

El Salvador: Failure of a Successful Internal Settlement

by
Thomas G. Mitchell

INTRODUCTION

Within a month of each other, at the end of 1979, one internal settlement ended and another began. The Rhodesian internal settlement, which was specifically referred to by that label by its architects, ended with the signing of the Lancaster House Agreements on 21 December 1979. On 3 January 1980 a new junta was created in El Salvador with the participation of Jose Napoleon Duarte and the Christian Democratic Party. Applying the theory that this author developed for Southern African internal settlements, this article will compare the internal settlements in Rhodesia and El Salvador.

In 1977 Rhodesian rebel Prime Minister Ian Smith coined the term "internal settlement," by which he meant a settlement between the ruling white minority regime and internal black leaders which bypassed the "external leaders" — those affiliated with the guerrillas who were in exile. This concept also held true for Namibia and South Africa. By changing the definition of internal settlement slightly, from racial to class terms, this concept can be applied throughout the Third World and even to Europe (Northern Ireland, for example).

What follows in this article is first an exposition of the elements of an internal settlement. Then the theory is illustrated by the Rhodesian case. Next, it is applied to El Salvador, and the Rhodesian and Salvadoran cases are compared by components. Finally, in the summary the outlines of the Central American internal settlement are covered and suggestions for further application of the model elsewhere are made. The purpose of this article is to attempt to show that the theory of internal settlements — why they occur and why they fail — is valid for areas beyond Southern Africa.¹

INTERNAL SETTLEMENTS: A THEORY

For the purposes of this article the following definition of internal settlement will apply:

A regime which comes to power through an accord between an incumbent minority regime and leaders from the majority for the purpose of granting the existing regime greater legitimacy, both internally and externally, but involving terms falling short of those demanded by the external leaders affiliated with the insurgency.

It has been argued elsewhere that the internal settlement is the normal political counterinsurgency response of white settler regimes in Southern Africa to insurgencies by the black majority.² By altering only slightly the definition of

internal settlement, it can be argued that internal settlements have occurred or may occur in other regions outside of Southern Africa. Because there is a long history in Latin America of whites and mestizos (mixed-race persons of European-Indian derivation) leading political parties that are supported by Indians, mestizos and blacks — that is by non-whites — which is generally lacking in Southern Africa, internal settlements must be defined in class terms rather than in racial terms, although in many places there is considerable overlap between racial and class distinctions.³ Therefore, for the purposes of this article an internal settlement will be defined as a political settlement whereby the external nationalists connected with the guerrillas are excluded from a settlement while selected leaders of the majority classes are included. The majority classes are the peasants and urban workers which are predominantly Indian and mestizo by race.

In Southern Africa internal settlements take place between white settler regimes, the Rhodesians and the South Africans, and internal black leaders either formerly connected with the armed struggle of the guerrillas and/or system politicians involved in the framework that whites have set up for black representation. In Central America internal settlements take place between the military and popular parties such as the Christian Democrats.⁴ In both Southern Africa and in El Salvador the military was the instrument of the whites — the settlers and the oligarchy. In both regions internal settlements involve a formal handing over or sharing of power in a junta followed by elections for a parliament or national assembly but with the former powers maintaining real control through hidden means of control or quite openly through various clauses in the new constitution.

Internal settlements come about as a response to a viable insurgency that taxes the resources of the regime to a point where an external colonial power would have made peace with the insurgents through withdrawal. However, because the ruling regime is local, as opposed to the commercial and settler colonies in Africa and Asia ruled from Europe, it prefers to endure by attempting to broaden its base of support. This is done by creating a facade of majority rule, while the existing regime continues to exercise real power, through the inclusion of leaders from the majority. In Southern Africa the lifting or avoidance of economic sanctions was the prime motivator behind the internal settlement. For the purposes of Central America and elsewhere this negative incentive can be transformed into a positive one, the attraction of foreign economic and military aid.

Internal settlements may have up to three basic goals. The first is to avoid or end economic sanctions or to win foreign economic and military aid. The second is to win popular support for the regime by coopting popular figures. The third is to cause defections from the ranks of the guerrillas. In Southern Africa all the internal settlements so far implemented have failed in all of these three goals.⁵ They failed for a number of reasons. In the case of Namibia and South Africa the leading figures involved in the internal settlements lacked widespread popular support to begin with. In all three African countries the black rulers or participants lacked real political power and authority and were hesitant to use what authority they did have

under the new constitutions. In all three the military and police continued to remain under the control of their former commanders and continued to behave in their usual repressive manner. This involved massacres, torture, kidnappings, and disregard for civilian casualties when raiding villages where guerrillas were believed to be hiding. And finally there was considerable international and domestic pressure on the leading Western countries not to lift economic sanctions.

RHODESIA AND EL SALVADOR: A COMPARISON

Rhodesia was founded by 200 white settlers in a pioneer column in September 1890 on the basis of a prospecting concession that mining mogul Cecil J. Rhodes had bought from Ndebele King Lobengula in 1888. Lobengula's kingdom was overthrown three years later and a combined Ndebele-Shona rebellion severely repressed in 1896. Prior to 1923 the colony was ruled by the British South Africa Company, and from then until 1965 it was ruled by the local settlers as a self-governing British colony under "responsible government." Between November 1965 and December 1979 it had de facto independence under a settler government but this independence was not officially recognized by a single foreign government as being legal. From March 1978 until December 1979 it was ruled by an internal settlement. In the period up until 1 June 1979 that internal settlement consisted of an Executive Committee (Exco), comprised of the four signatories to the settlement with each rotating in turn as chairman of the Exco and with black deputy ministers for each white minister in the cabinet.

Before 1961 blacks had no voting rights in the country even though — or rather, because — they made up at least 90 to 95 percent of the population. After 1961 a qualified franchise was created that gave blacks one quarter of the seats in parliament, but this was a ceiling with no prospect for peaceful change. Since World War II the chiefs had become salaried government employees and lost their traditional authority and respect among the majority populations. The whites, who during the 1970s numbered between a quarter million and 270,000, were only about 3.5 percent of the population but had all the power.

El Salvador became an independent republic with the collapse of the Central American Federation in 1838. Until 1932, it was ruled by the white oligarchy — a small (20 to 30) group of families that owned most of the wealth in the country.⁶ In 1932 the military took control and ruled for the next fifty years on behalf of itself and the oligarchy. Although the population of El Salvador is only 10 percent white, the oligarchy is entirely white, and the rest of the population is either pure Indian (10 percent) or mestizo (79 percent) — that is non-white. El Salvador can be said to be a settler colony like others in Latin America and Southern Africa.⁷ *New York Times* correspondent James LeMoyne called it "one of the sickest societies in Latin America." He described the system of government as:

Its archaic social structure remains basically colonial . . . a tiny urban elite and dominating caste of army officers essentially rule, but do not effectively govern, an illiterate, disease-ridden and frustrated major-

ity of peasants and urban slum-dwellers . . . there is not now, nor has there ever been, a just legal system.⁸

THE INTERNAL PARTIES

Because of the calibre of internal leaders involved, the Salvadoran internal settlement can best be compared to the Rhodesian internal settlement, which was the most forthcoming of the internal settlements in Southern Africa. The Rhodesian internal settlement was formed between the Rhodesian Front government and three black parties. These three parties included ZUPO;⁹ the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's rump of ZANU;¹⁰ and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's UANC.¹¹ The first party was actually created by the Rhodesian government and its leader was basically acting as an agent of the Rhodesian Front during the negotiations. This left Sithole's ZANU, which had little popular support or membership, and the UANC, which in 1977 was the most popular party in the country.

