

REVIEW ESSAYS

Responding to Terrorism

Howard, Lawrence, ed. *Terrorism: Roots, Impacts, Responses*. New York: Praeger, 1992.

Schmid, Alex P., and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds. *Western Responses to Terrorism*. London: Frank Cass, 1993.

Two themes run consistently throughout *Terrorism: Roots, Impacts, Responses*, edited by Lawrence Howard, and *Western Responses to Terrorism*, edited by Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten. Both themes serve to highlight the highly emotional public response and debate surrounding terrorism, while also pointing to some of the primary sources of difficulty associated with efforts to reach a consensus on either the definition of terrorism or the selection of appropriate responses. Central to the discussions presented in *Terrorism and Western Responses* is the question of legitimacy. Before terrorism can be defined, and before the most appropriate responses can be identified, observers, analysts, and policy makers must decide on the degree of legitimacy they are willing to afford terrorists. Failure to define the extent to which acts of terror can be viewed as justified within the context of political struggle prevents meaningful consensus on response. For democracies, the importance of determining legitimacy becomes even more critical given the emphasis placed on the rule of law and respect for rights in those societies.

Efforts to determine the degree of legitimacy a government is willing to cede, in turn, impact significantly on the state's willingness to relinquish elements of sovereignty. By recognizing the legitimacy of political offenses, the state is forced to balance varying standards of acceptable behavior using an artificial situational context to differentiate between justified and unjustified uses of force. Society demands protection from unanticipated violence against the innocent. Allowing for the legitimacy of acts committed in the context of political activity disregards those generally accepted standards of society. At the same time, international efforts to coordinate and integrate policies and actions into a common set of responses appears most likely through integration of law enforcement and judicial activities. Common responses, if effective, will require international consensus on the definition of "terrorism," the nature of "political offenses," the degree of legitimacy afforded to those pursuing violence as a form of political struggle, and the degree to which each participating state is willing to cede measures of state sovereignty to its partners.

Each volume stands well on its own, displaying its own set of strengths. *Terrorism* highlights the broader, more intangible theme of terrorism's legitimacy and that question's impact on crafting a successful response. *Western Responses*, on the other hand, focuses on developing a model for a common European response, addressing mainly the question of shared judicial and police policies and their effect

on the tangible goal of identifying that model. In this light, *Western Responses* addresses the concrete aspects of the response problem. Taken together, the two volumes bring the reader through the full range of considerations, allowing for a more considered appreciation of the difficulties inherent in creating an effective, and acceptable, response to terrorism. While each has its own particular strengths and weaknesses, like any other work in a field so intimately tied to values judgments, the volumes compliment each other well and are best read together.

The notions of legitimacy and sovereignty form an underlying basis of both *Terrorism* and *Western Responses*. *Terrorism* originated as publicly presented lectures given at the University of California, Irvine in 1989 and 1990. Howard's contributors were asked ". . . to address the casual background (the roots) of terrorism and the impact on various audiences and institutions and to suggest responses that they believe should form the basis of public policy." (p. ix) Acknowledging that terrorism affects different audiences in varying ways, Howard points out that for Americans, his contributors' primary audience, terrorism remains primarily a symbolic threat. Given the relatively small numbers of Americans killed or injured by terrorist violence, especially when compared to the numbers killed or injured as the result of traffic accidents or lightning strikes, *Terrorism* serves to illustrate the prejudices and fears generated by terrorist violence. These, Howard points out, can contribute to the terrorists' success. Since public reaction magnifies the terrorists' goals of riveting public attention, Howard argues terrorism may, in a sense, be effective. This observation raises, for Howard, the central question addressed by his contributors: should we acknowledge any legitimacy in terrorism?

Brian Jenkins begins to tackle the question by examining broadly defined ways in which democracies should respond to terrorism and how terrorism itself impacts on those democracies. While recent trends in terrorist violence have led to increased deadliness, Jenkins points out that terrorists have been aided as well by more widely available weapons and explosives, greater global mobility, and advances in mass communications. Communications advances are reinforced by the media's tendency to devote more attention to the dramatic, yet the terrorists themselves have tempered those advances by their inability to effectively communicate their political message in a simple, easily understood manner free of confusing and pedant rhetoric. In arguing that democracy itself is perhaps the strongest weapon available to counter the threat, Jenkins points out that emotional public reactions often lead to emotional government responses which can be taken as a reward for terrorist violence in the absence of any real terrorist-to-government dialogue. Overtly emotional responses, such as military retaliation, have little place in Jenkins' vision of appropriateness. Besides conveying a form of legitimacy through dialogue, military retaliation is seen as inappropriate since

[t]errorists offer few targets for conventional military operations. They control no territory and have no cities or populations to protect. States that sponsor terrorism are more vulnerable to military violence, but we must have evidence that connects the state to the act of

terrorism — and that is hard to get. For example, the Japanese Red Army leader shows up in Tripoli and vows to take revenge for the bombing of Libya; attack follow in Europe. They may have a base in Lebanon or maybe Damascus. What do you attack? (pp. 22-23)

Jenkins, however, falls into the common trap of viewing the phenomenon from a narrow perspective by asserting that international terrorism is a uniquely American concern.

