Winter 1994

bureaucratic detail by Hal Ford. Ford’s handbook may very well be the bible of an old religion. Policy makers may have to accept the fact that all intelligence estimators can really hope to do is to give them guidelines or scenarios to support policy discussion, and not the predictions they so badly want and expect from intelligence.

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Werner Stiller is not unlike Winston Smith. The main difference, of course, is that George Orwell’s character existed only in 1984. In his book, Beyond the Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy, (translated and annotated by Jefferson Adams) Stiller tells of his days as an agent in the East German Ministry for State Security (the Stasi) where he was responsible for the recruitment of Western agents, particularly those involved in scientific research. Stiller traces his life from the time of his recruitment as a student at the Karl Marx University of Leipzig, to his escape to the West in 1979. Underlying his account is the ideological struggle that he faced. Like Smith, Stiller found himself surrounded by a ubiquitous party that affected virtually every aspect of his life. It was primarily the disillusionment with the party, the increasing realization that the Stasi existed to protect those in power and not the community, that led Stiller to pursue contact with the West German Secret Service. Stiller embodies the essence of the Cold War.

Beyond the Wall offers both the general reader and the intelligence scholar insight into the inner workings of the East German Secret Service. Although certain details had to be omitted for the sake of the security of those involved, Stiller nonetheless explains a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from the techniques of transmitting messages to the West, to the Stasi’s international role in the Cold War. With regards to this role, Stiller evokes the tension of the Cold War and confirms the West’s fears. Among other aspects, he discusses the fact that détente was simply another stage of war for East Germany, and that the West German anti-nuclear movement was penetrated in an effort to influence public opinion and threaten the fundamental political stability of West Germany.

However, one must be cautious about Stiller’s anti-Communist stance. During the course of the book, the reader realizes that Stiller was not only disillusioned with the Communist regime, but crusaded against it: wanting to defect to the West and deal a crucial blow to the stability of the party. Due to his disenchantment, he paints a dismal picture of the German Democratic Republic. Whether it is the state of workers’ housing in Halle, or the level of scientific research at the Dresden Technical University, Stiller is highly critical. As Stiller relies solely
on memory, this work must be read for its insights into the nature of the intelligence system in East Germany, and not its pronouncements on the GDR’s society.

Beyond the Wall takes the reader on an espionage tour behind the Iron Curtain. Whether in Zagreb, Leipzig, or Helsinki, Stiller tells a tale of drama. The final chapters detailing Stiller’s escape to the West are replete with the tension that fiction only attempts to capture. Stiller’s book is both an interesting, and rarely told, story of the Stasi.

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The Rhodesian bush war of 1972-79 must be the most written about guerrilla war since the Vietnam War ended in 1975. Salisbury, with its luxuriant life-style and English-speaking white population, was the place for freelance journalists in the late 1970s. Since the war ended there have been several general histories as well as specialized studies dealing with white politics, black politics, revolutionary mobilization methods, counterinsurgency tactics, international mediation and diplomacy, the propaganda war, and the internal settlement. Therefore, any new monograph on Rhodesia has to justify itself by dealing with an unexplored subject or by including information not covered by the first general histories published in the early eighties.

This study, by the authors’ own explicit admission, does not test any new theory or explore any new subject. Rather it explores white attitudes and politics during the decade from March 1970 when the Rhodesian republic was proclaimed — five years after UDI — to March 1980 when the results of the majority rule elections were announced. Except for the Lancaster House negotiations, it does not cover in any detail the diplomacy of this decade, mentioning it only as a backdrop to white politics. What the authors seem to do is to extend early detailed studies of the Rhodesian Front and Rhodesian settler politics forward in time from the UDI era to the end of Rhodesia. Thus it is a natural sequel to such works as Kenneth Good’s The Politics of UDI and Larry Bowman’s Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State. As the latter work was published twenty years ago much has happened and been discovered since then. It also compliments Hancock’s White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia 1953-80, which dealt mostly with the Centre Party and Rhodesia Party from 1968 to 1977, to also include a detailed treatment of the Rhodesian Front and the rightwing Rhodesian Action Party. Some of the highlights of this earlier work are reproduced in an abridged form in discussions of the 1970, 1974, and 1977 general elections and a couple of by-elections.