A modern democratic state. In Canada, this subculture is small enough to be well represented in a readable 361 pages.

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Why did the USSR break up so suddenly, so — relative to other empires and multinational states — comparatively peacefully? Why have the new states emerging from the USSR experienced such internal turbulence? These books provide partial answers.

Miron Rezun's book consists of eleven essays by specialists, more than half of them professors in Canada, on the “Center” of the former USSR (including the Army); the European, Caucasian, and Muslim peripheries; and the international dimension (including comparisons with China and Canada). Most of the essays are quite competent — often, summary distillations of a life’s work. Most bring their story up to and just beyond the December 1991 collapse of the USSR.

The anthology provides a collection of viewpoints and factual reporting useful to any serious student or scholar wishing to do research on the parts or the whole of the erstwhile Soviet empire. But it lacks a strong overall structure or theory to unify the various chapters. Such an anthology could have put forward a collective effort to test a theory such as that argued in Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (1986) on the role of the metropole, the periphery, and relations between them.

Rezun’s essay includes a categorical evaluation of others’ writings on the Muslim periphery, describing some as “Indian old boys” and others as “mediocrities.” Bohdan Harasymiw’s essay on the Ukraine evaluates Alexander’s Motyl’s book *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?* (1987) and shows why its main thesis (even Ukrainians cannot rebel and hence will not) proved to be both incorrect and prescient.

One of the most eye-opening contributions is that of Lawrence Shyu, who compares the situation of Muslim minorities in China with that of Muslim peoples
in the ex-USSR. Canadians may be intrigued (and perhaps amused) by Larry Black's account of Soviet perceptions of federal-provincial relations in Canada.

The importance of religion in national life of the ex-Soviet republics is noted by Juris Dreifelds in Latvia, by Stephen Jones in Georgia, and in other chapters of the Rezun book. But the place of religion is the central focus of David Little's study of intolerance in the Ukraine.

Little is Director, Working Group on Religion, Ideology, and Peace at the United States Institute of Peace. His group is also preparing studies of Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Sudan, Nigeria, Tibet, and Israel. The approach seems to be that specialists on the region present papers at a working group, where they are discussed. Little writes up his own synthesis which is reviewed by the specialists and refined.

Little compares religious contention within Ukraine with the principles and concepts laid down in the UN Declaration against Intolerance adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 November 1981. But he starts more than 1000 years ago when Orthodox Christianity became the religion of Kievan Rus'. Political and military events interacted with theology and proselytizing to produce three churches in Ukraine (and abroad)—Uniate, Russian Orthodox, and Ukrainian Autocephalous. The book relates how these churches have contended and occasionally cooperated with one another.

Religion as well as language and other cultural differences could have kept Ukrainians and Russians living in Ukraine at each others' throats. To the surprise of many observers, such differences have been overshadowed in recent years by common efforts of Ukrainians and others living in Ukraine to forge a new political community independent of Moscow. This book details the efforts of some Ukrainians to undercut ancient strains of intolerance.

Compared with the Caucasus and other parts of the ex-USSR, religion and other potential sources of discord have played a small role in Ukraine since 1991. Compared with Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Lebanon, much of the TransCaucasus has been relatively calm.

To commemorate the second millennium of Christianity in Ukraine-Rus', the University of Toronto (aided by a private grant) produced a cartographic survey of three millennia of Ukrainian history. The 25 color plates, each accompanied by a page of text, tell the story of this borderland (wedged between other regions and powerful states), from the Cimmerians and Scythians to World War II and after. Several plates illustrate the expansionist and contracting tides of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries that left Ukraine with three churches and other complicated legacies.

The historical atlas is a work of art as well as exacting scholarship. Its quality stands as a reproach to the typesetting and copyediting at Praeger, which has many lapses in the English text as well as Russian footnoting. It has no howlers like
footnote 1 in the intolerance study which dutifully explains why most Westerners formerly spoke of the Ukraine. The book's compiler-author states that Russians typically employed the definite article in referring to the region. Ukrainians, however, tend to drop the definite article, implying that the republic stands by itself and is nobody's borderland. In reality, neither Russian nor Ukrainian has articles — definite or indefinite.

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By introducing the term ‘containment’ to the American political vocabulary in July 1947, George Frost Kennan ensured his place in history. During his twenty-seven years of formal public service this stately gentleman served in a number of key government positions, including first deputy for foreign affairs at the National War College, head of George Marshall’s Policy Planning Staff in the American State Department, and finally, in May 1952, as the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union. After retiring from government service in 1953 Kennan found a new home at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, where he has since authored eighteen books on a variety of historical subjects. Today, he is recognized as both a primary architect and a vociferous critic of post-war American foreign policy.

In essence Around the Cragged Hill represents yet another attempt by Kennan to set the record straight vis-a-vis what he terms his “personal and political philosophy.” One could argue, that this book is a response to those scholars, a group of which has significantly proliferated over the last ten years, who have spent the bulk of their intellectual lives trying to come to terms with the political ideology of the so called ‘father of containment’ — a title which he disparages.

Yet, if as Kennan argues, the primary purpose of Around the Cragged Hill is to “respond to the demands of some critics that [he tries] to identify, somewhat more specifically than [he has] ever done in the past, those of [his] views and reactions — of his prejudices . . . that might be said to be of a philosophical nature,” (p. 113) then this latest publication can only be viewed as disappointing. For within this context there are very few new insights offered. Indeed, one of the most amazing yet curious aspects of Kennan’s career is the degree to which his personal political philosophy has remained unchanged over the past fifty years.

Philosophically Kennan remains the quintessential realist. He argues that “people tend, over the long run, to get the type of government they deserve,” and therefore the United States bears no responsibility for those who are unfortunate