Muzorewa had from December 1971 until December 1974 led the internal surrogate for the two banned liberation movements and from December 1974 to October 1976 was the nominal head of the nationalist movement. He had considerable popular support in the cities and among the Manyika tribe of the Shona people.¹² He was popular because of his role as a figurehead in rejecting the deal between Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front government and the Conservative government of Prime Minister Douglas Home of Britain to lift sanctions in exchange for majority rule sometime in the twenty-first century. Because of his leadership role and his moderation he was popular with Western politicians in Britain and the United States.¹³ As a moderate with widespread popular and international support he was the ideal internal candidate for a settlement. Muzorewa and Sithole had actually been "external leaders" during the mid-1970s from late 1974 until mid-1977.¹⁴

Jose Napoleon Duarte, an American-educated engineer and a leading civic figure in El Salvador before entering politics in 1960 was the Salvadoran equivalent of Bishop Muzorewa.¹⁵ He is of mestizo origin coming from a poor family that moved up economically after his father won the national lottery. He was a founder of the Christian Democratic Party of El Salvador in November 1960 and one of eight on its ruling council. In 1964 he became mayor of San Salvador, the capital and largest city in the country, and remained mayor for three terms until 1970. He organized a popular civic defense of the capital during the "soccer war" of 1969 with Honduras. On the strength of his service as mayor he ran for president in March 1972 but was deprived of the election through widespread vote fraud — detected because the military originally underestimated how much ballot box stuffing was necessary — which in turn triggered an abortive coup and led to his exile in Venezuela until late 1979.

ORIGINS OF THE SETTLEMENTS

In Rhodesia the internal settlement came about after the collapse of the Geneva conference in December 1976, and the recognition of the Patriotic Front by

the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the sole legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people, which left both Muzorewa and Sithole politically isolated. The whites, pressured by an escalation of the war along with continued sanctions and increased white emigration, decided to coopt Sithole and Muzorewa. They gambled that they could still retain real power in their own hands and yet win foreign recognition and a lifting of sanctions following elections for a "majority rule" government.

In El Salvador the internal settlement occurred after reformers within the military, linked with civilians, convinced their fellow officers that reform was preferable to sharing the fate of the Nicaraguan National Guard under Somoza.¹⁶ A coup took place on 15 October 1979 and a junta was inaugurated that included Duarte's vice-presidential running mate from 1972, Guillermo Ungo, the rector of the Catholic university, Ramon Mayorga Quiros, a representative of the business community, Mario Antonio Andino, and two prominent military officers.

In late December 1979 a showdown took place between the military reformers and civilians, and the conservative officers. Colonel Vides Casanova told the junta that the military would continue to take orders from Minister of Defense Jose Garcia rather than from the junta. He went on to inform the civilians that,

We have put you into the position where you are, and for the things that are needed here, we don't need you. We have been running this country for fifty years, and we are quite prepared to keep on running it.¹⁷

The civilian members of the junta resigned as did every minister from the government with the exception of Garcia between 3 and 4 January 1980.

Duarte divided the army into three camps: reformist officers, supporters of ARENA, and supporters of the army's institutional role and traditional privilege. Nearly all of the first group had been eliminated by the end of the rebel "final offensive" of January 1981 by either being purged or by electing to join the guerrillas.¹⁸ This meant that the Christian Democrats had to depend on the last group who were not open supporters of the oligarchy. Reagan's Ambassador to El Salvador Dean Hinton reported to Washington frankly that, "The PDC [Christian Democrats] without the army would be nothing." The State Department's human rights bureau wrote to Secretary of State Alexander Haig in March 1981 that, "The government of El Salvador is not Duarte's but rather effectively controlled by a council of senior army officers . . ." Those identified as being in control were divided between the last two groups mentioned above.¹⁹

At this point a small insurgency, which had been building since the fraudulent elections of 1977, escalated dramatically as the guerrillas moved to preempt reformist measures by the junta and the military attempted to crush the insurgency. The Christian Democrats were divided between those who wanted to participate in the government and those who wanted to stay out until elections were held. Duarte was in favor of staying outside of government in order not to become tainted by collusion with the military. A compromise was reached whereby the Christian

Democrats would join in exchange for the removal of Garcia as Defense Minister, and the resignation of the head of the Treasury Police and a vice-minister said to be connected with the death squads. The military agreed to these demands but then failed to carry them out once the Christian Democrats joined the government.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

During the last two years of the Rhodesian bush war, which overlapped with the internal settlement, the real white leaders were the commanders of the armed forces who ordered cross-border raids into Mozambique and Zambia without even bothering to consult their civilian counterparts until after the fact. This pattern began under the Rhodesian Front and continued after the UANC was in charge of the government. The insurgency also escalated a month after the initiation of the internal settlement in March 1978 as the Patriotic Front attempted to demonstrate that there could be no peace without it.

Likewise, in El Salvador the military continued its repression and the death squads — financed by the oligarchy, led by officers, and manned by soldiers, police and civilians — continued to operate. During the first six months of 1980 some 2,065 people were killed by the security forces, army, and police and by the end of the year this figure had topped 9,000.²⁰ Between October 1979 and January 1984 some 40,000 innocent civilians were murdered in El Salvador according to the legal aid office of the Roman Catholic church in the country.²¹ Both the death squads and the guerrillas seemed to have an interest in preventing real reforms like agrarian reform, which could win popular support for the government.²² The oligarchy wanted to thwart any move that would limit its power and wealth.

In addition to the death squads, which sprang mainly from the “internal security” branches of the military such as the Treasury Police, the army itself was guilty of major human rights violations in its normal activity in the field. An editor for *Pacific News Service*, Mary Jo McConahay, claimed that peasants reported that the Salvadoran air force attacked “anything that moves” in guerrilla-controlled zones and that peasants regularly fled their homes to hide in caves when the army swept through these areas burning the peasants’ crops in order to prevent them from being used to feed the guerrillas.²³ In March 1985 Berkeley Mayor Gus Newport and a “reporter” travelled to Chalatenango province in El Salvador. They were present during a Salvadoran army sweep through a pro-guerrilla zone. The two reported on what they had witnessed.

