on memory, this work must be read for its insights into the nature of the intelligence system in East Germany, and not its pronouncements on the GDR’s society.

*Beyond the Wall* takes the reader on an espionage tour behind the Iron Curtain. Whether in Zagreb, Leipzig, or Helsinki, Stiller tells a tale of drama. The final chapters detailing Stiller’s escape to the West are replete with the tension that fiction only attempts to capture. Stiller’s book is both an interesting, and rarely told, story of the Stasi.

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The Rhodesian bush war of 1972-79 must be the most written about guerrilla war since the Vietnam War ended in 1975. Salisbury, with its luxuriant life-style and English-speaking white population, was the place for freelance journalists in the late 1970s. Since the war ended there have been several general histories as well as specialized studies dealing with white politics, black politics, revolutionary mobilization methods, counterinsurgency tactics, international mediation and diplomacy, the propaganda war, and the internal settlement. Therefore, any new monograph on Rhodesia has to justify itself by dealing with an unexplored subject or by including information not covered by the first general histories published in the early eighties.

This study, by the authors’ own explicit admission, does not test any new theory or explore any new subject. Rather it explores white attitudes and politics during the decade from March 1970 when the Rhodesian republic was proclaimed — five years after UDI — to March 1980 when the results of the majority rule elections were announced. Except for the Lancaster House negotiations, it does not cover in any detail the diplomacy of this decade, mentioning it only as a backdrop to white politics. What the authors seem to do is to extend early detailed studies of the Rhodesian Front and Rhodesian settler politics forward in time from the UDI era to the end of Rhodesia. Thus it is a natural sequel to such works as Kenneth Good’s *The Politics of UDI* and Larry Bowman’s *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State*. As the latter work was published twenty years ago much has happened and been discovered since then. It also compliments Hancock’s *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia 1953-80*, which dealt mostly with the Centre Party and Rhodesia Party from 1968 to 1977, to also include a detailed treatment of the Rhodesian Front and the rightwing Rhodesian Action Party. Some of the highlights of this earlier work are reproduced in an abridged form in discussions of the 1970, 1974, and 1977 general elections and a couple of by-elections.
The concentration on white politics to the exclusion of black politics, however, weakens the book's chapter on the Rhodesian internal settlement. Because the authors only explore white motivations behind the settlement and not black motivations, they fail to explain what it was that kept Muzorewa in the internal settlement after he failed to get his way during the Hove affair. Reference to the Frontline States and the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee would have clarified this issue for the reader. Muzorewa and Sithole stayed in the settlement because they had nowhere else to go. Godwin and Hancock sufficiently describe the political situations of Chief Chirau and the Rev. Sithole but not of Bishop Muzorewa. But they do an excellent job of describing the negotiations that led to the internal settlement and the general terms of the settlement; the Zimbabwe Rhodesia constitution which came later is passed over without adequate comment.

Such a work would normally be of more interest to a student of African politics or comparative politics than to one of low-intensity conflict. The authors, however, deal at length with Rhodesian attitudes toward their black fellow countrymen, the guerrillas and the proper means of fighting an insurgency. The main lesson that comes across is that the Rhodesians never fought a "hearts and minds" counterinsurgency campaign because they were fundamentally incapable of conducting one due to their belief systems. The whites also consistently underrated the fighting and organizational ability of their opponents — "garden boys." This reviewer can testify to this from personal experience in Rhodesia during the last year of the war.

Those interested in Rhodesia purely from the military point of view are best advised to consult the less expensive studies by J.K. Cilliers and Julie Frederikse on counterinsurgency methods and the propaganda war or some of the regimental studies written by Rhodesians and published by Galago Press in South Africa.

After World War II many in the West wondered how Germans could have let themselves be led blindly by Hitler into disaster. As a result, studies flourished of Hitler, the Nazi Party, the German educational system, German history and psychology, etc. The question that Godwin and Hancock seem to address is: how could the whites who had fought, or whose fathers had fought, against the Nazis, be blindly led by Ian Smith into disaster? how is it that the Rhodesian Front managed to win every white seat in every election from 1965 to 1980? (That is in a total of six elections including the elections of 1979 and 1980.) The authors seem to supply the same answer for the Smith phenomenon as historians did for the Hitler phenomenon: he knew what his audience wanted to hear and he said it.

The main theme throughout the book is the critical examination of white mythology and self-image. Much of this self-image was accepted at face value even by Rhodesia's enemies. Instead of a monolithic white community the authors give us a community divided along ideological and ethnic lines which begins to fall apart as soon as pressure is applied in earnest. Instead of rugged individualists we have a "nation" of lemmings who are prepared to follow "good old Smithy" blindly because "he knows what is best for us." Instead of a Christian community there is
a group of non-observant non-church-goers who are constantly embroiled with any clergy bold enough to criticize their methods of fighting the war. Instead of a community standing up for Western values is a government engaged in censorship, manipulation of the electronic media, and under sanctions imposed by the West. And — most fatal of all — they continued to believe that race relations were better in Rhodesia than anywhere else in the world at a time when thousands had either gone for guerrilla training or were assisting the guerrillas inside the country.

Godwin and Hancock mostly rely on official papers, private papers, newspaper accounts, and interviews as well as published works to flesh out their case. For their examination of white mythology and self-image they could have usefully quoted from a few of the war novels which were published between 1969 and 1979 in Salisbury. Although at least three are mentioned in the bibliography only one is mentioned in the text.

There are a few minor errors: Rhodesia's advanced mine detection vehicle was a Pookie not a Puma, and the attempted coup in the Seychelles was in 1981 not 1984. The retention of British spelling in the American edition is a definite shortcoming: most Americans will not know that being gaoled means being jailed.

What is more annoying is their insistence on using the term terrorists in quotations even when describing terrorist acts. Those responsible for the Elim massacre or for the cold-blooded murder of the survivors of the Viscount crash in September 1978 were terrorists, not "terrorists;" the authors are correct in using the term in quotes to describe most ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas.

This reviewer has two main reservations about the book. First is that at $69 (US), this book is simply too expensive for not only the general reader but even the scholar. I advise both general readers and scholars to wait until this book comes out in paperback. Second, and more importantly, is that due to my training as a political scientist (IR) I think that history should be studied in order to learn lessons which then can be applied to other situations rather than merely studied and written about for its own sake. Since this is not a specialized study of counterinsurgency methods or economic sanctions, etc., it is mainly of value for studying other white settler colonies in Africa. Only one such settler colony still remains: South Africa. The authors devote the sum total of one page to comparisons with South Africa. This means that this study is of little use to policy makers not in the habit of digging below the surface. Godwin and Hancock don't explain how one applies lessons from a settler colony that is largely monolingual to one that is divided by language: Afrikaans-speakers and English-speakers. They also do not speculate on what happens when the settlers negotiate powersharing while they still have the military advantage. They only note that Smith failed to do this back in 1975 when he had the chance.

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