affect the way sovereignty can be exercised in specific areas” — e.g., the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. (p. 86) At the same time, Turkey and Greece accuse each other of territorial ambitions. Stearns suggests that the two countries need to negotiate a non-aggression pact, guaranteed by NATO. As for the Aegean, he recommends that Turkey and Greece place the issues of delimitation of national air space, the rights to mineral resources on the continental shelf, and the extent of territorial seas before any mutually acceptable group of arbiters. Stearns concludes that

a successful resolution of the Cyprus problem must await progress on bilateral Greek-Turkish problems and a definite improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. There is ample evidence to indicate that Athens and Ankara know where their vital interests conflict and that the primary arena is not Cyprus. (pp. 127-28)

As Cyprus is a nonaligned state, albeit with two large British bases, Stearns asserts that intercommunal talks under UN auspices, though unsuccessful since 1968 in reaching a resolution of problems, need to continue. He also concludes that

The failure of the communities to reach an agreement is caused less by the complexity of the constitutional and territorial problems they face than by their misgivings about sharing power and the disinclination of Athens and Ankara to work actively for a settlement. (p. 124)

At the same time, a UN peacekeeping force has remained on the island at a total cost of over US$2 billion. Without disentangling the above issues, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus will continue to put at risk prospects of economic growth, political stability and territorial security; and the US and its other allies will continue to face problems associated with regional instability.

Entangled Allies, especially with its appeal for an “imaginative and courageous” US policy to address Turco-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem, should be read by all with an interest in the politics of the non-Semitic eastern Mediterranean and with American relations with the countries in that region.

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The dilemma of America’s relations with “friendly tyrants” is an important one that is well worth extensive scholarly examination. What is the dilemma? It is that the creation and maintenance of cordial US relations with highly authoritarian and sometimes tyrannical leaders or governments, although intended to protect
important US strategic interests, runs directly counter to the common American
desire to support basic human rights democracy abroad. Moreover, these relation­
ships have a tendency to produce negative long-term consequences for American
interests when the foreign dictator or government falls from power. The edited
volume reviewed here examines the dilemma from a variety of perspectives.

What does this book contain? After a preface and introduction by the editors,
Friendly Tyrants is divided into two sections, each of which includes a number of
sub-sections. The first section is entitled “A Troubled History” and contains a
foreword by Lawrence S. Eagleburger and chapters that discuss “Friendly Tyrants
and American Interests” (Howard S. Wiarda), “the First Friendly Tyrants” (Adam
Garfinkle and Alan H. Luxenberg), the South Vietnamese government (Douglas
Pike), the dictatorship of the Greek colonels (Adam Garfinkle), why the Turkish
government is not an example of a friendly tyrant (Paul B. Henze), the Somoza
regime in Nicaragua (James Theberge), the Shah’s regime in Iran (Barry Rubin),
Argentina under its military junta, 1976-82 (Mark Falcoff), Haiti under the
Duvaliers (Georges Fauriol), and the rule of Marcos in the Philippines (Theodore
Friend). This section concludes with a chapter entitled “Friendly Tyrants: Histori­
cal Reckoning” by Adam Garfinkle. Thus it covers past American relations with
assorted friendly tyrants and its concluding chapter rounds it off well.

Section Two’s heading is “Current Challenges” and it also begins with a
foreword, this time by Joseph J. Sisco. After a chapter entitled “Reflections on the
Friendly Tyrants Dilemma Today” by Michael Mandelbaum, it includes chapters
that deal with American relations with Chile after General Pinochet (Mark Falcoff),
Paraguay after the Stroessner era (Riordan Roett), a potentially unravelling
regime in Mexico (Howard J. Wiarda with the assistance of Carlos Guajardo), a
democratizing regime in South Korea (Edward A. Olsen), a similarly democratizing
regime in Taiwan (Martin L. Lasater), the highly authoritarian government of
General Suharto in Indonesia (Guy Pauker), an apparently changing governmental
and political system in South Africa (Richard A. Haass), a relatively unchanging
regime in Zaire (Michael G. Schatzberg), the authoritarian but not tyrannical rule
of King Hussein in Jordan (Robert Satloff), and the government of Pakistan under
General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq (Craig Baxter). The second section concludes with
a chapter entitled “Friendly Tyrants: A Policy Primer” by Richard A. Haass. In all,
because there are 519 pages of text, this is a fairly lengthy, comprehensive book.

In many respects, Friendly Tyrants is a fine volume. It covers its subject
matter well and so is a “must” purchase both for scholars interested in the topic as
well as for libraries that possess strong collections in the field of American foreign
policy. Although other books dealing with this topic may appear in the next few
years, it is difficult to imagine that any will be superior overall.

After just having written such praise, is it possible also to criticize this
volume? Of course! No book is perfect and this one is no exception. What then is
there about it that might give cause for dispute or disappointment? To begin, greater
attention could have been paid to the possible effects of the end of the Cold War on
American relations with friendly tyrants. Will there be as much justification for these relationships in the future? Probably not because America's overriding security needs abroad should be reduced somewhat.

A discussion of the effects of the end of the Cold war on close American relations with friendly tyrants should lead to a more careful analysis of the types and levels of national interests deemed sufficiently important to warrant this form of relationship in the future. Since America has paid a considerable price over time for its cordial relations with some friendly tyrants, there needs to be a higher threshold for its security interests before America enters such relationships in the future.

Furthermore, additional attention should have been paid to those aspects of the American domestic scene that led to and sustained these relationships. In particular, there ought to be an examination of the elective political and civil/foreign service career costs for officials who advised against entry into or the continuation of close relations with friendly tyrants. There have already been far too many damaging cries of "WHO LOST...?" that have necessitated short-term actions for the protection of careers. What can be done about this harmful tendency in the making of American foreign policy?

The editors of the book also should have paid greater consideration to the question of what exactly constitutes a "friendly tyrant"? A number of chapters, particularly in the second section begin with statements that the leaders studied only superficially appear to be examples of friendly tyrants but that they truly are not. This understandably may irritate some readers but it did not bother this one. It is unlikely that any operational definition of the term "friendly tyrant" will command unanimous agreement but increased attention to the subject is nevertheless in order.

This is a rather lengthy book and most elected officials will be too busy to read it in its entirety. For these persons, the chapter entitled "Friendly Tyrants: Historical Reckoning" by Adam Garfinkle stands out as a source of realistic, useful advice about the policy dilemma. Nevertheless, those persons who desire to see the problem eliminated will be disappointed by Garfinkle's chapter and indeed the entire book because they offer no reason to conclude that the US can every safely rid itself of relations with friendly tyrants once and for all.

Finally, it almost goes without saying that disputes will arise about the chapters that deal with specific leaders and/or governments. This is inevitable given the sometimes highly individual accounts of events presented in a number of the chapters.

None of the criticisms above suggest that the book is anything less than very well done. This reader recommends it about as highly as any book he has reviewed for a professional journal in the last few years.

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