

Low-Level Military Threats and the Future of Japan's Armed Forces

by
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INTRODUCTION: A NEW WORLD POSITION

For more than forty years Japan has dwelt in the shadow of the United States and handled questions of defense policy almost entirely through the US-Japan Security Treaty. Yet, Japan is now the world's largest donor of foreign economic aid. It is the world's largest creditor and leading exporter of capital. Its trade surpluses and corporate wealth are well publicized. Japanese business has a substantial presence throughout the developing world and this presence now reaches far beyond the Pacific Rim to South America and some parts of Africa. In addition, Japan's armed forces have been steadily rehabilitated and improved. Forty years after the inauguration of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and almost fifty years since the complete dismantling of the Imperial Army and Navy, Japan has a substantial military establishment. If measured in US dollars, Japan's defense expenditures are the third largest in the world.¹ Japan's regular army is now larger than Great Britain's, though still overshadowed by several larger armies on the Pacific Rim.² And Japan now keeps military attaches in twenty-nine embassies around the world, including most of the Pacific Rim nations.³

Given Japan's great economic success, the Japanese are likely to become more frequently the target of violence or, at least, suffer the consequences of violence abroad. The Japanese are rich, and a struggling, impoverished, and envious world knows it.

Given Japan's rejuvenated military establishment and increasing susceptibility to international conflict, Japan's domestic debate on appropriate defense postures and plans will continue with vigor. Given the strange fate of the former Soviet Union and the great stature of Japanese economic interests around the world, Japanese defense planners must consider a complex variety of threats to Japanese territory, Japanese nationals, and Japanese business. The purpose of this article is to explore the recent and potential responses of Japan to low-level military threats.

PAST AND PRESENT PROBLEMS

Low-Level Attacks

Modern Japan is no stranger to low-intensity violence, including terrorism, banditry, piracy and other low-level military attacks. In November 1983, North Korea took prisoner two Japanese crewmen from the freighter *Fujisan Mara* after their vessel entered the port of Namp'o. The crewmen remained incarcerated for five years before their trial ended in 1987. They were subsequently sentenced to 15

years in prison. The Russians too are jealous of their territorial waters and fishing rights and from time to time seize Japanese fishing boats.⁴

Further south in the East China Sea, Japanese fishing boats have become a favorite target of pirates who from time to time open fire on the fishermen. In one such attack by a ship flying the PRC's flag, ten men, some of whom were in military uniform, boarded and searched a Japanese boat for twenty minutes.⁵

Beyond the South China Sea, in the busy straits in and around the Indonesian archipelago, piracy has thrived. In 1991 alone, Japanese ships suffered 18 acts of piracy in and near the Malacca-Singapore straits. A record high that year of 50 reported piracies in the Malacca Straits prompted demands from Japan and others that Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia patrol the area more effectively.⁶

In Japan itself, the Chukakuha terrorist faction has steadily improved its capabilities for violence. Using a launching tube only 40 centimeters long, they now are able to shoot metal projectiles up to 32 centimeters long and four centimeters in diameter. The range of this projectile is estimated to be 3.5 kilometers and it will hold up to 600 grams of gunpowder. The launching tube can be easily concealed in an automobile. Chukakuha has twice succeeded in hitting Prince Hitachi's residence, the projectiles "threading their way through a valley of buildings."⁷

In addition to these chronic, albeit low-level threats, Japanese businessmen traveling abroad have become the object of attack by both armed bandits and guerrillas looking for easy money. In one attack in the Philippines in the summer of 1990, Philippine bandits netted an estimated \$17,000 in cash and jewelry after ambushing four Japanese businessmen in their car outside Manila.

In Peru guerrillas of the Shining Path attacked the Japanese Embassy on the very day that President Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, attended a conference of the Inter-American Development Bank—in Nagoya, Japan.⁸ In the following months three car dealers offering Japanese cars were bombed by the Shining Path. In July 1991 guerrillas murdered three Japanese engineers and bombed a research center funded by the Japanese government. When they murdered a Japanese tourist they explained "he is Japanese like Fujimori."⁹

Indeed, the Japanese presence is now so encompassing and Japan's foreign policy so closely identified with that of the United States that Japan is considered a worthy target by governments as well as bandits and insurgents. Between January 1987 and July 1988, ten Japanese-owned merchant ships were attacked in the Persian Gulf. Four of the ten ships flew the Japanese flag. During the next Gulf crisis 790 Japanese citizens were stranded in Kuwait and Iraq after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. In the tense months that followed the invasion, 200 Japanese hostages were used as "human shields" alongside American and British hostages.¹⁰ In response to the economic sanctions brought by the West and which Japan had joined early on, Saddam Hussein explained:

We will never allow anybody, whomever he may be, to strangle the people of Iraq without having himself strangled. If we feel that the

Iraqi people are being strangled, that there are some who will deal a sanguinary blow to it, we will strangle all who are the cause of this.¹¹

Japan's good relations with Iraq before the war were of no account. Following the lead of its largest trading partner and principle ally, Japan had levied sanctions against Iraq and voted with the United States in the UN Security Council. Japan had reached a point where it could not be exempted from either the responsibilities or the costs of international influence.

The Japanese preference for maintaining a low-profile in foreign operations is well-known. But threats to Japanese commerce, businessmen, investments and vital interests are likely to escalate as Japan continues to prosper at home, while at the same time investing abroad in unstable or potentially unstable countries.

Territorial Disputes

Japan has a number of territorial disputes outstanding with her many neighbors on the Pacific Rim. Best-known among these is the dispute over the Kurile Islands formerly controlled by the Soviet Union and now the inheritance of the new Russian Republic. Occupied by Soviet troops at the end of World War II and occupied still by a Russian army division, the four islands are a constant source of irritation between the Japanese and Russian governments.¹²

Another and perhaps more dangerous dispute exists over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. These tiny coral islets two hundred miles north of Taiwan are controlled by Japan and claimed by Taiwan and China. The islands are so small and seemingly insignificant that they do not appear on most maps. Yet, the possibility that the seas around the islands contain rich oil deposits means that interest in the islands remains very keen.¹³

