The Future of Northern Ireland (1991). But in presenting it now as their solution, the authors again seem highly selective in their evidence. For instance, one argument they cite against re-partition is that this would simply encourage the IRA to "one more push": yet when they come to discuss joint-sovereignty, where such an argument might equally or even more forcefully apply, they do not raise it.

They do acknowledge that joint-authority would have to be imposed upon the majority in Northern Ireland, but do not see that as an insuperable obstacle. After all, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which the authors almost alone among commentators and politicians still seem to regard as a success, was so imposed.

This book is a stimulating (perhaps because it is also infuriating) contribution to the polemics of Northern Ireland. Taken as such it may indeed help toward understanding the Northern Ireland problem. But a "stand-alone introduction" to the problem it is not.

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Low-Level Conflict


In varying ways, Richard Connaughton, Sam Sarkesian and the contributory essays edited by Roy Licklider from the proceedings of a Rutgers University conference in 1990 all address the nature of conflict amid the uncertainties of the 'new world order.' However, for all that the collapse of communism has resulted in the re-emergence of older national rivalries in the Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union, in one sense, the overriding pattern of conflict has remained exactly the same as it did before. Connaughton, indeed, reminds us that there have been in excess of 150 limited wars since 1945 at a cost of perhaps 20 million casualties, of which 95 percent occurred outside Europe. According to Connaughton, some 85 percent have also been intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts, a calculation supported to some extent by Licklider, although the various estimates of the number of civil wars he presents in his introductory essay range from 16 to 114 such conflicts since 1945.
Whatever the precise categorization of conflict — and the case studies in Licklider vary considerably and, perhaps not altogether convincingly, from protracted internal revolutionary violence in Colombia to insurgencies in Greece and Rhodesia and rather more classical civil wars in Nigeria, the Yemen and the United States — it is certainly clear that large-scale conventional wars occur rarely. Understandably, this has not prevented most major armies from predating doctrine upon the notion of what might be termed 'real war' and it is Sarkesian's purpose in particular to encourage debate on the most appropriate means by which the United States might meet the future challenge of the kind of unconventional conflict for which, he would argue, its forces and public alike are manifestly unprepared. Expanding upon an earlier book, *America's Forgotten Wars* (1984), he establishes an analytical framework based on the British experience in Malaya and the United States in Vietnam for a “more cautious, prudent and sophisticated view of unconventional conflicts and US interests.” The analysis itself is not startlingly original and is largely drawn from some altogether familiar secondary sources on Malaya and Vietnam. However, Sarkesian makes a reasonable case for selective American engagement in Third World conflicts, primarily through the employment of special forces and within the context of structural command changes within the United States military and governmental establishment.

At least Sarkesian has some solutions to offer, which does not appear to be the case with Licklider's contributors who attempt to address how civil wars are brought to a conclusion. While a tentative conceptual framework is outlined by the editor, only the case studies of Yemen and Greece actually follow it and Licklider's own somewhat unhelpful conclusion is that the settlement of civil wars can emerge from a variety of conditions and that more research is required. As suggested by the variety of case studies included — there are thirteen essays in all — one of the problems is that what constitutes civil war is never really satisfactorily defined, although individual essays such as Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell on the Sudan, Manfred Wenner on the Yemen and John Iatrides on Greece, are excellent in their own right.

By contrast to Licklider and going perhaps well beyond Sarkesian in offering a detailed program for action, Connaughton is concerned to set down the principles — he lists nine — for the successful application of multilateral military intervention as part of what he sees as an emerging system of collective security in the new world order. He was apparently drawn to the subject from study of the Allied intervention against the Bolsheviks in 1918-20 but other examples such as Suez, Afghanistan and Panama are also invoked, while the second half of the book is a detailed examination of the Allied coalition in the Gulf War. As might be expected of a former professional soldier and a volume in a series devoted to the operational level of war, the nine principles have a decidedly military feel. Moreover, one suspects that the author's proposals for change in the functioning of the United Nations may be difficult to achieve in the light of that organization's past performances, for all that he detects a “new collegiality” among the permanent members of the Security
Council. Usefully, however, Connaughton draws a distinction between military intervention and peacekeeping in the same way that Sarkesian also draws a necessary distinction between special forces and special operations.

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