THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

1 The suicide operations on 11 September 2001 against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon transformed the concept and the practice of international security. The asymmetric use of force by a transnational network of al-Qaeda affiliated religious extremists – bent on producing mass-casualty, synchronized attacks and disgracing America on its own soil and at the heart of its own symbols – astounded the world. The audacity of the perpetrators and their non-conventional use of conventional technologies demonstrated that even the universally recognized hegemon of the post-Cold War international system could not prevent its territory and resources from being utilized to inflict damage on its own citizens and infrastructure.

2 In consequence, terrorism emerged from the backwaters to which it had been relegated following the neutralization of terrorist groups from the far left and the far right in the 1970s and the 1980s and the semi-successful resolution of various communal, ethnic, and separatist conflicts in the 1990s. The sheer magnitude and the destructive scale of the 11 September attacks called for a comprehensive re-evaluation of the security threat posed by al-Qaeda and its associated groups. The dreadful ability of international terrorists and their transnational networks to strike "anyone, anywhere, anytime" required immediate action and a resolute response. Policy makers worldwide recognized the challenge and braced their societies for a lengthy struggle.

3 Responding to these atrocious acts, President George W. Bush declared a "global war on terror" (GWOT) and designated it America's number one foreign policy priority. He committed the US nation and its people to a worldwide, multifront, and multifaceted campaign. Its key initiatives focused on interdicting al-Qaeda operatives and disrupting their terrorist support infrastructures; dislodging state sponsors of terrorism and warning other nations against providing permissive environments for terrorist groups; and cautioning pre-emptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction proliferation regimes.2 Its methods included military action, law enforcement, sharing intelligence information, freezing financial assets, and concerted drives for international cooperation. In response to the pervasiveness of the threat, counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism activities increased both domestically and internationally.

4 In the early months after 11 September, a brief crystallization of the will of the international community to fight terrorism also occurred. The contours of a coherent and uniform international policy were outlined in a succession of UN resolutions, which rejected "the prevalent moral ambivalence on terrorism and declared unambiguously that no moral and political justification could be accepted for acts of terror."3 These were reinforced by a strong and sustained rhetoric on the part of President Bush, who spoke of "a world where freedom itself is under attack," and a "war on terrorism" that will not stop until "terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated."4

5 Almost immediately after 11 September, governments in Europe and Southeast Asia responded positively by aligning their administrations and societies with the US-led GWOT. On 21 September 2001, the European Union (EU) Heads of State and Heads of Government approved a framework action plan on terrorism and incorporated the fight against al-Qaeda into all aspects of the EU's internal, foreign, and security policy.5 In December 2003, the European Council (EC) adopted a common European Security Strategy, in which it reiterated the need for EU member-states to combat global terrorism through joint action with both regional and extra-regional partners.6 Following the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004, the EC issued a solidarity clause, pledging to help any EU country that fell victim to a terrorist attack, and appointed Dutch politician Gijs de Vries as the EU's counter-terrorism coordinator.7 His mandate included overseeing the EU's anti-terrorism policy and streamlining the implementation of counter-terrorism measures among EU member-states. In December 2004, the previous EU action plan on terrorism was updated to bolster security procedures and enhance operational cooperation.8

6 Similarly, on 5 November 2001, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ratified a Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, focusing on strengthening national mechanisms and improving regional channels of cooperation.9 An ASEAN Work Programme on Counter-Terrorism was adopted on 17 May 2002, outlining a three-stage process to combat terrorism by ratifying international conventions and protocols; prescribing practical cooperation between national law enforcement agencies under the headings of ASEANAPOL; and encouraging extra-regional cooperation with ASEAN partners.10 During this period the ASEAN Ministerial Committee on Transnational Crime emerged as a useful platform for sharing best practices and enhancing information exchange, intelligence sharing, and capacity building.11 In the wake of the Jakarta bombings against the Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003, and the Australian embassy on 9 September 2004, ASEAN member-states sought to strengthen the regional legal framework for combating terrorism by signing the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on 28 November 2004.12

