pursued its interests during and after the crisis could be usefully examined and contrasted with post-war activity for a more total picture of Egyptian foreign policy.

In summary, this study is extremely useful and makes a number of very good points. Mr. Aftandilian’s writing style reflects the straightforward, no-nonsense approach of a current intelligence analyst building an argument and not wasting a lot of words doing so. Key facts are included and historical background is held at a minimum. This is useful for busy people, although some readers may leave the table a little hungry for more of the clearheaded analysis that the author is so clearly capable of providing.

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*The views expressed are those of the author and are not meant to reflect any position of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory or the US Department of Energy.


This book, completed in the summer of 1992, contains five very well-documented essays that review and analyze Turkey’s foreign policy options following the end of the Cold War. Fuller, a former US foreign service officer and CIA analyst, contributes two chapters: one entitled “Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation” that focuses on relations with the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, and the other a conclusion entitled “The Growing Role of Turkey in the World.” Lesser, an international security affairs expert, authors an essay entitled “Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War.” The other chapters — “Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century” and “Turkey: Back to the Balkans?” — are written by Paul B. Henze, a former US government official, and J.F. Brown, a former director of Radio Free Europe. (It should be noted that both Henze and Fuller served for periods of time in Turkey.) This work, unlike *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, edited by Clement H. Dodd (Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, UK: Eothen Press, 1992), which focuses on many similar issues, also concerns itself with US-Turkish relations and how they are affected by the new geopolitical setting that has resulted from the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War of 1991.

Henze’s main emphasis is on domestic developments and trends in Turkey. He states emphatically that Turkey “is not part of the Third World” as it is “far in advance of most Third World states” and “is comparable to the major nations of Europe.” But, at the same time, Henze asserts that the “Turkish Republic is new and may in some respects be compared to new Third World states.” (p. 4) While one
might think that these statements are contradictory, they are not for it is hard to define Turkey's identity. Unlike its Middle Eastern Muslim neighbors, Turkey is a secular state – it has no established *ulema* (Islamic jurists or clergy); and although it has a large military it also has a democratically elected parliamentary government. Over the last decade, Turkey's industrial exports increased greatly, while its economic growth has been well above norms in the European Union (EU). Despite adding a million people to its population every year and its problems with high inflation, Turkey meets its food requirements. Henze compares “ politicized Islam” in Turkey to the “Moral Majority” and Unification Church’s activities in the United States and points out that Turkish politics have been centrist in nature and will remain so. However, Turkey’s “greatest single challenge,” in Henze’s words – and also in the opinion of Fuller – “is to find ways to successfully adjust its policies toward its Kurdish population.” (p. 21) As for the Cyprus stalemate, Henze feels that the Western governments should treat the issue with “benign neglect” as he asserts that it is “politically marginal.” (p. 12) Monteagle Stearns, a former American ambassador to Greece who, in his book *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus* (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), calls for the US and NATO to take a more active role in helping to settle problems between Greece and Turkey, notes that disputes over use of the Aegean Sea are of far greater importance than the issue of Cyprus and should be settled first.

Fuller, in the longest of the essays, points out that the “Atatürkist tradition” of Turkey is coming under re-examination. The Republic’s founder, Kemal Atatürk, built up a statist economy, promoted “militant” secularism, and renounced pan-Turkism and other foreign ambitions. During the last decade especially, under Turgut Özal – who was prime minister and later president until his death in April 1993 – Turkey has emphasized privatization, a more relaxed attitude toward Islamic institutions, closer relations with countries in the Islamic world, and even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, an active interest in its Turkic brethren in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. There also has been a re-evaluation of Ottoman history in Turkey that has promoted greater interest in the Balkans. In recent years, Turkey’s relations with its immediate neighbors in the Middle East – Syria, Iraq and Iran – have not been devoid of tensions: for example, Syria’s support of the Marxist Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), who have engaged in a decade-old war against the Turks; Turkey’s support for the Western governments in the Gulf War against Iraq; and Iran’s support of Islamic activism and terrorism elsewhere in the Middle East. However, these countries have sought and/or may seek cooperation in economic projects and trade. Such courses of action do have a positive political effect. Fuller (and Turkish and American policy makers) see Turkey as a model for the newly-independent Turkic states of the Caucasus and Central Asia and as a counterweight to Iran in the region. Although Fuller makes no mention of it, it seems likely that the US has encouraged Turkey to work together with Israel in that regard.

Lesser asserts that Turkey’s prospects for full membership in the EU and the Western European Union (WEU), a defense organization, are worse than before the
Gulf War because of an European unwillingness to become involved once again in the Middle East. Indeed, while the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey have had the European countries as their main trading partners, Europe has not felt politically comfortable with Turkey because of “cultural differences,” i.e., its Islamic population. Beyond that fact, Turkey has almost half the per capita GDP of the poorest countries in the EU. (Greece was accepted into the EU in 1981 for political reasons, following its restoration of democratic government; it has remained an economic problem.) The Kurdish insurgency, Turkish guest workers, and Turco-Greek relations further complicate matters. Since Turkey will not be extended membership in the EU and WEU, relations with the US will remain of greatest importance. However, given the experience of the Gulf War and Özal’s zeal for toeing the American line, Turkey’s approach under Süleyman Demirel, now president, and his successor as prime minister, Tansu Çiller, has and will continue to be more reserved, and more concerned of its own national interests.

Turco-Balkan relations have been the least studied subject of Turkish foreign policy. Brown, in the shortest of the essays, points out that while ties with the Balkan states have been continuous under the Republic, it “was not one of Turkey’s main foreign policy interests” until recently. (p. 144) Nevertheless, relations with the Balkans have involved in the past matters of security and treatment of Turkish minorities; today, security remains a prominent concern along with the plight of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Turkey has been frustrated by the response of the Western countries toward the latter issues. Unfortunately, this book was completed just a few months after the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the latter part of 1992 and throughout 1993, Turkey has tried unsuccessfully through various international organizations to bring about a multi-national military intervention in the former Yugoslavia.

Fuller concludes the book with an assessment of the implications of Turkey’s new role in the world for US foreign policy. Turkey, he states:

is now more likely to become involved in one way or another with regional conflict — in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, and with Iran and Iraq. There is every reason to believe that conflict will grow, rather than diminish, in most of these regions .... [Moderation, responsibility, and general commitment to the international order, to democracy, and to a free market economy are all valuable qualities ... [that Turkey brings with its] presence in these troubled regions ... even when Turkey is pursuing its own goals .... It will be in the U.S. interest to understand the Turkish vision of the Turkish world and to consult with Ankara on its perception of the character of problems and potential change in and around the Turkish world. (pp. 181-82)

While during 1993, Russia has increased its influence in the Caucasus and has maintained close relations with the former communist leaders who head all the Central Asian states except Kyrgyzstan, it is still too early to predict what is going to happen in the long run regarding Turkey’s ties with the Turkic states of the former
Soviet Union. In any event, the US is concerned about these regions and is certainly consulting with Turkey.

*Turkey's New Geopolitics* provides an excellent overview and analysis of the present-day foreign policy concerns of Turkey and how various factors can affect that country's relations with its neighbors, Western Europe and the United States. It offers a very useful and thorough account of Turkey's prospects in the world of international relations and to a lesser degree concerning domestic issues.

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