Christon Archer, a professor of history and the chairman of the Department of History at the University of Calgary, examines the period leading to Mexican independence in searching for antecedents to today's terrorism. Looking at the years 1810 to 1821 and the actions of both the Mexican rebels and the colonial Spanish authorities, Archer illustrates the commonalities in tactics both between Mexicans and Spaniards and between those two groups and today's terrorists. While providing a well written overview of the struggle for Mexican independence, Archer's greatest contribution to *Terrorism* lies in highlighting the common elements of political violence found in both early nineteenth-century Mexico and today's international arena. In the final analysis, Archer succeeds in demonstrating that the very elements which make terrorism abhorrent today are not unique to the twentieth century.

While terrorist violence, as Archer points out, is not new, we often tend to focus on particular groups or ideologies we associate with terror. These associations are generally fleeting and firmly grounded in the attention and publicity of the most recent deadly series of attacks. This tunnel vision, in turn, leads easily into the type of stereotype attacked by Khalid Duran. An Associate Scholar at Philadelphia's Foreign Policy Research Institute, Duran examines the current popular association of terrorism with Muslim extremism on the one hand, and contrasts these with the tenets of the Koran on the other. Demonstrating an intimate understanding of the Koran, Duran points out that despite popular perceptions and despite the claims of some Middle Eastern terrorists, the Koran specifically forbids the use of violence in pursuit of political goals, effectively negating the claimed religious legitimacy of some Middle Eastern groups. He further argues that the true roots of Middle Eastern terrorism can be found in anti-colonial struggles, the Palestine question, wealth disparities, and in authoritarian states which cynically invoke Islam for their own ends. Duran cites European fascism, communism, and the success of Jewish terrorists in Mandate Palestine as inspirations for Middle Eastern terrorists. The examination suffers in the end, however, in Duran's fairly weak attempt to demonstrate his view that Middle Eastern terrorism pales when compared to Iranian terrorism which, in turn, pales when compared to that perpetrated by Pakistan. In this argument, Duran has his greatest difficulty separating Pakistani internal security and foreign policies, particularly toward Afghanistan, and their relationship to terrorism. Arguing that Pakistani policy centers on the absorption of Afghanistan as a means to provide strategic depth against India has little demonstrated link to terrorism. While Duran may have valid

points to make, his argument lacks the evidence and compelling construction necessary to successfully make his point.

Martha Crenshaw moves the examination toward the psychological motivations which allow for indiscriminate violence. Crenshaw argues well that much can be learned about terrorist motivations by thoroughly examining strategic and political aspects of terror, but that to understand a group such as ETA requires psychological analysis at both the individual and group levels. Strategic and political analysis often tends to suggest that groups granted some of their demands, particularly those associated with access to the political process and a chance to affect political change through non-violent means, are likely to give up violence at least as long as the changes appear to be working. The ETA however, is one group which has refused to renounce or refrain from violence despite political reforms implemented after the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Something else, either at the group or individual levels, Crenshaw argues, motivates these individuals and the most likely weak point lies in the strength of the group's cohesiveness. Crenshaw argues that psychological analysis will likely provide the information most useful in breaking that cohesion. Military retaliation, on the other hand, could serve to further motivate the group by reinforcing feelings of common struggle against an unyielding opponent.

Nehemia Friedland, an associate professor of psychology at Tel Aviv University, adds to Crenshaw's assessment by seeking to construct a framework for understanding motivations toward violence based on socio-psychological axioms. Friedland sees three generalizations as the basis for such a framework, beginning with the idea that terrorism is a group phenomenon. This categorization eliminates much of what is often labelled terrorism by the mass media, such as attacks conducted by lone individuals with or without a political agenda. However, this narrower focus does not represent a weakness in Friedland's analysis. Secondly, intergroup conflict provides the genesis for terrorism, although here Friedland clearly refers to the terrorists and the state or society they attack as the groups in conflict. Friedland seeks to clarify this generalization by arguing that terrorism's roots in intergroup conflict negate individual psychosis or personality disorders as identifiable root causes of terrorism. Finally, terrorism conducted by non-state actors is a weapon of the weak who feel, correctly or incorrectly, that they have no alternative to violence in their struggle. Viewing terrorism as intergroup conflict between the terrorists and the larger society, Friedland raises three questions for which answers are needed when seeking insight into the causes of terrorism. First, what are the conditions that produce a movement toward social and political change? Next, what are the dynamics that turn such a movement to violence? Finally, why has terrorism acquired unprecedented dimensions in the last two decades? (p. 83)

