Kriger's work on Zimbabwe speaks to this issue in two ways. First is her previously noted finding that peasant support for the insurgents was indeed at least partially due to coercion. Second, Kriger's research also backs up Theda Skocpol's argument that when a state is powerful, insurgents will not be able to offer utilitarian incentives and will have to rely on a combination of coercion and normative messages for mobilizing the population. Finally, Kriger uses the apparent contradiction of peasants being mobilized sometimes by coercion and sometimes by their own internal interests to debunk the rational choice theorists' assumption that interests are fixed.

This discussion, though interesting, is not nearly as groundbreaking as Kriger's work on the role of internal peasant dynamics during insurgencies. She nonetheless devotes an entire chapter in the middle of the book to the subject of coercion and the state, and discussion of it recurs throughout the work. This, like Kriger's constant and repetitive references to others' academic and professional work, tends to sap the book of its potential power, and relegates her most original point of being one among many lesser points.

In the end, though, Kriger's book justly admonishes researchers for being deaf to some of the most important voices on the subject of revolutions. Except for some distractions along the way, Kriger's Zimbabwe's Revolution: Peasant Voices demonstrates effectively both how difficult and how valuable tuning in to these voices can be. Her work on this subject is therefore a worthy first step, and provides us with an interesting and important new perspective on peasant behavior during guerrilla wars.

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Chester Crocker served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Reagan administration and was the chief architect of a policy known as constructive engagement, or linkage, which represented a three-pronged US policy: develop warmer ties with the South African government; stall a Southwest African People's Organisation (SWAPO) victory in Namibia because, according to Crocker, it was a "Soviet-oriented, Marxist movement" (p. 63); and, link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435, which provided for the independence of Namibia.

The book provides a detailed account of the often tortuous diplomatic efforts to pursue linkage, with Pretoria's interests placed front and center. Crocker also
spends much time discussing the sanctions debate of the mid-1980s, and argues that sanctions were a mistake because pro-sanction forces were wrong to believe that domestic change could precede regional peace. Finally, there is a great deal of material on negotiations with the Angolans and Cubans. While Crocker treats the Angolan and Cuban negotiators as stubborn obfuscators, it seems obvious that they, along with nearly the entire world community, simply did not accept linkage and disagreed fundamentally with Crocker’s definition of “balance.”

Crocker provides an interesting analysis of foreign policy-making within the Reagan White House. The president apparently was extraordinarily unattuned to Southern African issues — Alexander Haig explained to Crocker that Reagan “was not too steeped in the issues.” (p. 66) Reagan’s insensitivity to racial issues on the homefront extended to South Africa as well when, for example, he described South Africa as a “friendly nation” in March 1981. Right-wingers such as Jesse Helms (who held up Crocker’s nomination for six months), Patrick Buchanan, and William Casey played a pivotal role in the shaping of US foreign policy toward the region. And, according to Crocker, the State Department, under his leadership, attempted to pursue what he somewhat disingenuously called a “balanced” and “centrist” policy. In fact, in retrospect it is clear that the Reagan-Crocker tilt toward Pretoria gave Buchanan et al. the opening to convert the cosy handshake with Afrikanerdom to a warm embrace.

It is difficult to accept Crocker’s characterization of constructive engagement as a balanced policy. Crocker took Pretoria’s delaying tactics with regard to Namibia seriously, thereby legitimating its prolonged illegal occupation of Namibia. By insisting on linkage — which was rejected by the Western Contact Group, the Front Line States, and the United Nations — Crocker treated South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia as equivalent to Cuban and Soviet support for Angola. Crocker also supported the 1986 repeal of the Clark Amendment, which had prohibited aid to Jonas Savimbi and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). This allied the US with a group openly backed by South Africa and increasingly known for its brutality and terror in the 1980s. (Savimbi refused to honor the free and fair presidential elections in Angola, held in the fall of 1992.) At the same time, Crocker refused to argue for the diplomatic recognition of Angola or SWAPO or engage in sustained discussions with the African National Congress (ANC), the major opposition movement in South Africa. So much for balance.

Crocker blithely ignores the stepped-up attacks launched by South Africa against the entire southern African region. He seems unaware of the linkage P.W. Botha made between US policy and unimpeded South African militarism. He grossly underestimates the effect of Gorbachev on the negotiations in 1988-89, and he also underestimates the increasing effectiveness of the Angolan and Cuban military in battles with South African/UNITA forces. In the decisive battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987, the South Africans supplied somewhere between 3,000 and 15,000 troops. Crocker deemphasizes the South African commitment and labels it
a "strange campaign." (p. 369) In fact, the South Africans were denied an important victory. Despite Crocker's efforts to dissemble, the Cuban and Angolan armies performed brilliantly, which convinced the South Africans that they needed to negotiate. The irony is that the Cubans left Angola, and Namibia achieved its independence because of events beyond Chester Crocker's control.

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Informed by a soldier's perceptions, this work, based mainly on research undertaken during the 1970s, illuminates the widely known essential facts about a conflict that ended officially only in 1960. Its author, a former Chief of the General Staff of the Australian Army, provides an operational analysis of the Malayan Emergency, placed within the socio-political circumstances of the first critical years. By 1954, he concludes, the methods for the ultimate defeat of the Communist insurgents had been established, subsequent developments being but minor adaptations to meet the evolving situation.

Coates argues that although sometimes held to be exemplary, British counterinsurgency measures were inept until early 1952, when Churchill's recently-elected government gave unambiguous direction to the campaign. Correcting exaggerations of the insurgents' strength, he notes that at the height of the rebellion the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), the armed wing of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), numbered fewer than 3,500 troops organized into twelve poorly equipped, scattered 'regiments,' "not one of which had the offensive strength of more than two British infantry companies" (p. 2) and, suggestive of the scale of operations, that "No single clash cost either side more than a platoon in casualties." (p. 143) Furthermore, the composition and sympathies of the population worked against the Chinese-led challenge from its outset, the Malays being opposed, the Indians largely indifferent, and the Chinese themselves deeply divided. But the nature of the terrain and the fact that the insurgents were able to attract or extort support from Chinese agriculturist squatters located at the peripheries of the jungle permitted guerrilla warfare to persist for twelve debilitating years, for the first two of which, the army pursued insurgents as if it were "engaged on a large scale partridge drive." (p. 36)

Wartime opposition to the Japanese had given the insurgents experience of jungle fighting and had promoted organizational links with sympathizers in the Chinese community and with jungle-dwelling aborigines. During the Emergency,