The army is destroying fields and homes. We observed lots of land that had been burned by mortars. They can start fires which can burn for days. The army drops incendiary rockets, gasoline rockets. We saw lots of land — acres and acres — that had been charred. When the Salvadoran Army invades they always burn the crops and destroy the waterpipes in the villages. They cut down the fruit trees, kill the cows, destroy all the tools they find. Fishing boats are sunk.²⁴

Just as in Rhodesia, many civilians were killed in “crossfire” when the army attacked guerrillas who were among peasants. The striking thing in both countries was that the militaries seemed ready to kill any number of civilians in order to get at even one guerrilla. In the second half of 1984 two major massacres took place: one in July in Los Llanitos in Cabanas Department in which 68 people were massacred, roughly half of them children; and another where at least 50 civilians were killed in August in Chalatenango Department when 600 villagers escorted by guerrillas were attacked while fleeing the village of Las Vueltas.²⁵ On 14 May 1980 over 600 civilians were killed in or along the Sampul River border with Honduras. The Honduran army cooperated in preventing the victims from escaping into Honduras while the soldiers and members of the death squads murdered the unarmed peasants.²⁶ In October 1984, according to *Tutela Legal* (Legal Trust), a Catholic human rights organization in San Salvador, 107 people died from political violence. Of these 101 were killed by death squads, the army or as a result of military actions compared to only six killed by the guerrillas. That is, more than 94 percent of the political deaths were caused by those connected with the ruling regime.²⁷

Although Rhodesia lacked death squads as such, human rights abuses by the military eroded the early high levels of support for Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC party among blacks. The army continued to function in Rhodesia after the internal settlement much as it had before. The same holds true for El Salvador, with the exception that killings by the death squads diminished somewhat after 1982. In Rhodesia total deaths in the war from 1972 to 1979 were estimated at between thirty and fifty thousand whereas in El Salvador total deaths at the end of the twelve year civil war were estimated at 75,000 or more. And this despite the fact that by the end of the war in El Salvador the guerrillas there numbered at most about half as many as the guerrillas in Rhodesia.²⁸

In both countries the insurgencies were primarily rural based and only secondarily based on the poorer neighborhoods of the cities. (Although much of the guerrilla leadership in both countries was of urban origin as were many guerrillas.) Unfortunately for the internal settlements, both the UANC and the Christian Democrats were mostly urban parties. Duarte himself wrote that his party had been basically destroyed by 1980 and had to be rebuilt from scratch once he returned from exile.²⁹ Because the other two main political parties in El Salvador, Roberto D’Aubuisson’s ARENA and the PCN (National Reconciliation Party), were the instruments of the oligarchy and the military respectively, this left the countryside largely to the organizing efforts of the various guerrilla groups united in the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Many of the mayors of the smaller towns and villages were Christian Democrats, but they were vulnerable and fell victim to murder or kidnapping by the guerrillas.³⁰

In the cities the Christian Democrats competed with the guerrillas for the loyalty of the poor and working class inhabitants and with ARENA for the support of the middle class and business community. A similar process occurred in Rhodesia where the UANC competed with the Patriotic Front in the rural areas and

the townships and the right wing whites opposed to the internal settlement competed with the Rhodesian Front for support in the white suburbs. In both cases the internal settlements ended up having few supporters beyond those already supporting the regime. The internal settlements did little to transform the lives of the peasants in either Rhodesia or El Salvador. Meanwhile, white settlers, the business community and the oligarchy resented what meagre demands were made on their wealth in the form of land reform or the sharing of government. In Rhodesia the internal settlement benefitted at best a few thousand middle class blacks who could afford to either move into white neighborhoods in the cities, buy up white farm land when racial barriers to land sales were repealed, or who benefitted by winning positions in the government.³¹

In El Salvador the primary beneficiaries of the internal settlement among the poor were the few thousand peasants who managed to take advantage of the first phase of land reform that was instituted in March 1980.³² The oligarchy employed the death squads to dispossess peasants from the land that they had claimed under the agrarian reforms and utilized its power in the legislative assembly to kill the land reforms in 1981.³³ In the United States Senator Jesse Helms exerted his clout to pass a provision prohibiting the use of American funds to pay for compensation for land seized as part of agrarian reforms or for companies nationalized. This prevented payment of compensation and hence the execution of land reforms.³⁴ Duarte could not afford to simply seize plantations and turn them over to peasants as he was not running a revolutionary government and was dependent for support on a conservative Republican administration.³⁵

In January 1981, shortly before the guerrillas' "final offensive" failed, two American advisors working on land reform and their Salvadoran colleague were murdered by a death squad. The killers were eventually caught and they implicated an army officer, Captain Avila, in the murders. But under Salvadoran law their confessions are inadmissible in court and no one has yet been tried or punished for the murders. The land reform was in many ways designed in Washington on the basis of land reforms in East Asia created to prevent a revolution. There is some speculation that one or both of the assassinated Americans worked for the Central Intelligence Agency.³⁶

THE REAL POWER IN THE SETTLEMENTS

In the case of Rhodesia the limitations on the power of the blacks participating in the settlement resulted from the initial agreement establishing the internal settlement that was signed on 3 March 1978. In the agreement the black parties recognized that the military, police, civil service, and judiciary should remain "professional" and not be subject to "political interference." This principle, along with the continued payment of government pensions, was conceded quite early in the three-month negotiations which centered mostly on the question of how many seats the whites would be guaranteed in parliament. Under the new constitution, which was ready in early 1979, and which went into effect on 1 June 1979, a series

of small commissions dominated by members of the establishment were set up to control these institutions. The qualifications for participation on the commissions were ostensibly non-racial but in practice the chairman of each commission was required to have a certain specified rank within the establishment — a rank that would have been impossible for blacks to obtain. This subterfuge proved to be quite transparent in practice and was one of the main reasons why the Carter Administration refused to lift sanctions against Rhodesia.³⁷

In El Salvador the devices used to block power were more varied. The first means of limiting the power of the Christian Democrats occurred in early 1980 when it was decided to award the presidency of the junta — the chairmanship — to Duarte, in December 1980, while naming the military's candidate as the country's president in 1982. Duarte complained that he was denied real executive powers as president of the junta and blamed not only the military for this but also his own party which apparently feared that he might become a dictator.³⁸ In March 1982 after elections for a sixty-member National Assembly failed to give the Christian Democrats an outright majority,³⁹ the military summoned both Duarte and D'Aubuisson in turn and informed them that neither of them would be president. The military then gave a list of three candidates that it found acceptable to the National Assembly from among which to select a president, but made clear who their favorite was. After fifty years the military was still selecting the president of the country.⁴⁰

The new president, Alvaro Alfredo Magana, was a banker who for seventeen years had headed the country's mortgage bank. During this time he often gave loans to officers who were not good credit risks. The reformist officers had wanted to put him on trial immediately following the October 1979 coup but were prevented from doing so by their more conservative fellow officers. A year after he was elected president he would openly admit, "I have no power, no authority."⁴¹ Duarte writes simply that, "Magana had no political base, so he provided no buffer to the pressures." He went on to mention that the president used to visit the defense minister, which was the usual procedure in El Salvador rather than the other way around, as in most countries.⁴² It would be another two years before direct presidential elections were held.