Alex P. Schmid, as a contributor to *Terrorism*, addresses Friedland's third question in his "Terrorism and the Media: Freedom of Information vs. Freedom from Intimidation." Schmid argues that terrorism is violence directed toward

exploiting the power of the media. Revolving around the question of whether the media “by informing us on acts of terrorism, [does] not also intimidate all those who own a radio or TV set or read a paper and identify with the victim . . .” (p. 95) Schmid sees the media as a tool for terrorists, arguing that terrorists often engage in acts of violence as a means of securing otherwise ordinarily denied access. The impact as Schmid points out, both in timeliness and reach, of the mass media today lend even greater weight to the notion of killing one to frighten ten thousand.¹ (p. 99) Schmid makes some good points, but falters in assessing the point of blame. While he accurately reflects the media’s impact in allowing terrorists access to many more individuals than they might otherwise have, providing an outlet for spreading their message of fear and intimidation, he comes up short in maintaining that “[i]n a certain sense, we are all victims of terrorism as is constructed for us by the mass media . . .” (p. 101) The media does seem to focus shallowly on the violence itself, often not addressing in any depth the causes, impacts, or responses; yet by asserting that the media’s treatment of terrorism serves to victimize entire societies it denies the individual’s ability to simply ignore the media and message. Newspapers and newsmagazines can go unread, and TVs and radios can be turned off, removing the terrorists’ ability to reach those individuals with their message. For those individuals who do allow the intrusion of the media, however, Schmid’s assessment remains valid, particularly with respect to a government’s desire to counter or contain adverse emotional impacts of acts of terror. Toward this end, Schmid advocates media self-censorship, rather than governmental censorship, as a means of denying terrorists the outlet they need for the public attention.

Howard uses Abraham Miller’s examination of Britain’s “Guildford Four” case to highlight and expand upon the idea that media self-censure provides a more reasonable alternative to government censorship. Miller, a professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati, provides a very readable account of Gerard Conlon’s arrest and conviction in British courts for bombing a pub in Guildford, and of the injustice done to Conlon and his codefendants as a result of their false conviction and imprisonment. Miller demonstrates in this case how the British criminal justice system failed by allowing convictions based on suspect allegations of one individual and subsequent interrogation by British police. Beyond the claims of police beatings and other forms of mistreatment to obtain confessions, Miller illustrates the British courts’ failure to conduct itself in the manner British society generally expects, by refusing to reconsider the guilty verdicts in light of evidence obtained later, which clearly pointed to the guilt of others. Miller turns around Schmid’s arguments, in a sense, and seeks to demonstrate how a democratic government can persecute innocents in the name of preserving national security, and how only a free and persistent media can save those people. Miller demonstrates how persistent media pressure eventually forced British authorities to reconsider the conviction and imprisonment of Conlon and others. Miller argues, perhaps correctly, that without this pressure from an uncensored media, the Guildford Four would remain incarcerated in Britain. Miller’s presentation is compelling, yet his analysis seems to present the actions of separate British authorities at various levels

in the local and national bureaucracies as coordinated actions fitting into a plan to protect British society from Irish Republican Army terror at any cost. A more balanced approach would also include the possibility that sloppy police work, coupled with a bureaucratic obsession with IRA terrorism at the time, led to an environment in which abuses were possible. Seeing the experience of the Guildford Four as the result of such a time, rather than as a planned course of government action, would more accurately illustrate the dangers faced by democracies when the level of political violence rises to the point that the citizenry demands decisive action.

The future of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, particularly when it concerns US policy makers, is the concern of Bruce Hoffman's contribution to *Terrorism*. While Hoffman makes many good points and generally argues those items well, the overall tenor of his treatment is disappointing, due largely to his failure to clearly define terms. Hoffman states that there were "[o]nly thirteen identifiable terrorist groups . . . in 1969, for example, compared with seventy-four today," (p. 141) without setting parameters by which he arrived at those numbers. His treatment suffers a similar fate when he discusses religion-inspired terrorism. Asserting that this form of terrorism has occurred throughout history, Hoffman continues by arguing that religion-inspired terrorists:

. . . perform their terrorist acts for no audience but themselves. Thus the restraints on violence that are imposed on secular terrorists by the desire to appeal to an uncommitted constituency are not relevant to the religious terrorist. (p. 145)

Hoffman continues by arguing that secular and religious terrorists, consequently, see themselves differently, with religious terrorists motivated more by a sense of alienation and secular terrorists by a more pragmatic desire for system change. Despite the difficulties Hoffman encounters through lack of definitional clarity, he makes some interesting and relevant points for American policy makers.