As recently as October 1990, the contesting claims to the Senkaku Island group were made manifest in diplomatic circles. First, Japanese ultra-nationalists installed a lighthouse on Uotsuri Island (in the Senkaku group) in order to show their support for Japan's claim to the islands. Shortly thereafter, two Taiwanese boats attempted to land on one of the islands, presumably to demonstrate their own country's claim to the islands. The Taiwanese were intercepted by patrol boats of Japan's Maritime Safety Agency. In public, the incident was discussed in the sternest tones. China announced that the island group "has always been part of Chinese territory, and China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands." Japan's Cabinet Secretary, Misoji Sakamoto, replied that the "Senkaku Islands belong to us. There is no change in our position."¹⁴ Two years later, in 1992, China announced a new Law of the Sea which explicitly named the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands a territory of China and asserted that the surrounding waters were under China's jurisdiction.¹⁵

China's interests, of course, are not limited to the Senkaku islands. With a littoral of 18,000 kilometers, China has nearly 6500 islands off its coast. In preparation for pressing some of its island claims more vigorously, China is

building a military air base on the Parcel Islands in the South China Sea and buying military aircraft from Russia.¹⁶

Further north in the East China Sea, Japan and its neighbors have not yet resolved their overlapping claims to the submarine continental shelf. In addition, Japan and South Korea both claim the uninhabitable island of Tok Do.¹⁷ For the time being, Japan and South Korea have established a Joint Economic Development Zone within the intersection of their maritime claims. However, the zone, established in 1974 to last until the year 2014, left China out of the bargain. In early 1993 Chinese patrol boats twice fired at Japanese ships in the East China Sea and twice apologized for their conduct. If the undersea territory proves to have great mineral resources, the disagreement between these poorly endowed neighbors will surely intensify.¹⁸

Asian Conflict

Even if Japan does not become directly involved in territorial disputes or inter-Asian conflict, Pacific Rim conflict will be of great concern to the Japanese government. Like the United States, Japan is insulated by the sea. But unlike the United States, whose overseas rivals and conflicts have always been distant, Japan's well-armed neighbors are close by. Not far across any sea are found large military establishments, potentially unstable governments, and historical enmities. Japan's Defense Agency demonstrates this precarious situation by carrying a map in its annual Defense White Paper showing Japan's armed forces surrounded and outnumbered by foreign armies and navies on the Pacific Rim. Subsequent maps, charts and diagrams in the defense report show: Russian troops as well as warships and air forces deployed around northern Japan; how the operational radii of Russian fighter planes extend over the Japanese islands; Russian and Chinese troop deployments along their northeast Asian frontiers; troop deployments on the Korean peninsula; and military postures in Indochina. If Japan is in some way "the Switzerland of Asia," then its security position is more analogous to the Switzerland of the 1930s than to contemporary Switzerland.

The list of potential military problems is a long one. The new Russian Republic is, to say the least, unstable and bordering on the chaotic. Moreover, the situation is not likely to be rectified soon. The Chinese government is stable for the time being but many Japanese analysts fear the consequences of domestic disorders in China's future as well as their many territorial disputes with Asian neighbors.¹⁹ China's military spending has increased enormously over the past decade as has its indiscriminate arms sales.²⁰ North Korea suggests other murky scenarios. Even if the military situation on the peninsula has long been stable, the death of North Korea's President Kim Il Sung may lead to a turbulent transition of power. Whatever happens, Pyong Yang's hardline government has too many military forces for the comfort of its neighbors as well as a nuclear weapons program.²¹ Further, North Korea has a substantial inventory of Scud missiles and sells them by the hundreds to customers in southwest Asia, Iran being the most interested buyer.²²

Thus, Japan's near neighbor may contribute to warfare on the other side of the Asian continent, where 55% of Japanese oil transits the Straits of Hormuz.

Further from Japan but still of concern are the actual and potential problems of Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines and Myanmar. In this region of substantial Japanese business activity are ominous signs of instability. Cambodia, despite the recent peace settlement and elections has heavily-armed factions. Thailand is subject to military coups and has dubious control over its hinterlands in the north. Burmese rebels as well as Cambodian factions use Thailand as a sanctuary. Indonesia, with its burgeoning population, ethnic strife, and militarism never far from the surface, is another potential crisis area. Likewise, the Philippines cannot be considered stable over the long-term.²³

Given Japan's substantial economic interests in the Pacific Rim countries, threats of government instability, economic disruption, and military conflicts in the region will be of increasing concern to Japan. Given the extraordinary volume of seaborne trade that passes through the region on its way to and from Japan, the Japanese government cannot be unconcerned.²⁴ Japan's vaunted economic power is the product of a stable international order. Its investments, income, economic influence, supply of raw materials and domestic luxuries depend on stability abroad. Japan will actively encourage and ensure international order. It is merely a question of how.

PAST AND FUTURE RESPONSES

Military Intervention

The most interesting of possible developments is that Japan will shed, by degrees, its long-standing moral and legal obligation to refrain from military intervention abroad. Attempts by the United States to coax Japan out of its rigid adherence to the constitutional prohibition of sending military forces abroad have actually met with some small success. The United States continues to press and may eventually succeed when Japan has the proper equipment, broader domestic support for intervention, and the right political circumstances.

United States requests for some form of Japanese military assistance in the past have revealed subtle changes in the nature of Japanese non-interventionism. In September 1965, the United States informally requested help from Japan during the Indonesian upheavals when thousands of people were being killed across the archipelago. Japan flatly refused to become involved. But that same year, Japan had supplied at least ten million dollars worth of material to American forces operating in Vietnam.²⁵

Ten years later, in 1975, the United States requested Japanese help in the evacuation of Saigon. The Japanese government determined that it could not use military aircraft or military pilots to meet the request but that it would be willing to send the private, commercial jumbo-jets of JAL. In this case, the effort failed because JAL pilots refused the dangerous mission.

A decade later, the United States requested Japanese assistance in the Persian Gulf action of 1987-88. It asked Japan to send some of its 42 minesweepers to join American and West European naval vessels policing the vital oil routes of the Middle East. The request, although seriously considered in the Japanese Cabinet, was refused, but Japan did decide to make direct cash payments to the United States to defray the costs of the American deployment of escorts in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, while the Cabinet debated how to respond to the American request for minesweepers, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) made studies of and contingency plans for escort duties abroad.²⁶

In August 1990, the United States once again petitioned Japan to send naval vessels to the Gulf, this time to support the international blockade of Iraq. Once again, after some deliberation Japan refused direct military participation. However, the Cabinet soon decided to offer several billion dollars of assistance both to the United States, again to help defray the cost of military intervention, as well as to Jordan, Turkey and Egypt, which were suffering economically from lost trade with Iraq. In addition to this financial aid, which amounted to \$13 billion, Japan eventually sent 100 physicians to Jordan to help cope with the refugees who had flooded across the border from Iraq.

