

The Lair and Layers of al-Aqsa Uprising Terror: Some Preliminary Empirical Findings*

by
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INTRODUCTION

It is commonplace among analysts of the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict to note that the al-Aqsa Intifada represents perhaps the most profound and lasting period of psychological threat and dismay for Israelis and Palestinians since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. Seen from the vantage of counter-terrorism, the al-Aqsa Intifada puts singular focus on the strains and tensions associated with what some describe as the “delicate balance” between counter-terrorism policy and democracy.¹ The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast forms of terrorism in the al-Aqsa Intifada with Middle East terrorism that has come before, by means of a framework of terrorism I developed in previous work. Why is empirical study of al-Aqsa Intifada terror considered important? At a substantive level, the al-Aqsa Intifada, with its array of non-state actors, such as the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, that are in fierce competition with Israel and with each other, not only showcases the importance of non-state actors in the contemporary world, but illuminates what the rudiments of this conflict are all about.² At a more functional level, the bloodletting in this second round of Palestinian efforts to “shake off” Israeli control has been more copious than that of the first Intifada (1987-93), and that makes empirical investigation imperative.³

In this study, “al-Aqsa Intifada terrorism” encompasses terrorist assaults conducted by both Palestinian terrorist groups and Israeli settlers, and “lone assailants” on each side that was kindled by the “activating event” of Minister of Knesset (MK) Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount or Haram al-Sharif, as it is also known, on 28 September 2000.⁴ At the same time, what Azim Bishara calls the “October events” by Israeli-Arabs, committed within the context of the fledgling Intifada, are also included in the data base.⁵ The time frame of this study spans the 17-month period from the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada on 28 September 2000 to the end of February 2002, which marks the tail end to an

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important phase of the conflict. OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, an enormous Israeli counter-terrorism offensive into areas under the aegis of the PNA, began a month later on 29 March 2002.⁶ Analysis of nearly the first year and a half of the uprising makes it possible to discern patterns among a host of terrorist assault “attributes,” including target-type and location, and to determine the nature of terrorist groups active from the start, in contrast to the type of terrorist groups that have become more active with the passage of time. For the most part, those data findings will be presented within the context of theoretical conceptualizations and prior research findings on terrorist assaults conducted by Middle East terrorist groups and non-group actors.⁷

The implications of those findings are profound and lasting, and at times dramatic. One finding that is diametrically opposite to the common wisdom of this fierce struggle is that the single largest cluster of terrorist assaults that is attributable belongs to Israeli-Jewish settler terrorism and not to Palestinian terrorism. Hence, a fundamental matter from a public policy point of view really boils down to an appraisal of the relative anonymity of what is presumably a significant portion of Palestinian terrorism. It is equally important to acknowledge the scope and depth of Jewish settler-type violence in a political atmosphere in the Occupied Territories that is relatively permissive in terms of brandishing weapons, using other acts of intimidation, and the threat and use of force. The framework for discussion involves: the theoretical framework and operational definition of terrorism used; analysis of some general empirical contours of al-Aqsa Intifada terrorism according to target selection; types of terrorist groups predominant in early and latter time periods; and political/security ramifications.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

One of the underlying themes of this work is that terrorist group chieftains or tacticians are rational decision-makers. As Jorge Nef tells us, rationality can be demonstrated “. . . if by rational we assume an instrumental relationship between ends and means.”⁸ In other words, it is assumed that rationality holds for terrorist group chieftains and tacticians as it does for their counterparts, governmental leaders.⁹ In my previous work, eight terrorist group-types are crafted to capture different dynamics of terrorist groups active over the political landscape. Those group-types are differentiated from one another according to three defining characteristics that include ideology, leadership, and recruitment patterns.¹⁰ In the broader sense, those group-types include “theocentric” groups that embrace Islamic revivalism; “ethnocentric” groups that are nationalist-irredentist in nature; “ideo-ethnocentric” groups that are nationalist-irredentist groups with Marxist-Leninist trappings; and Jewish theocentric groups that embrace Jewish revivalism.

Since empirical observation suggests that charismatic leaders recruit from reservoirs of persons who share an almost singular vision of that leader’s per-

ception of fierce struggle, the four terrorist group-types are further delineated into those that are led by charismatic leaders and those that are not. For example, the category “theocentric” is broken down into “theocentric” and “theocentric charismatic,” the category “ideo-ethnocentric,” is split into two categories “ideo-ethnocentric” and “ideo-ethnocentric charismatic” and so on. This classification scheme presupposes and derives from studies of several terrorist groups that include, but are not limited to, Dr. George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Naif Hawatamah’s Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Rabbi Meir Kahane’s Kach, and Benjamin Kahane’s “Kahane Chai” organizations, as well as from authoritative works on “charismatic authority” and Middle East terrorism.¹¹

In the case of the al-Aqsa Intifada, terrorist groups that fall into six of those eight categories are active in the political fray. Those groups include theocentric terrorist, theocentric charismatic terrorist, ethnocentric, ideo-ethnocentric, Jewish theocentric terrorist, and Jewish theocentric charismatic terrorist, or “proto-groups.”¹² In addition, I have fashioned other classification categories, such as “anonymous” terrorist assaults, “uncompleted” terrorist assaults, and “multiple-claimant” terrorist assaults.

In my earlier work, I develop a continuum of Middle East terrorist group-types in which purely “structuralist” terrorist groups fall at the left axis, and purely “non-structuralist” terrorist groups fall at the right axis.¹³ In the case of “structuralist” terrorist groups, the underlying struggle is conceived of as a struggle against what Immanuel Wallerstein would call “world systems,” such as capitalism and imperialism.¹⁴ Alternately, in the case of “non-structuralist” terrorist groups, the struggle is viewed as being waged against persons who inhabit land that is not their “legitimate possession.” In between, in the center range of that continuum lie “hybrid” Middle East terrorist group-types that embrace aspects of a “world systems” struggle approach and simultaneously the view, within the context of fierce struggle, that the enemy consists of persons who do not rightfully own the land under consideration.¹⁵ In the case of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the theoretical conceptualization about “structuralist” and “non-structuralist” terrorist groups revolves around targeting “attributes” of terrorist assaults committed by terrorist groups that fall within the six group types under consideration.¹⁶

One cornerstone of that conceptualization, that draws from Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most’s work, is that charismatic leaders of Arab groups with a political ideology like the Marxist-Leninism of the PFLP will orient the group under their control to conduct targeting in ways similar to that of their Islamic counterparts “. . . because of a *cultural* ‘positive spatial diffusion’ of social and religious ideology that would shape the modus operandi of non-majority (e.g., Christian) terrorist groups to resemble the modus operandi of majority Arab/Islamic terrorist groups.”¹⁷ At the same time, terrorist groups with charismatic leaders that embrace the “prevailing social ideology” of Islam tend to amplify generally recognizable sentiments, such as, for example, identifying the

Israelis as groups or persons who inhabit Palestine in an illegitimate fashion.¹⁸ Hence, the expected result for ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups like Habash's PFLP is a strong emphasis on civilian targets to protest unjust occupation as a function of the influence of Habash's charismatic leadership on a terrorist group with Marxist-Leninist trappings.

At the same time, theocentric groups conceived of as a "hybrid" of "structuralist" and "non-structuralist" elements should also have notable focus on civilian targets and emphasis on government targets. In turn, ethnocentric groups, that are "non-structuralist" in nature, should have very strong emphasis on civilian targets as a result of the ethos of national-irredentist groups (i.e., ethnocentric types) that view the struggle as fierce competition between persons or groups. Theocentric charismatic terrorist groups as a function of the foregoing "amplification" dynamics, ought to place a premium on terrorist assaults on civilian targets that is sharper than theocentric group emphasis. The case of Jewish theocentric terrorist assaults ought to illuminate a different set of dynamics insofar as Jewish terrorist groups that operate predominately in "friendly" areas, such as the Occupied Territories and Israel, should assault civilian and government targets representative of the opposition to their political agenda, but with less intensity than their Arab/Islamic counterparts because they function, as Hoffman puts it, as "pressure groups" in Israeli society.¹⁹

The operational definition of "political terrorism" that is used in this study presupposes and derives from the "laws of war" of international law and is the same definition used in my previous work.

the threat, practice or promotion of force for political objectives by organizations or a person(s) whose actions are designed to influence the political attitudes or policy dispositions of a third party, provided that the threat, practice or promotion of force is directed against (1) non-combatants (2) military personnel in non-combatant, or peace-keeping roles; (3) combatants, if the aforementioned violates juridical principles of proportionality, military necessity, and discrimination; or (4) regimes which have not committed egregious violations of the human rights regime that approach Nuremberg category crimes. Moreover, the act itself elicits a set of images that serve to denigrate the target population while strengthening the individual or group simultaneously.²⁰

DATA COLLECTION

The data base for this study was put together primarily from two sources: the *Jerusalem Post* and the "Settler Violence and Occupation Watch" accounts published by *The Alternative Information Center (AIC)*.²¹ While both sources are robust, it is probably no exaggeration to say that certain terrorist assaults, such as so-called "mega-terror" events as described by Major General Aharon Ze'evi

(Farkash), are not chronicled in the *Jerusalem Post* because of national security concerns, and that because of the sheer number of terrorist assaults, certain minor terrorist assaults may not be given sufficient treatment.²² Clearly, that is one of the shortcomings of a database crafted from publicly available sources. Notwithstanding that, the omission of certain terrorist assaults probably would not change unduly the results, especially with the high number of more pedestrian terrorist assaults for which there is no plausible reason to conceal information. In turn, while the data from the AIC is comprehensive, two terrorist assaults by non-settlers are included in that data base as anonymous acts.²³ In the case of *Jerusalem Post* entries, newspaper accounts were extracted from daily issues from 28 September 2000 through February 2002. As previously mentioned, that 17-month period is chosen for empirical study because it covers a pivotal first phase of the al-Aqsa Intifada that was able to generate and sustain psychological trauma and abject fear among Israelis, and showcased the unprecedented PFLP terrorist assassination of Israeli M.K. Rehavam Ze'evi on 17 October 2001.²⁴

Precisely because this is a study of insurgent or oppositional terrorism, it follows that counter-terrorism assaults are excluded from the analysis. This includes counter-terrorist assaults that might be construed as examples of either state terrorism carried out by Israeli government forces, or "proto-state terrorism" practiced by the fledgling Palestinian National Authority (PNA). I made efforts to follow up on "unclaimed" or unidentifiable terrorist assaults with the goal of tracing an arc from them to summary accounts of events that followed for attribution purposes whenever possible.²⁵ In the case of a relatively small number of al-Aqsa Intifada terrorist attacks chronicled in *The New York Times*, I tried to find matching accounts in the *Jerusalem Post*, and in the case of Jewish revivalist extremist group actions, matching accounts in the "Settler Violence and Occupation Watch" entries produced by the AIC when possible.