Hoffman begins to bring *Terrorism* back to the question of appropriate response by arguing that the United States should not shy away from using military force to counter terrorism, particularly when the terrorist violence is state-sponsored. In highlighting the pressures to react felt by political leaders, even if the mood favors blind retaliation, Hoffman argues that the use of force should be carefully calculated to send a message to the terrorist leadership, or their sponsor's leadership, while limiting collateral damage to the greatest possible extent. Like Jenkins in chapter one, Hoffman argues for a measured and well-thought out course of action if military response is selected by policy makers.

Paul Wilkinson's first contribution, "Observations on the Relationship of Freedom and Terrorism," continues drawing the threads of *Terrorism* to a conclusion by discussing the strengths of democratic institutions against terrorist assault. Wilkinson points out the human impulse toward political freedom and suggests that in many instances these impulses highlight the irresistible allure of democratic

institutions. Wilkinson illustrates his point by arguing that as Eastern Europe experiences greater political liberalization, it will also face a greater threat from insurgent terrorism. This threat, in turn, will increase pressure on those governments to fall back on authoritarian means of suppression. The preferred alternative, Wilkinson counsels, is to reign in the impulse to reinstitute draconian state controls and to counter the threat through the strength of democratic institutions lest the gains of liberalization are lost.

Wilkinson's second contribution to *Terrorism*, "Can the European Community Develop a Concerted Policy on Terrorism?" not only brings Howard's edition to closure, but provides a bridge to his more in-depth examination of that topic in *Western Responses*. In *Terrorism*, Wilkinson briefly examines the prospects of greater European economic and political integration in terms of the impact on counter-terrorism efforts. He argues that a common legal policy would strengthen Europe's ability to meet and withstand terrorist challenges ahead. *Western Responses*, in turn, fleshes out in greater detail the challenges and opportunities faced by European policy makers as Europe moves toward greater integration.

Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten put together *Western Responses* to stimulate discussion on European responses to terrorism. Recognizing that countries such as Israel and the United States have developed certain anti-terrorist policies, Schmid and Crelinsten seek to address the need or desire for a common Western European response model. Given increasing European integration, they ask which, if any, present Western European national model is most appropriate for the future. If no present national model is suitable, they continue, is a new approach possible which combines the effective elements of others while preserving democratic acceptability? The editors stress their perspective, and bias toward preserving their conception of liberal democracy, by concluding the introductory remarks:

With these profound and dramatic changes [increasing European integration as well as changes in the international environment] has come a transformation of terrorism and political violence in general. The increasing importance of religiously-inspired, right-wing, nationalist or anti-foreign violence and the increasing recognition, as highlighted in many contributions to this volume, that domestic and international forms of terrorism are often closely connected, necessitate a rethinking of traditional approaches both to the study of terrorism and to its control by democratic states.

By looking back over the past two and a half decades of terrorism when a new era in international affairs is just beginning, we hope that this volume will serve to highlight the need to rethink traditional concepts of both terrorism and counter-terrorism and to develop new approaches for the democratic control of terrorism in a rapidly changing world. (p. 6)

The goals are admirable, yet *Western Responses* carries with it several shortcomings. Foremost among these is the evident bias in some of the selections

toward protection of the rights of those convicted of terrorist violence. Democracies do have a duty to protect and maintain the rights of individuals, yet when that desire conflicts with anti-terrorist practices to the detriment of society, one has to wonder whether the needs of society are being well served. It should be kept in mind that terrorists guilty of violence against society have, themselves, broken the rules society has established for itself. By stepping outside the bounds of accepted behavior, the terrorist effectively relinquishes any claims to legitimacy. Excusing his actions through justifications based on the political nature of the act serves only to raise the relative importance of the terrorist's rights above those of the greater society.

Western Responses also suffers, through no fault of the editors, from some rather sketchy treatments of specific country models. Schmid and Crelinsten organize the volume into three sections examining, in turn, the problem under discussion, specific national European experiences with terrorism, and a discussion of what lessons can be drawn from the foregoing. *Western Responses* has its genesis in a 1989 conference organized by the European student association AEGEE (Association des États Généraux des Étudiants de l'Europe), with participation from the Center for the Study of Social Conflict at Leiden University. Given that the content and scope of the contributions are dependent on the offerings of conference participants, Schmid and Crelinsten were left acknowledging that the French and Swiss experiences may hold some important lessons for all of Europe. Unfortunately, French and Swiss participants failed to provide the level of examination expected on countries significant for, respectively, their experience with international terrorists and their roles as neutral logistical bases for terrorists operating in other states. Similarly, *Western Responses* suffers in its focus on Western Europe by the noteworthy exclusion of considerations of both the Scandinavian and Greek experiences.