Then, most spectacularly, although largely unnoticed in the West, Japan sent a flotilla of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in April 1991, after the war. Despite Western criticisms that Japan was slow to respond to the crisis and should have participated sooner and more directly in the allied effort, the dispatch of the five minesweepers and one ship tender to distant, and potentially dangerous waters was an important step in the use of the SDF. The government took great pains to make the argument to its public that the mission of the ships was peaceful and was only to "remove obstacles" to "make the Persian Gulf safe for navigation."²⁷ Once the minesweepers were on station, they were explicitly allowed by the Defense Agency to give "fuel, lubricants, fresh water and food" to allied naval vessels, thus lending support to foreign warships in foreign waters and setting another precedent.²⁸ It was perhaps this successful dispatch of these 510 officers and men to the Persian Gulf which smoothed the way for the subsequent dispatch of nearly 700 troops to Cambodia under UN auspices in 1992 and another 50 troops to Mozambique in 1993. Indeed, the Gulf War was the catalyst for the passage of landmark legislation that will change Japan's military profile around the globe.

UN Activities

Extending the trend toward military action was the UN Peacekeeping Operations bill passed in June 1992 after much debate in the Diet's upper and lower houses. The bill allows Japan to participate in UN peacekeeping activities only under stringent conditions. For example, the dispatch of SDF personnel must have prior approval by the Diet; the actual participation of SDF personnel in any given operation must be regulated under separate laws passed by the Diet; and the prime minister must gain the Cabinet's approval for operational plans. Furthermore, the bill itself must be reviewed by the Diet in 1995.²⁹

For those who criticize Japan as a “free rider” in security affairs, the vocal opposition to the bill, its slow progress, and restrictive clauses have been, at the least, exasperating. These commentators view the peacekeeping bill’s limitations as more foot-dragging and further evidence of Japan’s uncooperative nature in international affairs.

Another way to see the bill’s introduction and passage is as an important evolutionary step in Japanese defense policy. Whatever the particulars of the bill, the mere fact that it was approved was an important departure from past policies. Passage of the bill was followed shortly by legislation that allowed 600 SDF troops and 75 civilian policemen to join UN peacekeepers in Cambodia. Most of the SDF troops were engineers whose tasks were limited to road construction. However, the real test came in May 1993 when one of the Japanese police officers was killed and four more injured in an ambush of their convoy. At home, critics demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese contingent. But the government’s determination to let stand the precedent of a Japanese killed on active duty abroad was characterized by the foreign minister who stated that Japan cannot be “the first to say goodbye and leave Cambodia just because there is some fighting in some areas.”³⁰ Before the Japanese contingent returned from Cambodia, another 48 SDF personnel, carrying rifles and pistols for self defense, were ordered to Mozambique for traffic control duties alongside other UN troops.³¹ Thus, however many difficulties the government had with its peacekeeping legislation, it set Japan on a new course that includes sending uniformed and armed troops abroad. In the future, Japan may go even further to relax its definition of intervention. Meanwhile, there are many ways of intervening without direct intervention.

Military aid and weapon exports

Superpowers and others have long intervened in distant conflicts by exporting arms and war materiel to beleaguered governments. Japan has generally resisted such low-level, though overt, intervention. Japan’s post-war arms exports officially could go neither to Communist governments nor those under UN embargo, nor to countries “involved in or likely to become involved in, international conflict.”³² To what extent Japan has adhered to these limitations has been the subject of controversy for some time, especially among Japan’s left-wing political activists. It is clear that Japan has become an arms exporter, though it is less clear whether any motive other than profit has forced a liberalization of export restrictions. It has not been difficult to justify the export of high-technology items, such as helicopters or aircraft engines, to Sweden and Norway or to justify sales of high-technology military components to the United States. Yet, now that a flourishing arms exports industry has been established, and legitimated by various arguments, the government has been forced to consider what effect those exports will have on politics at home and abroad. In addition to constant scrutiny by opposition parties, the government and the arms industry have had to face international scandals.³³

The issue is not likely to go away. To the contrary, as the arms industry flourishes so will the question of where business ends and politics begins. Arms exports to developing countries tend to be limited to low-technology items, such as ammunition, revolvers, or a few larger dual-use items such as patrol boats, landing craft, and transport aircraft, but the customers are Burma, Indonesia, Zaire, and even Iraq and Pakistan. Japan has even resold old American-built navy frigates to Taiwan and the Philippines.³⁴ These arms exports to developing nations not only have some effect on their strategic situation, but become to some degree the responsibility of the Japanese government.³⁵

Non-military intervention: use of ODA

Overseas development assistance (ODA) is clearly more than an economic tool to support developing economies or a humanitarian gesture. Economic assistance has been overtly linked by Japan's government to political considerations of insuring stability and reducing the risks of international violence.³⁶ One noteworthy example is the evolving Japanese position toward Russia and the dispute over the Kurile Islands. Japan long insisted that economic aid to the Soviet Union could not proceed unless the issue of the Northern Territories could be resolved. However, following the Soviet coup in August 1991, Japan offered \$2.5 billion in economic aid. The government suddenly cited the need for Japanese "flexibility" as the precarious situation in the Soviet Union and Russia grew worse.³⁷

Evolving Japanese policy toward Cambodia and Vietnam is another example of linking ODA with strategic concerns. Shortly after Prime Minister Miyazawa's new cabinet was installed in November 1991, Foreign Minister Watanabe suggested that aid to Vietnam be restored. That Vietnam has an immense army and a weak economy is cause for worry on the Pacific Rim. Japanese aid to Cambodia following the peace accords in Fall 1991 was considered important because Cambodia could act as a buffer state between Vietnam and Japan's Southeast Asian trading partners and ease concern over Hanoi's military strength.

About 65 percent of Japan's aid goes to Asian nations, with resource-rich Indonesia frequently leading the list of recipients. Japan is also China's largest aid donor. These and other aid programs have been justified time and again as strategic aid to foster not only economic prosperity but also political stability.³⁸ Indeed, the Defense Agency makes it clear each year that Japan's security must be ensured by diplomatic efforts that foster political stability and that political stability is intimately linked to economic prosperity. Thus, a typical phrase from the Defense Agency as well as other ministries is that "stability and development in developing countries located in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America can influence the peace and stability of the international community."³⁹ In sum, Japan is not merely responding to pressures from the United States to lend greater financial assistance where the United States cannot, but is using foreign aid more and more as a political tool, intervening, albeit as a preventative measure, in developing countries against possible threats to Japan's interests.