That data set is comprehensive with 1,617 terrorist incidents listed for the first 17-months of the al-Aqsa Intifada. However, it ought to be clear from the start that it does not claim to represent every terrorist assault that happened during the time period under consideration. As previously mentioned, many terrorist events have been omitted because of the large number of unclaimed and uncompleted incidents, presumably some of which remain unreported in the *Jerusalem Post*, in part because of national security concerns or because of selective bias due to the comparatively high frequency rate of terrorism events during that time period. Terrorist assaults may also have been omitted because of human error (e.g., double counting, wrongful inclusion of "terrorism events," missing bits of information).²⁶ At a functional level, the foregoing definition of terrorism has been used as a guidepost for each chronicled account of a violent event under consideration to determine if that event ought to be included or excluded from the database. In some instances, assaults described in scripted articles as generally recognizable common criminal activity met the criteria, while in some cases, so-called "terrorist events" were excluded from the database.²⁷

CODING SCHEME

As in my prior work, the basic structure of the coding scheme for terrorist target-type selection revolves around “civilian,” “government,” and “infrastructure” targets.²⁸ In the case of “civilian” targets, some examples include, but are not limited to, schools, commuter bus stations, discothèques, theaters, kibbutzim, moshavim, Israeli settlements, commuter buses, and marketplaces. In turn, “government” targets include, but are not limited to, Israeli Border Police facilities and/or personnel, political actors, such as Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Ze’evi, heads of state, European Union (EU) officials, military personnel on inactive status, and police officials.²⁹ The category “infrastructure” refers to such targets as bridges, oil refineries, oil tankers, radio stations, television stations, energy facilities, and highways.

Plainly, the basic target constructs of this scheme make it possible to put together combinations to reflect primary and secondary targets or “compound” targets with various aspects of target-types associated with them.³⁰ In the case where roadside bombs were placed on roads used by civilians, contextual analysis was used to include acts in the database even though the intended target could not be determined in a conclusive manner. At a functional level, contextual analysis is also important in cases where certain assaults were thwarted at some level. Those terrorist assaults may still be coded as completed incidents in some cases, for example when perpetrators who were traveling were discovered, leading to premature detonation of their bombs.³¹ With respect to location, East Jerusalem is coded as a part of the Occupied Territories rather than Israel.

ANALYSIS: RELATIVE FREQUENCIES BY GROUP-TYPE, GROUP, AND LOCATION

A breakdown of al-Aqsa Intifada terrorist events by group category reveals that the highest number of terrorist attacks recorded were anonymous; 843 out of 1,615 acts (52.2 percent of the total) were unclaimed by any individual or group. The second largest amount of terrorism and the largest amount *that is attributable* was carried out by Jewish theocentric “proto-groups,” such as groups of Israeli settlers with 435 out of 1,615 acts or 26.9 percent. Terrorist assaults committed by ethnocentric groups rank third with 92 acts or 5.7 percent, while theocentric groups rank fourth with 75 acts or 4.6 percent.


While 4.4 percent of assaults were uncompleted, “lone assailant” comprised 3.5 percent (56 of 1,615). Terrorist attacks with “multiple claimants,” by contrast, were very infrequent: only seven, or .4 percent of the total.³² Those trends with a high percentage of unclaimed terrorist assaults and a very low percentage of “multiple claimant” terrorist assaults are familiar from previous work.³³ A further breakdown of “multiple claimant” acts informs us that three acts were claimed by an ethnocentric and a theocentric group, while two theocentric terrorist groups claimed two acts. Two multiple claimant terrorist

assaults or .1 percent involved an ethnocentric and ideo-ethnocentric charismatic group (see Figure 1). The high rates of anonymous terrorist assaults and very low rates of “multiple claimant” acts are consistent with findings in my prior work.³⁴

Figure 1: Relative Frequency of al-Aqsa Terrorist Assaults by Group Type, 28 September 2000-February 2002

category of group

N	Valid	1615
	Missing	2



category of group

When the analysis is broken down according to identifiable terrorist groups, Hamas, otherwise known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, and al-Fatah, are found to be most prolific among Arab or Islamic groups. Hamas claimed 3.2 percent (52/1,615), while 2.2 percent (35/1,605 acts) were claimed by al-Fatah (see Figure 2). However, a newer terrorist “splinter” or “offshoot” group from al-Fatah ranks third overall. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, that Yael Shahar tells us first made its appearance in late September 2000, committed 1.6 percent of all terrorist attacks, while it and the Awda Martyrs Brigade, which is

a Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) offshoot group, together committed 1.7 percent of the total.³⁵ Attacks perpetrated by Islamic Jihad follow with 1.3 percent (21), while 1.1 percent (17/1,615) is attributable to the PFLP. What seems significant here is that the largest clusters of terrorist assaults revolve around anonymous actors, and more loosely organized “proto-groups” of Israeli settlers, which together, accounted for nearly 80 percent of all

Figure 2: Relative Frequency of al-Aqsa Terrorist Assaults by Terrorist Group, 28 September 2000-February 2002

name of group		N	Valid	Missing	1605	12
			Fre-	Percent	Valid	Cumulative
			quency		Percent	Percent
Valid	Jewish settlers	432	26.7	26.9	26.9	
	Uncompleted	71	4.4	4.4	31.3	
	Unclaimed	843	52.1	52.5	83.9	
	Lone Assailant	56	3.5	3.5	87.4	
	Hezbollah	11	.7	.7	88.0	
	Hamas	52	3.2	3.2	91.3	
	Islamic Jihad	21	1.3	1.3	92.6	
	Fatah	35	2.2	2.2	94.8	
	PFLP	17	1.1	1.1	95.8	
	DFLP	2	.1	.1	96.0	
	Kach	5	.3	.3	96.3	
	Committee for Road Safety	1	.1	.1	96.3	
	Zo Artzenu	1	.1	.1	96.4	
	Mult. Fatah/Islamic Jihad	2	.1	.1	96.5	
	Tanzim	16	1.0	1.0	97.5	
	al-Aqsa Brigades	26	1.6	1.6	99.1	
	Mult.al-Asqa/Awda Martyrs	1	.1	.1	99.2	
	Mult. Hama/Islamic Jihad	2	.1	.1	99.3	
	Mult. Fatah/Hamas	1	.1	.1	99.4	
	PNA	3	.2	.2	99.6	
	Shalhevet Pass Underground	1	.1	.1	99.6	
	Gilad-Shalhevet Brigade	1	.1	.1	99.7	
	Jordanian Islamic Resistance	1	.1	.1	99.8	
	Movement for Holy War	1	.1	.1	99.8	
	Palestinian Resistance Committee	1	.1	.1	99.8	
	Fatah/PFLP	1	.1	.1	99.9	
	Muslim Brotherhood	1	.1	.1	99.9	
	Jord. Islamic Resistanc	1	.1	.1	100	
	Move/Grp/Ahmed Daqamsah	1	.1	.1		
	Total	1605	99.3	100.0		
Missing	System	12	.7			
Total		1617	100.0			

incidents. At the other extreme, there are more shadowy terrorist groups that carried out one terrorist assault (.1 percent) each. These include the Jordanian Islamic Resistance Movement for Holy War, the Palestinian Resistance Committee, which as Arieh O'Sullivan tells us "includes members of Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad," and the Islamic Action Party that is a military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁶

I performed an analysis that seeks to isolate and identify terrorist groups active from the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada in order to chronicle terrorist groups that became active only with the passage of time and to help illuminate terrorist offshoot and splintering dynamics. Accordingly, I tagged identifiable attacks between 28 September and through November 2000. This analysis, which excludes uncompleted assaults, suggests that Hamas (four acts), al-Fatah (three acts), Islamic Jihad (two acts), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (one act), the "Tanzim" (one act), and Hezbollah (one act) were predominant. Other incidents, assaults included one threat by the Muslim Scholars of the Islamic Action Front Party, and a "multiple claimant" attack in Amman, Jordan claimed by the Jordanian Islamic Resistance Movement and the Army of the Holy Warriors Ahmed Daqamsah.³⁷ What seems significant here is that ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups, such as the PFLP and DFLP, and DFLP offshoots like the al-Awda Martyrs Brigades, were relative latecomers to the military fray.³⁸ It was only in February 2002 that an identifiable assault was claimed by al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and the al-Awda Martyr Brigade. Those findings are consistent with the central idea that terrorist groups on the margins of fierce struggle may produce offshoot groups that are a better fit with the immediate context of conflict, insofar as DFLP and PFLP are more closely associated with the Palestinian Diaspora in places like Syria rather than in the Occupied Territories.³⁹ Those findings are also consistent with the central idea that terrorist groups on the margins may need to elicit cooperation from groups, such as al-Fatah, that are inextricably bound up with the struggle, and that desire to cooperate may presuppose and derive from a need to share the arena of politics and a need for increased visibility.⁴⁰

In the case of Jewish revivalist terrorism conducted by more tightly interwoven terrorist groups, Kach, which is a time-honored terrorist group even though it was officially banned by the Israeli government in 1994, carried out only five acts, a mere .3 percent. Likewise, the Committee on Road Safety, that is a "Kach spin-off organization" carried out only one attack. Zo-Artzenu, which is a Kach-Kahane Chai-related political group established in 1993 and known to straddle the fence between legal and extralegal activity, also committed only one terrorist assault. The Gilad-Shalhevet (Pass) Brigade, that probably coalesced after the attacks that killed Shalhevet Tehiva Pass and Gilad Zar in March and May 2001 respectively, carried out only two acts.⁴¹ Those sparse findings for more established groups resonate with the central notion of "leaderless resistance" associated with both Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian Marxist-Leninist ter-

rorist chieftain who was killed in 1969, and Louis Beam of the American Ku Klux Klan organization. Under this strategy, looser, more informal ties among persons permit terrorist attacks to unfold in effective and sustained ways, while helping to make counter-terrorist actions against perpetrators more difficult.⁴²