Schmid leads off the volume by defining anti-terrorist response in terms of the problems associated with reaching consensus on the definition of terrorism. Schmid distinguishes four general categories of discussions on terrorism — academic, state or diplomatic, public use, and perpetrators/sympathizers — in which perspectives differ to the extent that building consensus across the categories may be impossible. Since the inability to develop a workable definition acceptable in each area hinders coordinating anti-terrorist policies, Schmid proposes examining the general models of terrorism. Rather than look at the phenomenon through the crime model filter, in which the focus is on the illegality of the act itself, or through the filter of the war model, which views terrorism as a form of political discourse, Schmid advocates the legal model. By looking at terrorism as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes, however, Schmid concedes a willingness to convey a sense of legitimacy on the perpetrators of violence which many states have been loathe to give. Schmid's argument is confusing at times, especially when stating "apparently some hijackings and kidnappings are more terroristic than others," (p. 10) and in arguing that there "is a difference between the target of

violence and the target of terror” to the extent that “one has to distinguish between a *common assassination and one in the context of terrorism* by labelling the first ‘individuated political murder’ and the second ‘de-individuated political murder’.” (p. 11. Emphasis added) Attempts to draw fine distinctions in terrorist violence, regardless of the intent, does little more than muddle the discussion by providing even greater opportunities to inject value judgments.

Schmid concludes his initial discussion by suggesting complete Western European legal and judicial integration, at least for countering terrorism. Schmid writes:

The European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism has been plagued by the lack of distinction between a ‘criminal offence’ and a ‘political offence’. By placing narrowly defined acts of terrorism in the context of ‘war crimes,’ the dilemma of contributing a given act of violence to the criminal or political sphere disappears. Acts of terrorism, like war crimes, could be dealt with by a special European tribunal with special jurisdiction on terroristic offences. (p. 13)

Schmid neglects to consider, however, the willingness or lack of willingness by Western European states to give up a measure of sovereignty in pursuit of judicial integration. The extent to which some states have jealously guarded their prerogative to distinguish between criminal and political acts when faced with extradition requests strongly suggests those same states would be unwilling to allow courts or tribunals outside their legal systems and borders to determine issues of guilt and punishment for those accused and convicted of terrorist violence.

Schmid’s second contribution begins to deal with the issue of legitimacy. Citing the strengths of democratic systems of government, he argues that it is more important for a democracy to maintain its own legitimacy than to achieve quick tactical success against terrorists while disregarding the most cherished tenets on democracy. For Schmid, the choice is between acceptability and effectiveness. The greatest danger, he argues, is not from the terrorists themselves but from the potential for the state to slip away from democratic practices in the attempt to “solve” the problem quickly. The discussion should, perhaps, address the very nature of democracy, how it is defined, and who decided its limits. Those who define democracy in terms of representative government in which the state is, ultimately, a tool of the citizenry’s will could have difficulties in accepting Schmid’s rather rigid view and embrace of the ideals of democracy.

A.J. Jongman provides a well-written, well-organized discussion of the trends in terrorism in Western Europe since 1968. Filled with statistics on attacks by targets, numbers, means, and location, Jongman illustrates effectively the dangers in not defining terrorism prior to analysis. The figures presented demonstrate how even slight differences in definition can lead to wide variances in data which, in turn, leads to wide disparities in trend assessments. Jongman provides a convincing argument for his assertion that trends in terrorist violence are most

appropriately viewed in a country-specific context, given data availability and definitions used. He continues by demonstrating the variety of trends identifiable in Europe since 1968 when the data is examined for each country. The discussion suggests, however, that Schmid and Crelinsten's goal of identifying a singular European anti-terrorist response model may be more difficult than expected.

Part two of *Western Responses*, in general, provides an excellent overview of anti-terrorist responses in Western Europe. Some presentations like those on France and Switzerland, however, fail to meet expectations, while others present only a limited and consequently unbalanced approach. Schmid begins the section with a discussion of the Dutch outlook and experience, arguing that there is a uniquely Dutch approach to countering societal violence. Based on a pragmatic approach to dealing with violence, Dutch tolerance is credited with creating a political environment which is not conducive to protest evolution. Schmid maintains Dutch history and practices have struck a balance between the ideals of democracy and the demands for security. Although he seems to set the Dutch experience up as a model for Western Europe, Schmid wisely tempers his conclusion by reminding us that the Netherlands has yet to experience the levels of violence other European states have experienced, while cautioning that the Dutch approach is largely untested against such a significant challenge.

The Spanish state has faced such a challenge in attempting to cope with at least one terrorist group, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), which has refused to put aside violence despite the state's acceding to longstanding political reforms demanded by ETA. Although the conditions allowing political reform came about only with the restoration of democracy following the death of Francisco Franco, succeeding Spanish administrations have allowed greater regional autonomy and other measures designed to meet and defuse the threat offered by ETA and others. Fernando Jimenez provides an overview of active groups in Spain, both domestic and international, and a summary of the steps taken since Franco to counter the challenge. From the Spanish experience, Jimenez offers five guiding principles for anti-terrorism efforts: adherence to and accountability under the law; clearly defined political objectives for countering the threat; unambiguous, centralized chains of command and control for both policy and implementation; a strong and centralized intelligence gathering capability; and, the ability to commit to long-term planning and action not only to counter the immediate threat, but to resolve and prevent those of the future.

