the main actors and explains their actions. Future historians should start by reading Ottaway’s book and then focusing on what changed with the main actors that she identifies between 1992 and 1994.

I do have several minor criticisms of the book. Like most American writers she uses the plural verligte and verkrampa which can be roughly translated as pragmatists and reactionaries as if they were adjectives meaning pragmatic and reactionary. She should instead use the singular verlig and verkrm. Ironically, the note she cites uses the terms correctly in the title.

The Indaba, which she is correct in highlighting as a major influence on the NP’s constitutional thinking under De Klerk, did not include strictly ethnic statutory groups in the second chamber. The categories were based primarily on language and culture. Thus a Zulu-speaking white could vote for the African group, fluent English-speaking Afrikaaners could vote for the English group as could Indians, fluent Afrikaans-speaking English could vote for the Afrikaans group, etc. Although probably 98+ percent of those voting for a particular background group would be of the ethnic composition of that group.

She also takes the NP declarations that the tricameral parliament constituted a “consociational” arrangement at nearly face value. A leading critic of the tricameral parliament wrote his doctoral dissertation in law at the University of Natal on the structure as being “sham consociationalism.” She should read Laurence Boulle's Constitutional Reform and Apartheid (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984). The tricameral constitution was offered to the colored and Indian parties on a non-negotiated "take it or leave it" basis.

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Gregory Aftandilian of the US State Department has written a short but useful study on Egypt’s quest for leadership of the Arab World. The main focus of this work is on how Egypt’s efforts to achieve Arab leadership may lead to increasingly serious differences with its superpower mentor, the United States. This is because the strategies necessary for consolidating friendly ties with the United States are not always compatible with those necessary to lead the Arabs. Aftandilian also suggests that upcoming problems between Egypt and the US could catch Western policy makers by surprise. The main reason for this is that Westerners may have been lulled into a false sense of security as a result of US-Egyptian coordination in the Gulf War.

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To support his thesis, Aftandilian cites US-Egyptian policy differences over a variety of issues including Libya, post-DESERT STORM treatment of Iraq and Gulf security concerns. The analysis dealing with Libya is particularly useful in illustrating how far Cairo has departed from its previous pattern of chronically bad relations with Tripoli. Egypt's efforts to prevent post-war punishment raids on Iraq are also useful to note and are presented as an interesting contrast to Cairo's actions during Operation DESERT STORM. Aftandilian also cites Egyptian criticism of the Gulf states for depending heavily on Western rather than Arab support for their post-DESERT STORM defense. This is of course a natural complaint for Egypt (and Syria) since previous plans to use an Arab deterrent force seemed to promise new and more lucrative aid from the Arab oil monarchies.

Aftandilian also states that Egypt's domestic political problems may push it closer to the Arab bloc and farther from the West. He describes a sense of guilt among Egyptian intellectuals who supported the war against Iraq and a deep-seated Egyptian concern with the UN embargo of Iraq. He also suggests that the Egyptian government may be forced to accommodate non-violent Islamic groups which are hardly Western-oriented. Aftandilian attributes the increased strength of Islam to the widespread discrediting of secular nationalism, communism, and socialism in the Arab World. He also points out how non-violent Islamic fundamentalists have taken over many of the social welfare functions of the Egyptian state.

Aftandilian does not make it clear (nor would it be fair to expect him to) how far differences between the United States and Egypt might go. Disagreements over Libya are quite profound and may become the most important source of political conflict in the future. Nevertheless, Egypt remains the second largest recipient of US foreign aid, receiving over $2.3 billion per year in aid. It is difficult to believe that the current Egyptian government would let serious difficulties develop to the point that this relationship was threatened even with the reestablishment of a strong Egyptian aid relationship with various Arab oil-producing states. Likewise, the US may choose to be somewhat tolerant of Cairo's foreign policy independence at a time when the government is facing a vigorous Islamic opposition.

Aftandilian's book was published in 1993, but written and researched in 1991 and 1992. Therefore, when reading this generally good analysis, one is again struck by how fast things change in the Middle East. While many of the factors analyzed in his study remain important, other new issues have entered into the situation. An example of this might be the increased enmity between Egypt and Iran as well as Cairo's continuing insistence that the Iranians are playing a major role in supporting militant Islam in Egypt. This hostility towards Tehran is hardly at odds with US regional concerns.

It might also have been useful for the author to have made this very short book a little longer by placing some of the events he examines in stronger context. In particular, the work might have benefitted from a more in-depth consideration of Egyptian activities during Operation DESERT STORM. The ways in which Egypt
pursued its interests during and after the crisis could be usefully examined and contrasted with post-war activity for a more total picture of Egyptian foreign policy.

In summary, this study is extremely useful and makes a number of very good points. Mr. Aftandilian’s writing style reflects the straightforward, no-nonsense approach of a current intelligence analyst building an argument and not wasting a lot of words doing so. Key facts are included and historical background is held at a minimum. This is useful for busy people, although some readers may leave the table a little hungry for more of the clearheaded analysis that the author is so clearly capable of providing.

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*The views expressed are those of the author and are not meant to reflect any position of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory or the US Department of Energy.


This book, completed in the summer of 1992, contains five very well-documented essays that review and analyze Turkey’s foreign policy options following the end of the Cold War. Fuller, a former US foreign service officer and CIA analyst, contributes two chapters: one entitled “Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation” that focuses on relations with the Middle East and the former Soviet Union, and the other a conclusion entitled “The Growing Role of Turkey in the World.” Lesser, an international security affairs expert, authors an essay entitled “Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War.” The other chapters — “Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century” and “Turkey: Back to the Balkans?” — are written by Paul B. Henze, a former US government official, and J.F. Brown, a former director of Radio Free Europe. (It should be noted that both Henze and Fuller served for periods of time in Turkey.) This work, unlike *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, edited by Clement H. Dodd (Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, UK: Eothen Press, 1992), which focuses on many similar issues, also concerns itself with US-Turkish relations and how they are affected by the new geopolitical setting that has resulted from the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War of 1991.

Henze’s main emphasis is on domestic developments and trends in Turkey. He states emphatically that Turkey “is not part of the Third World” as it is “far in advance of most Third World states” and “is comparable to the major nations of Europe.” But, at the same time, Henze asserts that the “Turkish Republic is new and may in some respects be compared to new Third World states.” (p. 4) While one