Even after Duarte was elected president in March 1984 with 54 percent of the vote, he still faced an assembly that was dominated by the combined forces of the right. Duarte had only beaten a challenger by one vote — only because he voted for himself while the challenger also voted for Duarte — to win his party's backing as presidential candidate.⁴³

In this weakness he resembled Bishop Muzorewa who was reduced from having a slight majority to a plurality by the defection of seven of his members of parliament who formed their own party based on ethnic identity.⁴⁴ This left Muzorewa dependent on the settler Rhodesian Front party for support. The constitution had called for a coalition government in any event, and Muzorewa only benefitted from Sithole's self-exclusion due to the latter's sensitivity over having lost the elections by such a wide margin.

James LeMoyné credits the Duarte government with having eliminated military massacres of civilians, lowering the overall number of political murders and executing some land reform.⁴⁵ But the overall economic situation of the country was much worse off than at the beginning of the decade. Per capita income had declined by one-third since the start of the decade and the unemployment rate bordered on 50 percent.⁴⁶ The ARENA election victory was explained in terms of a widespread perception that the Christian Democrats were both corrupt and economically incompetent.⁴⁷ People began to refer to the devalued one colon coins as “Duartes” because “no one wanted either of them.”⁴⁸

ELECTIONS

The National Assembly then arranged to have a two-part election with the top two candidates from the first round facing off in the second so that the rightist vote would not be split between ARENA and the PCN and allow Duarte to win by default. The official count from the first round gave Duarte 43.4 percent to 29 percent for D’Aubuisson and 16 percent for the PCN’s candidate. Duarte claims to have won the second round by getting out the vote among those in villages who abstained in the first round, whereas D’Aubuisson attracted only the combined vote total for himself and the PCN candidate.⁴⁹ D’Aubuisson demanded that the election results be declared void and Duarte claims that the military uncovered an assassination plot against him by ARENA. President Reagan was alarmed enough to dispatch special envoy Vernon Walters to El Salvador to warn D’Aubuisson off.⁵⁰

The military probably preferred a weakened Duarte to an unpredictable D’Aubuisson whose election might lead to a severance of aid by Congress for El Salvador. Most in the military high command probably favored the PCN candidate, however he, Chachi Guerrero, lacked the charisma of both Duarte and D’Aubuisson.

In the next presidential elections five years later in March 1989 ARENA put up a wealthy landowner, Alfredo Cristiani, as its presidential candidate, instead of D’Aubuisson, who was connected to the death squads and the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in March 1980, according to former American Ambassador Robert White.⁵¹ By then the Christian Democrats had been discredited as a party of corruption and incompetence which had been unable to either end the war or improve the economy. By the mid-1980s unemployment officially stood at 36 percent and unemployment and underemployment combined stood at 60 percent.⁵² Duarte was dying of cancer and his successor had little charisma. The Christian Democrats were unable to attract the high level of rural support that they had enjoyed in 1984 and so lost to the combined votes of supporters of ARENA and the PCN. Cristiani had the support of the middle class and the business community, including many mestizos. In this second presidential election since the 1979 coup, the American Embassy was no longer as openly partisan in favor of the Christian Democrats as it had been when D’Aubuisson had been the alternative.

The guerrillas probably favored the election of the ARENA candidate as it might mean a reduction in the level of American support for the ruling regime. In

April 1979 guerrillas in the Mudzi Tribal Trustland of Rhodesia instructed voters to vote for Muzorewa rather than Sithole.⁵³ This may have been because they were “closet” Muzorewa supporters, but more likely it was because Muzorewa was considered to be less competent than Sithole and because Sithole had fallen out with the guerrilla leadership in the mid-1970s.

D'Aubuisson's reaction to his loss in 1984 is similar to that of Sithole following the April 1979 internal elections. Sithole, after praising the election procedures at the start of the five-day balloting, proceeded to cry foul when the results became apparent. Sithole had convinced himself that he was the most popular man in Rhodesia and he failed to believe otherwise when the voters disagreed — therefore the results had to have been rigged by the government.⁵⁴ This accusation served to discredit the election further among foreign observers.

To read Raymond Bonner's chapter on the 25 March 1982 National Assembly elections is almost like reading a description of the Namibian internal elections of December 1978 or the Rhodesian internal elections of April 1979. In all three cases the left was effectively banned from the elections: in Rhodesia by explicit bans, including prohibitions against the Patriotic Front's internal wings and a pro-PF newspaper, *The Zimbabwe Times*; in Namibia and El Salvador this was accomplished by extra-legal harassment of the left by the security forces. In Namibia the internal wing of SWAPO⁵⁵ had never been banned but was continually harassed by the South African Defense Force which imprisoned its activists and often broke up its rallies or prevented them from being staged.

In El Salvador the death squads served the same function by effectively ensuring that the left would not dare to campaign openly. In 1989 after the level of repression had been reduced the left did participate in the elections. Several senior leaders of the pro-guerrilla Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) were murdered by a death squad in November 1980. The military issued a communique in March 1981 that described the FDR and Guillermo Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) as “terrorist groups” and which included a list of 138 “traitors” among whom were nearly the entire leadership of both parties.⁵⁶ This intimidation led to the self-exclusion of all groups on the left of the Christian Democrats from participation in the election process until 1989. By excluding the names of members of ARENA and the Christian Democrats from the list the armed forces were giving their stamp of approval to these two parties. But death squads continued to murder local Christian Democrat politicians in the countryside. Between 1980 and 1983 more than 260 of the PDC's leaders were murdered with many of these killings being tied to former members of the ORDEN death squad which became part of ARENA.⁵⁷

In the March 1989 presidential elections the voters had a wider choice when the left, the FDR under the label of “Democratic Convergence,” participated for the first time since 1972. But because the guerrillas made threats against voters and poll watchers and carried out several attacks on election day this discredited their civilian “representatives” who received only some 3.8 percent of the vote compared

with 54 percent for ARENA.⁵⁸ But the voter turnout was limited to about half of the electorate.⁵⁹

In Rhodesia the black population was effectively given a choice between Sithole and Muzorewa, as the platform's of their respective parties were nearly identical, as well as an Ndebele Senator-Chief who ran as an unauthorized surrogate for one of the leaders of the Patriotic Front.⁶⁰ In Namibia the blacks were given a choice that came down to voting for the ethnic coalition supporting the internal settlement, which was led by a white farmer, or for the front led by the National Party which thought that the internal settlement was too liberal. This was in essence the same range of choices that voters had in El Salvador up until 1989.

