was already the case when the Canadian infantry provided a reconnaissance support company under the British battalion and brigade commands in 1998 in Kosovo.⁴⁷ Building the weapons defence and intelligence systems to deter attacks such as 11 September 2001 is only one part of multinational interoperability – post-attack overseas deployments, ceasefire monitoring, ground force operations and post-conflict peacebuilding are also essential ele-

ments of the broader equation. This extends the more parochial view of interoperability and builds it into a broader, more strategic context. Such a vision may make it possible for Canada to achieve its five-year target objective of “managing our interoperability relationship with the US and other allies to permit seamless operational integration at short notice.”⁴⁸

But is it in fact Chapter VI peacekeeping to which the Canadian forces will aspire in the future? Evidence from their recent intervention in Afghanistan suggests otherwise. While carrying out combat operations and conducting joint training with the Americans in Kandahar, there is still no interim peace in Afghanistan, implying that the Canadians are in fact operating in a war zone characterized by the legalities embedded in Chapter VII of the UN Charter which underwrites “peace enforcement.” This raises the question of whether or not the Canadian forces, through interoperability, are implicitly taking themselves away from, peacekeeping (even the more “robust” kind), toward peace enforcement. Given the limitations on Canadian military resources, as well as the need to be selective about future operations, does mean that Canada will not be able to do both. The fact that Canada placed itself under the operational control of the American forces and not the British-led peacekeeping force, could open up arguments that make this debate even more complex – the fact that there now may be a NATO way of doing things, a UN way of doing things, and a new Canada-US approach to peace support.

Whatever the case may be it is important to remember that Canada prides itself on being an advanced liberal democracy with a quality of life that is second to none. Much of this profile derives itself from a responsible government that is committed to policy based on populous vote. It is perfectly acceptable that the Canadian government wishes to be selective about its future involvement in other peoples’ wars – in fact, the government should be able to decide whatever it wants for its armed forces because it reflects the choice of the Canadian people. However, for the tasks that are given to the Canadian Forces, it is essential to give them the tools that they need – this includes public opinion and political resolve.

As for training and doctrine, a focus on national leadership and policy may be the best step forward. Both doctrine and training are important functions of ethical military leadership and, where troops serve in multinational theatres of operations, commanders must realize that different national interpretations can result in disparities within an agreed series of legal responses and procedures. As such, the following recommendations are proposed to improve Canada’s position as an interoperable land force partner in future peace support operations:

- National Defence Headquarters should undertake research that explores the “positioning” of different national troop contributors in terms of manpower, fighting power, capability, and deployability, along with the cultural mindset and public and political support each nation brings to a

theatre. Such a study could further identify nations in broader categories, perhaps labelled as “front line,” “second line” or “support line” peace interventionists. As each country finds its position and establishes the goals it must pursue to achieve multinational interoperability with its allies, benchmarking the successful approaches and conduct of “like” countries may help them to reach their objectives and, more importantly, improve unity of effort in difficult and challenging circumstances.

- Multinational land force training must also underscore the fact that the different interpretation of ROEs by one national military contingent can seriously undermine the progress achieved by another. “Lessons learned” and “after-action reports” must be carefully monitored and fed back into the national and multinational training curricula, supported by explanations of why other multinational partners handled an incident in a particular way and the short to medium term impact of such disparities. This is currently covered at the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, but with more emphasis on warfighting rather than in peace support operations.
- The seven-day course held at the Canadian Forces Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario should include an element of “partner culture” within the current module on cross-cultural awareness. This part of the course focuses mainly on the cultural norms in the peace support theatres into which the delegates are about to be deployed, as well as including some basic language training. Combining some background knowledge on the other national military forces with which the Canadians would be serving would be an added benefit.
- Canada should continue its active participation and current level of commitment within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework at NATO. The Canadian Forces play a significant role in many of the exercises that fall under the Partnership Work Programme (PWP), a “menu” from which NATO partners can choose to pursue goals and objectives that increase their chances for full accession to the alliance. As Canada continues to play a peace support role in Afghanistan, benefits will accrue from PfP experience with countries like Uzbekistan and being familiar with its doctrine and equipment.
- Modules offered to Canadian and foreign civilian and military representatives at the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre should include lectures on the disparities of ROE interpretation and behavioral conduct and the impact these disparities can have, not only on the peace process, but also the ongoing development programs. The Pearson Centre could provide a forum for rich dialogue between these partners, particularly as it attracts delegates from both UN and

NATO countries. Parallel efforts should be made to publish the results of these syndicate discussions, presentations, or group assignments in order to build on the debate in a much broader and more representative way.