DISSIPATING JAPANESE RESISTANCE AT HOME

Incremental Interpretivism

Japan's concept of self-defense, like the activities of its Self-Defense Force, can be viewed over the long run as a slowly but ever-widening circle. As time passes, nuances are added to old understandings and new, seemingly insignificant, pronouncements, variations and SDF missions set precedents. It is not unreasonable to expect this pattern to continue.

For example, Japan at first accepted only the defense of its territorial waters, but in 1983 took responsibility for the defense of a 1000 mile radius from the main island of Honshu in the event that Japan came under attack. Most of this maritime defense responsibility is considered high seas. Some time later, Prime Minister Nakasone explained that this defense could include assistance to and defense of US naval vessels and even foreign merchant ships destined for Japan carrying strategic materials.⁴⁰ A professor at Japan's National Defense Academy explained the next step:

the clause 'when Japan is under attack' can be stretched further to mean a situation where, for instance, Japanese tankers in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean are under attack.⁴¹

More recent discussions of Japan's role in the Gulf War and UN peacekeeping activities demonstrate the same pattern of steady, incremental change. In 1987-88 when Japan used "checkbook diplomacy" to support the US naval deployment in the Gulf War, many in Japan objected because this money went to subsidize a military effort. In 1990, when the Japanese government wanted to go beyond checkbook diplomacy, the objection was that financial support for the allies should be the limit of Japan's role. When the government considered sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, this was said to be well beyond the Constitution's boundaries. However, when the MSDF vessels were sent to the Gulf immediately after the war, the discussion quickly faded away. The recurring disagreements over definitions, methods and details for each of these new actions have masked the fundamental change: Japan's concept of defense has altered and will continue to alter. And while much attention has been focused on Japan's UN Peacekeeping bill and contributions, there have been yet other, more subtle discussions taking place and changes taking root.

Maritime Safety Agency

While Japan-watchers and Diet members have focused recently on the constitutional role of the SDF, one organization falls conveniently outside the debate: Japan's Maritime Safety Agency (MSF).⁴² This equivalent of the US Coast Guard is not governed by the SDF legislation, nor does its existence and duties raise any constitutional qualms. Its duties, like those of the Coast Guard, are considered peaceful and as necessary as any other public service. Yet the Maritime Safety Agency has long been involved in low-profile, low-level confrontations at sea. Japan uses the Maritime Safety Agency to enforce its territorial claims against

Chinese pirates and Taiwanese ultra-nationalists. The Agency is the diplomatic and constitutional instrument of choice for enforcing Japan's maritime limits and fishing rights as well as interdicting smugglers and refugees. In addition, it has acquired the task of escorting the freighter *Akatsuki Maru*, which carries processed plutonium from France, the United Kingdom and the United States to Japan.

There was also, for a time, the possibility that the MSF might carry out rescue missions and evacuations of Japanese nationals abroad. With about half a million Japanese living abroad, the government had no plans and no mandate for rescue missions. Those who advocated the development of a rescue capability, suggested that if the Diet would not allow the regular SDF to engage in such missions, they might allow the Maritime Safety Agency.⁴³ Here was yet another consequence of the Gulf War and the ensuing debates on Japan's contribution to the world order. Three months before the Peacekeeping bill passed in June 1992, the government approved plans to allow SDF aircraft to be used for the evacuation of Japanese nationals in the event of a foreign crisis. Two Boeing 747 aircraft were to be transferred from the Prime Minister's Office to the Defense Agency for this purpose.⁴⁴ The transaction drew little interest among the public and few objections from those preoccupied with the peacekeeping legislation.

Naval and Air Operations: past planning, future developments

Japan seems to demonstrate in defense affairs, as in other areas of political and cultural behavior, a clear preference to act only after careful planning and rehearsal. *Kata*, or form, is emphasized in every endeavor in contrast to the American penchant for improvisation and innovation. This cultural generalization may both explain the government's decision-making during the course of the Gulf confrontation in 1990-91 and provide the basis for prediction.

The government's preferred choice of military responses to the Gulf crisis in the fall of 1990 — the dispatch of minesweepers — was favored in part because this was an action which the government had previously considered and because it was a contingency for which the MSDF had planned. During the hostilities in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88, when oil tankers were subject to attacks from Iranian gunboats and mines, the United States asked Japan to contribute to the international naval effort to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers. The government considered the request and during the debate the MSDF's Maritime Staff Office prepared plans in case they were called upon. The United States could reasonably make this request and Japan could realistically consider it because the MSDF operates more than 40 of the world's most modern mine warfare ships.⁴⁵ Japan had been perfecting the *kata* of minesweeping for several decades. Though the government eventually declined the request for minesweepers, two retired admirals went aboard US escort vessels in the Gulf and prepared a report for the Cabinet, concluding that the mission was well within Japan's capability.⁴⁶

When the next Gulf Crisis occurred in September 1990, the MSDF had contingency plans on hand for a Gulf minesweeping mission and thus was well

ahead of plans by the Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF), which were not initiated until early November, some four months after the crisis began. Moreover, of the three branches of the SDF, only the maritime branch had substantial overseas experience, since they had been allowed for almost two decades to conduct overseas training missions. The government favored the minesweeping mission all along simply because it was more familiar with the plans and more confident of the prospect for success.⁴⁷ The MSDF plans were ready and their task was well rehearsed. The ASDF had begun its planning late and was not convincing. The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) made only minimal gestures toward planning. So, even though the political climate made it impossible for the government to send MSDF minesweepers or ASDF transport planes during the open hostilities of January and February of 1991, when the war was over the maritime mission was selected as the next step in Japan's widening circle of military activities.

During the next crisis, the government will have not only more legal options on which to base its military actions but more operational choices. They have, first, the precedent of sending MSDF minesweepers abroad on something more than a training mission.⁴⁸ Now there is also the precedent of planning by the ASDF for a mission abroad and some substantial rehearsal for such a mission. ASDF pilots were on alert for several weeks in January and February 1991. They were briefed on air routes, procedures, possible dangers, and desert survival techniques by US Air Force officers. The ASDF's C-130H transports were readied. Pallets with food, spare parts, medicines and other supplies were set out and ready to be loaded.⁴⁹

Indeed, the participation of the ASDF in operations abroad gained more and more currency as debate on the Gulf War and the UN peacekeeping bill progressed. A survey of business leaders after the Gulf War showed much support for a greater role for the SDF. Asked "how should Japan assist the transport of refugees," 77 percent said "send SDF planes if asked."⁵⁰ Given past debates and actions, it may seem both innocuous and logical to use the ASDF's C-130 transports to ferry refugees and equipment for disaster relief teams.