In all three countries the inhabitants carried identity documents which could be checked for proof that one had voted or other means of pressuring voters to at least register. In Rhodesia, Namibia, and El Salvador there is considerable evidence of military pressure on peasants in rural areas to vote.⁶¹ During the election campaign period of March-May 1984 Salvadoran military helicopters flew at three to four times their previous frequency. The stated aim was to enhance security for the elections.⁶² This sounds similar to the Rhodesian practice of "escorting" peasant voters to the polls. By contrast, only in Rhodesia was there a sustained systematic effort to prevent the internal elections. In El Salvador a few minor incidents of guerrillas firing on polling booths occurred, but only one major battle and less than a dozen fire fights.⁶³ Threats and intimidation of voters appear to have been a local phenomenon undertaken by individual guerrilla leaders rather than the FMLN or even any one of its component organizations. A slogan "Vote in the morning, die in the afternoon" was widely reported in the American media but it was only found in one location. The FMLN's clandestine Radio Venceremos instructed Salvadorans five days before the elections not to worry about whether or not they voted as the elections were meaningless.⁶⁴ In February 1984 the guerrilla leaders of the FMLN announced that they would not interfere in the presidential election to be held the following month on the advice of the FDR. This was essentially the attitude to the Namibian internal elections adopted by SWAPO in December 1978.

One American activist, Frank Brodhead, who specialized in American counterinsurgency policy compared the Salvadoran elections of 1982-85 with those held in the Dominican Republic in 1966 and in South Vietnam in 1967.⁶⁵ He labeled all of these "demonstration elections" designed to buy American public support for American aid to a particular regime by convincing the public that the regime was legitimate by way of democratic elections. He pointed out that the American government spent between six and eight million dollars just for the computers to count the election returns.⁶⁶ He was very critical of American media coverage of the elections for not applying the same skepticism toward these elections and those in Eastern Europe from 1946 on. For the reasons cited above he concluded that the elections were not free. The same rationale applies to the internal elections in Rhodesia and, to a lesser extent, in Namibia, which were designed more for the consumption of the American and British publics and ruling elites than for the populations of those countries.

When the Carter Administration rejected the Rhodesian internal elections of April 1979 as not being free and fair it did not argue that they were fraudulent. Rather, it argued that the black population had had no say in the formulation of the new constitution and no chance to accept or reject it, that the election excluded important political elements (the Patriotic Front) and that the terms of the constitution fell short of majority rule. All these same arguments could be applied to the Salvadoran internal settlement and the elections of 1982, 1984 and 1985. The left was excluded by the death squads which had a semi-official character, the population had little say in the formulation of the constitution which the right-wing controlled assembly produced and effective power continued to reside in the military rather than in the civilian leaders. The Rhodesian elections were originally hailed by the Republican Party in the United States, the United States Senate, and the British Conservative Party as free and fair and an alternative to "Marxist terrorism." Similar arguments were made by the Reagan Administration and in Congress by members of both parties with regard to El Salvador.

In both cases a similar logic held. By African standards (only Botswana and Gambia have been consistently democratic) the internal elections in both Rhodesia and Namibia were democratic but clearly unrepresentative of the wishes of the population. By Central American standards (where in the 1980s only Costa Rica was a democracy) the same can be said of the elections in El Salvador.⁶⁷ Because El Salvador, unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, has had a long-established international identity as a sovereign state it is not held to the same standards as Rhodesia and Namibia. The standards it should be held to, however, are those of its propaganda and the propaganda of the American government on its behalf. If it claims to be a democracy it should be held to democratic standards, which it has clearly failed to meet. As a major recipient of American aid it must identify its claim to this aid on some ideological or security grounds.

BATTLEFIELD

This raises the issue of the communist threat to Central America. El Salvador was perceived by Secretary of State Haig as an ideal Cold War battleground in early 1981: it was close to the United States, within range of the American navy, and compared to Guatemala or Nicaragua under Somoza it had a respectable government. Haig was too much of a Cold Warrior to resist the temptation. The State Department's Latin American team under Carter had been purged by Reagan in the largest shakeup since the McCarthy era and replaced with people with experience in Europe and South East Asia.⁶⁸

Margaret Thatcher was restrained by pragmatic Foreign Minister Lord Carrington from turning Rhodesia into a Cold War battlefield between Britain and communist guerrillas. The Conservative Party's monitoring group led by former Colonial Secretary Lord Boyd produced a report favorable to the Rhodesian elections as did the American Conservative Union's team and Freedom House's delegation. White Rhodesians did not hold out much hope of support from the

Carter Administration but the election of Thatcher as prime minister in May 1979 was hailed as a change of fortune. Thatcher was inclined to recognize Muzorewa's government and lift sanctions and she was supported in this by the right wing of her party, including Winston Churchill II. Carrington, however, was concerned by the effect that British recognition, or even a lifting of sanctions without recognition, would have on Britain's relations with Africa and the Commonwealth. Nigeria had nationalized British Petroleum over this issue in summer 1979.

There was no pressure similar to that of the Commonwealth on Reagan in 1981 to counteract his conservative anticommunist views. Unlike Britain, the United States was a superpower, and the Salvadoran left did not have the level of support in Latin America and the Third World that the Patriotic Front had. One of the *raison d'être* of the OAU was the elimination of white minority rule in sub-Saharan Africa. The Organization of American States paid lip service to democracy but had no real crusade planned against military regimes. It had no Liberation Committee, like the OAU's, dedicated to the overthrow of military regimes. The Salvadoran left lacked the support among Democrats that the Patriotic Front had among Laborites in the British opposition. And the United States did not share a constitutional monarch with any other countries or organization. All these factors combined to make the American response to the Salvadoran internal settlement different from the American and British response to the Rhodesian internal settlement.⁶⁹

Even the Carter Administration had a very different attitude toward El Salvador than toward Rhodesia. Following the October 1979 coup the administration sponsored five million dollars in military aid for the Salvadoran army without making it conditional on immediate elections or democratic reforms. The American Embassy in San Salvador was much more critical under Ambassador Robert White, who was present only from mid-March 1980 until January 1981, than under Dean Hinton. White had the mission of preventing a revolution. This would be accomplished mainly through political and socio-economic means as opposed to the military ones favored by his successor.⁷⁰ Duarte had the following to say about the Carter Administration's attitude towards El Salvador:

When Ronald Reagan was elected president, we did not know what to expect. The Right celebrated his election victory, firing guns into the air. They were sure that Reagan would sympathize with their preference for a strong, authoritarian government. The oligarchy did not believe that a good conservative such as Reagan would prop up "leftist" Christian Democrats in a government. Under President Carter, the United States championed agrarian reform and human rights, opposing the military officers who wanted to do away with the junta.⁷¹