7 The signing of common strategic agreements between the prevalent multilateral institution in each region and the United States further reinforced such demonstrations of transatlantic and transpacific sympathy and political goodwill. A US-EU Terrorism Pact was endorsed on 25 June 2003.13 A US-EU Summit in Ireland on 26 June 2004 renewed the two parties' commitment to fight global terrorism.14 A number of US-EU strategic agreements to strengthen police and judicial cooperation, enhance border control and transport security, and streamline procedures for extraditing terrorist suspects were also signed.15 Although some differences of emphasis still remained, America and the European Union agreed that the best ways to tackle global terrorism are by combining judicial, police, diplomatic, and military means along with a long-term political approach.

8 In terms of Southeast Asia, a US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was ratified on 1 August 2002.16 During the 17th US-ASEAN Dialogue in Bangkok, Thailand in January 2004, a US-ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Work Plan was adopted to complement ASEAN's own Counter-Terrorism Programme.17 In addition to securitizing the issue of international terrorism, criminalizing its practices, and enlisting region al partners in the global fight against al-Qaeda, these accords served the purpose of enhancing regional capacity building measures and initiating information sharing procedures among co-signatories. Both in terms of diplomacy, military assets, and money, America recast its strategic engagement in Southeast Asia under the heading of combating terrorism.

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

9 Despite such broad-ranging and far-reaching commitments on the diplomatic front, the fight against terrorism on the domestic front remained the prerogative of individual nation-states. The need to target-harden important infrastructures and to develop emergency preparedness plans against possible terrorist attacks gave rise to the "homeland security paradigm" of national defence.18 This paradigm effectively blurred the traditional distinction between internal and external security. Both at the legislative and at the executive level, national leaders and their administrations held the key to whether or not terrorist networks would be unraveled, terrorist members prosecuted, and pertinent information shared with neighboring states. Even when recognizing the transnational nature of the threat and the need for joint action to thwart transborder flows of individuals, weapons, and money, some governments continued to feel constrained by their domestic political contexts and priorities. A crisis-driven paradigm of domestic counter-terrorism response emerged as a result.

10 For instance, although former Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri was the first international leader to visit the White House in the immediate aftermath of 11 September and to pledge her country's unconditional support for the US-led coalition against terror,19 she was later compelled to condemn America's bombing of Afghanistan. Facing staunch criticism from Indonesia's Islamist opposition parties and considering her own precarious political standing, President Megawati maintained a difficult balance between external commitments and internal priorities. As a result, Indonesia's domestic record of counter-terrorism responses was rather tepid at first. Regional neighbors like Singapore and Malaysia often felt exasperated that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists, who had managed to escape their own jurisdictions and national territories, could find easy safe-haven and logistical support inside Indonesia.

11 This situation changed dramatically after the horrific suicide attacks against two tourist nightspots in Bali on 12 October 2002. The political outcry stemming from the bombings and the negative economic impact on the country's tourism industry created the necessary political environment for Megawati to act. On 18 October 2002, she issued two presidential decrees effectively criminalizing all acts of terrorism and creating special judicial powers for prosecuting terrorist suspects involved in the Bali bombing. On 6 March 2003, these were officially passed into national laws.20 A special task force was formed under Major General Pastika to investigate the Bali attack and to bring those responsible to justice. However, lack of institutional capacity and poor coordination among Indonesia's security and intelligence agencies prevented the full dismantling of the Jemaah Islamiyah network and paved the way for more attacks. The terrorist operations against the JW Marriott Hotel on 5 August 2003 and the Australian Embassy on 9 September 2004 only confirmed the susceptibility of the country to terrorism.

