
This is a very useful contribution to the study of Mau Mau, and the author is to be congratulated on including so much important factual material in a book that no undergraduate can complain to be too long. It is well-researched, and incorporates some material only recently made available in Britain.

The work is divided into three main parts. "Background To the Revolt," "The Military and Ideological Phase," and "Rehabilitation Independence and Legacy." These are introduced by a theoretical chapter considering Mau Mau as a peasant revolution. The author goes on to argue that Mau Mau, although limited to the Kikuyu and allied ethnic groups, could also be justified as a national uprising as its political aims were nationalist; he takes care however not to lose sight of what essentially was the cause of Mau Mau and the sole aim of its early leaders — land.

Of especial value is Maloba's succinct and clear portrayal of the immediate pre-Emergency years with the different African groupings and the failure of the colonial government, especially governor Mitchell, to comprehend the worsening situation. Equally useful are his descriptions of the distorted representations of Mau Mau that served only to mislead, and his analysis of Mau Mau strategy, such as it was. Here Maloba clearly pin points Mau Mau's failure to mobilize the African, or even the bulk of the Kikuyu population; no clear manifesto was ever produced by the movement. He attributes this overall failure largely to the counter-productive style of Mau Mau: indiscriminate killings, robbery, terror and inhibitory superstitions.

The work's defects are minor. A little more reflection might have been provided on the British Conservative Party's reappraisal of its African policies in the late 1950s, in particular the more progressive Conservative's view, much influenced by the Bow Group, that future British interests in Kenya were going to be those of periphery capitalism rather than any on-going support of white settlers. In the opening chapter Maloba's classification of Mau Mau as a peasant rebellion is imprecise, peasant is not defined, but it seems to have been extended to squatters and the Nairobi proletariat; more dangerous is Maloba's use of the term "landed gentry": to describe Kikuyu small-holders in the reserves. Occasionally, one also feels Maloba has over-colored the pre-Mau Mau scene.

The picture of "harsh discriminatory treatment" with Africans "mistreated, shouted at, beaten, sneered at, ridiculed, derogatorily described" is only half, if that, of the story. There was an immense amount of goodwill and concern, albeit paternal, but not without respect for human dignity, among the white community. The "colonial state" was a good deal less monolithic, particularly after 1952, than Maloba appreciates; there were very sharp differences of view within both the civil service and the business community. Discussion of these would have been useful. He presents a picture of a harassed trade union movement, but even before the
outbreak of the Emergency, the Labour Department had a special officer, an experienced Scots trade unionist, to help the nascent movement.

Nevertheless, the book stands very well as an overview. Instructors prescribing preliminary reading for classes studying the conflicts of decolonization should ensure that it is on their lists.

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Political Parties and Terrorist Groups sets out to shake loose Western perceptions of political parties as organizations that engage in peaceful resolution of conflict. The underlying theme of the collection is that terrorist groups are intimately linked to political parties, and that by examining party politics in countries plagued by violence, a greater understanding of terrorism can be achieved.

The editor's introductory chapter provides a conceptual framework whereby relationships between political parties and terrorist groups are analyzed throughout the rest of the text. Weinberg contends that among the various linkages between political parties and terrorist groups, three stand out. The first occurs when a political party attempts to realize its objectives through the means of terrorist violence. The second arises as a terrorist group forms a political "umbrella" organization so as to pursue its objectives through participation in the electoral process. A third takes place as dissidents within a political party, disillusioned with the electoral arena, exit the party and form a terrorist group to achieve their goals. The subsequent essays provide tangible examples of these proposed linkages.

In the first essay, "Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture," Khachig Tololyan focuses on the relationship between terrorism and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (in modern times the dominant party in Armenia). Support is evident for the first proposed linkage, as the essay shows that the ARF has intermittently engaged in terrorism to achieve its objectives. A similar linkage is apparent in "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism," by Anna Geifman. This essay explores the operations of the Combat Organization — a terrorist unit operating under the aegis of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries — and concludes that, unlike members of the SR party as a whole, members of the Combat Organization lacked a unifying set of ideological principles and practiced terror for its own sake.

The second linkage, that concerning terrorist group participation in the electoral arena, finds support in Adrian Guelke and Jimmy Smyth's essay, ""The Ballot Bomb": Terrorism and The Electoral Process in Northern Ireland."