superpower and other threats in the general area, the Haile Selassie regime and, to a considerably lesser extent, the Barré regime were able to extract arms assistance out of proportion to what might have been anticipated in terms of their military importance. But such a manipulation of a patron was only possible so long as the great power felt strategically vulnerable. As the Ethiopians shifted their backers and the Kagnew facility became obsolete, the US was prepared to forego its access to Kagnew and Ethiopia's leverage quickly disappeared. Similarly, in the case of the Berbera facilities, as Barré revealed himself to be a brutal and unreliable ally and as the base access agreements with neighboring countries proved sufficient for the Pentagon's purposes, the Somali government lost its ability to manipulate US policy makers regarding the provision of military assistance. As Lefebvre observes, "a client's threats of defection carry little weight if global competition is muted or one's assets are deemed expendable or at high risk." (p. 274)

Thus Arms for the Horn can be described as a useful case study of the forces at work on the Horn during the Cold War. Such an environment explains the decision of the superpowers to become involved in the military affairs of the Horn and the way they could be manipulated by local actors once they had secured access to military facilities. One wishes for more attention to the long-term impact of these diplomatic manoeuvres — for example, the consequences of military assistance to authoritarian governments, particularly in such areas as long-term US relations with minority ethnic and nationality groups and movements. Even so, in terms of its objectives on US strategic relation, this study can be said to accomplish its purposes well.

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The collapse of the Soviet Union has necessarily led to fundamental reassessments of national interests, foreign policy objectives, and perhaps even the basic conceptual frameworks of international relations. In Free At Last? Michael Clough, Senior Fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations, contends that the post-Cold War era offers US an unprecedented opportunity to develop and implement a new and more sophisticated policy toward Africa. The natural tendency to ignore Africa simply cannot be sustained, he argues, nor can the US "save" Africa with a Marshall Plan approach which injects American ideas and resources into the continent.
The ability to discard the geopolitical baggage of the East-West conflict certainly does allow for fresh, new analyses of US policy and Clough makes the most of it. He asserts that traditional government-to-government diplomatic approaches to the problems in Africa have for the most part failed miserably. Citing what he believes are relative successes of private initiatives in combatting famine in Ethiopia and ending apartheid in South Africa, Clough proposes that the most fruitful path for both the US and Africa is to encourage American civil society "to foster and sustain African civil society." (emphasis added)

There are any number of reasons for the past ineptness of US policy toward Africa and Clough spends some time in outlining the obstacles to coherent policy by tracing US-African relations from World War II to the present. Again, the most important stumbling block has been that "...throughout the Cold War, geopolitical considerations determined Africa's place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda." (p. 5) From somewhat abashed support of the colonial rule of NATO allies to fumbling in the Angolan civil war, the US was driven by strategic concerns and fear of Soviet inroads into the continent.

Why were geopolitical concerns so paramount in the minds of American policy makers? One reason, says Clough, is that the US in fact has so few real, tangible interests there. The existence of recognized interests, he says, directs and stabilizes policy.

Where interests are limited or ambiguous, as in the case of Africa, policy is much more sensitive to the changing moods of U.S. domestic constituencies and the instinctive reactions of midlevel officials in Washington. (p. 14)

Perhaps unfortunately, he concludes in a summary of American economic involvement in the continent, tangible US interests in Africa today remain marginal.

Given that the US has no real interests in Africa and the fact that the impetus of Soviet involvement has dissipated, Clough goes on to highlight the importance of American perceptions of the continent as factors in policy development. These perceptions, he contends, have been overwhelmingly pessimistic and have discouraged investment, hampered attempts to build public support for relief efforts, discouraged black Americans from identifying with the continent, and driven both American academics and policy makers from focusing on African issues. "In short," he concludes, the basic American perception of the continent "has marginalized Africa." (p. 25)

Clough goes on to show how the lack of strong domestic constituencies have also hampered US policy toward Africa. Tensions between Africanists and policy makers, the ambivalence of the black American community, and the relative impotence of issue-oriented constituencies have again "marginalized" Africa. However, both domestic and international change may energize and refocus these constituencies, especially on such issues as humanitarian relief, human rights and the environment.
Clough’s main argument, then, is that the historical experience of the shortcomings outlined above, combined with new domestic and international realities (especially the changing nature and limitations of US global power), dictate a reliance on the global reach and potency of American civil society to promote development and democracy in Africa. “If left to their own devices,” he charges, “the bureaucrats and politicians responsible for formulating U.S. policy toward Africa are likely to play the same kinds of diplomatic and political games that they have played in the past.” (p. 76) He then goes on to offer important practical steps to operationalize and implement this recommendation.

US policy toward Africa may indeed be at a crossroads. The dismal record of American policy in Africa has been the result of a complex confluence of many factors. The post-Cold War environment does appear to offer us the chance to cut the Gordian knot and pull apart some of these complications. And, indeed, we may find that the development of radical, new strategies in foreign relations is required. In Free At Last? Michael Clough has certainly offered us that. The real question is whether or not the volunteerist spirit his analysis relies on actually exists in the US today.

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Monteagle Stearns, US ambassador to Greece from 1981 to 1985, presents an excellent study of the dynamics of American relations with the countries of NATO’s southeastern flank as well as Cyprus, an important factor in Turco-Greek relations since the mid-1950s. He completed the book in mid-1991, before the collapse of the USSR, and thus a major thesis of his is that US policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus since the beginning of the Cold War has been so exclusively devoted to the containment of Soviet influence in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean that [the Americans] . . . have learned little about the countries that did the containing and have generally minimized or disregarded their own foreign policy concerns when they did not coincide with [that of the US government] . . . . (p. 3)

Stearns also examines the reasons behind Turkey and Greece’s chilly relationship, in addition to the Cyprus dispute, and recommends that the US utilize NATO as a diplomatic mechanism in order to first resolve Turco-Greek differences — chiefly concerning disputes over the Aegean — and later the Cyprus problem. He makes good use of US government documents, published memoirs and academic studies