For Jewish revivalist terrorism, analysis of the data reveal that Jewish settler “proto-group” terrorist assaults dominate the political landscape from 28 September through November 2000. It is only in January of 2001 that identifiable Jewish theocentric charismatic and Jewish theocentric terrorist groups, such as Kach and Kach affiliates like the Committee on Road Safety and in time the Shalhevet Pass Underground (Brigade), begin to make their formal appearance. While the splintering and offshoot dynamics of some of the foregoing groups are murky, it seems plausible to suggest that what at first was an environment comprised of more loosely organized Jewish settler “proto-groups” continuously evolved as the al-Aqsa Intifada and its pressures grew apace, thereby in effect helping to craft a landscape where Jewish settler “proto-groups” and more formally articulated terrorist groups work side by side.⁴³

With respect to location, analysis of the data informs us that a full 88.8 percent (1,403/1,580) of the terrorist assaults happened in the Occupied Territories, while only 10.3 percent (162/1,580) took place in Israel.⁴⁴ In the broader sense, the total amount of al-Aqsa Intifada terrorism that happened inside the Occupied Territories and Israel amount to 1,565/1,580 acts (99.1 percent). With respect to other locales, only seven acts occurred in Lebanon, while four events took place in Jordan. In the case of Jewish revivalist terror, a separate test reveals that 99.3 percent of Jewish theocentric group or “proto-group” terrorist attacks (431/434) happened in the Occupied Territories, while only .7 percent (three acts) happened in Israel. By contrast, 83.3 percent of Jewish theocentric charismatic terrorist assaults (five out of six acts) took place in the Occupied Territories, while one incident happened in the United States. No Jewish theocentric charismatic terrorist assaults happened in Israel.⁴⁵

ANALYSIS: TERRORIST ACT ATTRIBUTES: FATALITIES, INJURIES, PROPERTY DAMAGE, TARGET PREFERENCE

One of the single most predominant themes that flow through the extant literature is that terrorism does not rely on enormous amounts of physical devastation for its power but rather on its psychological import to thrive in effective and sustained ways. Analysis of al-Aqsa Intifada terrorism with respect to “event deaths” and “event injuries” is supportive of that underlying theme. While estimates of the number of dead in the al-Aqsa Intifada fluctuate to a considerable extent, in the case of event deaths, I found that only 120 out of 1,602 acts (7.5 percent) during the 17 months under consideration resulted in the deaths of between one and 50 persons. Conversely, a full 92.5 percent of terrorist assaults (1,482/1,602 acts) did not cause any deaths. A total of 238 deaths was reported

for the 28 September 2000 through February 2002 time period.⁴⁶ That figure is much lower than the reported 800 deaths claimed by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the reported 500 death figure issued by the Palestinian Rights Monitoring Group in September 2001.⁴⁷ This figure may be low because it excludes deaths associated with counter-terror offensives.

In a similar vein, a breakdown of attacks by injury rates also provides strong support for the aforementioned theme.⁴⁸ A total of 2,395 injuries was reported for the period. The mean for terrorist event injury is 1.57 with a standard deviation of 8.90. A full 68.6 percent of all incidents (1,046/1,524) were injury-free events. In turn, 30.8 percent (470 acts) caused injuries to between one and 50 persons, while five assaults (.3 percent) caused injuries to between 51 and 100 persons. In addition, there are three more extreme outlier cases that lie over 14 standard deviations from the mean.⁴⁹ In one event, 130 persons were wounded, another resulted in 150 persons hurt, while in the third, 160 persons were injured. One notable finding is that all of the outlier cases happened in Israel, rather than in the Occupied Territories.⁵⁰

Analysis of property damage arising from these attacks also reveals patterns consistent with the central idea that terrorism does not rely on an enormous capacity to cause physical devastation. I found that over one-third of all events (38.8 percent or 358/922) did not result in any discernable property damage. A full 55.7 percent (514/922) caused “slight” damage (defined as less than or about \$US 15,000). Moderate damage (defined as from about \$US 30,000 to \$US 100,000) occurred 5.4 percent of the time (50/922 cases). None of the recorded attacks yielded “high” or “severe” property damage (in the \$100,000 to \$1 million + range).⁵¹ In turn, analysis of target type frequencies reveals that a full 92.0 percent of all attacks (1,454/1,581) were directed at civilian targets, while only 7.8 percent of all attacks (123 out of 1,581) were directed against government targets. Assaults against infrastructure were extremely rare; only four acts were recorded.

The most statistically significant findings in this category are those concerning civilian targets. The extremely heavy emphasis on civilian targets is a marked departure from the pattern of Israeli-Palestinian-Arab terrorism between 1994 through 1999.⁵² In that period, civilians accounted for 77.7 percent of targets. Writers such as Rashid Khalidi suggest that emphasis on civilian target assaults seems to be a proactive strategy by the Palestinian resistance leadership, which aims to pursue, by what amounts to “propaganda by deed,” political goals that have been elusive under the Oslo frameworks.⁵³ It may also reflect the emergence of a full-blown war between Israelis and Palestinians that is discussed below.

The foregoing results make it possible to articulate some of the parameters of al-Aqsa Intifada terrorism. First, when the data for this period are broken

down according to group category, the largest number and percentage of al-Aqsa terrorist assaults were carried out by anonymous terrorist groups or non-group actors, followed by loosely organized Jewish theocentric terrorist “proto-groups,” ethnocentric groups, theocentric groups, uncompleted acts, and “lone assailants.”

With respect to identifiable al-Aqsa terrorist group or “proto-group” attacks, Jewish theocentric “proto-groups” rank first, followed by Hamas and al-Fatah, with a virtual tie between the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Islamic Jihad. The major roles played by al-Fatah affiliated groups, such as al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and other “Tanzim,” complicates the ranking process. Seen from a different angle, al-Fatah, coupled with al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and so-called “Tanzim” comprise a full 4.8 percent that would promote an al-Fatah aggregate measure into second place. Furthermore, it is likely that the bulk of anonymous terrorist assaults were carried out by al-Fatah or al-Fatah affiliated groups, in addition to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Indeed, Ruth Beitler tells us that cooperation and coordination between al-Fatah and Hamas is often managed in effective and sustained ways.⁵⁴

With respect to location, what seems significant here is that the 8.6:1 ratio in favor of attacks in the Occupied Territories in this time period is far greater than the nearly 1:1 ratio for the 1994-99 period, when Israel experienced 33.7 percent of Israeli-Palestinian-Arab terrorist attacks and the Territories experienced 30.8 percent.⁵⁵

In the broader sense, the data reveal that al-Aqsa terrorism caused relatively low amounts of physical devastation as measured by numbers of deaths, numbers of injuries, and property damage when compared to other forms of ethnic conflict or to full blown war.⁵⁶ While devastation rates remain comparatively low, the outlier cases with respect to injuries all occurred within Israel rather than within the Occupied Territories. While those findings support the importance of location as an explanatory variable to help account for differences in terrorist attack “attributes,” there is no definitive interpretation as to why location patterns have shifted during this period, as compared to Israeli-Palestinian-Arab terrorism for the 1994-99 time frame.⁵⁷ Notwithstanding that, one interpretation consistent with this data is that the large proportion of attacks in the Occupied Territories mirrors the experiences that Beitler highlights, namely that the relatively non-violent actions of the First Intifada, largely relegated to the Occupied Territories, were simply not effective in terms of capacity to generate and sustain meaningful political concessions from the Israelis.⁵⁸ Plainly, the emergent reality that the First Intifada began to pass into eclipse within the context of international events, namely the Persian Gulf War, might have compelled even those with almost singular focus on “liberation” of the Occupied Territories, as opposed to the full blown “territorial maximalism” of the extremists, to take the fight beyond the “Green Line” into Israel.⁵⁹ This does not explain the shift back

to the almost exclusive concentration of attacks in the Territories during the 2000-02 period under study.

ANALYSIS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND TARGET TYPE

This portion of my analysis uses two hypotheses to examine the relationship between political ideology of terrorist groups, and their target choices. The first hypothesis captures the notion that nationalist-irredentist groups with Marxist-Leninist trappings led by a charismatic leader (i.e., ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups) should focus special attention on civilian targets because, as explained earlier, charismatic leaders of terrorist groups with a political ideology that is different from “the prevailing social ideology of Islam,” will amplify generally recognizable propositions that focus on Israelis as persons who occupy Palestine.⁶⁰ Hypothesis Two is based on the notion that theocentric terrorist groups as “hybrid” types will attack civilian targets with less intensity than ethnocentric terrorist groups.⁶¹

Hypothesis One: Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic terrorist groups will attack civilian targets more often than theocentric terrorist groups.

Hypothesis Two: Ethnocentric terrorist groups will attack civilian targets more often than theocentric terrorist groups.

A cross-tabulations test suggests that a substantive and significant relationship exists between the variables “target type” and “category of group.”⁶² The data distribution informs us that theocentric charismatic groups have the highest rate of terrorist attacks directed against civilian targets: a full 100.0 percent or 11/11 acts. Jewish theocentric attacks rank second with 98.2 percent of attacks (425/433) while theocentric terrorist group attacks involved civilian targets 97.3 percent of the time (73/75). Ethnocentric civilian target attacks rank fourth with 94.4 percent (85/90), and uncompleted terrorist attacks rank fifth; they focused on civilian targets 93.9 percent of the time (46/49 instances). “Lone assailant” assaults place sixth (92.7 percent or 51/55 attacks). At the other extreme, ideo-ethnocentric charismatic attacks have the lowest rate of all: only 78.9 percent (15/19 acts). Plainly, this finding for ideo-ethnocentric charismatic terrorist assaults is unexpected. In turn, Jewish theocentric charismatic groups have the second lowest rate of civilian target attacks (83.3 percent or five out of six events). All but one “multiple claimant” incident were directed against civilian targets. At the same time, it should be noted that the civilian target range under consideration is very small, and most of the foregoing group-types show an overwhelming preference for civilian targets (See Table 1). Therefore, the findings disprove both hypotheses.