After a very short and disappointing treatment of France, Kurt Groenewold provides one of *Western Responses* more obviously biased examinations in presenting a single-sided view of German treatment of suspected and convicted terrorists from the Red Army Faction. Groenewold's assessments, however, are more easily understood within the context of his association with Germany's radical left. A lecturer at Hamburg University, Groenewold obtained first-hand insights into the German legal system through his work as a lawyer defending anti-Vietnam protestors in the 1960s, and RAF members, including Andreas

Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, in the 1970s. To his credit, Groenewold states his bias and perspective up front:

I am not concerned with the problem of how such groups have been or are to be combated by the government, the holder of state authority. I am concerned with the question of whether or not the measures taken by the Federal government [Federal Republic of Germany] to combat captured members of urban guerrilla groups and to bring them to trial, plus any supporting measures, are acceptable from the point of view of civil liberties and the self-image of the Western constitutional democracies. (p. 136)

Asserting that the trials of RAF members were political trials, Groenewold's argument revolves around his perception of the RAF inmates as political prisoners rather than as criminals. The very act of putting on a political trial, he claims, serves to indict the government for its attempts to stage trials in order to discredit government opponents rather than to assess guilt and apply appropriate punishment.

Groenewold attacks the German penal system for its harsh and inhumane treatment of RAF prisoners, arguing that the state sought to degrade its prisoners while breaking their personalities and identities. Bemoaning the use of solitary confinement as a tool for maintaining positive control, forced feeding of hunger strikers, and the German courts' allowance of trials conducted without the defendant's presence in some instances. Groenewold fails to ask how much better the German state treated its "victims" than the RAF. In the end, Groenewold argues the state must conduct itself at the highest standards of democratic ideals, yet fails to demonstrate any way in which German terrorists themselves lived up to the minimal standards of civilized conduct. Groenewold's analysis is also lacking in its focus on events of the 1970s, raising the question of change in the 1980s and beyond. While the merits of examining past practices for their lessons remains valuable in any discussion of future options, Groenewold's one-sided presentation, lacking an assessment of any recent changes, only illustrates the stridency of impassioned agendas.

Donatella della Porta, on the other hand, provides a well-balanced assessment of the Italian experience with terrorism. Recognizing four distinct periods separating Italian approaches since 1970, della Porta uses the lessons learned to shape suggestions for a coordinated European model. Between 1970 and 1974, she demonstrates well how the Italian state disregarded the threat of left-wing terrorism while suffering from secret service protection of right-wing terrorism. In the second period, 1974 to 1976, right-wing terror declined and Italian authorities devoted more time and effort to countering and suppressing left-wing terrorism and organized crime. Between 1977 and 1982, the previous patterns of Italian response led to a period which saw an explosion of left-wing terror coupled with an apparent decline of terrorism on the right. In contrast, della Porta argues the policies of repentance laws and amnesties contributed to the decline of left-wing terror between 1982 and 1989. Using the analysis presented, it is easy to extend della

Porta's examination beyond 1989, the year of the AEGEE conference, to explain and understand the rapid growth of terrorism perpetrated by rightists and organized crime in the early 1990s. Della Porta's organization and analysis provide valuable tools for use in efforts to develop a European response model by illustrating the effects, both positive and negative, of a number of Italian responses to a variety of threats. Highlighting the negative impact on civil rights brought on by the state's policies during the *emergenza*, the presentation continues by explaining the steps taken to reverse the adverse side-effects of more draconian Italian anti-terrorist policies. Della Porta shows how Italy largely defeated leftist terror of the 1970s through changes in the Italian party system, increasing stability in the national government, development of coherent and unified political policies, and the focus of legislative attempts to counter terror, which recognized the power of psychological motivations and inducements designed to address the more basic human needs of individuals involved as a means of breaking terrorist group cohesion. In highlighting Italian efforts to address group cohesion and terrorist motivations through amnesties and reconciliations, della Porta aptly demonstrates how the ideas presented by Martha Crenshaw in *Terrorism* have worked in practice.