On the other hand, the SDF has noted that its transport aircraft are inadequate in both number and size to support SDF units dispatched to UN operations. As many as 30 Hercules C-130 transports would be needed to airlift several hundred personnel and their equipment.⁵¹ The SDF has only 15. Thus, the logistics of disaster relief operations or UN peacekeeping activities may support arguments for new acquisitions of equipment and new ASDF activities.

The public debate is enlarging the circle of acceptable SDF activities and promises to enlarge it further. Wider support for a minimal ASDF role provides a rationale to acquire more transports for the ASDF. A well-equipped and well-trained ASDF then makes it all the more plausible that they be sent abroad on new missions.

Domestic public opinion: *ca change*

Commentators are quick to note that there is still strong resistance among Japan's public to military activities of any kind, especially overseas missions. The furor in the Diet when the Peacekeeping bill was finally passed was spectacular enough to be broadcast on news stations around the world. Yet, while this deeply rooted resistance should not be overlooked, it is not altogether relevant to any one incremental change in Japanese defense policy.

Even before the Gulf War, public opinion was quite sensitive to what kind of missions the SDF might perform abroad. For example, a 1989 poll showed only 22 percent of respondents might approve of SDF participation in UN peacekeeping forces while 46 percent would oppose it. But more than 30 percent of respondents either "didn't know" or could "not say in a word." Moreover, only 33 percent expressed outright approval or opposition leaving a great majority with weak opinions. And in the same 1989 poll, 72 percent of respondents approved of SDF participation in disaster relief activities abroad. Only 20 percent opposed such activity, and only 8 percent expressed outright disapproval. This suggests that the actual details of participation were important to the public and that there is much room for change in this opinion. Indeed, when minesweepers were dispatched to the Gulf two years later, there was no public outcry though there was certainly much criticism in the Diet.⁵²

The public's views of SDF participation in the Gulf War also reveal subtle hints of future change. Most polls showed, unsurprisingly, a general opposition to Japanese cooperation with UN military allies' war effort. But more specific questions revealed interesting variations. Opinion was evenly split over whether to send transport planes to evacuate refugees and opinion was favorable toward sending such civilian personnel as physicians or technicians. And again, a survey of business leaders showed that 77 percent supported the idea of sending SDF planes to assist in the transport of refugees. Almost 80 percent of the business leaders agreed that the Gulf War raised the "need for laws and systems for emergencies."⁵³

In a yet more poignant example of changing attitudes, in September 1990, 40 percent of the general public opposed any use of SDF troops abroad. A year and a half later, in contrast to the vocal opposition parties of the Diet, a national poll showed that only 20 percent opposed any use of the SDF abroad. At the same time, 68 percent approved of the use of Japanese troops for UN peacekeeping operations.⁵⁴

Japan's public may be opposed to militarism, SDF involvement in combat roles, and SDF support of foreign military forces engaged in combat. However, this opposition does not necessarily extend to limited roles for the SDF abroad and certainly does not preclude the incremental development of such roles. As in the past, the public will be asked in the future to approve or disapprove not a speculative long-range trend but specific measures.⁵⁵

In Opposition and Government

The caveat to incremental advancements made in defense policy in the past decade may be that the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) finally fractured and in the summer of 1993 lost its majority in the House of Representatives. Elections can and do change policies. However, there is no reason to assume that the opposition parties that came to power in a broad coalition, can or will arrest the development of Japan's slowly widening sphere of defense activities. Like the public at large, the parliamentary parties have significantly changed their views in the last several years on the use of the SDF in foreign missions. In fact, it should be remembered that the LDP passed the Peacekeeping bill with the help of two opposition parties in the upper House of Councilors where the LDP did not control a majority of seats. Moreover, three of the opposition parties that came to power in 1993 were composed of former members of the LDP.⁵⁶ The three splinter parties together won 104 seats in the July 1993 general election, which was only slightly less than half the number of seats won by their former colleagues in the behemoth LDP. Prime Minister Hosokawa, elected to the Diet as the leader of the Japan New Party (JNP), was formerly a member of an LDP faction headed by former Prime Minister Tanaka. Tsutomu Hata, elected in July 1993 as the leader of the Shinseitō party and who became the deputy prime minister, was a member of an LDP faction led by former Prime Minister Takeshita and served in several LDP cabinets. Neither these men nor their followers had remarkable disagreements with the LDP over foreign or defense policies but rather disagreed about domestic political reform. It should not be overlooked that these three LDP splinters together accounted for more than a third of the new governing coalition in the House of Representatives.⁵⁷

To be sure, those parties which long sat in opposition until July 1993 before coming to power are more dovish about defense policy than the LDP. Yet a close look at these various parties does not demonstrate unmitigated opposition to the development of roles for the SDF. Each of those parties has been willing to contemplate some greater participation in international conflict (or international conflict resolution as they often prefer to call it).

The Social Democratic Party (SDJP), for example, which was vociferous in its opposition to the UN Peacekeeping bill and whose members resigned from the Diet in protest when the bill passed, has long insisted that the constitution does not allow the SDF to go abroad under any circumstances and, in fact, that the SDF is itself unconstitutional. However, the SDJP apparently would have considered sending a civilian corps abroad provided that it was unarmed. Moreover, elements in that party argued that it was time at least to accept the constitutionality of the SDF.⁵⁸ The party's adamant opposition to the Peacekeeping bill led to a resounding loss in the summer elections of 1993. In opposition, the SDJP held 134 seats in the lower house. It came to the coalition after the 1993 summer election with only 73 seats, fewer than it had held in its history, and agreed that it could compromise some of its principles in order to participate in the new government.