Insofar as leading authorities, such as Khalidi, have pointed to the urban warfare context of the al-Aqsa Intifada that pushes beyond military targets to focus on civilian targets in the cities, those findings, while at odds with the

Table 1: Relative Frequency of al-Aqsa Terrorist Tar-Type by Group-Type, 28 September 2000-February 2002

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
type of target* category of group	1579	97.6%	38	2.4%	1617	100.0%

type of target * category of group Crosstabulation

			% within category of group
Type of target	Civilian	Theocentric charismatic	100.0%
		Jewish theocentric charismatic	83.3%
		Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic	78.9%
		Jewish throcentric	98.2%
		Uncompleted acts	93.9%
		Unclaimed acts	88.1%
		Theocentric	97.3%
		Ethnocentric	94.4%
		Lone Assailant	92.7%
		Mult. Ethno/Theo	100.0%
		Mult. Ethno/Ethno	100.0%
		Mult. Theo/Theo	50.0%
Mult. Ethno/Ideo-char	100.0%		

expected results, are consistent with what urban warfare is all about.⁶³ In his work, P.N. Grabosky tells us of the advantages of target availability in an urban context, where civilian targets as well as government targets abound and are found in close proximity to one another.⁶⁴

ANALYSIS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND NUMBERS OF DEAD

The following hypothesis derives from earlier work of mine, which suggests that more “non-structuralist” Middle East terrorist groups, such as ethnocentric groups that view their struggle as opposition to groups of persons, rather than against what Wallerstein would call a “world system” like capitalism, place a special emphasis on civilian targets in terrorist attacks.⁶⁵ If this hypothesis is correct, then the percentage of ethnocentric terrorist attacks that killed between one and 50 persons ought to be relatively high when compared to other types of terrorist groups under consideration.

Hypothesis Three: Ethnocentric terrorist groups will have a higher percentage of terrorist acts that cause deaths than terrorist acts committed by theocentric terrorist groups.

The statistical testing reveals that a systematic and substantive relationship exists between the variables “political ideology” and “numbers of deaths.”⁶⁶ The data distribution shows that ethnocentric groups have the highest percentage rate of terrorist assaults that killed between one and 50 persons (39.6 percent or 36 out of 91 acts) and that rate represents a little over one-third of all ethnocentric attacks. Theocentric terrorist groups rank second (21/74) (28.4 percent), while theocentric charismatic terrorist ones come third (2/11) (18.2 percent) of all theocentric charismatic attacks. Jewish theocentric charismatic groups follow closely with 16.7 percent (1/6), while 15.8 percent (3/19) ideo-ethnocentric charismatic assaults killed between one and 50 persons. At the other extreme, Jewish theocentric groups have the lowest rate of attacks (2.8 percent or 12/433 acts), while anonymous actors have the second lowest rate (3.7 percent or 31/843).

One set of findings concerns “multiple claimant” assaults, where 57.1 percent (4/7) killed between one and 50 persons. This was shown in two out of the three attacks (66.7 percent) claimed by both an ethnocentric and a theocentric group. One out of two assaults claimed by an ethnocentric and an ideo-ethnocentric charismatic group, and one out of two claimed by two theocentric groups also killed between one and 50 persons. Hence, three of those four “multiple claimant” assaults were claimed by terrorist groups across group-types, while one of them was claimed by terrorist groups within the same terrorist group-type.⁶⁷ So, the data findings support Hypothesis Three and it is accepted as valid.

ANALYSIS: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND SUB-LOCALE

At a functional level, analysts of the al-Aqsa Intifada sometimes depict that fierce struggle as urban-based warfare, that has pushed over and beyond generally recognizable strikes and protests in the Palestinian urban centers that were a hallmark of the First Intifada.⁶⁸ For example, Khalidi, who is critical of Palestinian attacks against civilian targets in the Israeli “metropole,” tells us, “that their effort [should] be directed . . . from *ever* carrying out attacks against *anywhere* in the metropole . . . indeed many of the attacks since September 2000 have lost the Palestinian cause potential friends and swelled the ranks of its enemies.”⁶⁹ At the same time, Remma Hammami and Salim Tamari suggest that a central theme of the continuously evolving environment of the al-Aqsa Intifada revolves around attacks against Israeli settlements.⁷⁰ The following hypothesis captures the notion that cities and towns, and Israeli settlements are the primary loci of terrorist assaults:

Hypothesis Four: al-Aqsa Intifada terrorist assaults will happen in cities or towns most frequently and there will be very strong emphasis by terrorists against Israeli settlements.

A cross-tabulations tables analysis suggests that a strong correlation exists between the variables “political ideology” and “sub-locale.”⁷¹ The data distribution informs us that 44.2 percent of the incidents under study (498/1,126) are directed at targets en-route, such as automobile drivers. Terrorist assaults against cities or towns have the second highest rate of attack (33.0 percent or 372/1,126). Assaults against Israeli settlements rank third at 21.2 percent (239/1,126 acts), while attacks against kibbutzim or moshavim have the lowest rate of attacks: only 1.5 percent or a mere 17 out of 1,126. In the broader sense, Hypothesis Four must be rejected since the expected findings that cities or towns will be the most common venue for attacks and the that attacks against Israeli settlements will play a predominant role in terrorist assault strategy are not supported by the results.

The data distribution also reveals the predominant position of anonymous terrorist assaults in the political fray. In the case of all en-route attacks, unclaimed acts have the highest rate (69.5 percent or 346/498). Jewish theocentric attacks place a very distant second with 19.7 percent (98/498), followed by ethnocentric groups with 6.2 percent (31/498). For “lone assailants,” the rate is 2.2 percent (11 attacks). In the narrower sense, which types of groups seem to favor most attacks against moving targets? The findings reveal that 53 percent of all Jewish theocentric acts, (98/185) were directed against such targets. Ethnocentric groups accounted for 48.4 percent (31/64) while unclaimed acts represent a nearly identical rate: 46.8 percent (346/740). (See Table 2).

In the case of all city or town attacks, unclaimed acts account for the highest percentage (46.5 percent or 173/372), followed by Jewish theocentric attacks (22.8 percent or 85/372). Theocentric terrorist assaults rank third at 8.1 percent (30/372), while ethnocentric attacks came fourth at 6.7 percent (25/372). “Lone assailant” attacks were infrequent: only 15 attacks (four percent), but of the seven “multiple claimant” acts chronicled here, five happened in a city or town.⁷² Among all ideo-ethnocentric charismatic attacks, a full 83.3 percent (10/12) happened in cities or towns, followed by 80.0 percent (4/5 acts) for all Jewish theocentric charismatic attacks. In turn, 71.4 percent (30/42) of all theocentric incidents occurred at these locales, while 50 percent (3/6) of all theocentric charismatic attacks occurred in cities or towns, and for all “lone assailants” attacks, 48.4 percent (15/31 acts) were carried out in cities or towns.

In the case of all attacks against Israeli settlements, unclaimed incidents rank first at 87.9 percent (210/239). In other words, almost 90 percent of attacks against Israeli settlements remain unclaimed or unattributable. However, one out of seven “multiple claimant” terrorist assaults involved an Israeli settlement.⁷³ The findings suggest that theocentric charismatic groups favor attacks against Israeli settlements the most out of all types of terrorist groups with 50.0 percent (3/6 acts). In turn, unclaimed acts rank second with 28.4 percent (210/740 acts), and uncompleted acts came third with 26.5 percent or nine out of 34. Ideo-eth-

**Table 2: Relative Frequency of al-Aqsa Terrorist Assaults:
Category of Group X Sub-Locale, 28 September 2000-February 2002**

category of group * sub locale Crosstabulation

category of group		sub locale				
		cities/ towns	kibbutz/ moshav	settle- ments	en-route	Total
Theocentric charismatic	Count	3		3		6
	% within category of group	50.0%		50.0%		100.0%
	% within sub locale	.8%		1.3%		.5%
	% of Total	.3%		.3%		.5%
Jewish theocentric charismatic	Count	4			1	5
	% within category of group	80.0%			20%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	1.1%			.2%	.4%
	% of Total	.4%			.1%	.4%
Ideo- ethnocentric charismatic	Count	10		2		12
	% within category of group	83.3%		16.7%		100.0%
	% within sub locale	2.7%		.8%		1.1%
	% of Total	.9%		.2%		1.1%
Jewish theocentric	Count	85		2	98	185
	% within category of group	45.9%		1.1%	53.0%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	22.8%		.8%	19.7%	16.4%
	% of Total	7.5%		.2%	8.7%	16.4%
Uncompleted acts	Count	22	1	9	2	34
	% within category of group	64.7%	2.9%	26.5%	5.9%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	5.9%	5.9%	3.8%	.4%	3.0%
	% of Total	2.0%	.1%	.8%	.2%	3.0%
Unclaimed acts	Count	173	11	210	346	740
	% within category of group	23.4%	1.5%	28.4%	46.8%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	46.5%	64.7%	87.9%	69.5%	65.7%
	% of Total	15.4%	1.0%	18.7%	30.7%	65.7%
Theocentric	Count	30	2	2	8	12
	% within category of group	71.4%	4.8%	4.8%	19.0%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	8.1%	11.8%	.8%	1.6%	3.7%
	% of Total	2.7%	.2%	.2%	.7%	3.7%
Ethnocentric	Count	25	1	7	31	64
	% within category of group	39.1%	1.6%	10.9%	48.4%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	6.7%	5.9%	2.9%	6.2%	5.7%
	% of Total	2.2%	.1%	.6%	2.8%	5.7%

**Table 2: Relative Frequency of al-Aqsa Terrorist Assaults:
Category of Group X Sub-Locale, 28 September 2000-February 2002
(continued)**

category of group * sub locale Crosstabulation

category of group		sub locale				
		cities/ towns	kibbutz/ moshav	settle- ments	en-route	Total
Lone Assailant	Count	15	2	3	11	31
	% within category of group	48.4%	6.5%	9.7%	35.5%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	4.0%	11.8%	1.3%	2.2%	2.8%
	% of Total	1.3%	.2%	.3%	1.0%	2.8%
Mult. Ethno/ Theo	Count	2			1	3
	% within category of group	66.7%			33.3%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	.5%			.2%	.3%
	% of Total	.2%			.1%	.3%
Mult. Theo/ Theo	Count	1		1		2
	% within category of group	50.0%		50.0%		100.0%
	% within sub locale	.3%		.4%		.2%
	% of Total	.1%		.1%		.2%
Mult. Ethno/ Ideo-char	Count	2				2
	% within category of group	100.0%				100.0%
	% within sub locale	.5%				.2%
	% of Total	.2%				.2%
Total	Count	372	17	239	498	1126
	% within category of group	33.0%	1.5%	21.2%	44.2%	100.0%
	% within sub locale	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	33.0%	1.5%	21.2%	44.2%	100.0%

nocentric charismatic groups follow with 16.7 percent of all attacks (2/12), while ethnocentric groups with 10.9 percent (7/64) follow in turn. At the other extreme, for all theocentric group attacks settlements were the target of choice only 4.8 percent of the time (2/42 acts).