David Bonner approaches the British experience from a legal perspective and separates terrorism into three distinct categories: international terrorism; domestic terrorism not related to Northern Ireland, and; domestic terrorism connected with Northern Ireland. Focusing on security legislation to deal with Irish-connected terror, Bonner concludes that only a political solution acceptable to all parties involved in Northern Ireland will significantly increase Britain's prospects for peace and stability. While agreeing with most contributors in both *Terrorism* and *Western Responses* by stating "one must remember that one does not save the liberal state from terrorism by trampling roughshod on its most precious values and postulates," (p. 178) Bonner remains largely unapologetic for the security practices of the UK. The difference between Bonner's perspective and that of Miller in *Terrorism* is striking. Bonner provides a valuable discussion of various elements of British anti-terrorist legislation including proscription; stop, question, and search practices in Northern Ireland; attacking financial and logistics sources of terrorist groups; evolving investigative powers; wider latitude for arrests and extensions in detention without charge; variety of charging choices, and; extradition and extra-territorial jurisdiction arrangements. While many would criticize Bonner, and the British, for advocating security practices open to abuse of democratic ideals, Bonner creditably defends British practices by also addressing criteria and methods by which anti-terrorist policies can be evaluated for both effectiveness and acceptability within the liberal democratic framework. His assessment seems to emphasize the idea that the rights of the law-abiding members of society are no less important than the rights of individuals engaging in violent protest against the state. Recognizing the rights of society's majority, Bonner draws lessons from the British experience which seek to balance the demands of democratic ideals with the rights and expectations of society.

Schmid and Crelinsten also include an assessment by Gilbert Guillaume of the French experience, which could have contributed significantly to the volume if expanded, and Albert A. Stahel, highlighting Switzerland's place as a neutral ground for rest, financing, and logistics. Heinz Vetschera provides the final country assessment by examining Austria's philosophy of rejecting specific anti-terrorist legislation in favor of relegating terrorist activities to criminal law statutes. Citing this philosophy, Vetschera's main lesson for Europe lies in Austria's having little need for high profile security measures. By relying on criminal statutes to deal with terrorism in Austria, the state has successfully streamlined its response procedures to effectively deal with violent acts, like Britain, as easily identifiable crimes. Removing terrorism from the political arena, at least for the purposes of legal and judicial response, allows Austria and others to more readily agree on methods of countering the challenge posed by terrorism. In this, Vetschera offers what may be Europe's best solution to the problem of developing a united anti-terrorist policy, while avoiding the potential for abuse provided by state insistence on reserving judgment about an act's political nature.

The final section of *Western Responses* addresses this desire for a common model of European response to terrorism. Focusing on the Schengen Agreement and the impact of free movement across inner European borders, Korthals Altes highlights the complexity and adaptability required of a coordinated European response. As borders become more porous, European states will have to develop common practices of controls which will allow the free and unrestricted movement of individuals, while providing the mechanisms authorities need to counter terrorists' exploitation of European integration. Mechanisms discussed include coordinated visa policies, creation of an integrated computer-based information exchange system, standardization of social welfare practices, and increased cooperation by police across state boundaries.

Meliton Cardona expands on the discussion of implementing effective coordination by arguing that agreements are often rendered ineffective through implementation differences. While the protocols and treaties may suggest high degrees of cooperation, implementation clauses allowing states to choose the conditions under which they will honor the text, if not the spirit, of the agreement provide a significant barrier to effective implementation. Cardona sees potential, however, in eventually achieving success in drafting an agreement acceptable to all parties and workable if the focus is on smaller, more limited regional agreements in contrast to global agreements. In this light, Cardona seems optimistic that Europe can develop a workable regional protocol.

The American perspective on combatting terrorism is addressed briefly by Paul Bremer III. Bremer argues in favor of efforts to remove vestiges of legitimacy from terrorists as a means of effectively meeting the threat. Bremer also argues, in contrast to some other contributors, in favor of pressuring states which sponsor terrorism. He continues by assessing specific measures used against terrorists, but falters in focusing largely on defensive measures such as airport screenings and

physical security without addressing the root causes or motivations of terrorists. Limiting responses to physical security, defensive measures, and state sponsors will certainly have an impact on the levels of terrorist violence, but remain only treatments of the symptoms. A longer view of the threat, its causes, and solutions would likely provide insights into effective means of permanent controls.

Richard Clutterbuck takes a longer view in examining the practice of negotiating with terrorists. After providing a summary of notable cases, Clutterbuck seeks to determine whether or not governments should negotiate, whether negotiations and concessions lead to further attacks, and whether governments should control the situation by prohibiting private negotiations and privately paid ransoms. While arguing that governments ultimately do more damage by giving in to blackmail, Clutterbuck argues that governments are equally erroneous when they adopt firm policies prohibiting negotiations which do not allow for flexibility in response to situational specifics. Transposing a firm but flexible response into an international agreement raises further problems. Clutterbuck cites the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) to demonstrate how political concessions among states designed to entice additional states to sign the treaty led to additional clauses which defeated the treaty's objectives. In the end, the Convention retains clauses allowing signatory states to opt out of honoring extradition requests at their discretion. Clutterbuck's assessment remains that a firm policy is required, but should be tempered with flexibility. While some concessions in past instances have, indeed, led to further attacks, Clutterbuck finds the pattern cannot be easily generalized across state or situational boundaries. Restrictions on private efforts, he argues, are generally counterproductive by forcing the businesses, families, and individuals so inclined to negotiate behind the backs of state authorities.