12 Following the election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Indonesia's new president in October 2004, there was much optimism both in the region and internationally that the government's stance against JI would receive a significant boost. For one, Yudhoyono had previously acted as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs during President Megawati's term in office, and had presided in this capacity over the crafting of a comprehensive and coordinated policy to eradicate terrorism in the country.21 He had also repeatedly voiced his determination to clamp down on Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia and to work more closely with the United States, Australia, and other ASEAN countries.

13 But without a clear majority in parliament and having to maintain a delicate balance within his own coalition government, President Yudhoyono proved reluctant to stage a full-scale crackdown. Instead, his cabinet continued to dismantle JI sleeper cells and JI-affiliated clandestine rings with proven connections to terrorism. This reluctance also manifested itself in the unwillingness of the country to proscribe Jemaah Islamiyah and the leniency that some JI terrorist suspects received during sentencing.22 The uncertain course of the judicial proceedings against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir – the alleged spiritual leader of JI – is another case in point.23 Although Yudhoyono's personal commitment to the GWOT and to Indonesia's role in it is not to be doubted, his government is unwilling to portray itself as caving in too much to US pressure, while alienating the country's predominantly Muslim population. Moreover, other important challenges facing Indonesia – such as corruption, economic reforms, and democratic transition – have taken priority over the day-to-day fight with terrorism.

14 Similarly, in Europe, the presence of large diaspora communities from North Africa and the Middle East has resulted in a certain political unwillingness to identify the terrorist threat as "coming from within" and to equate it, instead, with radical elements "coming from outside." In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Europe associated the security challenge of al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups with an external foreign threat. Its sources originated outside of Europe and were linked primarily to non-citizens or first and second-generation immigrants, who had effectively transported violence directed against their home countries to European soil.24 In consequence, the majority of European politicians were particularly careful not to create the impression that they were targeting law-abiding Muslim citizens. By contrast, they were especially vocal about illegal immigrants and political refugees, who "misuse Europe's freedoms" and the continent's "social atmosphere of religious and ethnic tolerance."25 Measures implemented to delimit the granting of political asylum and refugee status to incoming immigrants were indicative of these tendencies.26

15 Great Britain, in particular, has long been identified as a sanctuary and breeding ground for Islamist militants. In 2000, the Blair administration enacted two far-reaching counter-terrorism laws, effectively broadening the definitions of domestic and transnational terrorism and promoting the government's "special arrest powers" to prosecute terrorist members and terrorist supporters.27 These legislative measures were further strengthened by the adoption of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act of 2001, allowing for the indefinite detention without trial of non-British nationals suspected of terrorism.28 However, in view of the historical record of British citizens involved in terrorist activities – including a number of major al-Qaeda plots abroad – these new statutory powers will have little effect on dampening domestic participation in international terrorism. In April 2003, two British nationals took part in a suicide operation in Tel Aviv, Israel.29 At present, two other British-born Islamists are in detention in Morocco on terrorism charges related to the Casablanca bombing of 16 May 2003.30 Furthermore, in the three years since 11 September, UK-born and UK-bred terrorists – such as Omar Said Sheikh (the mastermind of the kidnapping and killing of US journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in January 2002) and Richard Reid (the al-Qaeda "shoe-bomber," who attempted to ignite explosives on a Paris-Miami overseas flight in December 2001) – have figured prominently on the international terrorism scene.

16 In the aftermath of the Madrid attacks, such threat perceptions underwent a slight change. For one, the majority of the perpetrators were North African migrant workers who had settled down in Spain and had launched the attacks in response to the participation of Prime Minister Aznar's government in the Iraq war.31 Reporting on the key findings from the criminal probe, Spanish Judge Juan del Olmo attributed these heinous acts to a clandestine terrorist network that had prepared and executed the bombings from within Europe's territory and with the help of European citizens.32 The killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh – by a Dutch-born national of Moroccan origin, who had no prior jihad experience or known connections to terrorism – only confirmed the danger of domestic radicalization. Policy makers in the Netherlands responded immediately by introducing tougher anti-terrorism laws and enhancing the investigative powers of law enforcement agencies.33 These initiatives stood in stark contrast to the country's tradition of paying homage to civil rights and civil liberties.