The right was not to be disappointed as both the death toll in El Salvador and the level of American aid to El Salvador increased dramatically. Aid increased from \$25 million in 1981, to \$82 million for fiscal year 1982, to \$136 million for fiscal

year 1983 and in January 1984 the White House announced that it would seek \$300 million in military aid alone through fiscal year 1985.⁷² By November 1989 the United States had supplied over \$4 billion in aid to the Salvadoran government since the beginning of 1981, with over a billion of this figure as military aid. Since 1984 this amounted to a daily subsidy of \$1.5 million.⁷³

While the guerrillas did not grow exponentially like the Patriotic Front did from 1976 to 1980 in Rhodesia, they more than managed to replace their combat losses and even to increase. The guerrillas grew from about 2,000 at the time of the "final offensive" in January 1981 to three times that number in mid-1983. By February 1984 the Embassy was claiming that there were between 9,000 and 12,000 guerrillas in El Salvador, although some reporters thought this might be an exaggeration designed to justify increased military aid.⁷⁴ By the end of 1984 the official estimate of guerrilla strength stood at between 10,000 and 14,000.⁷⁵ Following the guerrilla offensive of November 1989 the American Embassy in San Salvador concluded that there were more than 6,000 rebels under arms.⁷⁶

Unlike the Patriotic Front guerrillas who were openly supplied through China, the Soviet Union, the East bloc, and African countries and operated from "sanctuaries" in Mozambique and Zambia,⁷⁷ the Salvadoran guerrillas operated without secure rear bases and with little foreign military support.⁷⁸ The rebels did receive some M-16s from Vietnam and some arms and training from Cuba, and guerrilla commanders could use Nicaragua as a site for periodic vacations, but that was the extent of foreign support. This aid increased considerably during the late 1980s,⁷⁹ possibly as a consequence of the Contra War which left the United States with little credible bargaining power in reserve with which to threaten Nicaragua.

The main reason why the Rhodesian guerrillas had not done even better was that the Rhodesian military was a very competent and professional military which lacked the corruption of the Salvadoran military. In El Salvador the military was traditionally a means of advancement for people from the lower-middle class who had no conscience or scruples. Advancement occurred on the basis of time in service and connections rather than merit.⁸⁰ Many of the soldiers were from the poor who were swept off the streets by the army or police and forced to serve. The guerrillas through a policy of encouraging surrender were able to rearm themselves by taking the weapons, ammunition and supplies of captured soldiers and by buying additional arms on the black market in Miami.⁸¹

In November 1989 following two rounds of unsuccessful negotiations with the Cristiani government the rebels mounted a general offensive in San Salvador and six other major provincial towns. The offensive involved some 3500 rebels and resulted in the rebel takeover of some of the poorer barrios of San Salvador for several days. The government resorted to strafing and bombing these neighborhoods from the air, creating tens of thousands of refugees and hundreds of civilian dead in the process. The rebels managed to take over the wealthy Escalon district of the capital and hold some forty houses before melting away into the countryside. They even trapped American military advisors temporarily in the Sheraton Hotel. The

offensive was condemned by Guillermo Ungo's MNR party and by Ruben Zamora, Ungo's partner in the Democratic Convergence. But the rebel offensive, like the January 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, demonstrated that the guerrillas were far from being a spent force, although it cost them as many as 1,000 dead to accomplish this.⁸²

CONCLUSION

The internal settlement demonstrated that it was a massive failure in accomplishing the last two goals mentioned at the beginning of this article: winning popular support and causing guerrilla defection. Although the PDC was popular in 1984, as the UANC had been in 1977-78, it ended up losing to the anti-settlement ARENA in 1989. This was caused by its economic mismanagement and the repressive tactics of the military. There is no record of any numerically significant guerrilla defections during the 1980s. However, the Salvadoran internal settlement was very successful in terms of accomplishing its first and primary goal: winning outside support for the regime. This enabled it to conclude an agreement with the FMLN on New Year's Day 1992 that was favorable to the regime, certainly by comparison with the Lancaster House agreement.

There are two differences between the African internal settlements and the Salvadoran one which account for the relative success of the latter. First, the former involved pariah regimes that were either considered illegal or, at the very least, were isolated in the United Nations and other international organization, whereas the Salvadoran regime was a member in good standing of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Second, the outside power in the case of Rhodesia was as much South Africa as it was Britain and the United States. But Pretoria could offer Rhodesia only limited support and needed the legitimacy of British and other support for the settlement to succeed. Britain was restrained by its Commonwealth ties and economic investments in Africa. The United States, a superpower in the eighties and *the* superpower in the nineties, was not similarly restrained as regards El Salvador.

This may encourage other Central American regimes faced with domestic unrest and revolution, particularly in Honduras and Guatemala, and other American allies to attempt internal settlements. Staying in power in a stalemate for a decade is much better than losing outright, especially when the tab is being picked up by outsiders. The question is: will Washington be so willing to support internal settlements with the Cold War over, especially once Fidel Castro leaves power?

The Salvadoran internal settlement's success has already caused it to be imitated by Guatemala which held civilian elections in late 1985 that resulted in Venicio Cerezo, a Christian Democrat, being inaugurated as president in January 1986. The Guatemalan internal settlement under the Cerezo presidency (1986-90) was in many ways a repeat of the Salvadoran settlement. Days before Cerezo's inauguration the military government declared a blanket amnesty for all military personnel which Cerezo allowed to stand. Those who had reputations for brutality

and repression remained in command in the military and the violations of human rights continued. Human rights institutions never seriously challenged the military. But Cerezo was able to use his name and legitimacy to gather foreign funding for Guatemala from the United States government and participation in programs by Harvard and other universities.⁸³

During the 1980s under prodding from Washington the Honduran military allowed civilians to take over the government as long as they gave the military free reign. Because the American government needed the cooperation of the Honduran military to wage its covert Contra war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua it allied itself with the military. So nothing had really changed in Honduras.⁸⁴ Washington poured over \$1.2 billion into Honduras between 1982 and 1989, which accounted for more than half of the government's revenue and was an enormous amount for a country of only 4.4 million people.⁸⁵ But because there was neither an insurgency nor a credible revolutionary threat to the military in Honduras the facade cannot really be labeled an internal settlement. Unlike El Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras lacks a white oligarchy and the great disparities in wealth between rich and poor.⁸⁶ Thus it is less of a candidate for an internal settlement than Guatemala.

This article demonstrates that the internal settlement is valid beyond Southern Africa. However, this validity is not universal. It is most applicable to areas, similar to the settler regimes of Southern Africa, where a racial, ethnic, or religious minority rules over a majority that is both ethnically or religiously different and oppressed. That oppression creates, or results from, a clear class cleavage, which is at least partially along ethnic or religious communal lines, so that all of the ruling elite before the internal settlement belong to the same community in either ethnic or religious terms. It is this cleavage that breeds the insurgency for which the internal settlement is envisaged as a cure.

Also, it is most applicable to those areas where the ruling minority either faces international sanctions or is dependent upon, or hopes for, outside support from a foreign power. Two situations that fit these conditions come to mind: the West Bank and Gaza/Palestine and Northern Ireland.⁸⁷ In the former case, a preliminary attempt at the creation of an alternative Palestinian leadership—the Village Leagues—failed miserably in the early 1980s.⁸⁸ In the latter case an internal settlement has yet to be attempted, but could result from future British-Irish cooperation.

In neither situation, however, will an internal settlement occur unless there is outside pressure for fundamental reform, which forces the ruling regime to pretend to seek a negotiated settlement with the majority. But that pretence does not necessarily have to take the form of an internal settlement. It could take the form of autonomy.⁸⁹ An internal settlement in Northern Ireland is more likely to come about to appease the European Community or a weary British public than to satisfy the United States (or Ireland). In all cases, however, an internal settlement is likely to fail as long as it is merely seen as a pretence that permits the ruling elite to cling to power. For without real change, only the first goal can be met and, at best, that will result in a stalemate.

Endnotes

1. As discussed in passing in the conclusion of my previous article; and Thomas G. Mitchell, "Internal Settlements: A Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Conflict Quarterly*, (Winter 1992), pp. 7-24.
2. See Thomas G. Mitchell, "Internal Settlements in Independent Settler Colonies," *The Journal of Third World Studies*, (Spring 1992); and for more detail see Chapters 3 and 8 in Thomas G. Mitchell, "Black Faces, White Heads: Internal Settlements in Southern Africa" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1990).
3. Indians in this article refers to American aborigines, also known as Native Americans. In my previous article Indians refers to Asians in South Africa whose ancestors came from India and Pakistan.
4. The Christian Democrats have held power in both Chile (1964-1970, 1990-) and in Venezuela (from 1963) and exist or existed in sixteen out of the twenty republics in Latin America. They are tied rather loosely to the European branch of the Christian Democrats which have often held power in Germany, Belgium and Italy.
5. These internal settlements are: the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian settlement of 1978-79; the Turnhalle settlement of 1978-82, and the Transitional Government of National Unity of 1985-88 in Namibia; and the Tricameral parliament (1984-present) and the National Council (1986-89) in South Africa. The National Council fell apart before it could be implemented and a regional internal settlement in Natal, the KwaNatal Indaba, was negotiated but never implemented.
6. Known, however, in El Salvador as "the fourteen families."
7. These figures are taken from Special Report No. 132, *US Department of State*, September 1985 and reprinted in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds. *El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War* (New York: Grove, 1986), p. 4.
8. LeMoyné, James, "El Salvador's Forgotten War," *Foreign Affairs*, 3 (1989), pp. 105-29.
9. Zimbabwe United People's Organization created in December 1976 by Senator-Chiefs Jeremiah Chirau and Kaiser Ndiweni at the behest of the Rhodesian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
10. Zimbabwe African National Union founded in 1963 with Sithole as its first president until 1974. Robert Mugabe took over in 1977.
11. United African National Council first called that in late 1976 but formed from antecedents created in December 1971 and December 1974 respectively.
12. The Manyika are the third largest of seven main Shona tribes after the Karanga and the Zezuru. The Shona constitute about 80 percent of Rhodesia's blacks and the Manyika about 14 percent of the total.
13. Cyrus Vance writes in his memoirs that President Carter initially preferred Muzorewa to the guerrilla leaders but allowed the professional advice of the Africanists in the State Department to prevail over his personal preferences. See Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 290-96.
14. Muzorewa went into exile in December 1974 and returned in October 1976 (although he traveled abroad throughout much of 1977), whereas Sithole left the country in 1975 and returned in July 1977.
15. His bachelor's degree is from Notre Dame and he was a leader in the Salvadoran Boy Scouts, the 20-30 club and other civic organizations. For his pre-political life see Jose Napoleon Duarte, *Duarte: My Story* (New York, NY: G P Putnam's Sons, 1986), pp. 42-48.
16. The Guardia had lost the civil war in Nicaragua to the Sandinista rebels and had been either imprisoned or forced into exile (mostly in Miami or Honduras).
17. Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit* (New York: New York Times Books, 1984), p. 162. Bonner was the *New York Times* correspondent in El Salvador from 1980 to 1982. His book and Duarte's autobiography are two of the main sources on the Salvadoran portions of this article along with Gettleman's *El Salvador*.
18. Duarte, *Duarte*, pp. 125, 161-62.

19. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, p. 243.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
22. Although some claim that the guerrillas refrained from physically interfering with agrarian reform out of fear of losing popular support. See Bonner, in this case excerpted from the book cited throughout this article, "The Failure of Land Reform," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, p. 299.
23. Mary J. McConahay, "Living Under El Salvador's Air War," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, pp. 235-40.
24. Gar Smith, "The Invisible War on the Environment," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, p. 242. I took the liberty of putting the testimony of Newport and reporter Diane Green together.
25. Holly Burkhalter, "Massacres in Cabanas and Chalatenango Departments," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, pp. 267-68.
26. Presbytery of Honduras, "The Sampul River Massacre," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, p. 266.
27. Tutela Legal, "Recording the Terror: El Salvador's Tutela Legal," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, p. 253.
28. The figure for El Salvador is taken from the broadcast of the *McNeill-Lehrer Newshour* (PBS), which announced the peace agreement on 1 January 1992.
29. Duarte, *Duarte*, p. 179.
30. By the spring of 1985 the guerrillas had murdered two Christian Democratic mayors, kidnapped eight others, and burned 32 mayors' offices. See FMLN, "Why We Kidnap Mayors" in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, pp. 274-76.
31. In Namibia the situation was even starker in the areas in which the insurgency was taking place. Conservative Afrikaners and Germans were opposed to the Namibian internal settlements and so voted for the Namibian branch of the National Party in elections in December 1978 and again in 1980. The settlements had few supporters among the Kavango and Ovambo peoples who lived along the Angolan border where the war was taking place. This left support for the settlement mainly confined to the smaller ethnic groups in the center and southern parts of the territory. In South Africa the tricameral constitution lost support among both coloreds (mixed-race) and Indians from 1984 to 1989. Less than 20 percent of the potential electorate of both groups voted the first time and this number decreased significantly among coloreds in 1989, despite the fact that the colored Labor Party participating in the settlement was much more credible than any of the Indian parties participating.
32. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, pp. 317-18.
33. According to the AFL-CIO affiliate, AIFLD, which was overseeing the reform program, 184 peasants, government workers and others associated with the reforms had been murdered during the first eight months of the reforms. Of these killings 133 had been traced to the military, police, para-military forces and the Treasury Police. The other 51 were killed by unknown assassins which would be a combination of the above plus possibly some guerrillas. But the AIFLD admitted that there had been no organized campaign against the reforms on the part of the guerrillas. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, pp. 200-01.
34. Duarte, *Duarte*, p. 166.
35. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, p. 239.
36. See *Ibid.*, pp. 188-98. See Duarte, *Duarte*, pp. 163-67 on agrarian reform, especially 164 for complaints that Washington imposed its program of land reform on El Salvador.
37. See Mitchell, "Black Faces," pp. 176-87 for a detailed summary. The best analysis of the entrenched clauses of the constitution can be found in Michael Beaubien, "The 'New' Rhodesian Constitution: The Illusion of Majority Rule," *Southern Africa*, (March 1979), pp. 11-29.
38. Duarte, *Duarte*, p. 131.