The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) has had a more complicated series of positions than the SDJP. From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the DSP suggested that the government could send unarmed personnel to the conflict area. The DSP also allowed that these personnel could include members of the SDF so long as they did not wear their SDF uniforms. A year later, by December 1991, the DSP was seriously negotiating with the LDP over the Peacekeeping bill. Though the DSP voted against the bill in the House of Representatives in late November 1991, they voted with the LDP and for the bill in the House of Councilors. They extracted a number of concessions from the LDP and ensured that the bill would be limited in scope, but they nonetheless supported the evolutionary step of sending armed forces abroad.⁵⁹

Through all of this, Komeito posed as the responsible swing party, its leaders willing from the first to negotiate the issue of sending personnel to conflict areas abroad. Though at first they opposed including the SDF in any corps sent overseas, they later not only accepted SDF participation but also that SDF personnel could carry weapons. In the interim, Komeito voted with the LDP in the upper house to pass the multibillion dollar aid package to support the United States' and UN's forces. Komeito claimed this monetary support for the war did not violate the constitution; to the contrary, it was Japan's international duty. And, although Komeito's support for the Peacekeeping bill did not materialize in the early months of 1992 as expected, this was due to a sudden increase of inter-party rivalry as trade relations with the US were strained and financial scandals stirred the political waters. Little noticed in the confusion was the support of Komeito and the DSP for an LDP bill in early 1992 to allow the SDF to participate in disaster relief missions abroad.⁶⁰

Control of the legislative houses by a coalition of small parties will no doubt ensure that new measures come slowly. However, new measures would come slowly anyway. Even with the LDP in the minority, there is ample evidence to suggest that the government can continue to make new plans for the SDF. Komeito, the DSP, Shinseitō, the Japan New Party, Sakigake, and the LDP minority together suggest a substantial bloc of support for new measures and missions. The Diet, with or without an LDP majority, will be able to consider a greater role for Japan in international conflicts even if this role is known in public debate as peacekeeping. Moreover, no Japanese government will easily put aside aspirations for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and such aspirations must coincide with a greater disposition to intervene in global crises and, at times, to use the armed forces of the country.⁶¹

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: EVOLUTIONARY REVOLUTION

This analysis of Japan's defense policies and politics emphasizes the evolutionary nature of change. While many analysts seem to anticipate a revolution in Japan's defense policy, those who fear Japan's military potential may be relieved and those who look forward to a greater Japanese presence in international conflict resolution will be disappointed. The evidence suggests that changes have been

incremental and will continue to be incremental even as some of those incremental changes imply revolutionary change.

Japan has long been prepared for a conventional, general war in the northwest Pacific as the junior partner to US armed forces against the Soviet Union. However, a combination of the implosion of Soviet power, the Gulf War, and dozens of other irritants suggests a new scenario for the 1990s and beyond. But rather than becoming either a military power to match its economic interests or remaining in the shadows of US defense policy, Japan is likely to develop the role of its Self Defense Forces on a case by case basis. These cases and situations are likely to be either low-level threats to Japanese economic interests or muted territorial disputes on the Pacific Rim. In either case, Japan will more and more engage indirectly and directly in international conflicts.

The author owes his gratitude to many people in Japan who agreed to be interviewed, including editors of *Asahi Shimbun*, SDF officers, officials of the Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry, and Fellows at the International Institute for Global Peace.

Endnotes

1. Japan's defense expenditures are somewhat exaggerated if measured in US dollars because of the unusually high value of the Japanese yen relative to the dollar. In addition, defense money spent in Japan on locally made equipment does not buy what it would elsewhere, as local prices are 2 to 3 times world market prices.
2. Britain has recently reduced its regular army but its reserve forces greatly outnumber those of Japan. Further, Japan has long had and still has difficulty recruiting troops in the numbers authorized by the Diet. For comparative figures, see *Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: Defense Agency, trans. by Japan Times, annual).
3. *Ibid.*, part III, ch. 1.
4. "Soviets Nab Japanese Fishing Boat," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 30, no. 48 (3-9 December 1990), p. 2.
5. "Pirate raids resume on Japanese boats," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 22 July 1991, p. 7.
6. Barbara Kwiatkowska, "Current Status of the Indonesian Archipelagic Jurisdiction," paper presented at Joint Conference with the Law of the Sea Institute and Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute, Seoul, Korea, 15 July 1993, pp. 14-15.
7. See, "Guerrilla Attacks on Prince Hitachi's Residence and Kyoto Palace; Chukakuha's new-type projectile," *Asahi*, 11 January 1990, p. 31, translation in *Daily Summary of Japanese Press*, Office of Translation Services, Political Section, American Embassy, Tokyo, 18 January 1990, p. 15.
8. "Peru's Rebels Cut Power and Attack Embassies," *New York Times*, 7 April 1991, p. 4.
9. "Peruvian Guerrillas kill three Japanese aid workers," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 16 July 1991, p. 7.
10. See, *New York Times*, 27 November 1990, p. 1; and *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 19 November 1990, p. 4.
11. Statement carried in *New York Times*, 24 September 1990, p. 12.
12. Japan would like the Russian Republic to abide by the 1855 Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation. Under that treaty the islands south of Uruppu belong to Japan: Etoforu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai islets.
13. On Japan's territorial disputes in the East China Sea see, *inter alia*: K.T. Chao, "East China Sea: Boundary Problems Relating to the Tiao-yu-ta'i Islands," *Chinese Yearbook of International Law*

