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Journal which, cyclostyled, was distributed fortnightly to senior British officials. Otherwise, the work appears to be a sound assessment of the primarily operational aspects of the low-intensity conflict in Malaya.

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Charters, David, ed. *Democratic Responses to International Terrorism*. Ardsley-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational, 1991.

Terrorism is the common cold of the body politic — hard to ignore but no danger unless the victim is already much weakened by other problems. A cold can be attributed (sometimes) to a particular virus, but the infection is usually left to run its course. Similarly, we have learned something about the origins of terrorist groups, but no cure has been discovered. Indeed, students of terrorism are generally quite cautious in making policy suggestions, and, among the many books and articles aiming to increase our understanding of the origins of terrorism, relatively few have had the audacity to suggest a treatment program. This book is one of the few, and deserves special attention for this reason alone.

The editor, David Charters, introduces this collection of essays with a statistical portrait of terrorism and the burgeoning literature on terrorism. It appears that, from 1968 to 1987, the number of casualties from “international” terrorism (24,000) is of the same order of magnitude as the number of books and articles devoted to terrorism (5000). The goal of the book is to sift this large literature for suggestions about how a democratic state can best deal with terrorism. The editor notes that most of the authors are Canadian and much of the experience represented in the volume is Canadian, but suggests that the “lessons of experience” brought together in his concluding chapter can be useful to any democratic state facing a terrorist threat.

Thanks to support from the Centre for Conflict Studies of the University of New Brunswick and from the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, the editor was able to bring his authors together in a workshop at the University of Toronto in 1987. The present essays are the outcome of this workshop, and the editor, as coordinator of the workshop and Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies, had an unusual opportunity to control his inputs and produce an integrated volume.

The volume is divided, somewhat unevenly, into two parts. The first and smaller part (Chapters 1-3) aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the problem of terrorism; the second and larger part (Chapters 4-11) focuses on state responses to terrorism, with particular concern for identifying responses consistent with the preservation of a liberal democratic state.

The first chapter takes up the vexed issue of defining terrorism. The author of this Chapter, Thomas Mitchell, is Associate Director of the Center for Public Education, School of International Affairs at the University of Southern California. In a brief eight pages, Mitchell succeeds in giving some indication of the complexity and political sensitivity of this issue, but ends up plumping for a definition — “. . . the purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim, and/or audience of the act or threat” — that will not distinguish between the IRA and the mafia. Succeeding chapters do not build on this definition or even refer to it, except that the second chapter suggests amending Mitchell’s definition in the direction of Alex Schmid’s emphasis on the audience-attracting quality of extra-normal violence. In Chapter 9, Ronald Crelinsten moves in the same direction by describing terrorism as “a form of political communication that uses threat and violence against one set of targets, the victims, to compel compliance or allegiance from another set of targets, including opponents and supporters, to impress a wider audience that at times includes the mass media itself.”

The author of the second chapter, Jeffrey Ross, is a professor of Political Science at the University of Lethbridge. His goal is to provide an overview of recent scholarship on terrorism, and he takes the simple strategy of identifying the common themes of nine recent chapters written by recognized authorities on international terrorism. He comes up with eight popular themes: terrorism typologies, trends in the number, location, tactics, and targets of terrorist acts, identification of terrorist groups, support for terrorist groups, and the future of terrorism. He reviews statistics suggesting that terrorism since 1968 is slowly and irregularly increasing in number of incidents (average 7 percent a year) and regions affected, but relatively constant in tactics (bombing 50 percent of incidents, with assassination, armed assault, kidnapping, hijacking, and hostage-taking accounting for another 45 percent) and targets (military facilities or personnel least common, “miscellaneous” civilian targets most common). Some terrorist groups have faded, but some have persevered for twenty years and show no sign of weakening.

In Chapter 3, Claude Bergeron — a retired captain in the Canadian Armed Forces — provides an accounting of 1077 air hijackings from 1930 to 1983. About half of these appear to have been politically motivated and might qualify as terrorism. Hijackings peaked between 1969 and 1972, and declined thereafter in association with the agreement between the US and Cuba on treatment of hijackers and increased airport security measures worldwide.

Chapter 4 begins the explicitly policy-oriented part of the volume by providing brief histories of the policies pursued by the states most victimized by terrorist hijackings. Peter St. John, a professor of International Relations at the University of Manitoba, focuses on 110 “internationally significant” hijackings between 1968 and 1988 (listed in an Appendix) and follows Bowyer Bell in categorizing state reactions on a spectrum ranging from Concession and Flexibility to No Compromise and Retaliation. Surprisingly, there is no history of Canadian policy, although Canada is placed with the states showing Flexibility. St. John

suggests that the best results will come from international cooperation and coordination in refusing to compromise with hijackers; he points to NATO as a possible forum for this kind of cooperation.

Unfortunately, the case for a hard line against terrorists is not so clear as St. John would have it. In the 1970s, Japan and Austria were willing to ransom planes and facilitate hijackers' escapes; they are held up as examples of the dangers of encouraging hijacking with concession and accommodation. Mysteriously, however, neither Japan nor Austria seems to have suffered any internationally significant hijackings in the 1980s (although Abu Nidal attacked the Vienna airport in 1985).

Chapter 5, by G. Davidson-Smith, gives an overview of counterterrorism contingency planning and incident management in Canada. Davidson-Smith is a strategic analyst in the Department of the Solicitor General, which in Canada is the lead agency in counterterrorism policy. He deftly guides the reader through the alphabet soup of acronyms identifying the many divisions of government that have to be coordinated in an effective defense against terrorism. This tour leaves the reader with some appreciation of the enormous costs — in time, talent, money and friction — that a few terrorists can inflict on a state determined to be prepared for them.

