

IN THIS ISSUE

When President Reagan took office in January 1981, he promised “swift and effective retribution” against international terrorism. In the wake of the prolonged hostage crisis which had humiliated the nation and had brought down the Carter administration, Reagan’s promise may have been the tonic the nation needed to restore its morale. But did the president’s policies and actions live up to that promise? Michael Gunter assesses the Reagan administration’s record in the counterterrorism field by the administration’s own criteria for success. He finds that, public perceptions notwithstanding, the administration’s record was mixed. While its policies and actions achieved some success, they also violated some of the administration’s fundamental principles, and failed to contain the growth of international terrorism.

Thomas Mitchell returns to the internal settlement issue with an analysis of the French approach in Vietnam from 1949 to 1954. The French attempt failed, for the same reasons that they have failed elsewhere: lack of a leader more popular than the insurgents; lack of authority over economic and social matters or over the security forces; and the absence of broad-based reform.

Michael Bishku explores the changing Israeli-Ethiopian relationship, which has survived the Cold War and conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. For a variety of political, economic and military reasons the relationship has evolved, from being “special” to one of purely pragmatic, practical, mutual interest. Ethiopia (and the newly independent Eritrea, formerly part of Ethiopia) retain their importance for Israel, particularly as all three share concern about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

The opinions expressed in the articles, reviews and other contributions are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent those of the Centre for Conflict Studies or the University of New Brunswick.