M.P.M. Zagari follows Clutterbuck's presentation by examining the specific content of various treaties designed to combat terrorism. Focusing on the 1977 Convention, the 1978 Dublin Agreement, and efforts of the TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and political Violence) Group and the European parliament, Zagari highlights the difficulties encountered in achieving agreements among states which have similar, but uniquely national perspectives. Extradition has been, and will likely remain, a problem for effective cooperation, as will the issue of national sovereignty. Zagari writes:

The process of integration . . . presupposes that the Member States recognize the affinity of their political structures and moral values and that they recognize one another as partners equal in every sense. It follows that a Member State cannot, by invoking the right of asylum, refuse a request for extradition from another Member State as this would effectively mean that it was claiming greater independence and impartiality for its own courts and was setting itself up as more respectful of human rights. (pp. 295-96)

To counter the problems raised by differences in perspective, Zagari suggests the establishment of a common "European Judicial Area" which, by incorporating the values and principles of the member states, conceivably could allow European authorities to circumvent expected problems arising from different conceptions of terrorism's political nature. In Zagari's construction, any time differences between states arose as the result of differing perceptions of extraditability or concern for human rights guarantees, suspects would be tried before a supranational European Court. Like other contributors, however, Zagari fails to adequately consider the realities associated with surrender of such measures of state sovereignty. The ideal certainly seems agreeable to potential member states, for without such commonality none of the present day anti-terrorist agreements would exist. Repeated disagreements over the language of those texts, however, particularly over the right to decide whether the offense is in fact an extraditable offense, clearly suggests states would be equally unwilling to cede that exercise of sovereignty to a European Court.

Recognizing the difficulty in coordinating effective international judicial and police practices against terrorism, Richard Clutterbuck adds a second contribution examining practical means for tracking individuals suspected of terrorist activities. He notes, first and foremost, that states maintain the right and expectation to provide for their own internal security. The free movement of people across internal European borders, however, opens a Pandora's box of problems for the authorities charged with maintaining that order. Clutterbuck briefly surveys the potential technologies available for use in this effort.

Schmid and Crelinsten bring *Western Responses* full circle by assessing the responses presented by their contributors in an effort to make some suggestions for a common European policy which would prove effective without trampling democratic ideals. Pointing out that the reality of terrorism includes both elements of international terrorism and domestic terrorism, the editors break the various types of responses surveyed into workable categories ranging from the softer approaches of accommodation and reform to the harder responses based on repressive force. Schmid and Crelinsten spend considerable effort in explaining why a military response is ultimately ineffective and threatening to the democratic stability of the state itself, yet interestingly cite at least one example which also supports military responses. In arguing that the military should be an instrument of last resort, General George Grivas' statement that "one does not use a tank to catch field mice — a cat will do the job better," is used seemingly in the context of suggesting that military responses often attract more terrorist attacks. An alternative interpretation would agree that the wisest standing policy would look upon military response as a last resort, yet acknowledge the usefulness of such a response if the military's use is tempered in the context of the situation. Military response is not, in and of itself, irrational. Rather, the overwhelming use of force at inappropriate levels — the sledgehammer-to-break-an-egg syndrome — lends the irrational quality to many previous uses of military force against terrorists.

Schmid and Crelinsten also assess the types of responses not already brought out into open discussion by their contributors in order to add a fuller measure of consideration to their assessment. Balancing the needs of the state and society against both democratic ideals and the demand for effective actions, Schmid and Crelinsten write:

A balance must be struck between the 'delegitimation' of terrorism in political life, typical of offensive operations, and leaving open the door to those who wish to come back, typical of defensive operations. To this end, violence and coercion might not always be the best method of coping with terrorism. The more coercive and repressive methods might strengthen the terrorist organization and its hold over its members. Anti-terrorist strategies might be directed, on the one hand, to preventing new recruits from joining terrorist organizations and, on the other, to facilitating the exit of older members from existing organizations. To achieve this, positive incentives have to be created so that, beyond victory and defeat, the conflict can be carried on at a different level. Nobody is born a terrorist. Nobody should die a terrorist. A dead terrorist is likely to become a martyr and an inspiration for further violence. (p. 329)

This is sound advice, based well on the contributions to the volume. The difficulty, as they point out, will lie in achieving the required balance between effectiveness and acceptability. Given the competing concerns and debate over the legitimacy of terrorist violence and call to create a supra-national forum for dispensing justice when two or more states cannot agree, the reality of attaining effective and cooperative ideals may prove even more difficult than *Western Responses* or *Terrorism* suggest.

Daniel S. Gressang IV
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Endnotes

1. Schmid cites the Chinese saying, "Kill one, frighten ten thousand" in addition to quoting German terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein.