Norma J. Kriger's *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, takes a fresh look at the issue of popular, specifically peasant, support for guerrillas. Kriger points out that support from this segment of the population has never been examined from the most obvious point of view — that of the peasant — and maintains that an understanding of this community's motivations is critical to understanding revolutions.

Comparing her own research approach to structuralist and voluntarist studies, Kriger demonstrates that examining this perspective offers more satisfactory explanations of peasant behavior during and following the Zimbabwean revolution. This sector of the Zimbabwean population seemed to be motivated by two very different factors. Not surprisingly, the peasants made it clear that they were often coerced by the insurgents into supporting the revolution. Although this obvious explanation of peasant behavior contradicts much of the theoretical literature on revolutions, it is commonly accepted in military and professional literature. More interesting and novel, though, is Kriger's finding that internal peasant structures — based on generation, gender, and status — were more critical in determining individuals' behavior than those factors most often cited by structuralists and voluntarists, such as peasant relationships with capitalist economies, markets, or other classes. Accordingly, recognition of this internal dynamic can arguably help identify those sectors of populations which are most susceptible to insurgent overtures. Further studies in other areas of Zimbabwe as well as in other countries and regions are needed to help ascertain whether internal peasant structures are generally more determinative than peasant-elite relations in motivating popular support for guerrillas.

Unfortunately, the coercion theme that runs through Kriger's work threatens to overwhelm this more original insight. It is true that much of the literature on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies considers popular support to be synonymous with legitimacy, and therefore focuses on competition for "hearts and minds," wherein governments and guerrillas each seek to gain popular support by offering motivational ideologies, protection, improved standards of living, and other incentives for cooperation. The Maoist revolution in China and the British counterinsurgency in Malaya are frequently cited as the best respective examples of deliberately and successfully courting "hearts and minds." Clearly, however, popular support can be won not only with positive inducements but through threats and coercion. Numerous studies have depicted the difficulties of populations caught between repressive states of emergency imposed by their governments on the one hand, and brutal guerrilla reprisals on the other.
Kriger’s work on Zimbabwe speaks to this issue in two ways. First is her previously noted finding that peasant support for the insurgents was indeed at least partially due to coercion. Second, Kriger’s research also backs up Theda Skocpol’s argument that when a state is powerful, insurgents will not be able to offer utilitarian incentives and will have to rely on a combination of coercion and normative messages for mobilizing the population. Finally, Kriger uses the apparent contradiction of peasants being mobilized sometimes by coercion and sometimes by their own internal interests to debunk the rational choice theorists’ assumption that interests are fixed.

This discussion, though interesting, is not nearly as groundbreaking as Kriger’s work on the role of internal peasant dynamics during insurgencies. She nonetheless devotes an entire chapter in the middle of the book to the subject of coercion and the state, and discussion of it recurs throughout the work. This, like Kriger’s constant and repetitive references to others’ academic and professional work, tends to sap the book of its potential power, and relegates her most original point of being one among many lesser points.

In the end, though, Kriger’s book justly admonishes researchers for being deaf to some of the most important voices on the subject of revolutions. Except for some distractions along the way, Kriger’s *Zimbabwe’s Revolution: Peasant Voices* demonstrates effectively both how difficult and how valuable tuning in to these voices can be. Her work on this subject is therefore a worthy first step, and provides us with an interesting and important new perspective on peasant behavior during guerrilla wars.

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Chester Crocker served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Reagan administration and was the chief architect of a policy known as constructive engagement, or linkage, which represented a three-pronged US policy: develop warmer ties with the South African government; stall a Southwest African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) victory in Namibia because, according to Crocker, it was a “Soviet-oriented, Marxist movement” (p. 63); and, link the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola with the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435, which provided for the independence of Namibia.

The book provides a detailed account of the often tortuous diplomatic efforts to pursue linkage, with Pretoria’s interests placed front and center. Crocker also