- and Affairs, 2 (1982), pp. 45-97 and in the same volume: Ying-Jeu Ma, "The East Asian Seabed Controversy Revisited: Relevance (or Irrelevance) of the Tiao-yu-ta'i (Senkaku) Islands Territorial Dispute," pp. 1-44; and Tao Cheng, "The Sino-Japanese dispute over the Tiao-yu-ta'i (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of Territorial Acquisition," *Virginia Journal of International Law*, 14, pp. 221-66.
14. "Japan Reverses Course in Senkaku Islands Dispute," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 30, no. 44 (5-11 November 1990), p. 3.
 15. See, 1992 *Territorial Sea Law of China*, article 2, section 2; Wang Liyu, "The Territorial Sea Law of China," paper presented at the Joint Conference with the Law of the Sea Institute and Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute, Seoul, Korea, 15 July 1993, pp. 6-7. References to the Senkaku Islands may be rendered in Chinese as Diaoyu or Diaoyudao or, the older usage, Tiao-yu ta'i.
 16. "China Building Air Base near Disputed Area," *Korea Times*, 14 July 1993, p. 1; and see also, Harlan W. Jencks, *Some Political and Military Implications of Soviet Warplane Sales to the PRC* (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University, 1991).
 17. See Tiajudo, "The dispute between Japan and Korea respecting sovereignty over Takeshima (Tok Do)," *Japanese Annual of International Law*, 12, pp. 1-17.
 18. "Japan protests to China over shooting incidents," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 33, no. 8 (22-28 February 1993) p. 3. For a summary of conflicting territorial claims on the western rim of the Pacific see: Hungdah Chiu, "Political Geography in the Western Pacific after the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 5, no. 1 (January 1986), pp. 25-32; and more recently "Japan affirms Continental Shelf Agreement," *Korea Times*, 14 July 1993, p. 3.
 19. See, F. Ikle and T. Nakanishi, "Japan's Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, 69, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 83-86; Tai Ming Cheung, "Beijing puts priority back on PLA," *Nikkei Weekly*, 17 August 1991, p. 20; Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 136-52.
 20. Neither has it been lost on the region's analysts that China recently set off the largest underground nuclear blast in history. See, June Teufel Dreyer, "The Chinese Military Since the Soviet Coup," *American Asian Review*, XI, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 25-43; "China's neighbors are getting nervous" *Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition, 12-18 April 1993, p. 7.
 21. See, Larry A. Niksch, *North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program* (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 11 March 1992); "NK Now Developing 6 N-Weapons," *Korea Times*, 16 July 1993, p. 1.
 22. "North Korea Provided Iran with 220 Scud Missiles in '92," *Korea Times*, 17 July 1993, p. 1.
 23. P. Lewis Young, "Southeast Asian Nations see no sign of Peace Dividend," *Armed Forces Journal International*, (February 1992), pp. 30-34; Kenneth Conboy, "Conflict Potential in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea," in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., *From Globalism to Regionalism* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), pp. 57-72; Robert A. Scalapino, et al. eds., *Internal and External Security Issues in Asia* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1987); Dora Alves, ed., *Cooperative Security in the Pacific Basin*, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1990); B.A. Hamzah, "ASEAN and the Remilitarization of Japan," *Indonesian Quarterly*, XIX, no. 2 (1991), pp. 141-68; Hiroyuki Kishino, "Why Japan Should Help the Philippines Now," an IIGP policy paper, (Tokyo: International Institute for Global Peace, 1990).
 24. Put as succinctly as possible, the "fatal weakness of Japan as an economy is in its poor natural resource endowments." In fact, Japan is the world's number one importer of twenty different categories of primary goods, including iron ore, coal, wood, and unmilled cereals. Kazuo Sato, "Japan's Resource Imports," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 513 (January 1990), pp. 76-90; and by the same author, "Increasing Returns and International Trade: The Case of Japan," *Journal of Asian Economics*, I (March 1990), pp. 87-114; and *International Trade Statistics Yearbook* (New York, United Nations, annual).
 25. As reported in *New York Times*, 8 February 1966, p. 11.

26. Admirals Yoshida and Takata, JMSDF (ret.), whom this author interviewed on 25 July 1991, went to the Persian Gulf aboard US Naval vessels to study the requirements of escort duty. Meanwhile, the staff office of the MSDF drafted its own plans. See text and footnotes below.
27. The phrases are taken from a colorful pamphlet issued by the MSDF for the purpose of public relations. It includes a photo of each ship's captain and a warm note from the commander of the Overseas Minesweeper Force.
28. Hideki Sakata, "Gulf cooperation mission questioned," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 31, no. 46, (18-24 November 1991), p. 3. The dispatch of this flotilla was justified by Article 99 of the Self-Defense legislation which prescribes minesweeping activities without specifying any geographic limits. Actually, Japanese minesweeping units had been used by SCAP in Korean waters during the Korean War. See James E. Auer, *The Postwar Sea Forces of Maritime Japan, 1945-1971* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 63-68.
29. "Peacekeeping bill becomes law," *Japan Times*, 32, no. 25 (June 22-28, 1992), p. 1; "Key points of Japan's New PKO Law," *By the Way*, 2, no. 6 (November/December 1992), p. 7.
30. "Renewed fighting revives PKO debate," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 33, no. 8 (22-28 February 1993), p. 1; and "Government reassess PKO mission in Cambodia," 33, no. 20 (17-23 May 1993), p. 1; "Peacekeeping role doubts raised," 33, no. 21 (24-30 May 1993), p. 1.
31. See several stories in the *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition: "Mozambique next for SDF peacekeepers," 33, no. 14 (5-11 April 1993) p. 1; "SDF dispatch to Mozambique approved," 33, no. 19 (10-16 May 1993), p. 3; "SDF personnel receive orders for Mozambique," 33, no. 20 (17-23 May 1993), p. 5.
32. See, *Boei Handobukku*, 73 nenpan (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1988), p. 431, cited in Hartwig Hummel, *The Policy of Arms Export Restrictions in Japan*, Occasional Papers Series, Number 4 (Tokyo: International Peace Research Institute, Meigaku, 1988), p. 8.
33. The implications have not been overlooked by the press. See, Susumi Awanohara, "Son of Toshiba," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (19 September 1991), pp. 10-11; "Missile parts probe shadows of Japan's arms sales policies," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 16 July 1991, p. 7.
34. For statistics and descriptions of Japan's arms exports see, Hummel, *The Policy of Arms Export Restrictions in Japan*, pp. 23-36.
35. Several of Japan's largest debtors, including Pakistan and Sri Lanka, also spend a substantial percentage of their GNP on defense. Several of the largest recipients of Japanese development assistance are among the world's largest arms exporters, including China and Brazil. This paradox continues to raise questions within and outside of Japan and proposals are afoot to link foreign aid to recipients' defense and weapons export policies. For a brief summary see, Jocelyn Ford, "Questions fly at LDP plan to link ODA to Arms," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 31, no. 11 (18-24 March 1991) p. 3.
36. "New Aid Policy Emphasizes Markets, Demilitarization, Democracy & Environment," *Weekly Japan Digest*, III, no. 26 (6 July 1992), p. 14; Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, 70, no. 5 (Winter 91/92), p. 66. Japan's 1991 White Paper on Overseas Development Assistance for the first time ties aid to political values. See also, Takashi Kitazume, "Tokyo to link aid more closely to politics," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 31, no. 41, (14-20 October 1991) p. 3; Kenneth Pyle, "Japan's Pacific Overtures," *The American Enterprise*, (November/December 1991), pp. 29-37.
37. "Watanabe foresees end to islands dispute," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 31, no. 46 (18-24 November 1991), p. 3; "Japan, Letting Bygones Go," *Washington Post*, National Weekly Edition, (29 March-4 April 1993), p. 18.
38. For foreign aid statistics and a summary of programs and motivations see, Alan Rix, "Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: A Capacity for Leadership," *Pacific Affairs*, 62, no. 4 (Winter, 1989-1990), pp. 461-75; Robert Orr, *The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
39. This quote comes from Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, 1990, (trans. by Japan Times, 1990), p. 81. Other annual issues of this government White Paper carry similar phrases.