In the cases of all kibbutzim or moshavim attacks, unclaimed acts (64.7 percent or 11/17 acts) have the highest percentage, followed by theocentric groups and “lone assailants,” each with rates of 11.8 percent (2/17 acts). Likewise, there is a tie for third place ranking between ethnocentric group attacks and uncompleted terrorist actions at 5.9 percent (1/17 acts) each. Among category types, “lone assailants” favor kibbutzim or moshavim attacks the most with 6.5 percent (2/31 acts), followed by theocentric groups with 4.8 percent (2/42

acts), and uncompleted acts with 2.9 percent (1/34 acts). There are no identified theocentric charismatic or ideo-ethnocentric charismatic group attacks against kibbutzim or moshavim for this time period, nor are there any “multiple claimant” terrorist assaults. What seems significant here is that the rate of unclaimed terrorist assaults diminishes with movement away from rural settings, such as kibbutzim or moshavim and settlements toward urban locales.

In conclusion, Jewish theocentric charismatic groups prefer cities or towns as venues for terrorist attacks, while Jewish theocentric groups seem more evenly split in terms of venue preference between targets on the road and targets in cities and towns. Among identifiable Arab nationalist or Islamic terrorist group-types or both, ideo-ethnocentric charismatic terrorist groups most prefer terrorist assaults in cities or towns, while ethnocentric terrorist groups favor terrorist attacks against moving targets on the road, but nonetheless conduct over one-third of actions against targets in cities or towns.⁷⁴ In turn, when comparisons are made across terrorist group-types, theocentric charismatic terrorist groups are found to favor attacks against Israeli settlements the most. Theocentric terrorist groups are found to favor attacks against kibbutzim and moshavim the most when terrorist group-types are compared.

What seems significant here is that theocentric terrorist groups appear to find some utility with respect to targeting Israeli settlements, kibbutzim or moshavim, that are perhaps the most rural of all sub-locales. Conversely, there were no ideo-ethnocentric charismatic terrorist assaults against kibbutzim and moshavim between September 2000 through February 2002, and only two out of 12 acts were directed against Israeli settlements. For ethnocentric groups, over one-third of their attacks occurred in cities or towns and nearly half were directed against moving targets on roads. Those findings suggest that among some Islamic and/or Arab terrorist group-types, or even between some Arab nationalist-irredentist and Islamic terrorist group-types, there are apparent differences in conception about the utility of the urban setting as the primary venue of conflict. Hence, broad brush depictions of al-Aqsa Intifada fighting as urban in nature may mask more subtle differences in terrorist leader targeting behavior, perhaps based on terrorist group ideology-type, that are important for counter-terrorist assault analysts to consider.

FINAL REFLECTIONS

Plainly, one of the single most predominant set of findings for the Intifada in this period revolves around the central role that civilian targets play in an overwhelming majority of al-Aqsa terrorist assaults. As previously mentioned, 92.0 percent of the attacks involved civilian targets. Jewish theocentric terrorists focused on civilian targets 98.2 percent of the time, while Jewish theocentric charismatic groups, such as Kach directed attacks against civilian targets 83.3 percent of the time.

In essence, that extreme emphasis on civilian targets marks a departure from earlier target selection trends in Israeli-Palestinian-Arab terrorism that showcase preferences for civilian targets, but at a ratio of 3.5:1, by contrast to the over 12:1 ratio in favor of civilian targets found in this work. There is no definitive interpretation as to why that rate of civilian target assaults has grown apace, but findings for Palestinian terrorist groups and non-group actors are consistent with the central notion that attacks against civilian targets in urban areas and on roadways comprise a proactive strategy on the part of terrorist leaders.⁷⁵ It is possible that this stratagem contributed to the resurrection of the idea of building a defensive wall through areas of the West Bank, a notion that can be traced back to the Rabin era through the concept of “separation.”

One important set of findings reveals that different types of Arab or Muslim terrorist groups may favor one type of locale over another as settings for terrorist assaults. Claims of responsibility seem to matter most for assaults in urban settings. In the case of Jewish revivalist terrorism, which all too frequently revolves around destruction of Arab property, such as olive groves and homes, the evidence suggests that, contrary to the common wisdom prevalent in some circles that Jewish terrorism is in large part a reaction to terrorism, the bulk of Jewish terrorism is proactive, not reactive in nature.⁷⁶ Two-thirds of all Jewish theocentric charismatic group terrorist attacks were independent acts, while only one-third occurred in reaction to terrorist assaults. For all Jewish theocentric groups or “proto-group” attacks, a full 86.4 percent (375/434 acts) were independent events, with only 9.9 percent done in reaction to terrorism.⁷⁷

When analysis is performed to isolate and identify the types of terrorist groups found at earlier and later states of the period under consideration, what seems significant is that in the case of Palestinian terrorist groups, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, al-Fatah, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the “Tanzim” dominated the landscape from the start, and that the PFLP, DFLP, and their affiliates entered the military fray only with the passage of time. In the case of Jewish revivalist terrorism, the data suggest that Jewish settler “proto-groups” predominated from the start, but that attributable terrorist assaults carried out by more formally articulated Jewish revivalist terrorist groups, such as Kach and the Shalhevet Pass underground, grew apace over time.

The data distribution reveals that observed results for terrorist group-type target selection rates are not consistent with expected observations associated with the Middle East terrorist group-type continuum. Theocentric charismatic terrorist groups rank highest for civilian target terrorist assaults with 100.0 percent (11/11 acts), and those results place that group-type at the “non-structuralist” axis rather than toward the middle of the continuum where “hybrid” types ought to be found. Theocentric groups are also found toward the “non-structuralist” axis of the continuum with a civilian target rate of 97.3 percent (73/75 acts). For ethnocentric groups, the expected result is a position close to or at the

“non-structuralist” axis, but the observed findings place ethnocentric groups to the left of theocentric groups with a civilian target rate of 94.4 percent or 85/90 acts (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Continuum of “Structuralist” and “Nonstructuralist” al-Aqsa Intifada Terrorist Group-Types and Target (Jewish Fundamentalist Terrorist Group-Types Excluded)

	“Hybrid” types			
“Structuralist”			“Nonstructuralist”	Expected Observations
Ideo-ethnocentric	Theocentric		Ethnocentric	
“Structuralist”	“Nonstructuralist”			Observations
	Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic	Ethnocentric	Theocentric	Theocentric charismatic
Civilian targets	78.9% (15/19)	94.4% (85/90)	97.3% (73/75)	100.0% (11.11)
Government targets	21.1% (4/19)	5.6% (5/90)	2.7% (2/75)	0.0% (0/0)

It is probably no exaggeration to say that results for terrorist group-type and target selection would be more meaningful if there was significant variation in target type selection between civilian targets and government targets by group-type. Seen from a slightly different vantage, what is clear is that the range with respect to civilian target terrorist assaults across group-types is, for the most part, very small. In the broader sense, while efforts to position al-Aqsa Intifada terrorist group-types along the continuum remains problematic, some of the observed findings do conform to expected observations. For example, the expected finding that theocentric charismatic terrorist groups place a premium on civilian target terrorist assaults, because of their “hybrid” nature and charismatic leadership, is supported by the findings. Likewise, the expected finding that ethnocentric groups would place strong emphasis on civilian targets is also supported by the results. While theocentric groups seem to place more emphasis on civilian targets and less on government targets than anticipated, the general position of placement on the continuum near but not at the “non-structuralist” axis, is generally consistent with the notion of theocentric groups as “hybrid types,” and the notion that the “militarized nature” of the al-Aqsa Intifada, as Hammami and Tamari put it, or the context of the al-Aqsa Intifada, may have altered or amplified aspects of target selection practices.⁷⁸

It follows that if the context of full-blown resistance may alter or skew terrorist target preference, then one way of thinking about why civilian terrorist targets are in such sharp focus revolves around the relative decline in effectiveness of governmental control at specific geographical locales and in specific time frames, and the abject fear that is generated and sustained in a most effective fashion by means of civilian targetting. It may be significant that the preference for civilian targets by Palestinian terrorist groups and non-group actors mirrors findings for Algerian terrorism between 1994 through 1999 where 84.2 percent of terrorist attacks were directed at civilian targets and only 10.6 percent involved government targets.⁷⁹ Even though the al-Aqsa Intifada is not “a civil war” as Michael Dunn has described the conflict in Algeria, the underlying dynamics of target selection that are inextricably bound up with what resembles a full blown war deserves the increased devotion of scholars.⁸⁰ In essence, the study of terrorism within the al-Aqsa Intifada becomes increasingly important not only because of what is illuminated about terrorist targeting in this round of Israeli-Palestinian-Arab violence, but because such empirical work helps to shed light on the dynamics of contemporary wars of resistance in urban settings, a topic under consideration in a most carefully reasoned way in the wake of the occupation of Iraq by military forces from the United States and Great Britain.

Endnotes

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1. For example, see Jerrel A. Rosati, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy Second Edition* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Group/Thomson Learning, 1999), p. 87; Eric Lichtblau, “Senate Deal Kills Effort to Extend Antiterrorism Act,” *The New York Times*, 9 May 2003, pp. A-1, A-17.
2. Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 601-02, 677, 742, 240; Ruth Margolies Beitler, “The Path to Mass Rebellion: A Tale of Two Intifadas” (unpublished manuscript, 2002), p. 2.
3. Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p. 677; Beitler, “Path to Mass Rebellion,” pp. 208, 221; Kristen E. Schultze, “Camp David and the *al-Aqsa Intifada*: An Assessment of the State of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, July-December 2000,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24 (2001), p. 220; James Ron, “The Second Palestinian Uprising: Cause for Optimism?” *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 1 (March 2001), p. 73; Remma Hammami and Salim Tamari, “The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?” *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXX, no. 118 (Winter 2001), pp. 5, 17, 118.
4. Albert J. Reiss and Jeffrey A. Roth, *Understanding and Preventing Violence* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993); Schultze, “Camp David,” pp. 215, 220, 225. For Schultze, Palestinian terrorist assaults against civilian targets in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo were “signaling a new phase in the uprising,” but my data suggest that terrorist assaults against civilian targets in Gilo happened as early as 5 October 2000. Margot Dudkevitch, “Closure clamped

- on territories: PA releases Hamas prisoners," *Jerusalem Post*, 6 October 2000, pp. 1, 12. Seen from a Palestinian vantage, several authors suggest the sources and origins of al-Aqsa Intifada revolve around profound and lasting Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza; Israeli settlements and bypass roads growing apace; full blown Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Oslo Accords with respect to the matters of Jerusalem, Haram al-Sharif, and "the right of return" for Palestinians; vacuous Israeli promises and continuously evolving interpretations about accord implementation; the subsequent need for Arafat to find what Schultze calls "an exit strategy," and what both Schultze and Rashid I. Khalidi suggest is the need to make change with respect to the common wisdom of Arafat's culpability at Camp David in 2000. Rashid I. Khalidi, "Essay: Toward A Clear Palestinian Strategy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXXI, no. 124 (Summer 2002), p. 9; Schultze, "Camp David"; Ron, "Second Palestinian Uprising"; Hammami and Tamari, "Second Uprising," pp. 6-13, 19-21. Beitler touches on some of those points as well as others and cites Khalil Shikaki's assertion that the struggle also reflects generational cleavages in Palestinian society. Beitler, "Path to Mass Rebellion," pp. 210-12, 218-19, 227, 229, 230-31, 245.
5. Azim Bishara, "Reflections on October 2000: A Landmark in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXX, no. 119 (Spring 2001), pp. 54, 62. There are scripted accounts in the *Jerusalem Post* that refer to Israeli-Arab-Israeli strains and tensions directly, such as when in early October persons from the Israeli-Arab village of Umm el-Fahm engaged in stone-throwing against Israelis automobiles on the Wadi Ara roadway. The foregoing assault which is #419 in the data base, is coded as "anonymous." David Rudge, "2 Israeli Arabs killed in Nazareth clashes," *Jerusalem Post*, 10 October 2000, p. 2; Shaul Shay and Yoram Schweitzer, "The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Palestinian-Israeli Confrontation," *International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, 2001 (www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=153), p. 2.
 6. Hani Shukrallah, Sana Kamil, Mona Ziade, and Cengiz Candar, "The Street Reacts to Operation Defensive Shield: snapshots of the middle east," *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXXI, no. 124 (Summer 2002), p. 49.
 7. Richard J. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1968-1993* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999), pp. 137-42, 198 n15, 198 n16; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism 1968-1993: An Empirical Analysis of Terrorist Group-Type Behavior," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 17, no. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 73-114, 107 n3; Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most, "Patterns of Conflict: Quantitative Analysis and the Comparative Lessons of Third World Wars," in Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neumann, eds., *Approaches and Case Studies*. Volume 1 of *The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1985), pp. 33-52; Margot Dudkevitch, "Guard killed by terrorists at isolated farm near Itamar," *Jerusalem Post*, 9 May 2001, p. 2; "Fatah Tanzim: The Organization," Institute for Counter-Terrorism (www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=82); Matthew Levitt, "Designating the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades," *Institute for Counter-Terrorism* (2002) (www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=431). In my prior work a three-dimensional terrorist group-type typology that is based on Starr and Most's work on third world conflict is crafted with three defining characteristics of terrorist groups each posited along one axis of that typology. Those defining characteristics include ideology, recruitment type, and goals. It follows that recruitment type can be sorted out within the context of charismatic and non-charismatic leadership of terrorist groups. Since there are three ideology types, three recruitment patterns, and four goal types, there are 36 possible combinations in theory. Eight terrorist group-types that presuppose and derive from that typology are chosen for empirical study. Al-Fatah, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and other Tanzim are sorted into the ethnocentric terrorist group category of the work. In the case of Jewish terrorism, actions of "proto-group" Jewish settlers fall into the realm of Jewish theocentric terrorist assaults. The categories "lone assailant" and anonymous are also articulated.
 8. Jorge Nef, "Some Thoughts on Contemporary Terrorism: Domestic and International Perspectives," in John Carson, ed., *Terrorism in Theory and Practice: Proceedings of a*

- Colloquium* (Toronto, ON: Atlantic Council of Canada, 1978), pp. 19-20. In contrast, Martha Crenshaw-Hutchinson tells us, "paradoxically terrorism, which must appear irrational and unpredictable, in order to be effective, is an eminently rational strategy, calculated in terms of predictable costs and benefits," Crenshaw-Hutchinson as found in Nef, "Some Thoughts," p. 20; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, p. 197, n1.
9. Frederic S. Pearson and J. Martin Rochester, *International Relations: The Global Condition in the Twenty First Century* (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 1998), pp. 445- 65; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 73, 107 n1; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, p. 137 n2; Richard J. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994-1999* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 2, 16 n3, 16 n4, 52, 54. Plainly, if a terrorist straps explosives to his or her waist and detonates herself to impede or perhaps for some, but certainly not all, to accelerate the "peace process," those actions if seen from the vantage of the perpetrator are construed as rational insofar as that act produces some desired effect, at least in the short run.
 10. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism."
 11. David E. Long, *The Anatomy of Terrorism* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), pp.18-19, 211; Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987), p. 89; Talcott Parsons, *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 361; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism."
 12. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism."
 13. Richard Chasdi, "The Dynamics of Middle East Terrorism, 1968-1993: A Functional Typology of Terrorist Group-Types," PhD dissertation, Purdue University, 1995; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 74-75, 107 n6, n7, 108 n8; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 143, 201 n18, n19, n20, 180-87; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 24-26, 411-16.
 14. Immanuel M. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origin of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
 15. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 36, 415-16; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 75, 143, 201 n18, n19, n20, 180-87; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 74-75, 107 n6, n8; Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 3-5, 100-05, 239, 277 n20, 344-50.
 16. At a functional level, it is possible to conceive of terrorist "proto-groups" that consist of persons who coalesce to commit terrorist assaults, and who either form the rudiments of a fledgling terrorist group, or who disperse following the commission of a terrorist assault.
 17. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 75, 81 n60, 201 n19; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 25, 56 n5; Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most, "Contagion and Border Effects on Contemporary African Conflict," *Comparative Political Studies* 16, no. 1 (1983), pp. 92-117; Starr and Most, "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research," *International Studies Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1976), pp. 581-620.
 18. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 76, 79 n12.
 19. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 35-36; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, p. 77; Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 171, 228 n20; Bruce Hoffman, "The Jewish Defense League," *Terrorism, Violence, Insurgency Journal* 5, no. 1 (1984), pp. 10-15.
 20. Louis Rene Beres, "Terrorism and International Law," *Florida International Law Journal* 3, no. 3 (1988), pp. 293-99 n14; Beres, "Confronting Nuclear Terrorism," *The Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 14, no. 1 (1990), pp. 130, 132-33; Noemi Gal-Or, *International Cooperation to Suppress Terrorism* (New York: St. Martins, 1985); Gregory F. Intocchia, "International Legal and Policy Implications of an American Counter-Terrorist Strategy," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 14, no. 1 (1985), pp. 136-39; Christopher Joyner, "In Search for an Anti-Terrorism Policy: Lessons from the Reagan Era," *Terrorism* 11, no. 1 (1988), p. 37; Alex P. Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature* (Amsterdam: Transaction Books, 1983), pp. 119-58; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 9, 19 n52; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 24, 51 n26; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 74-75, 108 n9; Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 16, 34 n9, 36 n10;

- Richard J. Chasdi, "Terrorism: Stratagems for Remediation from an International Law Perspective," *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* 12, no. 4 (1994), pp. 59-86.
21. Those *Alternative Information Center* scripted accounts range from: "Settler Violence and Occupation Watch Report XXVII, 7 October-17 October 2000": printed on Tuesday, 17 October 2000, (http://www2.alternativenews.org/occupationwatch/display_print.php?id=225) through "Settler Violence and Occupation Watch Report XXXVI, 16 January 2002 - 27 March 2002": printed on Sunday 7 April 2002 (http://www2.alternativenews.org/occupationwatch/display_print.php?id=1334).
 22. Nina Gilbert and David Rudge, "OC Intelligence: Hizbullah aiming to strike soon," *Jerusalem Post*, 5 June 2002; David Rudge, "Cabinet orders Pi Gliilot closed," *Jerusalem Post*, 27 May 2002, p. 1.
 23. Those two non-settler terrorist events that are coded as "anonymous acts," or "6" include a mob attack in Netanya, Israel is against a Palestinian in reaction to a Palestinian terrorist assault (event #1,617), and a mob attack against a mosque in Jaffa (#1,616). David Rudge, and Reuters, "Enraged Netanya residents wound Palestinian," *Jerusalem Post*, 5 March 2001, p. 1; Margot Dudkevitch, David Rudge, and Mia Ridberg, "Rioters attack Jaffa mosque," *Jerusalem Post*, 3 June 2001, pp. 1, 5.
 24. Beitler, "Path to Mass Rebellion," pp. 201, 222, 228; Ron, "Second Palestinian Uprising," pp. 75-76. I would like to acknowledge the carefully reasoned points articulated by my anonymous reviewer at Israel Studies Forum.
 25. With respect to interconnections between terrorist assaults and "political events," I relied on terrorist group claims of responsibility, attribution made by *Jerusalem Post* sources and/or Israeli military or police sources, or sources of attribution made by other governments and *Alternative Information Center* sources. In the case where a terrorist assault and a political event are separated by a time interval of one day or within a few days, I used "contextual analysis" in some cases to make interconnections between them. Anthony Kellet, Bruce Beanlands, and James Deacon, *Terrorism in Canada 1960-1989 No. 1990-16* (Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada Ministry Secretariat, 1991), p. 40; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 43-45, 47; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 145, 202 n 27; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 77, 108 n 15.
 26. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 41, 59 n91; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 144, 202 n23; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 75, 108 n11; Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 123-26.
 27. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 144-45; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," p. 76.
 28. Chasdi, "Dynamics;" Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism;" Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*.
 29. Etgar Lefkovits, "PFLP claims responsibility for Jerusalem hotel shooting," *Jerusalem Post*, 18 October 2001, p. 1. It follows that if a "suicide bomber" detonates at a police road stop, that terrorist assault target is coded as a "1" or government target as in data entry #177. Likewise, if the phrase "Palestinians" is used in a scripted account, that terrorist assault is coded "anonymous" or "6" unless "contextual analysis" suggests a "proto-group," in which case terrorist group-type is coded as "ethnocentric" or "8." At the same time, in the two cases where non-settler Israelis committed acts of terrorism those terrorist assaults are also coded as "6" or "anonymous." In a similar vein, if the phrase "Palestinian sniper" is used as it is in data entry #242, that terrorist assault is coded "lone assailant" or "11."
 30. Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 145, 202 n26; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 76, 108 n14; Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 126-27.
 31. Plainly, certain terrorist assaults in which perpetrators "detonate prematurely" are, in my judgment, actually completed acts insofar as the civilian populace is seized by "abject fear" that pre-supposes and derives from explosions, thereby in effect helping to disrupt travel routes and evoke similar hardships. Margot Dudkevitch, "Four Palestinians killed in clashes," *Jerusalem Post*, 25 November 2001, (entry #7); Etgar Lefkovits, "16th Maccabiah Games open: two ter-

