Publishing on South African politics has tended to follow the periodic crises that have erupted in that country with some lag time for writing and publishing. There was a first major wave starting in 1977-78 following the Soweto rebellion and the murder of black activist Steve Biko. A second wave occurred in the mid-eighties following the 1984-86 rebellion and the national state of emergency. A third wave has now begun in 1991-94 following the release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the beginning of negotiations between State President Frederik Willem de Klerk and the African National Congress.

Willem de Klerk has been for some twenty years the leading Afrikaans journalist in South Africa. He coined the terms *verlig* (enlightened) and *verkramp* (narrowminded) to describe the pragmatic and reactionary wings of the National Party (NP) which his family was steeped in. In 1989 he was briefly involved in the formation of the Democratic Party – the new opposition party in parliament – as the leader of the “fourth force” of Afrikaner intellectuals. He is also the elder brother of the former state president.

Surprisingly, considering his relationship to F. W., he wrote not a conventional biography, but rather an examination of the NP and of South Africa in 1991. He details the background of his brother, explains the positions taken by his brother in the past as a cabinet minister under P. W. Botha, and tries to examine his brother’s personality and makeup.

Willem de Klerk also has a chapter on the events and influences that led up to his brother’s startling speech to parliament in February 1990. He credits variously the Democratic Party, Inkatha, the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba, and the “New Nats” for paving the way for de Klerk’s speech. This was the first solid biography of President de Klerk available, but it has since been superseded by the double biography of de Klerk and Mandela written by Marina Ottaway’s journalist husband David.

One of the prime issues in the analysis of international politics is the correct level of analysis for the subject. There are basically five levels of analysis: the systemic or global level, the regional level, the national level, the group level and the individual level. Most analysis is done either at the national or the individual level, hence the popularity of political biographies and of unitary rational actor analyses. Marina Ottaway, an academic specializing in Africa but not previously in South Africa, chose – correctly in my opinion – the group level to analyze the negotiations between the ANC and the NP. Her book deals with the period from 1990 to 1992 beginning with de Klerk’s speech and ending with the breakdown of the CODESA negotiations in June 1982.
The back cover is filled with endorsements of the book from such leading Africanists as Gail Gearhart and I. William Zartman. After reading the book it is not difficult to understand why. Although it is not much longer than Willem de Klerk's book, once notes and index are set aside, it is much more comprehensive. The book, like Caesar's Gaul, is divided into three parts.

The first part is a survey of the main actors involved in the transition. One chapter is devoted to the government establishment. She uses the concept of party-state which is correctly applied to the NP. Although white South Africa was never a de jure one-party state it was always a de facto one in a way that Israel in 1948-77 or Sweden under the Social Democrats never was. In my own writing on South Africa I use the terms NP and government almost interchangeably. The second chapter is devoted to the liberation establishment or the "charterist" organizations. It is concerned with the ANC, the United Democratic Front, the labor federation COSATU, and the South African Council of Churches. The third chapter surveys the remaining actors involved: the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Inkatha, the homeland parties, the tricameral parties and the Conservative Party. I concur with all of her conclusions regarding these parties.

The second part deals with the issues under negotiation. The first chapter of this section deals with the constitutional thinking of the two main actors and how it has evolved and stayed the same. There are also two chapters dealing with local government and the economy respectively.

The final part deals with the collapse of the CODESA negotiations and what is to follow. The biggest weakness of this type of book is that it tends to be a snapshot when a movie camera is really required. The book was published in early 1993. Two months later in May 1993 two important events occurred. The first was the assassination of Chris Hani, the commander of the ANC's armed wing - MK, by a right wing assassin in a conspiracy which included members of the Conservative Party. Hani, a supporter of Nelson Mandela, was popular with township youth and was perhaps the only one capable of reining in the undisciplined youths of the townships. The second was the death from natural causes of Conservative Party leader Andries Treurnicht. This led to the splitting of the CP into two factions: one which participated in subsequent negotiations and one which boycotted them.

Yet by the end of 1993, negotiations were once again back on track and had produced agreement for elections in April 1994. Marina Ottaway's book is very useful to policy makers and journalists and of some use to historians who will write about the transition to majority rule. But it is of little use to the person in 1994 who wants to know how the negotiations went from collapse to success. This is less an unfair criticism of Ottaway's book than a warning to potential readers.

What Ottaway has managed to do is to synthesize a great deal of material in the South African press and combine it with works by leading South African, British and American academic specialists on South Africa. She does a good job of sorting out the relative importance of the players - who is minor and who is major and which have the potential to move up. She brilliantly analyzes the positions of
the main actors and explains their actions. Future historians should start by reading Ottaway’s book and then focusing on what changed with the main actors that she identifies between 1992 and 1994.

I do have several minor criticisms of the book. Like most American writers she uses the plural verligte and verkrampte which can be roughly translated as pragmatists and reactionaries as if they were adjectives meaning pragmatic and reactionary. She should instead use the singular verlig and verkram. Ironically, the note she cites uses the terms correctly in the title.

The Indaba, which she is correct in highlighting as a major influence on the NP’s constitutional thinking under De Klerk, did not include strictly ethnic statutory groups in the second chamber. The categories were based primarily on language and culture. Thus a Zulu-speaking white could vote for the African group, fluent English-speaking Afrikaaners could vote for the English group as could Indians, fluent Afrikaans-speaking English could vote for the Afrikaans group, etc. Although probably 98+ percent of those voting for a particular background group would be of the ethnic composition of that group.

She also takes the NP declarations that the tricameral parliament constituted a “consociational” arrangement at nearly face value. A leading critic of the tricameral parliament wrote his doctoral dissertation in law at the University of Natal on the structure as being “sham consociational.” She should read Laurence Boulle’s Constitutional Reform and Apartheid (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984). The tricameral constitution was offered to the colored and Indian parties on a non-negotiated “take it or leave it” basis.

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Gregory Aftandilian of the US State Department has written a short but useful study on Egypt’s quest for leadership of the Arab World. The main focus of this work is on how Egypt’s efforts to achieve Arab leadership may lead to increasingly serious differences with its superpower mentor, the United States. This is because the strategies necessary for consolidating friendly ties with the United States are not always compatible with those necessary to lead the Arabs. Aftandilian also suggests that upcoming problems between Egypt and the US could catch Western policy makers by surprise. The main reason for this is that Westerners may have been lulled into a false sense of security as a result of US-Egyptian coordination in the Gulf War.