17 In both cases, however, the threat of terrorism continued to be associated with immigration practices and unassimilated Muslim minorities. Such considerations were poignantly reflected in various national debates surrounding referendum voting on the new EU Constitution.34 Looming membership for Turkey, together with the need to open up European markets to foreign labor, have become particular areas of concern. European voters are cognizant of the dangers inherent in global terrorism, but do not consider them intrinsic to their own domestic political contexts. It is still Europe's physical location – in near proximity to conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan – that renders them vulnerable to returning jihadists or newly recruited ones.35 Moreover, it is the duty of their own security apparatuses and law enforcement agencies to be prepared to countermand the radicalizing influences which such external elements exert on their own domestic Muslim communities (i.e. foreign jihadists, radical Middle Eastern and North African clerics, jihadist websites, and transnational recruiting networks).36

18 What this indicates is that domestic regulatory measures against terrorism are always context-specific and driven by trial-and-error practices. The need to reconcile democratic principles of governance with tough internal security measures – crafted to prevent acts of terrorism both at home and abroad – remains an ongoing, but necessary struggle. When extrapolated at the regional level, these developments create situations where nation-states cooperate and coordinate primarily in the name of short-term political interests and immediate social and economic gains. Such difficulties are unavoidable given the magnitude of the threat and the challenges facing individual countries. Limited resources, bureaucratic and judicial disparities, and varying domestic and foreign policy contexts all play a role.

19 At the regional level the need to harmonize these divergent domestic counter-terrorism experiences with the unifying requirements of international agreements presents an even more daunting task. Identifying a common threat, recognizing shared vulnerabilities, and coming up with a multilateral framework to redress these issues is a slow process. For one, the US-led GWOT is only one of the many priorities that local governments face, both at the national and the international level. Second, the varying domestic political environments and foreign policy expectations of individual nation-states further complicate the picture.37 Finally, multilateral frameworks that envision processes of joint action – even in the immediate-response-requiring sphere of counter-terrorism – have to be constructed with regard to the ideational spirit and institutional logic of each community. In consequence, the road to counter-terrorism as an experiment in region building will be a long one.

THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

20 So far, multilateral cooperation against terrorism in Europe and Southeast Asia has focused more on capacity building and the sharing of best practices, than on structural re-adjustments and policy coordination. In the majority of cases, the direct outcome of multilateral framework agreements has been to strengthen cooperation at the bilateral and trilateral levels. For instance, days before the signing of the ASEAN Work Programme on Counter-Terrorism, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia ratified a trilateral security pact for mutual assistance in the fight against terrorism.38 The accord's primary objective was to intensify joint patrols and intelligence sharing among co-signatories, aimed at curbing the movement of suspected terrorists and illegal substances across borders. The pact was later joined by Cambodia and Thailand, with Singapore also expressing interest.39 Prior to that, Malaysia and Indonesia had created a Joint Malaysian-Indonesian General Border Committee to oversee maritime and landborder policing.40 In November 2001, Singapore and Indonesia met to discuss piracy and bilateral defence cooperation.41 Most recently, in July 2004, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have launched trilateral coordinated patrols in the vital shipping lane of the Straits of Malacca to deter terrorism and to curb maritime piracy.42

21 Similarly, in Europe bilateral and trilateral agency-to-agency information sharing and the reciprocal granting of access to detainees have been the most effective measures in terms of producing results-oriented outcomes to date. Joint counter-terrorism investigations like OPERATION MAGNESIUM and OPERATION DATIL (Date) – pooling together the efforts and resources of intelligence and security agencies as far apart as France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK – have proved decisive for dismantling al-Qaeda's European networks and putting into place the various pieces of the bin Laden puzzle.43 Following the Madrid bombings, Spain, Italy, France, and Belgium have worked together to dismantle the clandestine network responsible for the attack. Together with the United States, France, Britain, and Germany are already engaged in joint intelligence gathering missions in East Africa and Afghanistan.44

