

Since Imset's analysis is mainly a compilation of his earlier in-depth reports, his book at times appears disconnected and repetitious. Occasionally, the author even contradicts himself when, for example, he declares in one place that "Turkey's people of Kurdish origin ... constitute at least one-fourth of the country's population," (p. 303) while in another "that at least one-sixth of Turkey's 60 million population is made up of Kurdish-origin citizens." (p. 321) Although reasonable people can argue over the precise figure, the difference between Imset's two estimates is 5,000,000 people.

Even more glaring are the constant grammatical, stylistical, and typographical errors. The entire manuscript begs for the hand of an editor, skillful in the norms of the English language. In addition, there is no index, an oversight particularly troublesome for an analysis so rich in detail. A bibliography would also be helpful. Finally, the price of \$100 for such a paperback will make this analysis difficult to acquire for all but the most specialized and dedicated of scholarly libraries. Nevertheless, for those interested in the current Kurdish insurgency in Turkey, Imset's study is the best factual analysis in existence.

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White, Robert W. *Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretive History*. Westport, CO and London: Greenwood, 1993.

If you believed that Irish republicans were irrational, marginalized individuals whose "terrorism" is an illegitimate assault on British liberal democracy, then this book may perform a positive function. The problem is that not very many academics or journalists – not to mention policemen and soldiers – who deal with the IRA believe anything as manifestly untrue as the straw man which White has written this book to demolish.

As he states in the first chapter, one of the objectives of the book is:  
... to have the perpetrators and supporters of clandestine political violence present their own interpretation of their behaviour. Too often state censorship and a conservative agenda on the part of social scientists deny even the possibility that perpetrators of violence have legitimate needs and concerns. (p. 10)

The core of the book is a series of interviews with 69 republicans which are used as the raw material to illustrate his main arguments. There are massive problems with this approach. How are we supposed to evaluate the arguments of the book which do little more than recycle the republicans' own articulate and well-organized view of the reasons for their struggle? While it may be clear at the end of it all that they

use violence for the attainment of ends which are “rational,” it would be useful to have some notion of the other “rationalities” in play in the situation – particularly that of the Unionist and loyalist communities.

There is an ingenuousness at the heart of this book. The weight of Provo-speak ends up simply swamping any serious analytical purpose. Those familiar with the literature on the conflict will find the tired old litany of the Irish nationalist narrative which ends up being much less interesting and complex than the things that the current leadership of the republican movement is saying.

I will give just one example. In his final chapter “Theoretical Issues and Implications: Continued Violence in Ireland,” he writes: “The imposition of direct rule from Westminster did not alter the life situation of Northern Ireland Nationalists.” (p. 170) This ignores the important effect of direct rule in greatly strengthening the size and self-confidence of the Catholic middle class and its long-term implications for the weakening of Ulster Unionism. It is true that in the urban ghettos where Sinn Fein support is concentrated the sentence rings much truer. But in order to understand the current “peace process” and the hitherto unthinkable degree of flexibility evinced by leaders like Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness it is these broader changes that have to be acknowledged. Republicans are skilled and articulate people and they have imprisoned White in a very partial history of their movement and of the broader situation in Northern Ireland.

Strangely for a book published in 1993 there is not one mention, let alone an analysis, of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, a development which is crucial to any attempt to understand current republican strategy. In fact the bulk of the research seems to have been completed before 1985 and so the last 8 or 9 years are dealt with in a rather cursory fashion. Thus the eight month series of talks with the SDLP in 1988 are not mentioned. These were extremely significant in the evolution of republican strategy and they revolve around an issue – the role of Britain – on which White merely recycles traditional republican views. It is becoming increasingly clear that leading republicans have been influenced by the assertion by the leader of the SDLP, John Hume, that, whatever its negative role and “imperialist” interest in the past, Britain is now “neutral” on the question of partition and that the task is to make it become a “persuader” of the Protestants of Ulster that their future is an Irish rather than a British context.

Increasing republican involvement in the “peace process” has led to internal tensions in the movement and it is in this context of divisions and possible splits that White’s research is of value. He argues that, despite a uniformity on certain ideological themes, the provisionals are divided into four blocs according to the timing and geography of recruitment into republican politics: pre-1969 northern and southern republicans and post-1969 northern and southern republicans. Pre-’69 republicans were part of a tradition of marginalization and defeat largely passed on through families. Post-’69 republicanism has been dominated by a northern influx, largely a product of the crisis in the north and subsequent events on the ground. It is less ideological and more flexible. Northern republicans whose perspective has

always been determined by the pressing realities of a hostile state and antagonistic majority population, have always been more opportunistic with regards to tactics than their southern comrades. Thus it has been the pre-'69 southern republicans who have been the main obstacle to the modernization of republican strategy carried out by Gerry Adams since the late 1970s. The conflict culminated in the secession of leading members of this group and the formation of Republican Sinn Fein in 1986. The most interesting aspects of the book concern the oral history of the 1986 split and the much more important, founding split of 1969/70. The lasting value of the analysis will reside in the interviews which provide revealing material on contemporary republican mentalities

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Bryden, John. *Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War*. Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1993.

It is generally well-known the role intelligence played during World War II as a decisive factor in the Allied victory. What is not well-known is that Canada made a notable contribution to secret intelligence and, while a great deal has been written about intelligence in general and UK and US signals intelligence (SIGINT) in particular, little has been written about Canada's wartime SIGINT effort. *Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War* by John Bryden, sheds new light on some wartime intelligence activities in Canada.

John Bryden's first book, *Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War 1937-1947*, discussed our pioneering role in chemical and biological warfare research. Noted for his painstaking research, Bryden was able to glean interesting nuggets of information from declassified and sanitized documents unavailable in other countries. Now the Member of Parliament for Hamilton-Wentworth, Bryden applied the same technique during his research for *Best-Kept Secret*. In fact, his second book is a first-class collation effort. However, good collation did not result in good analysis, and Bryden—despite all the information available to him—has been unable to place consistently his data in its proper context.

*Best-Kept Secret* covers a wide range of activities in chronological order, discussing the role of operational intelligence in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), low-level cryptography and postal censorship. With regard to censorship, the author's seemingly anti-establishment tone and journalistic background comes to the fore, and he is clearly uncomfortable with the need for and requirements of censorship during wartime, applying the mores of the 1990s to a wartime situation. Indeed, describing Allied censorship as the "most elaborate and systematic invasion of privacy in world history" (p. 152) is rather melodramatic, given the pace and nature of all forms of censorship carried out by the Axis.