- Theatre war games and tactical exercises integrated into staff college modules should consider the implications of joining certain national military partners serving under the same multinational flag (although, quite understandably, theatre wargaming exercises are geared more toward warfighting rather than peacekeeping). The conclusion drawn by the research in this article suggesting that UN member states remain divided between subscribing to the “NATO” as opposed to the “UNDP-KO” approach to doctrine and training, should be conveyed to both junior and senior staff courses. Efforts should also be made to inform Canadian military representatives serving in foreign delegations and on the international military staffs of inter-governmental organizations, such as NATO, UN, the European Union and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, of the division between UN and NATO approaches and the impact this has on conflict communities.
- The Canadian government should review the relationships between the National Defence Headquarters, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and CIDA in terms of “joint” policy and planning functions. In today’s peace support operations, the wide spectrum of activities in which ground forces find themselves engaged requires the close cooperation and transparency between those responsible for diplomacy, defence, and sustainable development. This closer interface will be required for planning at the strategic and operational levels.
- The National Defence Headquarters should consider developing a Combined and Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre dedicated to the continuous development of Canadian Defence Doctrine, including doctrine for peace support operations. This should be viewed as a dynamic process which remains in line with national interests and in keeping with a “joined up” government policy on defending Canadian interests abroad.
- Lastly, in terms of civilian education, university modules that teach undergraduate and postgraduate students about the principles of contemporary peacekeeping should discuss the need for multinational forces to combine a “human face” and a commitment to the local dynamics, with a robust military posture. This requires a sound understanding of not only the cultural environment and the wider spectrum of activities ranging from peace enforcement to post-conflict peacebuilding, but also effective transitional management approaches necessary to support these changes. Emotional wounds take a long time to heal and

fractious and divided communities can easily regress if they perceive that the international civil and military communities cannot guarantee their basic safety and security needs for stability. Much of the Canadian literature on peacekeeping principles has been based on the founding principles upheld by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre⁴⁹ – principles that are much less “absolute” in contemporary “Chapter VI^{1/2}” conflict zones.

CONCLUSION

This article has examined the realities and uncertainties of current conflict landscapes and the challenges posed to military interventionist forces deployed to these areas. It has also emphasized that, despite claims of a changing future strategic threat, that most interventions will almost always include the deployment of ground forces, either before, during, or after an actual targeted attack. For this reason, it is essential that future policies on multinational and bilateral interoperability consider the more operational and tactical requirements that are essential for improving cohesion and unity of effort on the ground.

Empirical research undertaken in Bosnia and Haiti underlined the significance of the local populations in these areas and how international military forces must view these groups as the main stakeholders of conflicts and the only key to a sustainable peace. If, through inconsistent behavior and disparate approaches of multinational troops, the local groups re-evaluate their allegiance to the international effort, they may easily fall vulnerable once again to the forces that ignited the conflict in the first place. Once this happens, the prospect of a sustainable peace becomes more uncertain and the task of the interventionists becomes increasingly difficult.

Calls for increased efforts for Canada to achieve multinational interoperability with her allies has resulted in a plethora of documentation on the subject, primarily with regards to fostering the country’s defence relationship with the United States. However, while much of the literature stresses the importance of trade partnerships, the shared defence industrial base, and advanced weapons systems, complementarity at the tactical and operational levels must also be included in the interoperability equation. These objectives will only be met through more “multinational” training, inter-agency coordination, and joint doctrine development, as well as enhanced clarity between Canada’s political masters and the soldiers on the ground.

Endnotes

1. For more information on the concept of “Second Generation Peacekeeping,” which looks at the less absolute nature of concepts like impartiality and consent, see John Mackinlay, “Improving Multinational Forces,” *Survival* 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp.149-73; and John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, eds., *A Draft Concept of Second Generational Multinational Operations* (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1993).
2. See *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: United Nations, 1994), p. 19
3. *Ibid.*, p. 22
4. Michael Evans, “Eyes in Sky will back unarmed peace terms,” *Times* (London), 14 October 1998, p. 13.
5. See the *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*, Article 45 (New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information, Reprint DPI/511-93243, 1994), p. 25.
6. See H.J. Rubin and I.S. Rubin, *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data* (London: Sage, 1995).
7. The number of people interviewed in Haiti and Bosnia were as follows: Port-au-Prince – 146, Cap Haitien – 62, Sarajevo and Mount Igman area – 131, Gornji Vakuf – 68, Mostar – 62, Coralicci – 28, Prijedor, Koserace and Banja Luka (Republika Srpska) – 97, Drvar, Jajce and Livno – 102. (Please note that these figures reflect members of the indigenous populations only and do not account for the significant number of interviews with international civilian and military representatives that complemented this work).
8. Throughout the study, the reliability figure of 77 percent was maintained.
9. The validation questionnaire used a semantic differential scale to summarize feedback.
10. The demise of French domination in Haiti left the French slave owners and their black concubines to produce a new class, “the mulattos,” also known as the *gens de couleur* or *affranchis*. This new class’s social status rested between those of whites and blacks. In spite of the institutional discrimination against them, many mulattos became wealthy land owners, establishing a viable class unto themselves.
11. For an excellent overview of the Duvalier legacy, see Elizabeth Abbott, *Haiti: the Duvaliers and their Legacy* (London: Robert Hale, 1988).
12. President Aristide led the *Lafanmi Lavalas* political party. In Creole, the word *Lavalas* means “avalanche,” which reflected the approach Aristide promised to clean up the mess that prevented the “seeds” of development from growing in the country’s “gardens.” Integral to this strategy was Aristide’s promise to prosecute the criminals of the past and rid Haiti of any remaining *ton ton macoutes*.
13. Ironically, the leaders of the coup were the same officers Aristide had promoted in hopes of reforming the military.
14. Under the Governor’s Island Agreement, President Aristide would be immediately reinstated, appoint a new commander in chief of the armed forces, and engage in political dialogue with the OAS and the UN. The dialogue would pave the way to creating political and social conditions to ensure a peaceful transition that would enable the Haitian Parliament to resume its normal functioning as quickly as possible. Other provisions dealt with issues of amnesty, the creation of a new police force, and international cooperation. Lastly, the agreement specifically requested the presence of United Nations personnel in Haiti to assist in modernizing the armed forces and establishing the new police force.
15. UNSCR 867.
16. It should be noted that although the Serbian Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milosevic, contested that Serb minorities were under threat due to Croatian secessionist aspirations, federal mili-

tary reinforcements sent to the region by the government were responsible for many of the Muslim and Croat atrocities.

17. Ian Traynor, "Muslims seek UN protection," *Guardian* (Manchester, UK), 28 March 1992, p. 13.
18. Michael Evans, "NATO jets take on a reconnaissance role over Bosnia," *Times* (London), 16 April 1993, p. 1; and "UN and NATO plan joint attack role in Bosnia," *Times* (London), 7 August 1993, p. 1.
19. See Christopher Bellamy, "NATO takes step into the unknown," *Times* (London), 21 December 1995, p.8.
20. For an excellent overview of the Dayton Peace Accords, see Warren Bass, "The Triage of Dayton," in *Foreign Affairs* 77, no 5 (Sept/Oct 1998), pp. 95-109.
21. Multinational Division Southwest (MND SW) was moved in 1997 from Gornji Vakuf in Central Bosnia (in the Croat-Muslim Federation) to Banja Luka in the Bosanska Krajina area (in the Republika Srpska). The others two commands, MND North and MND Southeast, are located in Tuzla and Mostar respectively.
22. Interview with Mr. Ti Don Moore, 9 May 1996.
23. Chris Bellamy, "Knights in White Armour," paper presented at Defence-Development-Disaster: Security Imperatives in the new Millenium, a NATO-sponsored conference at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 7-8 November 1996.
24. Based on discussions with Canadian military officials at the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, 7 May 1996.
25. Ibid.
26. This number excludes input from the humanitarian and UNSMIIH representatives interviewed and represents a local opinion only.
27. Based on discussions with soldiers and officers of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) stationed in Bihac, Bosnia and interviews with other Canadian staff officers at MND SW, Banja Luka, Republika Srpska.
28. Based on discussions with Lt. Col. Douglas MacLean, 2RCR, Canadian battlegroup, SFOR, Corralici, Bihac, Bosnia, 10 May 1999,
29. For an interesting account of this incident, see General Sir Michael Rose, *Fighting for Peace* (London: 1998).
30. Jeffrey Record, "Force Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences and Solutions," *Aerospace Power Journal* (Summer 2000), p. 5, taken from Lawrence Freedman, "The Third World War," *Survival* 43, no. 4 (Winter 2001-2002), p. 72.
31. Simo Drljacha was shot dead at a lake just outside of Prijedor, Republika Srpska.
32. Some Danish officers remarked on their use of "non-lethal weapons" during this incident.
33. Based on discussions with Muslim groups living on the slope of Mount Igman, November 1996.
34. Based on discussions with UNHCR and OHR representatives, Sarajevo, 26 February 2002.
35. The Czech Republic joined the "Partnership for Peace" program in January 1994, and officially became a full member of NATO at the Washington Summit on 24 April 1999.
36. Bill Nash vs John Hillen, "Can soldiers be peacekeepers and warriors?" *NATO Review* 49 (Summer 2001), p. 17.
37. Based on discussions with Major-General J. Iqbal, Military Representative to the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, New York, 5 September 1999.
38. Based on discussions with Brigadier Jon Riley, British Force Commander in Sierra Leone, November 2000-May 2001.

39. The Canadian Forces Staff College uses an excellent exercise that reinforces a clear understanding of how ROEs are developed for multinational forces. Lawyers are assigned to advise syndicate groups (acting as a Joint Staff) writing a set of ROE that must be approved by a Joint Chief of Defence. (One example might be the restrictions on military engineers whose country has not yet signed up to the terms of the Ottawa Treaty.)
40. Robert L. McClure and Morton Orlov II, "Is the UN Peacekeeping Role in Eclipse?" *Parameters* XXIX, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 99
41. The expression "Sinai-based" refers to peacekeeping principles characteristic of one of the UN's first peacekeeping operations, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), that deployed to the Sinai in 1956 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Israeli and Egyptian forces. It is appropriate to mention here that the initial UNEF (UNEF 1) was under Canadian command and applied the traditional principles of peacekeeping that assumed a zone of separation between the warring factions, consent for the force to occupy a position in the disputed territory, the non-use of force, and the requirement for the troops to remain impartial. More recent circumstances have demonstrated that these conditions, and therefore the principles that apply to them, are no longer characteristic of contemporary peace support operations.
42. These statements were taken by the author in a series of meetings with national military advisors in New York between 4 and 6 September 1999.
43. Based on discussions with Christopher Coleman, Adviser to the Deputy Under-Secretary-General, DPKO, and with Omar Bakhiet, Emergency Response Division, UNDP, New York, 16 May 2001.
44. Based on discussions with Jehangir Khan, Adviser, UN Department of Political Affairs, 17 May 2001.
45. See *Strategy 2020* on the Chief of Defence Staff's documentation and presentations, found at: <http://www.vcds.forces.ca.cds/strategy/2k/>, 2 February 2002.
46. "Speaking notes for the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of National Defence to the Toronto Board of Trade," D-Net Newsroom, found at: <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/speeches/2001/dec01/14dec01trade.htm>
47. Based on discussions with Brigadier Nick Smith, Commander, 4th Armoured Division, British Army, Osnabruck, Germany, 1 February 2002.
48. *Strategy 2020*, p. 4
49. The Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training Centre gains its name from a former Prime Minister whose contribution to the first formalized UN peacekeeping policy was invaluable. While there is still much utility in the three basic principles (consent, non-use of force and impartiality) underlining Pearson's original idea of UN Peacekeeping, these tenets are much less absolute and the conflict theatres in which they are applied are much more complex. The Pearson Centre has modelled its ideas on a "New Peacekeeping Partnership" paradigm that includes the media, the police, the military, NGOs and election monitors. The author would contend that this model is more relevant to post-conflict peacebuilding and has limited utility in volatile theatres where contemporary peacekeeping still involves robust soldiering.