accessible works on tactics and strategy, most of which have been translated into English, were not included is a matter of some puzzlement. Buy this book if you will, but be warned that it will need to be used carefully.

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This book is the product of a conference held in 1991 at the University of New Brunswick. Its purpose was to evaluate the current relationship between military history as an intellectual discipline, and military history as a factor in the education and training of military professionals. A quarter-century of distance between armed forces strongly utilitarian in their focus and scholars committed to analyzing war in its economic, social, and political contexts seems in the process of coming to an end. In its place is emerging what the editors describe as a “*new* new military history,” integrating the academy’s breadth of approach with the military’s pragmatic, operational concentration.

In the work’s first section, “Military History: The State of the Field,” nine distinguished English-language scholars draw conclusions about their craft. Allan Millett describes Clio and Mars as “pards” in a US military history community that has found a common foundation in what he calls an “institutional-cultural” approach. Tim Travers takes a larger view, surveying British military historical writing since the eighteenth century and stressing its connections to the general intellectual climate. W.A.B. Douglas and Robin Higham discuss the state of the history of sea and air war, respectively. Both contributions stress the importance of fresh academic stimuli in expanding the scope of subjects whose nature favors a technical, professional focus.

The relatively new fields of intelligence and low-intensity conflict are covered by Keith Jeffrey and Ian Beckett. Jeffrey concedes that source availability means the greatest volume of work investigating intelligence inevitably focuses on World War II and later periods. Beckett stresses the growing importance of low-intensity conflict for military studies because of the decline of large-scale war as a source of experience. Pride of intellectual place in this section, however, goes to Bill McAndrew’s “The Soldier and the Battle” — a brilliant demonstration of the contemporary roles academicians and soldiers can play in developing an understanding of battlefield behavior uninfluenced by romanticism on one side and *grand guignol* on the other. Don Higginbotham’s concluding survey stresses the latitudinarian approach and the high quality of the new military history. His insistence that military historians will “have a home in Clio’s mansion” as long as they produce
good work is comforting. It is, unfortunately, also highly debatable in the context of current academic trends.

The six essays in Part II address directly the relationships between military history and the military profession. Dominick Graham makes a strong case that understanding the “stress lines” unique to the management of violence requires the academician to become intimately acquainted with the ways military institutions think, feel, and behave. This process risks sacrificing detachment, but is necessary for anyone seeking to write military history as opposed to “military nonsense.” Roland Foerster provides a useful counterpoint in an excellent survey of the work of the Federal Republic of Germany’s Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. From its inception the MGFA has successfully resisted being drawn into the “lessons learned” orbit favored by the Bundeswehr. Freedom of professional opinion and unyielding adherence to the scholarly standards of the historical profession have formed the MGFA’s approach since 1957, and continue to structure its activities in a united Germany.

Military history’s utilitarian function is affirmed by Richard Kohn. His essay highlights the role of the US Air Force historical program in creating a body of records for the utilitarian purpose of making the service more efficient. This focus, according to Kohn, facilitates both depth and integration: senior commanders consistently affirm the contributions of history to the success of the Air Force. Eric Grove makes similar points while insisting that naval history is too important for naval practitioners to ignore. Such contemporary problems as shipping protection do not exist in a vacuum, and past experience may usefully inform present policy. David Jones, in one of the book’s strongest contributions, demonstrates the continuing influence, despite its shortcomings, of “the Napoleonic paradigm” of offensive war on Soviet military doctrine.

Donald Schurman provides a dash of cold water by showing that the nineteenth-century Royal Navy followed a singularly pragmatic intellectual approach, eschewing grand theories in the style of Clausewitz or Mahan. What concerned the Royal Navy was its relation to empire, and by extension to the national interest. Esoteric doctrines were correspondingly uninfluential. Schurman’s essay usefully challenges the thrust of a work that otherwise highlights the links between soldiers and scholars. It is a correspondingly worthwhile reminder that essential distinctions exist and persist between the discipline of history and the profession of arms. Accepting a dialectic may well prove more fruitful, intellectually and professionally, than asserting a symbiosis.

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