Clough’s main argument, then, is that the historical experience of the shortcomings outlined above, combined with new domestic and international realities (especially the changing nature and limitations of US global power), dictate a reliance on the global reach and potency of American civil society to promote development and democracy in Africa. "If left to their own devices," he charges, "the bureaucrats and politicians responsible for formulating U.S. policy toward Africa are likely to play the same kinds of diplomatic and political games that they have played in the past." (p. 76) He then goes on to offer important practical steps to operationalize and implement this recommendation.

US policy toward Africa may indeed be at a crossroads. The dismal record of American policy in Africa has been the result of a complex confluence of many factors. The post-Cold War environment does appear to offer us the chance to cut the Gordian knot and pull apart some of these complications. And, indeed, we may find that the development of radical, new strategies in foreign relations is required. In Free At Last? Michael Clough has certainly offered us that. The real question is whether or not the volunteerist spirit his analysis relies on actually exists in the US today.

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Monteagle Stearns, US ambassador to Greece from 1981 to 1985, presents an excellent study of the dynamics of American relations with the countries of NATO’s southeastern flank as well as Cyprus, an important factor in Turco-Greek relations since the mid-1950s. He completed the book in mid-1991, before the collapse of the USSR, and thus a major thesis of his is that US policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus since the beginning of the Cold War has been so exclusively devoted to the containment of Soviet influence in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean that [the Americans] . . . have learned little about the countries that did the containing and have generally minimized or disregarded their own foreign policy concerns when they did not coincide with [that of the US government] . . . . (p. 3)

Stearns also examines the reasons behind Turkey and Greece’s chilly relationship, in addition to the Cyprus dispute, and recommends that the US utilize NATO as a diplomatic mechanism in order to first resolve Turco-Greek differences — chiefly concerning disputes over the Aegean — and later the Cyprus problem. He makes good use of US government documents, published memoirs and academic studies.
as well as interviews with Turkish, Greek and Cypriot officials and correspondence and conversations with other American officials and numerous academics.

The book is composed of an introduction and ten chapters; the first three are concerned with US policy in the region under study from the Truman Doctrine to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Subsequent chapters deal with Soviet and NATO policies, Turco-Greek relations and how the Aegean problem and Cyprus dispute can and should be resolved. Stearns laments that Greece and Turkey were the "stepchildren" of the US State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (NEA) until 1974, and after that the "orphans" of the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR). The Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (GTI) of the NEA had, over the years, few foreign service officers who had firsthand knowledge of both Greece and Turkey. This situation, the prominence given in the NEA to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the State Department's general preference for bilateral over multilateral diplomacy contributed to the state of affairs in which not enough attention was paid to the Turco-Greek relations. (Moreover, from 1960 — when Cyprus received its independence from Great Britain — on, the US has tended to look upon the island more as a problem in Turco-Greek relations than as a sovereign state, albeit divided.) Further complicating American relations with Turkey and Greece is the "strategic prominence of Turkey in the eyes of U.S. policymakers and the political prominence of over a million well-organized Greek-Americans in the eyes of Congress..." (p. 21) Thus, the US has had some very awkward moments in its relations with Turkey and Greece. Stearns highlights Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' letters of September 1955 to the Greek and Turkish prime ministers (Alexander Papagos and Adnan Menderes), which downplayed the anti-Greek Istanbul and Izmir riots and thus offended Athens; and President Lyndon Johnson's letter of June 1964 to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü, which threatened to remove NATO protection from Turkey in the event that Ankara intervened militarily in Cyprus. Stearns notes:

In its dealings with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus the United States seems continually to be playing catchup, reacting too late to threats to the peace in Cyprus and the Aegean and therefore reacting inappropriately, weighing regional problems on the scales of superpower military parity and therefore often weighing them incorrectly. (p. 39)

But, as he also points out, Moscow wasn't any better than Washington in its dealings with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

Stearns compares Greek-Turkish relations with those of postwar France and Germany prior to 1963. He notes that the Greek national personality is similar to that of the French, while the Turks "seem closer in spirit" to the Germans. However, unlike the French and Germans, the Greeks and Turks have more cultural familiarity at the popular level than among educated elites. Thus, Greece and Turkey have had less success at achieving political reconciliation and are in need of outside help. While the two countries have no outstanding legal claims against each other's territories, they have differing interpretations of international agreements "that
affect the way sovereignty can be exercised in specific areas” — e.g., the Aegean Sea and Cyprus. (p. 86) At the same time, Turkey and Greece accuse each other of territorial ambitions. Stearns suggests that the two countries need to negotiate a non-aggression pact, guaranteed by NATO. As for the Aegean, he recommends that Turkey and Greece place the issues of delimitation of national air space, the rights to mineral resources on the continental shelf, and the extent of territorial seas before any mutually acceptable group of arbiters. Stearns concludes that

a successful resolution of the Cyprus problem must await progress on bilateral Greek-Turkish problems and a definite improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. There is ample evidence to indicate that Athens and Ankara know where their vital interests conflict and that the primary arena is not Cyprus. (pp. 127-28)

As Cyprus is a nonaligned state, albeit with two large British bases, Stearns asserts that intercommunal talks under UN auspices, though unsuccessful since 1968 in reaching a resolution of problems, need to continue. He also concludes that

The failure of the communities to reach an agreement is caused less by the complexity of the constitutional and territorial problems they face than by their misgivings about sharing power and the disinclination of Athens and Ankara to work actively for a settlement. (p. 124)

At the same time, a UN peacekeeping force has remained on the island at a total cost of over US$2 billion. Without disentangling the above issues, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus will continue to put at risk prospects of economic growth, political stability and territorial security; and the US and its other allies will continue to face problems associated with regional instability.

**Entangled Allies**, especially with its appeal for an “imaginative and courageous” US policy to address Turco-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem, should be read by all with an interest in the politics of the non-Semitic eastern Mediterranean and with American relations with the countries in that region.

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The dilemma of America’s relations with “friendly tyrants” is an important one that is well worth extensive scholarly examination. What is the dilemma? It is that the creation and maintenance of cordial US relations with highly authoritarian and sometimes tyrannical leaders or governments, although intended to protect