There is much that is valuable within the covers of this book, for the two compilers have gathered information on a variety of subjects dealing with Viet Nam, focusing primarily on the First and Second Indochina Wars. Yet there are significant shortcomings and it must be used with care. Accompanying publicity from Regina Books states that “the sources cited here are in the English language,” yet that is not strictly true, for on p. 33 is a reference to Jacques Suant, *Vietnam ’45-’72: La Guerre d’indépendance* (Paris: B. Arthaud, 1972), and on p. 35 is a reference to Paul Mus, *Viet-Nam: Sociologie d’une guerre* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1950). There well may be additional exceptions.

Upon first examination of my copy I turned to the index to determine what the compilers had done with my own writings on Viet Nam. It was a disappointment to learn that they could not even spell my family name correctly! In all three listings the name was given with an incorrect spelling. I consulted the section on page 137 devoted to the PHOENIX program and noted that it did not contain Stuart Herrington’s *Silence was a Weapon* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982). Herrington was involved in PHOENIX and his book has been long available. I finally found an entry for his book under military intelligence operations.

Despite his numerous writings, there is no entry in the Author Index for Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, arguably one of the most important military leaders of the twentieth century. He is listed only in the Subject Index with a paltry five entries. (There should be six. The index does not include one Giap reference I discovered in the text, number 1778: the obscure *People’s War Against U.S. Aero-Naval War* [Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975]. Why was this included and not *People’s War, People’s Army* [New York: Praeger, 1962], or any of several other of his writings?)


accessible works on tactics and strategy, most of which have been translated into English, were not included is a matter of some puzzlement. Buy this book if you will, but be warned that it will need to be used carefully.

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This book is the product of a conference held in 1991 at the University of New Brunswick. Its purpose was to evaluate the current relationship between military history as an intellectual discipline, and military history as a factor in the education and training of military professionals. A quarter-century of distance between armed forces strongly utilitarian in their focus and scholars committed to analyzing war in its economic, social, and political contexts seems in the process of coming to an end. In its place is emerging what the editors describe as a “new new military history,” integrating the academy’s breadth of approach with the military’s pragmatic, operational concentration.

In the work’s first section, “Military History: The State of the Field,” nine distinguished English-language scholars draw conclusions about their craft. Allan Millett describes Clio and Mars as “pards” in a US military history community that has found a common foundation in what he calls an “institutional-cultural” approach. Tim Travers takes a larger view, surveying British military historical writing since the eighteenth century and stressing its connections to the general intellectual climate. W.A.B. Douglas and Robin Higham discuss the state of the history of sea and air war, respectively. Both contributions stress the importance of fresh academic stimuli in expanding the scope of subjects whose nature favors a technical, professional focus.

The relatively new fields of intelligence and low-intensity conflict are covered by Keith Jeffrey and Ian Beckett. Jeffrey concedes that source availability means the greatest volume of work investigating intelligence inevitably focuses on World War II and later periods. Beckett stresses the growing importance of low-intensity conflict for military studies because of the decline of large-scale war as a source of experience. Pride of intellectual place in this section, however, goes to Bill McAndrew’s “The Soldier and the Battle” — a brilliant demonstration of the contemporary roles academicians and soldiers can play in developing an understanding of battlefield behavior uninfluenced by romanticism on one side and grand guignol on the other. Don Higginbotham’s concluding survey stresses the latitudinarian approach and the high quality of the new military history. His insistence that military historians will “have a home in Clio’s mansion” as long as they produce