- rorists die nearby while preparing bomb," *Jerusalem Post*, 17 July 2001, p. 1 (entry #1,612). The category "sub-locale" is articulated to capture differences in terrorist assault frequency between locales, such as cities or towns, kibbutzim or moshavim, Israeli settlements, and those in transit or "en route" as in automobile travel in all but a handful of cases. In the broader sense, other terrorist assault attributes include "numbers of dead," "numbers of injuries," "level of property damage," and "location," that is a broader descriptor than "sub-locale" to differentiate between terrorist assaults that happened in Israel or the Occupied Territories. In the case of "coding rules" for location, if the phrase "on the Green Line" is used for example, location is coded "Israel,"("47") as in entry #111. If the term, "in the heart of Jerusalem" or "downtown Jerusalem" is used, location is coded "Israel" as in entries #14, and #40. If the phrase, "as they entered Israel . . ." is used, location is coded "Israel" as in terrorist assault entry #304. Plainly, as territorial boundaries between the fledgling Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Israel remained in a continuously evolving condition of flux during 28 September 2000 through February 2002, no attempt was made to articulate differences between PNA and Israeli controlled areas of the Occupied Territories for coding purposes.
32. The frequency distribution for "category of group" has an N=1,615 cases with 2 cases missing, while the frequency distribution of "name of group" described below has an N= 1,605 with 12 cases missing.
 33. Chasdi, "Dynamics," p. 147; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 80-81; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, p. 148, 150-51; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, p. 322.
 34. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 321-22.
 35. Yael Shahar, "The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades: a political tool with an edge," *International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism* (2002), (www.ict.org.il/articles/articleDet.cfm?articleid=430); NewsMax.com Wires, "Arafat Bans Armed Groups," 22 October 2001, p. 3. (www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/21/211110.shtml).
 36. Etgar Lefkovits, "34 hurt in riot after Sharon's visit to Mount," *Jerusalem Post*, 29 September 2000, p. A-4; that threat was made by the "Central Committee of Moslem Scholars" of the Islamic Action Party. Arieh O'Sullivan, "Terrorist killed in Gaza was senior Fatah member," *Jerusalem Post*, 2002, p. 1; Alternately, a *Palestine News* scripted account informs us that the Palestine Resistance Committee is comprised of "individuals associated with the Fatah movement." "Palestinian journalists in the danger zone," *Palestine News*, (www.ptimes.org/issue121/news.html#6).
 37. That chronology includes: 28 Sept. 2000 assault by Muslim Scholars of Islamic Action Front Party (#1615); 2 Oct. by Hamas (#1516); 9 Oct. by al-Fatah (#1445); 11 Oct. by Hamas (#1507); 15 Oct. by Hezbollah (#1553); 30 Oct. by al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (#1450); 2 Nov. by Islamic Jihad (#1509); 9 Nov. by al-Fatah (#1452); 12 Nov. by "Tanzim,"(#1463); 15 Nov. by al-Fatah (#1454); 19 Nov. by Jordanian Islamic Resistance Movement and the Army of the Holy Warriors Ahmed Daqamsah (#1616); 22 Nov. by Hamas (#1510); 22 Nov. by Hamas (#1511); 24 Nov. by Islamic Jihad (#1512)
 38. The first successful PFLP terrorist assault chronicled happened in January 2001(#1558) and the first successful DFLP terrorist assault recorded was in January 2002 (#49).
 39. Dexter Filkins, "Shutting Doors in Syria May Not End Militant's Attacks," *The New York Times*, 18 July 2003, p. A-6.
 40. Shay and Schweitzer, "Intifada," p. 3, Shahar, "Martyrs Brigades," p. 1, and Beitler "Path to Mass Rebellion," p. 233, all tell us of terrorist groups such as Hamas and al-Fatah that cooperate with one another.
 41. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 314-17, 322-23, 399 n212-17; Jewish Extremists Blamed for Killing of Palestinians," *Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, 20 July 2001 (www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=642); "Israeli Authorities Preparing Indictment against Jewish Terrorist Cell," *Institute for Counter-Terrorism*, 26 May 2002, (www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=782); Margot Dudkevitch, "A Family under the shadow of terror," *Jerusalem Post*, 27 March 2001,

- p. 1; Margot Dudkevitch, "Gilad Zar, 40, murdered in morning; Sarah Blaustein 53, Esther Alvan 20, gunned down later on tunnel road," *Jerusalem Post*, 30 May 2001, pp. 1, 16; Margot Dudkevitch, "Underground Jewish group claims responsibility for Arab's murder," *Jerusalem Post*, 15 June 2001, p. A-3; "Settler Violence and Occupation Watch Report," *Alternative Information Center XXVI*, 27 June 2001-26 July 2001; "Kach News: Wednesday, July 11, 2001 - The Voice of Jewish Resistance" (www.newkach.org/kach/kachnews20.html). To be sure, a set of interconnections between the Gilad-Shalhevet Pass Brigade and Kach seems the ineluctable conclusion insofar as a Kach bulletin called "Kach News" makes reference to the 6 July 2001 terrorist assault that the foregoing AIC scripted account tells us took place at the al-Tiba checkpoint in which a Palestinian taxi cab driver was shot and injured along with his passengers. In my judgment, my data suggest that the Gilad Shalhevet Pass Brigade may have carried out its first generally recognizable terrorist assault on 13 June 2001.
42. Martin A. Miller, "The Intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in Europe," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 1995), pp. 40, 43-44, 47; Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts," in Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context*; John Randall White, *Terrorism, an Introduction*, 3rd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2002), pp. 42-43, 114, 125, 131.
 43. That chronology includes: 1 Jan. 2001 assault by Kach (#1222); 20 March by Kach (#1274); 28 April by Kach (#1293); 17 June by Kach (#1372); 6 July by Gilad Zar-Shalhevet Pass (#1405); 19 July by the Committee on Road Safety (#1417); 9 April by Kach (#1441); 20 July by Zo-Artzenu (#1444); 13 June by Shalhevet Pass Underground (#1448).
 44. Maps used include: "Harel High School Mevasseret Zion, Israel," (www.tichon.org.il/enmap-e.html); "Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories A Guide: a special report of the foundation for middle east peace," Foundation for Middle East Peace (www.fmep.org/reports/2002/sr0203.html); "Latest Peace Now Ariel Survey Reveals 34 New Settlements Since Sharon's Election," *Americans for Peace Now* (www.peacenow.org/nia/pr03192002.html); "Communities in the Benyamin Region," (www.geocities.com/m_yericho/binyamin.htm); "Communities in the Gaza Coast Region," (www.geocities.com/m_yericho/katif.htm); "Communities in Har Hevron (Hebron Mountain) Region," (www.geocities.com/m_yericho/hevron.htm); "Communities in Gush Etzion: Etzion Bloc," (www.geocities.com/m_yericho/gush_etz.htm); "Jordan Valley Communities," (www.geocities.com/m_yericho/jordan.htm); "Communities in the Northern Dead Sea Region," (www.geocities.com/m_yericho/dead_sea.htm); "Communities in the Shomron Samara," (www.geocities.com/m_yericho/shomron.htm); Neil Tilbury, *Israel-A Travel Survival Kit* (Australia: Lonely Planet Publications, 1992).
 45. Crosstabulation table test result summary statistics include a Pearson Chi Square value of 145.184 at three degrees of freedom (3 d.f.), a p-value of less than .001, and 1 cell or 12.5 percent found to have an expected frequency of less than 5. In terms of strength of association, a Cramer V value of .491 with a p-value of less than .001 and a Phi value of .491 with a p value of less than .001 suggest a relationship of moderate strength between the variables. In that test, "location" consists of Israel, and the Occupied Territories, while terrorist group type consists of ideo-ethnocentric charismatic, Jewish theocentric, theocentric, and ethnocentric group-types.
 46. For "event deaths," N=1,602, "Minimum" =0; "Maximum" =21; "Sum" =238, "Mean"=.15; "Std. Deviation"=.94.
 47. Beitler, "Path to Mass Rebellion," p. 228; Khalidi, "Essay," p. 6. For Khalidi, who writes in May 2002, "more than 1,500 innocent unarmed Palestinian civilians . . . [and] more than 500 innocent, unarmed Israeli civilians" have been killed in the al-Aqsa Intifada. A figure of 238 deaths is consistent with Beitler's assertion that "from September 2000 until May 2002 (485) Israelis have been killed." James Bennett, "Year of Intifida Sees Hardening on Each Side," *New York Times*, 28 September 2001, p. A-3.
 48. For "event injuries," N=1,524; "Minimum"=0; "Maximum"=160; "Sum"=2,395; "Mean"=1.57; "Std. Deviation"=8.90.

