antiwar literature (the bombing was immoral, therefore it was also ineffective) is what got Saddam Hussein into such deep trouble.

Still, this book is written from an important perspective. From it, one does glean the important insight that Hanoi’s successes stemmed as much from its pivotal international and regional position as it did from the domestic vigor of its righteous cause. It is a work that lays out an important analytical framework, even as its shortfalls in performance calls for a better second try by another.

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In 1990, Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky published *KGB: The Inside Story*, a chronicle of the KGB’s foreign operations. The following year, they published *Instructions From the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975-1985*. This second book contains copies of selected KGB documents, some of which were used, along with other sources, in *KGB: The Inside Story*. Reading *KGB* and noting that some of the sources were listed as “Gordievsky,” one certainly gained the impression that they were from actual documents, since the length and detail of some of the information would be too much for one individual to digest and retain adequately. Now, with *Instructions From the Centre*, a companion volume to *KGB*, the reader can view first-hand some of the documents that Gordievsky passed to the West during his ten years as a penetration agent for Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service. Gordievsky, a Colonel in the KGB, was Resident-designate in London at the time of his escape to the West in 1985.

*Instructions From the Centre* is divided into ten chapters, and among the subjects it covers are the global priorities of the KGB, illegals and recruiting, Operation RYAN — a massive intelligence collection effort which sought proof of the (non-existent) preparations of the US and its allies for a surprise nuclear attack against the USSR — the “Main Adversary” (i.e., the USA, in Moscow Centre jargon), and China. The documents reveal a fascinating portrait of how the Centre approached intelligence collection, and are an interesting literary collage of KGB assessments, reports, and procedures. Indeed some of the assessments quoted in the book were drafted by Gordievsky (employing his KGB codename, GORNOV).

Chapter one contains documents that review some of the KGB’s foreign operations in 1982-83, in addition to plans for organizing future work. For example, a report of a conference of senior officers of the KGB in January 1984 posited that
“the deepening economic and social crisis” in the USA was contributing to its “increased aggressiveness,” blamed the government in Beijing for “blocking normalization of Sino-Soviet relations,” and trumpeted the fact that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Anti-War Movement were the Soviet Union’s “natural allies.” The Centre emphasized that the USSR must “work tirelessly at exposing the [main] adversary’s weak and vulnerable points.” The Centre then laid out a comprehensive plan for 1984 taking into account political as well as scientific and technical intelligence, and “active measures” (disinformation, covert action, and so on). Indeed, the main effort for 1984 was to concentrate on developing and carrying out “comprehensive operations” which would stimulate “further development of the anti-war and anti-missile movements in the West, involving in them influential political and public figures,” while “encouraging these movements to take more decisive and coordinated action.”

One of the greatest peacetime intelligence collection efforts spearheaded by the KGB was operation RYAN, an acronym for Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie, or “Nuclear Missile Attack.” Its purpose was to collect strategic military intelligence data on plans the US and NATO supposedly had to conduct a surprise first strike against the USSR. KGB: The Inside Story describes RYAN in detail. Documents describe clearly what otherwise would be a fitting scene for a spy novel. The Centre’s instructions are clear and detailed, with associated due dates which varied depending on the urgency of the data to be collected. Not only does Instructions From the Centre show the length and breadth of the intelligence collection effort, it clearly indicates the KGB’s ignorance of Western society, despite a veritable mountain of information easily available in open sources. Even had the West been preparing to conduct such an attack — which it was not — it would have been extremely unlikely that “... the leaders of national churches ...” or the “heads of ... the larger national banks ...” would ever be informed about such measures. The KGB believed that “an important sign” of an imminent attack was “... increased purchases of blood from donors and the price paid for it ...” When read in KGB: The Inside Story, such an account is incredible; when reading the document itself in Instructions From the Centre, it is truly shocking.

One weakness of the book is the chapter devoted to China. Most of the documents cited date from mid- to late-1970s. Despite the fact that, according to Gordievsky, Residencies abroad received more briefs on China than any other state, the authors’ comments are somewhat shallower than those describing European issues and developments. Perhaps Gordievsky did not pass on as much material dealing with China in comparison to other subjects. The final chapter, “New Thinking?”, is drawn almost exclusively from open sources in Russia, and the commentary is surprisingly short.

That being said, a speech by then-Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, in the summer of 1988 is perhaps the most fitting end to the book. Kryuchkov said the world had changed and that the superpower relationship had indeed improved. He went on to say, among other things, that only an “objective,
unprejudiced view of world development[s]” will permit the KGB to “keep in step with the times.”

To conclude, Instructions From the Centre is an interesting book which provides insight into the foreign operations of the KGB during a crucial ten-year period in East-West relations. It also blunts a recent criticism of KGB: The Inside Story where one reviewer stated that “Gordievsky” citations in the notes did not sufficiently indicate the source of the information. Instructions From the Centre now provides that authoritative source. Perhaps less jaundiced, better analyzed views of the world compiled by the successor to the KGB, the Russian External Intelligence Service, will prevent the new Russian leadership from making the same mistakes as the old Soviet one. As the Cheka played its part in the formation of the USSR, the KGB was central to its demise.

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