22 However, some crucial differences between the European and Southeast Asian response still remain. For one, there is a clear divergence in terms of threat perceptions and vulnerability assessments. Second, the varying historical experiences of each region predispose each framework community to address these issues differently. Third, a comprehensive counter-terrorism response at the regional level – aimed at countering the transnational threat of global terrorism – requires a pooling together of resources, a degree of bureaucratic centralization, and a level of political like-mindedness. The extent to which such economic and political integration has been achieved plays a significant role for crafting multilateral policy outcomes in each region.

CONCLUSION

45 This article has argued that the responses of Europe and Southeast Asia to 11 September, the Bali bombings, the two Jakarta bombings, and the Madrid train bombings have been predicated on two main factors, namely the perception of the terrorist threat and the level of institutionalization of each regional com munity. While Europe associated the security challenge posed by al-Qaeda and its supporters with an external foreign threat – originating, in the majority of cases, outside of its perimeters and equated primarily with non-citizens or first and second generation immigrants who had effectively transported violence directed against their home countries to European soil – the security challenge posed by bin Laden's operatives in Southeast Asia was of a radically distinct nature. Since the vast majority of JI members were of local origin and had effectively used the region's internal security problems as the operating framework from within which to launch their terrorist campaign, al-Qaeda was considered to have gained an "indigenous face." The challenge of terrorism in Southeast Asia was therefore viewed as an internal domestic problem, testing both the political survival of local regimes and the post-colonial boundaries through which the body politic was framed.

46 Whereas the European anti-terrorism policy response reflected the reality of the EU being the most highly developed structure for regional integration in the world, the ASEAN reaction emphasized the soft-mechanism frameworks prevalent in Southeast Asia. The varying projections of the terrorist threat served to reinforce the ideational and operational modalities of each community. While EU nation-states felt comfortable with notions of shared sovereignty and the external nature of the threat,88 ASEAN member-states – as newly independent countries protective of their sovereignty and identity as multicultural societies – were initially defensive of their boundaries and al-Qaeda's internal challenge to their domestic political contexts. The resulting policy outcomes highlighted the ideational spirit and institutional logic of each community. The EU response focused on greater legislative harmonization and policy coordination. The ASEAN response implemented informal tracks of cooperation, most notably in the spheres of sharing expertise and "best practices." As such, individual nationstates – in dealing with the problem of global terrorism – partook and benefited from the multilateral frameworks for cooperation and coordination that they themselves had instituted in each region.

47 However, in view of the fluid and evolving nature of the threat – as evidenced by the continuing string of terrorist attacks worldwide – concerted efforts to enhance regional anti-terrorism protection and prevention must continue. The path forward is to move in the direction of greater institutionalization. More areas of joint action can be outlined and followed through, as well as greater adherence to UN-mandated and regionally crafted policy initiatives can be implemented. EU's current search for a shared security and defence identity can prove beneficial for counter-terrorism cooperation, especially in the spheres of judicial and security collaboration. Likewise, the recently proposed initiative at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia to institute an ASEAN Security Community as a founding pillar of ASEAN practices and objectives can help mitigate the lack of coordinated political will in the region and free the necessary resources to advance toward a more comprehensive and action-oriented counter terrorism response.89 Such response is particularly needed in the "soft-security" areas of trans-border flows of individuals, weapons, and money in the region. In all cases the prevalent wisdom is that if the EU and ASEAN fail to respond effectively and efficiently to the modern-day challenges of a type of terrorism that kills their citizens and targets their interests on the principle "anyone, anywhere, anytime," their relevance as adequate multilateral frameworks for regional peace and cooperation will be seriously undermined.

Barry Desker is the Director of the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and was Singapore's Ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1993.

Elena Pavlova is Visiting Associate at the Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where she is the Research Manager for the Terrorism and Political Violence Program.