49. To calculate that figure, the mean=1.57, and standard deviation=8.90; $8.90 \times 14 = 124.6$.
50. Those terrorist assaults include the Sbarro pizza house bombing in Jerusalem that injured 130 persons on 9 August 2001 which is entry #220; Wafa Idris's suicide assault near a shoe store in Jerusalem on 27 January 2002 that injured 150 persons which is entry #40; and the Kikar Zion suicide terrorist assaults on 2 December 2001 that injured 160 persons which is entry #30.
51. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 45, 60 n17; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, p. 155; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," p. 86; Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 156-57, 159, 336, 341. With respect to "rules" for coding levels of terrorist assault property damage, some rules include: if a person is shot in an automobile in a drive-by shooting and no property damage is described in the scripted account, it is possible to extrapolate that terrorist assault damage is "slight" or coded a "2." In a similar vein, if a "suicide bomber" detonates in a commuter bus, it is possible to extrapolate and code property damage as a "3" or "moderate" damage.
52. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 331-32.
53. White, *Terrorism*, pp. 69, 135-36; Khalidi, "Essay."
54. Beitler, "Path to Mass Rebellion," pp. 224, 233. For Hammami and Tamari, the Tanzim, "is a murky designation that includes Fatah's street cadre (often with privately licensed weaponry) and by elements of the PA Preventative Security Force," Hammami and Tamari, "Second Uprising," pp. 12-13, 18. For *Institute for Counter-Terrorism* (ICT) corporate authors, one way of thinking about the Tanzim revolves around Palestinian "insider" support for Tanzim by contrast to Palestinian "outsider" support for the PNA. ICT tells us that the Fatah Hawks of the First Intifada are precursors to the Tanzim (www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=82).
55. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 324-25; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 150, 154, 160; Chasdi, "Middle East Terrorism," pp. 83-84, 109 n22; Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 194-99.
56. Long, *Anatomy*, p. 1; Ted Robert Gurr, "Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960's," in Michael Stohl, ed., *Politics of Terrorism*, 3rd ed., rev. and expanded (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1988), pp. 45-46; Edward F. Mickolus, et al., *International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events: Volume 1 1980-1983* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1989), pp. xxii-xxiii; Peter Flemming, "Patterns of Transnational Terrorism in Western Europe, 1968-1987: A Quantitative Perspective," PhD dissertation, Purdue University, 1992, pp. 164, 180, 194-95, 203-04; Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985); Fred R. von der Mehden, *Comparative Political Violence* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973); Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 150, 202 n35, 155, 202 n38.
57. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 324-25.
58. Beitler, "Path to Mass Rebellion," pp. 33-35, 221, 245. Drawing on Mark Lichbach's work, Beitler suggests that violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada presupposes and derives from the Israeli government's hard-line repression of largely non-violent Palestinian demonstrations during the First Intifada of 1987- 1993.
59. Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, pp. 667-753.
60. In addition to Starr and Most's work cited above, the notion of a "prevailing social ideology of Islam" presupposes and derives from several works: Long, *Anatomy*, pp. 18-19, 22, 41-42, 211; David T. Schiller, "A Battlegroup Divided: The Palestinian Fedayeen," in David C. Rapoport, ed., *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 96-97; Augustus R. Norton, "Terrorism in the Middle East," in Vittoriofranco S. Pisano, ed., *Terrorist Dynamics* (Arlington, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1988), pp. 13-14; Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1956), p. 110; Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 145, 244-45; Adeed Dawisha, *The Arab Radicals* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), p. 80; Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, *Terrorism: The PLO Connection* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1989), pp. 41, 46-47, 159, 186, 189; Amir Taheri, *Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism* (Bethesda, MD: Adler & Adler, 1987); Patrick Seale, *Abu Nidal: A Gun for*

- Hire* (London: Hutchinson, 1992). In the narrower sense, these hypotheses draw from Flemming's work on West European terrorism. Flemming, "Patterns," pp. 70, 115-18, 146, 149, 157, 161; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 25-26, 56 n4, n5, n6, n7; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, pp. 75, 81 n63, n64, n65, 203 n40, 204 n56.
61. Ideo-ethnocentric terrorist group assaults and ethnocentric charismatic terrorist group assaults are not chronicled in the data findings between 28 September 2000 through February 2002.
 62. A Pearson Chi Square statistic of 44.273 at four degrees of freedom (4 d.f.) with a p-value of less than .001 makes it possible to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between those variables at the .05 level of confidence. It is found that 1 cell or 10.0 percent has an expected count of less than 5. In terms of strength of the relationship, a Phi score of .175 with a significance value of less than .001 and a Cramer's V score of .175 with a significance score of less than .001 indicate that a weak relationship exists between the variables. Moreover, a Goodman and Kruskal tau diagnostic of .031 with a significance score of less than .001 when target type is the dependent variable also suggests a weak relationship. In that test, "category of group" includes: ideo-ethnocentric charismatic, Jewish theocentric, unclaimed acts, theocentric and ethnocentric.
 63. Khalidi, "Essay;" Schultze, "Camp David;" Bishara, "Reflections;" Ron, "Second Palestinian Uprising;" Beitler, "Path to Mass Rebellion."
 64. P.N. Grabosky, "The Urban Context of Political Terrorism," in Michael Stohl, ed., *The Politics of Terrorism*, 2nd ed., rev. and expanded (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983), pp. 51-76.
 65. Wallerstein, *Modern World System*; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, p. 341, Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, p. 185, Chasdi, "Middle Eastern Terrorism," pp. 100, 102.
 66. A Pearson Chi Square statistic of 122.293 with a p-value of less than .001 at three degrees of freedom (3 d.f.) makes it possible to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between the variables at the .05 level of confidence. It is found that 1 cell or 12.5 percent has an expected count of less than five. In terms of strength of association, a Goodman and Kruskal tau diagnostic of .198 with a significance score of less than .001 when "event deaths" is the dependent variable suggests a relationship of weak strength between the variables while a Cramer's V score of .445 with a significance value of less than .001 and a Phi score of .445 with a significance value of less than .001 suggests a moderate relationship. Ordinal categories for "numbers of deaths" that result from terrorist assaults are crafted to generate summary statistics as well as for data distribution purposes. Those ordinal categories include 0=0 deaths; 1=1 through 50 deaths. The group categories used in this test are: ideo-ethnocentric charismatic, Jewish theocentric, theocentric, and ethnocentric.
 67. The "multiple claimant" terrorist assault entries include: #1, #21, #22, #29, #247, #1610, #1612. David Rudge, "Afula Rampage kills 2, wounds more than 40," *Jerusalem Post*, 28 November 2001, pp. 1, 14 (#1); Etgar Lefkovits, "Palestinian worker kills boss in Atarot," *Jerusalem Post*, 28 February 2002, p. 1 (#21); Margot Dudkevitch and Herb Keinon, "Two terrorists killed in Alei Sinai: Sharon convenes security cabinet," *Jerusalem Post*, 3 October 2001, pp. 1, 2 (#22); David Rudge, "3 Israelis killed in bus bombing: soldier shot dead at roadblock," *Jerusalem Post*, 30 November 2001, p. 1 (#29); "Hamas, Fatah vow 'eye for an eye,'" *Jerusalem Post*, 26 August 2001, p. 3 (#247); Herb Keinon, "Israeli diplomats to stay in Amman despite shooting," *Jerusalem Post*, 20 November 2000, pp. 1, 18 (#1610); Etgar Lefkovits, "16th Maccabiah Games open — two terrorists die nearby while preparing bomb," *Jerusalem Post*, 17 July 2001, p. 1 (#1612). There was one incident omitted from that analysis because the sources and origins of both terrorist groups under consideration, namely the Popular Palestinian Resistance Force for Sabra and Shatilla, and the Popular Army Front, remain shrouded in uncertainty. Etgar Lefkovits, "Unknown groups claim Jerusalem car bombing," *Jerusalem Post*, 9 February 2001, p. A-14 (#1611).
 68. Hammami and Tamari, "Second Uprising," pp. 6, 12; Shay and Schweitzer, "Intifada," p. 1.
 69. Khalidi, "Essay," pp. 7-8.

70. Hammami and Tamari, "Second Uprising," pp. 11-13, 19, 200.
71. A Pearson Chi Square statistic of 27.144 with a p-value of less than .001 at four degrees of freedom (4 d.f.) makes it necessary to reject the null of hypothesis of no relation between those variables. It is found that 2 cells or 22.2 percent have an expected count of less than 5 but those findings, in my judgment, are worth reporting because of the fear of making a "Type II" or Beta error even though Norusis informs us that, "in general, you should not use the chi square test if more than 20 percent of the cells have expected values of less than five," Marija J. Norusis, *The SPSS Guide to Data Analysis for SPSS/PC+*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: SPSS Inc., 1991), pp. 270-71. In terms of strength of association, a Phi score of .307 with a significance value of less than .001 and a Cramer's V score of .217 with a significance score of less than .001 indicate a weak relationship between the variables. A Goodman and Kruskal tau diagnostic of .049 with a significance score of less than .001 with "sub-locale" as the dependent variable also suggests a weak relationship between those variables. The terrorist group-types in this test include: Jewish theocentric, theocentric, and ethnocentric, and in the case of "sub-locale" the category "kibbutz/moshav" is removed.
72. Rudge, "Rampage," pp. 1, 14 (#1); Lefkovits, "Workers," pp. 1, 14 (#21); "Hamas, Fatah," p. 3 (#247); Keinon, "Diplomats," p. 1 (#1610), Lefkovits, "Games," p. 1 (#1612).
73. That "multiple claimant" terrorist assault involved two theocentric groups. Margot Dudkevitch and Keinon, "Two terrorists killed," pp. 1, 2.
74. Conversely, theocentric groups most prefer terrorist assaults in cities or towns, with 19.0 percent or a little less than one-fifth of attacks aimed at moving targets.
75. Khaldi, "Essay."
76. A cross-tabulations test was performed with "group-type" that is comprised of "Jewish theocentric," "Jewish theocentric charismatic," and "lone assailant," and with "political event" that is comprised of "no relation" and "reaction to terrorist acts." A Pearson Chi Square statistic of 7.606 with a p-value of .022 at two degrees of freedom (2 d.f.) is generated making it possible to reject the null hypothesis of no relation between the variables. There is one cell or 16.7 percent with an expected frequency of less than 5. In terms of the strength of association, a Phi value of .126 with a p-value of .022 and a Cramer's V of .126 with a p-value of .022 suggests a weak relationship between the variables.
77. Chasdi, "Dynamics," pp. 337-38, 344; Chasdi, *Serenade of Suffering*, p. 146; Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 46, 60.
78. Hammami and Tamari, "Second Uprising," p. 17.
79. Chasdi, *Tapestry of Terror*, pp. 87-92.
80. Michael Collins Dunn, "Algeria's Agony: The Drama So Far, The Prospects for Peace," *Middle East Policy* III, no. 3 (1994), pp. 147-56.