

counter-terrorism in Australia, which could have helped correct these and other deficiencies in her treatment of the subject. The result is a book which contains a lot of useful information and raises some important human rights issues but which, taken as a whole, lacks credibility as a serious academic study.

At the beginning of her book, Hocking suggests that *Beyond Terrorism* has already aroused antagonism in official circles. The clear inference is that this antagonism stems from the concern of Australian politicians, public servants, police and intelligence officers over her "revelations" about their activities. If any such antagonism exists, however, it is much more likely to stem from the author's tendentious description of Australia's counter-terrorist apparatus, and the questionable motives which she has ascribed to the officials who administer them. Hocking's conspiracy theories make good reading and will no doubt win her a certain following in some circles. Yet they will help perpetuate many of the myths which currently exist about Australia's long-running efforts to establish workable counter-terrorist arrangements within the framework of a democratic society. They will also make it harder for those officials and others who recognize that the system still has shortcomings, but who wish to do something positive and constructive about them.

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Bozeman, Adda B. *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft*. New York: Brassey's (US), 1992.

*Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft* is a rich collection of fascinating and provocative essays by the distinguished American scholar and sociologist, Adda Bozeman. Already celebrated for her controversial treatise, *Politics and Culture in International History* (1960), which deals intensively with the non-Western world, Professor Bozeman has now put together old and new thinking after a lifetime of study in the field of intelligence and statecraft world-wide.

As early as the late 1930s this remarkable woman immersed herself in comparative studies of classical Persian, Chinese and Indian statecraft. The result is breathtaking and authoritative. Her chapter themes are timeless: "International Order in a Multicultural World; War and the Clash of Ideas; Covert Action and Foreign Policy in World Politics; Statecraft and Intelligence in the Non-Western World; and, Strategic Intelligence in Cold Wars of Ideas."

Writing much new material at the dawn of the new post-Cold War international order, Bozeman draws on an encyclopedic knowledge of American, Western and non-Western sources in order to emphasize her

dualistic conviction that successful statecraft is always and everywhere dependent on good intelligence, but that the United States will

not be able to promote its vital interests effectively in the 21st century unless it upgrades this particular dimension of policy formation by widening the field of intelligence collection, deepening levels of data analysis, and above all — by fashioning a reliable national consensus in support of strong intelligence services. (p. vii)

But alas, even this modest agenda is unlikely of achievement in the 1990s, says Bozeman, because of the typically American disinclination to take either “the past” or “other cultures” seriously. There is a stubborn disposition to identify non-Western states in terms of their nominal Western appearances rather than in their authentic substance. The net result is that Americans appear persuaded today that “intelligence is extraneous to the nation’s security interests and governing institutions and that it is somehow ‘undemocratic’ because some of its work is not open to daily public inspection.” (p 174)

There is a persistent theme in Bozeman’s writing that non-Western peoples everywhere have been reactivating their own political and cultural legacies without discarding the new protective umbrella of modern-style Western statehood. These political and cultural legacies play to the blind spot in the American foreign policy optic. There are three aspects of non-Western statecraft in particular, with which Americans seem unable to come to terms: “The first relates to the preponderance of authoritarian forms of rule; the second to the paramouncy of secret societies and clandestine or covert activities, and the third to the widespread predisposition to resort to war.” (p. 169) Concerning the first of these aspects, since 1991 the United States has somehow expected, as if by magic, that military defeat or peacekeeping would lead automatically to democracy in Iraq, Bosnia, Panama, Somalia and Haiti. Whereas in fact authoritarian rule, if not direct warlordism, is likely to be the enduring order of the day world-wide and Americans had better get used to it.

Concerning the other two aspects, Bozeman points out that cultures in the Middle East and elsewhere actually accept and even value conflict, conspiracy and war. Consequently,” she writes, “one may view a Muslims’ entire life as a continuous process of warfare, psychological and political, if not strictly military.” (p. 63) Because of the concept of “Jihad” or “Holy War,” Muslims live in a state of continuous insurgency. As a result, Arab statecraft has relied on psychological warfare, espionage, and subversion in its relentless pursuit of victories.

Similar themes emerge under the legalists in China of the fourth century BC and in Sun Tzu’s *Art of War*, in which the stress in strategy is squarely placed on the need to “encircle” the enemy’s mind. Strikingly different oriental cultures affirm the need to cancel, neutralize or subvert the human mind and Asian despotisms see conflict systems in which human nature is feared and distrusted and in which considerations of war always eclipse considerations of peace. Sun Tzu advocated hitting the enemy’s mind, thus his famous aphorism “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” (p. 73) Mao later quoted this dictum with approval as a statement of scientific truth.

But Bozeman reserves her deepest condemnation for the “Leninist operational code which involves psychological and diplomatic attack campaigns against the capitalist West (which) must be launched in the value language of the West if they are to reach, confound and eventually conquer the minds of people targeted for takeover.” (p. 83) In this way, Leninists could and did, in Sun Tzu’s phrase, “encircle our intelligence” which simply does not accommodate the communist formula that covert thought must spearhead covert as well as overt action. Bozeman actually goes so far as to suggest that China’s conversion to Marxism-Leninism has had the effect of “[c]ancelling the integrity of China as a civilization.” (p. 147) In her wide-ranging and penetrating analysis of non-Western societies, Bozeman demonstrates that contemporary American foreign policy is completely unprepared for either the psychological or clandestine dimensions of activity.

Two other sections of this book are incredibly apposite to the new world order. One is Bozeman’s description of the Venetian intelligence service — the progenitor of European secret services — in which special ambassadors carried out espionage, clandestine collection, covert action, counter-intelligence and paramilitary or psychopolitical operations. (p. 121) The other is a completely absorbing chapter on the “Guerra Fria” or “Cold War” in Spain 711-1492 AD. In this uniquely unfamiliar account of the otherwise familiar history of the clash of Christendom and Islam in Spain, Bozeman not only asserts that we ought to have known much more about cold wars from past history than we did after 1945, but that “all human contests are, in the final analysis, mental and psychological, and that they can be won or managed only by those who understand the mindset of the counterplayer while being absolutely certain also of just who they are themselves and what it is they stand for.” (p. 16)

Bozeman is convinced that the Western, sovereignty-directed, Westphalian state system is embattled everywhere. Robert Kaplan’s recent provocative article in the February 1994 issue of *Atlantic Monthly* on “The Coming Anarchy” could have been written as a postscript and addendum to *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft*. “We are dealing everywhere in the world with covert societies, covert thought and covert action,” writes Bozeman, “and further, and not coincidentally, we are dealing with societies that accept the constancy of conflict including war within society as well as in international relations without losing their bearing in life.” (p. 175) Unless American diplomacy wakes up to the strategies of non-Western societies then the future looks gloomy. Full of detailed knowledge and extraordinary erudition, this book deserves to be carefully studied by both scholars and practitioners as an antidote to ethnocentrism and cultural blindness and in the pursuit of successful statecraft. It is unfortunate that such a well-produced book lacks an index.

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