40. Masashi Nishihara, "Prospects for Japan's defense strength and international security role," in Douglas T. Stuart, ed., *Security Within the Pacific Rim* (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1987) p. 43; and see various remarks by Nakasone reported by *Asahi Shimbun*, morning edition, 5 February, 10 March, 25 March and 19 April 1983. Japan's sea lane defense focuses specifically on the eastern sea lane stretching 1000 miles southward from Tokyo Bay toward Guam and the western sea lane reaching 1000 miles from Osaka Bay to the southwest as far as Bashi Channel south of Taiwan.
41. Nishihara, "Prospects for Japan's defense strength," p. 43.
42. The Maritime Safety Agency, or *Kaijo Hoan Cho*, comes under the Ministry of Transportation and has its own service academy (*Kaijo Hoan Daigakko*) and its own seaman's school (*Kaijo Hoan Gakko*). The agency has more than 330 patrol vessels at its disposal, including 81 "offshore" vessels capable of operating on the high seas. It also has 38 helicopters and 25 planes, including two British-made Skyvans. Better and longer range equipment could simply be transferred from the MSDF if needed, though this would require a period of training.
43. Author's interview with Kiyofuko Chuma, *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 August 1991. Japanese nationals living abroad includes 63,000 Japanese living in Asian countries, 6,500 living in various Middle Eastern countries, and another 6,400 living in Africa. *Facts and Figures of Japan* (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, 1989), p. 12.
44. "Government backs SDF for crisis airlifts," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 32, no. 12 (23-29 March 1992), p. 3.
45. In addition to this substantial number of minesweepers, the MSDF has almost five dozen escorts armed with ASROC launchers and close-in weapons systems. Some of these are also equipped with ship-to-ship guided missiles. See Defense of Japan, "Reference Material and Statistical Tables." By contrast, the US navy was found embarrassingly short of mine warfare ships during the Persian Gulf operations of 1987-88. It had not launched a single new minesweeper from 1958 until 1987. See, *The Almanac of Seapower* (Arlington, VA: Navy League, annual).
46. These were Admiral Manabu Yoshida and Vice Admiral Taketo Takata, JMSDF (ret.) whom the author interviewed on 25 July 1990. Their 1988 study was produced for the independent "Strategy Research Center" and circulated in the Diet, the Foreign Ministry and the MSDF Staff Office in order to show that an escort mission in the Gulf could be accomplished by the MSDF and how it would be undertaken.
47. This view was advanced by a number of officials, including several members of the *Sorifu*, the Prime Minister's Research Office. This author had three hours of interviews with four members of the Foreign Affairs Research Department of the Cabinet Research Office in July 1991. Interviews in July and August 1991 with officers of the MSDF and ASDF at the Air Staff Command College in Ichigaya as well as SDF officers and professors at the National Defense University confirmed this view.
48. The legal bases of new missions are usually found in new interpretations of existing SDF legislation. For example, Section 21, Article 5 of the Defense Agency Establishment Law was first used to legitimize MSDF training missions beyond Japan's territorial waters and later interpreted to allow practice by antiaircraft batteries in the United States and still later to justify MSDF participation in naval maneuvers with the United States on the high seas. These new twists in interpretation, followed by some new SDF activity, soon ceased to be the object of debate while, later, a new deviation was the subject of brief attention.
49. This detailed preparation received scant attention in Japanese newspapers while the main focus was on intra and inter-party debates over the issue of sending ASDF planes in any capacity. Interviews in July and August 1991 with instructors at the Air Staff College in Ichigaya and US Air Force officers stationed at Yakota revealed the unprecedented planning and preparation by the ASDF.
50. "Industry's View of the War," *Economic Eye*, 12, no. 2 (Tokyo: Keisai Koho Center, Summer 1991), p. 17.
51. See *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, "Miyazawa terms Diet OK for SDF dispatch unnecessary," 31, no. 47, (25 November - 1 December 1991) p. 5, and "Gulf aid package gathers speed," 31, no. 5 (4-10 February 1991) pp. 1, 4.
52. Prime Minister's Office, "Public Opinion Survey on Japan's Peace and Security," (August 1989),

- trans. by Foreign Press Center, September 1989, p. 12; "Tokyo's Plan to Aid U.N.," *New York Times*, (11 December 1991), p. A17.
53. "Industry's Views of the War," and see, *New York Times*, 24 September 1990, p. 1, 2 November 1990, p. 9; *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 30, no. 43 (29 October 1990), pp. 1, 6, 7.
 54. "Yomiuri Poll Finds 68% Approval of Using Troops for Peacekeeping," *Daily Japan Digest*, III, no. 83 (6 May 1992), p. 2.
 55. A careful analysis of changing public opinion is offered by Davis B. Bobrow, "Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33, no. 4 (December 1989), pp. 571-604.
 56. The three splinter parties are the Japan New Party, Shinseito or the Japan Renewal Party, and Sakigake. The Japan New Party was formed by Prime Minister Hosokawa, then governor of Kumamoto prefecture, in May 1992. His party won 36 seats in the lower house elections of July 1993. Shinseito was formed only one month before the July 1993 elections by Tsutomu Hata, who had served the LDP as finance minister and by Ichiro Ozawa who had been the LDP Secretary-General. Shinseito won 55 seats in the July election. Sakigake was also formed one month before the election, when it was already quite clear that the LDP would fare poorly. Sakigake won 13 seats in the July 1993 election.
 57. "LDP fails to gain majority," *Korea Times*, 19 July 1993, p. 1; "Hosokawa to be prime minister," *Japan Times*, 33, no. 32 (9-15 August 1993), p. 1.
 58. For reports of shifting party positions see, "JSP reverses stance," *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 30, no. 43 (29 October 1990), p. 1; "Tokyo Debates," *New York Times*, 20 September 1991 p. A3.
 59. *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 30, no. 43 (29 October 1991), p. 1; 31, no. 49 (9 December 1991), p. 1; 31, no. 50 (16 December 1991), p. 10.
 60. *Japan Times*, Weekly International Edition, 31, no. 49 (December 9, 1991), p. 5; 31, no. 10 (11 March 1991), p. 7; 32, no. 12 (23-29 March 1992), p. 3.
 61. Presidents Bush and Clinton as well as Chancellor Kohl have expressed their desire to see Japan join the permanent members of the UN Security Council but, like UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, they have suggested that a permanent seat must be accompanied by a much more activist foreign policy by the government of Japan. "If you are an important country, you have important responsibilities" is the admonition of Boutros-Ghali. "I cannot ask small island countries in the Pacific or small countries in Africa to do the same as the major countries." *Japan Times*, 33, no. 9 (1-7 March 1993), p. 3.