39. The Christian Democrats received 35 percent of the vote for 24 deputies, ARENA followed with 26 percent and 19 deputies with the PCN winning 17 percent and 14 deputies. Three deputies were shared by two minor parties.
40. Terry Lynn Karl, a Harvard political scientist, contends that it was only American intervention that kept the Salvadoran assembly from electing D'Aubuisson president and that they retaliated by electing him president of the assembly. See Terry Lynn Karl, "After La Palma: The Prospects for Democratization in El Salvador" in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, pp. 404-28.
41. See Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, pp. 311-12 on the selection of Magana and his background.
42. Duarte, *Duarte*, p. 186.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-92. The loser, Fidel Chavez Mena, a technocrat with little charisma, was the party's presidential candidate in 1989 against Cristiani.
44. The defectors were led by James Chikerema who had been the UANC Secretary General, the leader of one of the four participating organizations that formed the umbrella African National Council in December 1974 and Muzorewa's right-hand man since then. The Zimbabwe Democratic Party, which the seven MPs established, was based on the Zezuru tribe of the Shona.
45. But as noted above, massacres still continued, at least when Duarte was only junta president and during the early days of his executive presidency.
46. LeMoyné, "El Salvador's Forgotten War."
47. Georges Fauriol, "Latin America", *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1989-90*, 5 (1990), p. 123.
48. *Newsweek*, 27 November 1989.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 200-01.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 201-02.
51. See Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, pp. 249-50, 307-10; and Duarte, *Duarte*, pp. 113, 118, 124-25; and Craig Pyes, "Roots of the Salvadoran Right: Origins of the Death Squads," and "ARENA's Bid For Power," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, pp. 86-90 and 165-74, on D'Aubuisson.
52. See Gettleman, *El Salvador*, pp. 300, 305.
53. The author was told this by Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel working in the area at the time.
54. See Mitchell, "Black Faces," pp. 203-04.
55. South West Africa People's Organization founded in 1960 and recognized by both the OAU and the United Nations as the legitimate representative of the Namibian population. SWAPO won 57 percent of the vote in the November 1989 independence elections and formed Namibia's first independent government.
56. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, p. 298.
57. See Pyes, "Roots of the Salvadoran Right," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, p. 172.
58. LeMoyné, "El Salvador's Forgotten War"; *Time*, 3 April 1989.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Kaiser Ndiweni had split from Chirau's ZUPO and used as his election symbol a cow, which in siNdebele is Nkomo, the name of the leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and co-leader of the Patriotic Front.
61. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, pp. 300-01. On the Rhodesian and Namibian elections see Mitchell, "Black Faces," pp. 191-202 for a summary of the reports of foreign observers on the Rhodesian elections, and 264-68 for a similar treatment of the Namibian elections.
62. Representatives Jim Leach and George Miller, Senator Mark Hatfield, "The Escalation of the Air War: A Congressional View" in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, p. 233.
63. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, p. 299.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 300.

65. Frank Brodhead, "Demonstration Elections," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, pp. 174-80. This account was an update of that in the book that he co-authored with Edward Herman, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1982).
66. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
67. The Nicaraguan elections of 1984 suffered from the same faults as the Salvadoran elections and Nicaragua only began to be a democracy with the 1990 elections.
68. See Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, chapter 10, pp. 211-29 for details.
69. The Namibian internal settlements were never really taken seriously by either country.
70. On White's tenure see Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, pp. 180-87, 207-10.
71. Duarte, *Duarte*, p. 157.
72. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, p. 270.
73. The total figure is from *Newsweek*, 27 November 1989; the daily figure is from *Time*, 3 April 1989; and the figure for military aid is from LeMoyné, "El Salvador's Forgotten War."
74. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, p. 137. At the same time the Nicaraguan Contras numbered some 12,000-14,000 and because Nicaragua has only about half of El Salvador's population this means that proportionally the Nicaraguan resistance was about four times the size of the Salvadoran rebels.
75. Leach, et. al., "The Escalation of the Air War," in Gettleman, *El Salvador*, p. 235.
76. *Time*, 4 December 1989. LeMoyné earlier in the year was only talking about 3,000-4,000 rebels, but as some 3,500 rebels took part in the November 1989 offensive this was probably an underestimate.
77. The Rhodesians repeatedly raided these host countries starting in mid-1976. In late 1979 they started attacking economic targets in both countries to put pressure on the host countries to pressure the Patriotic Front at the Lancaster House negotiations.
78. An outside committee appointed by the CIA to assess this issue concluded in 1983 that the FMLN bought most of its arms on the open arms market or from corrupt officers in the military.
79. See LeMoyné, "El Salvador's Forgotten War," for detail on the increased arms shipments starting in 1987. During the November 1989 offensive a Cessna aircraft with 24 SA-7 missiles crashed in El Salvador and the Nicaraguan government didn't even bother to deny that the arms were from Nicaragua.
80. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, p. 50-51.
81. Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit*, pp. 95, 127, 255-69. LeMoyné, "El Salvador's Forgotten War," claims that the rebels also bought arms from corrupt officials in Honduras, Guatemala, and Panama.
82. This paragraph is based on accounts in *Newsweek*, 27 November 1989; and in *Time*, 27 November, 4 December and 11 December 1989.
83. See Clifford Krauss, *Inside Central America* (New York: Summit, 1991), pp. 43-52, for the Cerezo presidency.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-209.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
86. Honduras is mainly mestizo — racially mixed of Indian and white blood. Costa Rica is primarily white. El Salvador is primarily mestizo but the oligarchy is white. Guatemala is primarily mestizo, but with a white oligarchy that sides with the mestizos in repressing the large Mayan Indian population. Nicaragua is primarily mestizo but with a white ruling class and minority black and Indian populations along the Atlantic coast. Honduras and Costa Rica have the most even spread of wealth in Central America.
87. In Ulster the ruling British Protestants are the majority and the Catholics the minority but the situation is reversed in the island as a whole and the Catholics are gaining as a percentage of the total six-county population.

88. The French regime in South Vietnam from 1950-54 can also be considered to have been a failed internal settlement. It was based on a puppet Vietnamese emperor, Bao Dai, who was subservient to the French. But it did help to win American funding for the French military effort.
89. Just as an internal settlement is sham majority rule or sham reform, autonomy can also be a sham with personal autonomy offered as a substitute for territorial autonomy.