Chapter 6 points to a different kind of cost: the potential loss of civil liberties in emergency measures against terrorism. William Vaughn, a political science professor at St. Thomas University in New Brunswick, examines the philosophical and constitutional foundations of emergency powers available to the Canadian government. Vaughn suggests that these foundations need rather more consistent attention than they have received in the past.

Chapter 7 is another insider's guide, this time to the bureaucratic complexities of distinguishing between the responsibilities of police intelligence (notably the RCMP) and the responsibilities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), established by statute in 1984. A. Stuart Farson writes from his experience as the former Director of Research with the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Review of the CSIS Act and the Security Offenses Act; his research for this chapter was supported by the Solicitor General. Here again the tour reveals the friction and confusion within government efforts to deal with terrorism.

The editor is himself the author of Chapter 8, which reviews the various sources of counterterrorism intelligence and points to the difficulties of getting the right kind of product into the right hands in a timely fashion. Human sources, informers and defectors, are the most important even as they are the most difficult to develop and assess. This chapter reinforces the message of Chapters 4, 5, and 7 in appealing for more centralization and rationalization of efforts against terrorism.

Chapter 9 stands out as the strongest contribution to understanding the problem terrorism poses to a democratic state. Ronald Crelinsten, a criminologist at the University of Ottawa, describes the complex war of communication waged

by terrorist actions and state reactions. The multiple audiences include those sympathetic to terrorist goals and those who are not, as well as all those who might be moved from indifference to support for either terrorists or government. This perspective leads Crelinsten to point out that, despite the concerns often expressed about how terrorists use media attention for their own ends, the fact is that government is much better able than terrorists to affect media interpretation of terrorist acts.

In the same vein, Abraham Miller's Chapter 10 suggests that the symbolic value of terrorist acts is often opposed by symbolic government acts to limit mass media attention to terrorists. His case history is the evolution of legal prohibitions against putting terrorists on television in Great Britain; his point is that these prohibitions have not been enforced against the BBC and appear to be more an attack on the moral status of terrorists than a threat to journalists. Although Miller is a political scientist at the University of Cincinnati, his is an anthropological analysis of the ritual value of attacking journalists when terrorists are out of reach.

Maurice Tugwell preceded Charters as Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies, and his Chapter 11 compares Canadian, British, American, French and Israeli experience with using military and paramilitary units against terrorists. The options range from brief use for special problems like siege-breaking to long-term use as police replacements. Tugwell points to Lebanon and Northern Ireland to suggest that limiting the military to a specialist role is the optimum strategy.

In his brief Conclusions chapter, Charters emphasizes the need for more coordination and cooperation in responding to terrorism; more flexible response requires better preparation and more centralization of control, both within a state and between states. More controversial is his conclusion that "even if hard-line policies cannot guarantee immunity from attack, policies of weakness and accommodation ensure repeated attacks." Here Charters depends upon the chapters by Bergeron and St. John that focus on terrorist attacks on civil aviation; as noted above, the case against accommodation is perhaps not so clear as St. John would have it.

In general this book shows the benefit of careful editing; it has few typographical errors and reads smoothly enough to pull the reader on from one sentence to another. There are two points, however, at which it might have been made more valuable as a reference work. Although the editor provides seven pages of 1980s "Select Bibliography," there is no cumulative bibliography that brings together all the works cited by all the authors. Similarly inconvenient is the book's footnote reference format, which sometimes requires the reader to track backwards painfully from *ibids* to *op cit*s to find a complete reference for some point of interest.

These are scholarly cavils. The real value of this book lies in the identity of its contributors, who are a fair cross-section of the people responsible for determining Canada's reaction to terrorist threats. The book deserves a place on our shelves because it provides a kind of field trip into the subculture of antiterrorism policy in

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a modern democratic state. In Canada, this subculture is small enough to be well represented in a readable 361 pages.

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Rezun, Miron, ed. *Nationalism and the Breakup of an Empire: Russia and Its Periphery*. Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1992.

Little, David. *Ukraine: The Legacy of Intolerance*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991.

Magocsi, Paul Robert, and Geoffrey J. Matthews. *Ukraine: A Historical Atlas*. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1985.

Why did the USSR break up so suddenly, so — relative to other empires and multinational states — comparatively peacefully? Why have the new states emerging from the USSR experienced such internal turbulence? These books provide partial answers.

Miron Rezun's book consists of eleven essays by specialists, more than half of them professors in Canada, on the "Center" of the former USSR (including the Army); the European, Caucasian, and Muslim peripheries; and the international dimension (including comparisons with China and Canada). Most of the essays are quite competent — often, summary distillations of a life's work. Most bring their story up to and just beyond the December 1991 collapse of the USSR.

The anthology provides a collection of viewpoints and factual reporting useful to any serious student or scholar wishing to do research on the parts or the whole of the erstwhile Soviet empire. But it lacks a strong overall structure or theory to unify the various chapters. Such an anthology could have put forward a collective effort to test a theory such as that argued in Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (1986) on the role of the metropole, the periphery, and relations between them.

Rezun's essay includes a categorical evaluation of others' writings on the Muslim periphery, describing some as "Indian old boys" and others as "mediocrities." Bohdan Harasymiw's essay on the Ukraine evaluates Alexander's Motyl's book *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?* (1987) and shows why its main thesis (even Ukrainians cannot rebel and hence will not) proved to be *both* incorrect and prescient.

One of the most eye-opening contributions is that of Lawrence Shyu, who compares the situation of Muslim minorities in China with that of Muslim peoples